Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas - National Intelligence ...

Brazil, in view of the intelligence police transgressions in that country, call “riding roughshodover” certain citizen rights). Taking a strictly operative or “more practical” intelligenceapproach implies a greater risk of violating constitutional rights. This view takes intoaccount the nature of the potential operations to be performed toward defined objectives,and in a context in which our security bodies can be compelled to fight against the internationaldrug guerrillas, all in the context of an overflow of the Colombian crisis.ADVANTAGES AND... DISADVANTAGESIn this scenario, if, as seems likely, the Toledo administration pursues a foreignpolicy of automatic alignment with the United States, Fernando Rospigliosi wouldhave some important advantages over those who preceded him in the CNI. SinceRospigliosi has recently worked in the security world, he could for the first timeassure interconnectivity, especially between the National Intelligence Council and theintelligence produced by the subordinate organizations responsible for the domesticsector (DIGIMIN). Apparently his police teams have experience in the tasks they aretaking on, and something more crucial still — he already has a good “background” or“record” in the matter of handling internal crises and social conflicts, as well as inhandling cooperation with his North American counterparts, something fundamentalto the objectives that he would try to reach especially as a function of governmentneeds at this time. It would seem to be that in fact by the end of 2002 a solid strategicassociation had been achieved between the National Intelligence Council — head ofthe intelligence system — and the DIGIMIN, the police intelligence organizationsubordinate to the Department of Interior, leaving aside the DINIE (the strategic nonmilitarybody) and the intelligence directorates of the three armed forces.It is true that such a situation stems from an approach that can be fruitful in theshort term, but it is also true that States have integral intelligence systems, that is tosay, systems with set, hierarchically-ordered elements and with specific functions,and that short-term mechanisms do not necessarily assure a “projective” perceptionof long-term threats. The only certain thing is that the first heads of Peruvian intelligence,after the fall of the Fujimori regime, could do little to sort through theseproblems. There are complex circumstances which limit the range of action (fewresources, lack of suitable personnel, distrust, journalistic scandals, quarrels andinstitutional confrontations between the newly arrived members that populated thesystem), but enough time has now passed (two years) and it is time to put the housein order.The fact that the Peruvian press is insinuating that Fernando Rospigliosi willlikely leave his CNI post in December 2002 to reenter the Ministerial cabinet is acomplicating factor. If this is true, or a decision is made to this effect in comingmonths, Peru would break an historic intelligence record, because it would have had,on average, a new head of intelligence every four and one-half months since Novemberof 2000!199