Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas - National Intelligence ...

consolidate the regime’s transition and to lay the foundations of a new political system inMexico, all combine to favor the executive branch’s making intelligence products availableto legislators through an executive agency such as the CISEN.Certainly the disadvantages argue powerfully for keeping national intelligence productionas a State secret, protected by the executive branch. But given the objective sociopoliticalconditions in Mexico, it would be extremely costly for the country, for the citizensand for democracy itself not to adopt such a transformation. The transformationwould help to avoid authoritarian temptations, which could mean a return to the past. Further,the legislative branch would serve as a counterweight and filter to avoid intelligenceservice distractions, as well as an aid in identifying national security threats, withoutblowing situations out of proportion to obtain political benefits or to distract attentionaway from the national agenda. Based on these arguments, the inclusion of legislators asintelligence product users is much more advisable for the Mexican State, than is keepingthem isolated from these processes. It is certainly risky, but it is also evident that it is necessaryto take the risks to consolidate democratic change in Mexico with the least possiblefriction between the branches of State power and the different actors on the national politicalscene. In order for the executive branch to issue intelligence products to the legislativebranch, it is necessary to very precisely identify a mechanism that will allowlegislators to begin familiarizing themselves with the intelligence world 649 through gradualprocedures that select which legislators will have access to intelligence products, aswell as the methods to access the intelligence documents originated by CISEN.THE MODEL IN OPERATIONIn considering either of the two positions, it will be necessary to evaluate lasting andlong-term criteria, that recognize the kind of country Mexico wishes to become, and thatreflect the national aspirations and interests that we must have for the State to be able tosuccessfully face 21st century challenges. Therefore, the country’s degree of democraticmaturity must be evaluated first, since greater democracy offers a better environment forlegislators to use intelligence products developed by the executive branch. Another relevantpoint is governmental transparency expressed on behalf of the executive branchtoward the other branches and the citizens: the less open and transparent the government,the more necessary will legislator access to strategic intelligence be. Thirdly, it is advisableto evaluate the political party system as represented in Congress, whereby partisanbalance must remain to allow legislator access to governmental intelligence. That is tosay, representation of one to four political parties will be necessary in at least one of thechambers of Congress in order for the use of intelligence products to be feasible — and ifonly one party is represented, it must be of a different party than the President. In fourthplace, one must consider citizen participation, which works to ensure that the executivebranch releases, through appropriate channels, specific information under its control thathas to do with the national political agenda, as well as releasing to legislators, by meansof intelligence products, information relative to national security and strategic issues. As a649 Shulsky, 4.423