ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa - Center on ...

publicity <strong>and</strong> fanfare of the <strong>in</strong>auguration of the framework,
prevention is a long-term, slow process <strong>and</strong> not a high
profile s<strong>in</strong>gle event. 13 If adhered to, these norms would
go a long way <strong>in</strong> prevent<strong>in</strong>g the outbreak of violent
conflict, s<strong>in</strong>ce they would contribute to creat<strong>in</strong>g an
environment that would ensure a more peaceful way
of settl<strong>in</strong>g political disputes.
1.2.2 Governance under Pressure
while there are reasons to question how effectively
ECowAs’ stated pr<strong>in</strong>ciples translate from theory to
action, ECowAs has undeniably been very active <strong>in</strong>
promot<strong>in</strong>g regional security. s<strong>in</strong>ce the adoption of the
Protocol, ECowAs has overturned military coups <strong>in</strong> sierra
Leone (1998), Gu<strong>in</strong>ea-Bissau (2003), <strong>and</strong> Togo (2005),
<strong>and</strong> negotiated the departure of Charles Taylor from
Liberia. operationally, ECowAs has deployed two peace
operations: the ECowAs Mission <strong>in</strong> Côte d’ivoire (2003)
<strong>and</strong> the ECowAs Mission <strong>in</strong> Liberia (2003). ECowAs
collaborated with the United Nations, France <strong>and</strong> the
United states <strong>in</strong> the two deployments, with troops from
both missions subsequently re-hatted to the follow-on
UN-led missions.
Despite the attention given to ECowAs’ collaboration with
the UN <strong>and</strong> others for its deployments <strong>in</strong> these countries,
ECowAs’ key role <strong>in</strong> resolv<strong>in</strong>g the political crisis <strong>in</strong> Togo
(2005) <strong>and</strong> Gu<strong>in</strong>ea (2007) was the most strik<strong>in</strong>g display
of its ability to <strong>in</strong>voke its new <strong>in</strong>struments to deal with
<strong>in</strong>tra-state conflicts before they erupt. Unlike liberia <strong>and</strong>
Côte d’Ivoire, where eCowas <strong>in</strong>tervened to deal with
the aftermath of violence, its engagement <strong>in</strong> togo
<strong>and</strong> Gu<strong>in</strong>ea was credited for avert<strong>in</strong>g the eruption of
further violence <strong>in</strong> both countries.
<strong>in</strong> Togo, the death of President Gnass<strong>in</strong>gbe Eyadema
<strong>in</strong> 2005, threatened to plunge that country <strong>in</strong>to chaos.
After his father’s death, Faure Gnass<strong>in</strong>gbe’s assumption
of power was rejected by members of the opposition <strong>and</strong>
ECowAs as unconstitutional <strong>and</strong> unacceptable. However,
hav<strong>in</strong>g changed the constitution <strong>and</strong> with the country’s
military on his side, Faure <strong>in</strong>itially appeared determ<strong>in</strong>ed
to succeed his father. This prompted ECowAs to <strong>in</strong>tervene
by call<strong>in</strong>g for an immediate end to the unconstitutional
‘father-to-son’ transition <strong>and</strong> a restoration of the old
constitution or Togo would risk sanctions <strong>and</strong> even military
<strong>in</strong>tervention - with Nigeria’s National Assembly endors<strong>in</strong>g
the latter. 14 <strong>in</strong>vok<strong>in</strong>g the Togolese constitution <strong>and</strong> its
zero-tolerance policy aga<strong>in</strong>st unconstitutional change
of government (<strong>and</strong> that of the <strong>Africa</strong>n Union), ECowAs
succeeded <strong>in</strong> broker<strong>in</strong>g a deal that saw Faure step aside,
<strong>and</strong> the deputy speaker of the National Assembly assume
the presidency.
Presidential elections, subsequently won by Faure
Gnass<strong>in</strong>gbe, were held <strong>in</strong> sixty days – <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with
the constitution but <strong>in</strong> the face of compla<strong>in</strong>ts by the
opposition about the short notice, as the sixty days
<strong>in</strong>cluded time spent negotiat<strong>in</strong>g with Faure to rel<strong>in</strong>quish
power. ECowAs’ success <strong>in</strong> resolv<strong>in</strong>g the crisis can be
attributed to three ma<strong>in</strong> factors: first, it <strong>in</strong>voked the
Togolese constitution as an entry po<strong>in</strong>t to justify its
pressure on Faure to rel<strong>in</strong>quish power; second, it <strong>in</strong>voked
its zero-tolerance policy aga<strong>in</strong>st unconstitutional change
of government to justify its <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>and</strong>; thirdly, its
close collaboration with the AU added legitimacy to its
actions.
on a separate note, <strong>in</strong> late January 2007, Gu<strong>in</strong>ea was
gripped by strike action as calls from the nation’s trade
union <strong>and</strong> civic movements for improved work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>
broader socio-economic conditions metamorphosed <strong>in</strong>to
dem<strong>and</strong>s for the country’s late president, Lansana Conté,
to resign. The government reacted with half-measures,
appo<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g a long-time ally of the president as prime
m<strong>in</strong>ister. The government’s move further <strong>in</strong>flamed the
civic opposition lead<strong>in</strong>g tens of thous<strong>and</strong>s of protesters
to take to the streets. The president responded by declar<strong>in</strong>g
a “state of siege” <strong>and</strong> unleashed the country’s military
on the protesters result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a high death toll with
thous<strong>and</strong>s <strong>in</strong>jured across the country. ECowAs, the UN
<strong>and</strong> bilateral partners unanimously condemned the government’s
heavy-h<strong>and</strong>edness <strong>and</strong> warned the military of
the repercussions of their actions. ECowAs dispatched a
high-level mediation team, led by former Nigerian president
General ibrahim Babangida <strong>and</strong> ECowAs Commission
president Dr. Mohamed ibn Chambas, to mediate
between the parties. The ECowAs mediation culm<strong>in</strong>ated
<strong>in</strong> the appo<strong>in</strong>tment of a new prime m<strong>in</strong>ister, which was
enough of a concession to appease the opposition. But
the new prime m<strong>in</strong>ister’s reign was short-lived as his
popularity waned when he was unable to meet expectations,
thus mak<strong>in</strong>g it easy for President Conté to fire him.
But this development raises broader operational issues
with ECowAs’ ability to mediate, but also to elicit compli-
ECowAs <strong>and</strong> <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> <strong>in</strong> west <strong>Africa</strong>: Confront<strong>in</strong>g the Triple Threats
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