The Human Rights situation of the Yezidi minority - UNHCR

This decline concerns first and foremost the economic pillars of the community and the
necessary critical mass for the normal functioning of Yezidi social institutions. Unlike
surrounding majorities or larger, territorially concentrated minorities Yezidis have not been
able to fall back on informal networks or support mechanisms such as “clan” networks, local
demographic majorities or an external kin-state. As one study has highlighted for stateless
minorities “the only bearer of justice and survival becomes the host state”. 140 However, the
entire movement of societies in the South Caucasus over the past 20 years has been away
from state endorsement and support of ethnic diversity, and towards the prioritization of the
ethnic majority’s interests. Ethnic majorities comfortably control both formal and informal
mechanisms of political representation and feel little pressure or incentive to cede any ground
to minorities. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have all demonstrated very little interest in
adopting international minority rights standards. What progress has been achieved is a
function of perceived obligations before international organizations rather than attempts to
resolve acknowledged domestic problems of discrimination or social exclusion.
This situation needs to be seen in the broader context of a poor governance environment and
deficient protection of human rights. Yezidis are not currently able to appeal to human rights
standards to protect their rights, due in part to a lack of knowledge of their rights and to the
ineffective nature of human rights protection mechanisms. In a different environment of
responsive government and effective enforcement mechanisms for human rights, Yezidis
might successfully appeal to international human rights standards to counter alleged
violations of their economic, social and cultural rights, and to hold authorities to account in
providing for due process in cases of civil and political rights violations. Yezidi communities,
especially in Armenia, also appear to be very poorly informed of legal developments relevant
to their survival as a community.
For human rights standards to become a lever of redress for Yezidis (and other minorities) a
significant increase in public awareness of the commitments implied by the state’s
membership of international organizations and adoption of instruments such as the FCNM
would be required. A quantum leap in governments’ own understanding of what is required
of them is also needed. Particularly in Georgia, however, where secessionist conflicts and a
bullish attitude towards ethnic conflict continue to dominate the broader political agenda, this
seems unlikely in the near future. In Armenia, the issue of minority rights remains distant
from mainstream political concerns and if the issue registers at all on the cognitive map of the
public, it is only thanks to the diligent work of Armenian human rights NGOs and
investigative journalists. These constituencies are not, however, well-placed to induce change
in government attitudes, although NGOs may usefully work towards fulfilling goals of
human rights education among ethnic minorities.
Under these circumstances it appears unlikely that Yezidi migration will cease. Yezidi
migrants will be primarily motivated by economic concerns; despite upturns in the economic
fortunes of the South Caucasian republics, Yezidis are socially too far removed from
positions of opportunity to be beneficiaries of sector-specific booms. Discrimination is most
likely to be cited as a background factor, although in some cases Yezidis may legitimately
claim that they cannot enjoy economic, social and cultural rights in their home countries. In
some cases Yezidis may also legitimately claim deprivation of police protection and violation
of the right to legal remedy. Forced displacement en masse, however, is a very unlikely
140 Khachatryan, S., Defining Uncertain Rights, p.11
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