The Human Rights situation of the Yezidi minority - UNHCR

those Kurds who helped facilitate the genocide in 1915”. 108 An apparent corollary of this
view over the past 20 years has been the delineation of a Yezidi identity separate from a
Kurdish one (referred to here as the position of the “Yezidist” faction). Interestingly it is
advocates of a separate Yezidi identity who occupy important community posts such as the
presidency of the National Union of Yezidis. Aziz Tamoyan, who currently fills this post,
denies any connection between Yezidis and Kurds. He has claimed that Yezidis speak neither
the Kurdish language nor any dialect thereof, but speak Yezideren (also referred to Ezdiki;
this appears to be a Cyrillic-based variety of Kurmanji Kurdish). Aziz Tamoyan sees
Kurmanji-speaking Yezidis as Yezidis who have been assimilated by Kurds, and also labels
the Yezidi religion differently as “Sharfadin”. 109 That Yezidi has been recognized as a
separate language by the National Assembly lends credence to claims that the Armenian
authorities endorse and support the separate Yezidi identity project. The project is not,
however, condoned by academic specialists on Yezidis or Kurdish studies outside of
Armenia, who assert that Yezidis speak Kurmanji Kurdish and belong essentially to a
Kurdish oral and material culture. 110 This view was also expressed, for example, by Amarik
Sardarian, editor of the Kurdish newspaper Ria Taza, when asked in a 1999 interview
whether he was Yezidi or Kurd. He answered: “I am a Yezidi, but unlike those people that
confuse the question of nationality with religion, I recognise the distinction. By religion I am
Yezidi, but I consider myself to be Kurdish by nationality”. Sardarian drew a parallel
between the relationship between Yezidis and Kurds and the Molokan religious minority visà-vis
ethnic Russians. 111
The Armenian government’s position is ostensibly one of non-interference. Hranush
Kharatyan, Director of the Department for National Minorities and Religious Affairs, has
stated that the Armenian government will not determine identities for the Yezidi and Kurdish
minorities, offering each equal government funding. 112 Kharatyan has suggested parallels
between the Yezidi/Kurdish split in Armenia with the divides between Serb/Croatian and
Romanian/Moldovan identities. The implication appears to be, “if Yezidis want to define
themselves as separate from Kurds, that is their business”. In some situations the Armenian
government has attempted to forge a compromise between the Yezidist and Kurdish factions
of the community, for example in naming the language Kurmanji, rather than either Yezidi or
Kurdish, but such compromises have apparently been rejected, especially by the Yezidist
faction. In this context, the Armenian government appears to have retreated to a position of
“maximum sensitivity” attempting to cater to both factions’ demands.
5.1.2 Armenia’s Yezidis and Kurdish Nationalism
A further element to these debates is the relationship between the Yezidi identity project,
global Kurdish nationalism and the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. In its public
statements the PKK has lauded Armenia’s treatment of its Yezidi minority, contrasting it with
the situation of Kurds in Turkey and Azerbaijan. Some observers have suggested that an
108 McIntosh, I. S., A Conditional Coexistence: Yezidi in Armenia, Cultural Survival Quarterly, Issue 27.1, 31
March 2003, http://www.cs.org/publications/CSQ/csq-article.cfm?id=1360 [accessed April 2008]
109 Krikorian, An Interview with Aziz Tamoyan, 2004, p.2
110 Krikorian, Armenia: Yezidi Identity Battle
111
Krikorian, O., An Interview with Amarik Sardarian, in O. Krikorian (ed.), The Yezidi Community in Armenia,
Tbilisi, 1999, p.13
112 Krikorian, An Interview with Hranush Kharatyan, p.5
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