From Exodus to Exitus Causes of post-war violence in El ... - eDoc

26 Heidrun Zinecker
individual as a marero and so criminalize them. However, the deaf also use sign language,
and rockers also wear tattoos.
The mano dura plan had at least four advantages for the government: 1) a scapegoat
had been found in the shape of the maras, a universal perpetrator of violence, easily recognizable
and easy to combat severely without going into the causes of the violence. Repeated
attempts to claim connections between the maras and al-Qaeda, which “threatened
world peace” (Vilanova Chica 2006) were intended to paint a picture of the maras as the
Central American counterpart to Islamic terrorists. This attempt was gratefully seized
upon by some American military strategists and politicians. 2) After the former FMLN
revolutionaries had been integrated into civilian life, there were now “new guerrilleros”,
whom government supporters seemed to think they could accuse of being the political
reserve of the FMLN. As the definition of “illegal group” was not based on any clear criteria,
and since the threat of terrorism undermining national security was universally and
continually suspected to be present, social protests in the street could now be labelled as
criminal. 3) The public insecurity stirred up in this way resulted, according to the Human
Rights Ombudswoman (Alamanni de Carrillo 2007), in fearful people who kept quiet –
just right for a system whose stability was shaky. This was useful for the ARENA leadership.
4) The topic of the maras proved outstandingly relevant as an election campaign
theme, not only on the occasion when the president drove tanks into Colonia Monserrat
especially for the media.
President Antonio Saca, in office since 2004, is caught between two camps: on the one
hand in view of international criticism he had to give way on Flores’ anti-mara law which
contravened human rights, and on the other he wanted to make his mark by successfully
fighting violence. The solution he adopted was the súper mano dura strategy, which was
supposed to include a puño de hierro (iron fist) as well as a mano amiga and a mano extendida.
The strategy was unveiled at the end of August 2004. A new law for the battle against
maras was not considered to be necessary, reforms of existing laws were considered to be
adequate. The mano amiga implied social measures to prevent violence, that is for young
people who although resident in risky barrios were not yet perpetrators of violence. The
mano extendida was designed for those young people who were already gang members
and who wanted to be reintegrated into society. As even a leading ARENA founding
member, who prefers to remain anonymous, explained the súper mano dura carried far
more weight than the mano amiga or extendida. This must have been interpreted as
provocation by the maras. However, provocation was the worst thing that you could do
(ARENA, anonymous 2006). With the mano amiga and mano extendida strategies, Saca
was moving away from the exclusively repressive strategy typical of Flores. At the same
time, he sold his strategy to the media more effectively.
The police and the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública were subsequently given
four guidelines for domestic security: correction, prevention (these are the two tasks of
the police and penal system), rehabilitation and reintegration (these are the two tasks of
the Consejo). The last three points were new. The first point on the other hand was already
a component part of the old mano dura strategy, but under the new plan it was designed
to be even more repressive, hence súper duro, but at the same time more rigidly