CentrO Oberhausen - Eltis

TRANSLAND in-depth case study CentrO Oberhausen 4
Also in 1992 the Regional Development Plan was modified to get planning permission for the
development of the CentrO. This would not have been possible without the strong support of
the state government. The City of Oberhausen modified both its preparatory land-use plan and
the legally binding land-use plan for the project and issued the planning permission. In the
course of the modification of both plans, the city contacted the neighbouring cities and was
able to create a consensus for the project within the region. This seems surprising in the light
of the negative impacts the CentrO has had on the retail sales in these cities but can be explained
by the light pressure from the state government that stopped criticism.
In parallel with the above planning process, a transport study was commissioned and its results
were incorporated into the existing Traffic Development Plan of Oberhausen. The
amendments corrected the assumptions of the plan to take account of the likely effects of the
CentrO, added a scenario for sustainable transport, compact urban development and the improvement
of public transport, and proposed measures for the improvement of the pedestrian
and bicycle network, an increase in parking fees and restrictions for car traffic.
One major feature of the improvement of public transport was the conversion of a former
freight railway line into an exclusive right of way for buses and light rail leading from Oberhausen’s
main railway and bus stations via the CentrO to northern suburbs. In 1993 the construction
of the mall and the conversion of the freight line were started. The opening of the
CentrO and the start of operation on the new line both occurred in 1996 (Schmidt, 1995).
2.2 Financing
In general owners of brownfield sites in the Ruhr area are not particularly eager to sell their
former industrial sites because they have to clean the contaminated soil before the sale. To
overcome this resistance, the City of Oberhausen, in co-operation with the state of North-
Rhine Westphalia, in 1992 bought the site from Thyssen for about 10 million Euro without
prior decontamination. The contaminated soil was cleaned and infrastructure was created for
about 65 million Euro entirely from public funds (Gansäuer, 1997).
Significant public investments were also made for the transport infrastructure linking the
CentrO to the rest of Oberhausen and the Ruhr area. To provide good motorway access to the
mall, the nearest motorway exit and the access road leading to it were upgraded for 22 million
Euro. The 135 million Euro investment for the new public transport line were financed jointly
by the City of Oberhausen and the state of North-Rhine Westphalia. The elevated bus and
tram stop at the mall was paid for by the developer.
The total investment volume for the CentrO amounted to approximately 1,200 million Euro.
The federal state of North-Rhine Westphalia contributed approximately 300 million Euro in
subsidies, as the CentrO was seen as a flagship project for the revitalisation of the Ruhr area.
2.3 Urban Design Concept
The layout of the CentrO follows familiar principles of greenfield-site shopping mall development.
The main shopping mall with its 70,000 m² of retail space extends as the backbone of
the development across the whole site between major department stores as anchors. Between
the mall and the access road there are multi-level garages (Figure 2).
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