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I See Satan Fall Like Lightning

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144 145<br />

it and cannot represent it precisely because they are based on it,<br />

because the victim mechanism is their generating principle. These<br />

texts are the myths.<br />

The exegetes are dupes of the modern bias of concluding too<br />

quickly that texts dealing with collective violence are violent texts<br />

whose violence we have the duty to denounce. Under the influ-<br />

ence of the Nietzsche tradition (see chapter 14), our bias tends to<br />

function on the principle of "no smoke without fire." This is as mys-<br />

tifying as can be in the subject concerning us here. The exegetes<br />

treat the Judeo-Christian revelation as a kind of Freudian or Niet-<br />

zschean symptom in the sense of the "slave morality." They see the<br />

revelation of the victim mechanism as the leveling effect of social<br />

resentment, for example. They never wonder whether by chance<br />

this revelation may be justified.<br />

Only wherever it is not represented can mimetic snowballing play<br />

a generative role due to the very fact that it is not represented, that<br />

it misunderstands itself. As soon as mimetic contagion has taken<br />

over the community, its members are possessed by it. Violent con-<br />

tagion speaks for them; mimetic violence pronounces the guilt of<br />

the victim and the innocence of the persecutors. The community<br />

no longer speaks; the speaker is rather the one the Gospels name as<br />

the accuser, <strong>Satan</strong>.<br />

Pseudoscientific exegetes don't see that the biblical basis of Ju-<br />

daism and Christianity transmits the first revelatory and liberating<br />

representations regarding violence. Violence has always existed, but<br />

until the biblical revelation it remained concealed in the infra-<br />

structure of mythology. Under the influence of Nietzsche and Freud,<br />

our contemporaries go and find in these texts, whose referentiality<br />

is denied without the least proof, various indications of a "persecu-<br />

tion complex" with which Judaism and Christianity as a whole are<br />

alleged to be afflicted. Mythology, on the other hand, is held to be<br />

exempt from this complex.<br />

The proof that all this is absurd is the superb indifference, the<br />

regal contempt, that mythology shows toward any suggestion of<br />

possible violence of the strong against the weak, of those in the<br />

majority against the minority, of the healthy against the ill, of the<br />

normal against the abnormal, of the native against the foreigners,<br />

and so on.<br />

Modern confidence in the myths is even stranger in our day when<br />

our contemporaries are terribly suspicious regarding their own soci-<br />

ety. They see hidden victims everywhere except where they really<br />

are, in the myths that they never look at with a critical eye.<br />

Contemporary thinkers, still under Nietzschean influence, have<br />

the habit of seeing the myths as kindly texts, sympathetic, cheer-<br />

ful, and lively. Mythology is regarded as superior in every way to<br />

the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, which are dominated, not by<br />

a legitimate concern for justice and truth, but by morbid suspi-<br />

cion. Most intellectuals in the present world seem to adopt this<br />

perspective. What sells this view is the apparent absence of un-<br />

just violence in the myths or the aesthetic transformation of violent<br />

deeds. By contrast, the Jewish and Christian Scriptures come across<br />

as so obsessed with persecutions that their relationship to them must<br />

at least suggest their own guilt. To grasp this misunderstanding in<br />

its enormity, we must see it in light of a case of unjust condem-<br />

nation of a victim. My example is the famous Dreyfus case, an<br />

affair so thoroughly clarified that it now eliminates any possibility of<br />

misunderstanding.<br />

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Cap-<br />

tain Dreyfus, condemned for a crime he had not committed, was<br />

serving his sentence, there were, on one side, the "anti-Dreyfus"<br />

people, who were numerous and perfectly serene and satisfied, for<br />

they had their collective victim, and they congratulated themselves<br />

on seeing him justly punished. On the other side were the defenders<br />

of Dreyfus, very, very few at first. For a long time people viewed them<br />

as obvious traitors or professional malcontents, always occupied with<br />

chewing over all sorts of grievances and suspicions whose real basis<br />

no one around them could see. Critics looked for the motives of<br />

their behavior in personal morbidity or political prejudices.<br />

In fact, anti-Dreyfusism was a true myth, a false accusation that<br />

the accusers confused with truth. Mimetic contagion maintained a

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