25.12.2012 Views

Security Profile for Advanced Metering Infrastructure - Open Smart ...

Security Profile for Advanced Metering Infrastructure - Open Smart ...

Security Profile for Advanced Metering Infrastructure - Open Smart ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

DHS-2.8.2 Management Port Partitioning<br />

DHS-2.8.2.1 Requirement:<br />

AMI components must isolate telemetry/data acquisition services from management<br />

services.<br />

DHS-2.8.2.2 Supplemental Guidance:<br />

Separation may be accomplished by using different computers, different central<br />

processing units, different instances of the operating systems, different network addresses<br />

or protocol ports (e.g., TCP ports), combinations of these methods, or other methods as<br />

appropriate. Such precautions reduce the risk of allowing access to a data acquisition<br />

server and can help limit the damage of a compromised system.<br />

Configuration and testing ports <strong>for</strong> AMI components should be disabled when not in use.<br />

Depending on the criticality of the system it may be advised that a device be physically<br />

disconnected.<br />

Such precautions reduce the risk of allowing access to a data acquisition server and can<br />

help limit the damage of a compromised system. Configuration and testing ports <strong>for</strong> AMI<br />

components should be disabled when not in use.<br />

Depending on the criticality of the system it may be advised that a device be physically<br />

disconnected.<br />

DHS-2.8.2.3 Requirement Enhancements:<br />

The AMI system management service must be physically or logically separated from<br />

telemetry/data acquisition services and in<strong>for</strong>mation storage and management services<br />

(e.g., database management) of the system.<br />

DHS-2.8.2.4 Rationale:<br />

The security requirements <strong>for</strong> access to configuration/management services on a given<br />

AMI component are greater than those required <strong>for</strong> access to telemetry/data acquisition<br />

services. Without isolation, the communication channel <strong>for</strong> access to the telemetry/data<br />

acquisition services has the potential to be leveraged to gain access to the management<br />

services. This leveraging can occur through a vulnerability in implementation, poor<br />

configuration, or other means. Ensuring separation between services limits the impact of<br />

a vulnerability in a service with lower security requirements being leveraged to access a<br />

service with higher security requirements.<br />

DHS-2.8.3 <strong>Security</strong> Function Isolation<br />

DHS-2.8.3.1 Requirement:<br />

AMI components must isolate security functions from non-security functions.<br />

<strong>Security</strong> <strong>Profile</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Advanced</strong> <strong>Metering</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> Version 1.0<br />

UtiliSec Working Group (UCAIug) December 10, 2009<br />

25

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!