From Exodus to Exitus Causes of post-war violence in El ... - eDoc

From Exodus to Exitus 35
Socioeconomic deprivation, as I have shown, is the order of the day in the case of postwar
El Salvador: on the one hand there is a high level of relative deprivation, which is connected
with the bipolarity of the highest and lowest quintiles. El Salvador possesses a homogenous
oligarchic nucleus and a comparatively very poor lowest quintile. The possibility
of falling into this hangs like the sword of Damocles above the heads of those in the
second and third quintiles, especially in view of the enormous insecurity of the labour
market. Both quintiles suffer at the same time from a relatively low level of relative deprivation
by Central American standards, and particularly in comparison with others in their
own quintile or in the next highest quintile, rather than with the very highest, which does
not provoke any less frustration than a high level of relative deprivation.
The fact that it is those belonging to the second and third quintiles who represent the
majority of perpetrators of violence in El Salvador, is directly connected with this: on the
one hand, if they are not already unemployed, they are conscious of a particularly high
level of insecurity in the labour market (for example in the informal sector); on the other,
if they do have work, they are discontented with their, falling, wage and compare it with
lucrative alternatives in the USA. As everybody basically does, the Salvadorans compare
themselves to others, especially to their own kind, i.e. those from the same or the adjoining
quintile. Remittances are the decisive factor for who among their kind in the second
and third quintiles has a better standard of living. But not every member of these two
quintiles by a long way is able to shoulder the economic and emotional transaction costs
necessary for a migration for the sake of remittances. It follows from this that those belonging
to the second and third quintiles compare themselves with those who either
(unlike them) already receive or are still receiving remittances, or else are getting more
remittances, and so have a slightly better standard of living than they do. The person affected
by this, whether in reality or in their perception, gets themselves the remittances
they lack for such a standard of living – by means of violence. The more successful they
are in doing this, the easier it appears to them to be, ultimately to achieve the standard of
living typical even of the top two quintiles.
While relevant specialists on political violence are of the opinion that, in keeping with
the rational cost-benefit calculation, individual advancement is an alternative to (political)
violence, this does not hold for violent crime, which does not call the status quo into
question. It is true that individual advancement here appears to be possible via migration
and remittances, and so it is, however it suddenly gets called into question whether because
of a failed migration attempt or return home due to deportation. Even in these
cases, however, the discontented do not join efforts as a political force against the status
quo, but attempt to achieve individual advancement in another way, namely by using
violent crime to access the market. Even if those affected organize themselves into maras,
they do so for the sake of advancing their own economic or personal status and not to
change the system. In other words, not only are the maras no collective alternative plan to
the political status quo, but they also operate only for as long as individual advancement is
possible through being in or using them.
The present exodus of Salvadorans, just like their “exitus” (death) in large numbers, is a
symbol of a perverse globalization: labour at home is becoming - in addition - devalued,