Ahmet Zog's Foreign Policy - Padis

FOREIGN POLICY OF AHMET ZOG 

The Independent State of Albania 

1920-1926 

Facoltà di Science Politiche 

Dottorato di Ricerca in Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali 

Cattedra di Studi Politici 

Candidato 

Donika Hoxha 

n° 1010082 

Coordinatore 

Prof. Gianluigi Rossi 

A/A 2009/2010

PhD 

in 

History of International Relations 

[11114] 

FOREIGN POLICY OF AHMET ZOG 

The Independent State of Albania 

1920-1926 

Donika Hoxha 

September 2010 

2

Ahmet Zog’s Foreign Policy 

3

............ to my lovely Father 

to the star so full of light 

who sees me from above... 

and to my sweet Mother, 

....... 

4


Ahmet Bey Zogolli 

5

……history ought to judge the past 

and to instruct the contemporary world 

as to the future…… 

Leopold von Ranke 

1795 -1886 

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A. PREFACE 

B. CHAPTER I 


INDEX 

AHMET ZOG AND ITS BEGINNINGS IN THE ALBANIAN POLITICAL LIFE 

1. Young Ahmet during World War I 

2. The Lushnja Convention and Zogolli as Minister of Interior 

C. CHAPTER II 

THE ROLE OF ZOGU IN BUILDING THE NEW ALBANIAN STATE 

1. Zogu the Minister of War and Prime Minister 

2. Albania and the Hanging Questions with Yugoslavia 

3. Revolution in Albania, Government of Fan Noli and the “Triumph of Legality” 

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D. CHAPTER III 

ZOGU’S ATTITUDE AFTER THE “TRIUMPH OF LEGALITY” 

1. Zogu‟s Political Stance towards the Neighbours (The Final Decision on the 

Dispute over Saint Naumi and Vermoshi between Albania and Yugoslavia) 

2. In Search of Economic Aid to Overcome the Crisis - Economic Orientation 

towards Italy 

E. CHAPTER IV 

AHMET ZOG, ITALY AND BRITISH DIPLOMACY 

1. Zogu and Anglo-Italian Disagreements over Albania 

2. Anglo-Persian Oil Company 

3. British Officers in Albania 

4. The First Tirana Pact 

F. Epilogue of a Regime 

G. Resources and Bibliography 

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PREFACE 


The independence of Albania was proclaimed at Vlorë, on November 28 th , 1912. The 

Conference of the Ambassadors which convened at London to settle amicably the Albanian 

question which nearly precipitated a general conflagration, recognized its independence and 

sovereignty which it placed under the collective protection of the then six great European 

powers. When, in accordance with the decisions of the Conference, Prince Wilhelm 1 was 

placed on the throne of Albania, all the great Powers, besides the lesser ones, accredited to 

him their diplomatic representatives, whose ranks ranged from Ministers plenipotentiary to 

Charges d’Affaires. (It is to be remarked that in addition to the Albanian Ministers that had 

been appointed to Italy, Austria, Greece etc. etc., the Government of the Prince appointed also 

a Minister to the United States, but he failed to come to America in time.) 2 

Prince Wilhelm of Wied arrived in March 1914 but stayed only six months, when he fled the 

country at the outbreak of World War I. Following the downfall of Wilhelm mainly thanks to 

Italian intrigues a de facto government established under Essad Pasha. However the new 

government was not acceptable to the people because of its Italian origin and support, 

1 Prince William of Wied, Prince of Albania (Wilhelm Friedrich Heinrich) reigned briefly as sovereign of 

Albania from 7 March 1914 to 3 September 1914 when he left for exile. His reign officially came to an end on 31 

January 1925 when the country was declared a republic. Prince William's aunt Queen Elisabeth of Romania, on 

learning that the Great Powers were looking for a prince to rule over Albania, asked Take Ionescu to attempt to 

persuade them to appoint her nephew to the post. Eventually the European Great Powers -- Austria-Hungary, 

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the French Third Republic, the German Empire, the Russian 

Empire and the Kingdom of Italy -- selected William, a member of the German princely house of Wied, to rule 

over newly-independent Albania. The announcement was made in November 1913 and the decision was 

accepted by Ismail Qemali, the head of the provisional government. The offer of the Albanian throne was first 

made to him in the spring of 1913 but he turned it down. Despite rejecting the offer, the Austrians put pressure 

on Prince William in an attempt to change his mind. [Heaton-Armstrong D., “The Six Month Kingdom: Albania 

1914”, xii, 12]. He let the Great Powers know on 7 February 1914 that he would accept the throne. On 21 

February 1914 a delegation of Albanian notables made a formal request, which he accepted thereby becoming 

by the grace of the powers and the will of the people the Prince (Mbret) of Albania. 

2 AMFAA, File 32, p. 47, 6 November 1920 

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nevertheless the Powers still recognized it. Pasha was arrested on 19 May 1914 and tried for 

treason and sentenced to death. Only the intervention of Italy saved his life and he escaped to 

Italy in exile. 3 Several months later, war broke out. The war led to occupation by the armies 

of France, Italy, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary. These invasions left Albania 

without any political stability, and the country was nearly absorbed by its neighbours after the 

war. The young Albanian state, though neutral, quickly became the object of Greek, Italian 

and Serbian attention, which did the utmost to bring the young country‟s existence to an end, 

and split its territories among them. Albania became a battlefield. This situation imposed a 

long and weary war on Albanians. The country was beset by enemies, racket by intrigue, 

paralysed by grinding poverty. 

On 25 December 1918, Essad‟s government was superseded by a new national government 

which was established by the National Albanian Assembly. Obviously, the Albanians were 

fully convinced that their sovereign and independent state (Albania), as recognized originally 

by the London Conference, had not impaired or interrupted by the general crisis that had 

convulsed the whole of Europe. Amidst the greatest difficulties and crises that the country had 

faced, the new government had almost miraculously succeeded in re-establishing State 

independence and the unity of the nation. It had also managed to establish the rule of law and 

order over the united Albanians whose confidence has remained high at all times. Pursuant to 

the agreement with Italy, signed at Tirana on 2 August 1920, which marked the end of a long- 

drawn and unequal struggle with Italy, the latter power recognized the independence and 

sovereignty of the Albanian state, handing over the province and seaport of Vlorë and at the 

same time becoming its guarantor against foreign aggression. 4 Before the end of the struggle 

3 Pearson O., Albania in the Twentieth Century: a history, pp. 50, 64, 292 

4 On 2 August 1920, the Italian government secretly concluded in Tirana with the Albanian government, the 

preliminary Protocol, under which it undertook to repatriate the Italian troops stationed in Vlorë and in the rest 

of Albania, except for the island of Saseno. [Sforza to Giolitti and Bonomi, Rome, 7 August 1920, s.h., ASE, P 

1919-30, 690]. It was raised, therefore, the question whether or not to communicate the Protocol of Tirana to the 

Allies, with whom negotiations were in progress for the Albanian border and for the recognition of the special 

Italian interests. On 27 June 1921, the Foreign Minister, Sforza, telegraphed to the Italian Ambassador in Paris, 

Bonin Longare: "You can declare the agreement is not political. It had to be concluded with the de facto 

Albanian Government to regulate matters arising from our troops' return from Vlora as a result of 

demobilization. The Royal Government therefore considers that the agreement is in respect of the simple nature 

of res inter alios acta and therefore with no international concern. Hence I consider inappropriate to 

communicate this information trying to avoid even doubts about the unchanged international situation as it was 

before our declaration of independence Albania. [Sforza to Bonin Longare, Rome, 27 June 1921, h. 23.00, ASE, 

CP, 12]. The Protocol was then not communicated to the Allies, while the Albanian question was resolved by the 

Conference of Ambassadors November 9, 1921, with the signing of the decision on the Albanian borders and 

entry into force of the Declaration on the special interests of Italy in Albania, already adopted, as a draft, at its 

meeting of September 28, 1921. 

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with Italy, France also had turned over to Albania the Provinces of Shkodër, in the north, and 

Korçë, in the south, which she had been holding for the avowed purpose of surrendering them 

to Serbia and Greece, respectively. Yugoslavia had repeatedly declared her intention to 

respect the independence and territorial integrity of Albania, but on the contrary an 

unfortunate conflict had broken out due solely to the Yugoslavs‟ unjustified desire to hold a 

number of strategic points on the frontier. 5 Fortunately, the conflict soon came to an end, 

particularly thanks to mediation by Great Britain. 6 Greece had finally received the turning 

over to Albania of the provinces of Korçë and Gjirokastër, which constituted the so-called 

Northern Epirus, and through an agreement entered into by the two governments; the matter 

had been left to be settled by the Peace Conference, if not by the lapse of time. 7 

Anyway, Albania was in possession of all territories assigned to her by the London 

Conference in 1912, and at peace with all her neighbours, without there being any danger that 

the state of peace might be ever compromised by the then Albanian government which owed 

its origin to the National Convention that assembled at Lushnja on January 28, 1920, in the 

aftermath of the outburst of the popular indignation against the decision of the Powers to 

dismember Albania, and which had been effectively blocked by the intervention of the 

President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, who vetoed the plans of Britain, France, and 

Italy at the Paris Peace Conference to divide Albania amongst its neighbours. From now up to 

annexation by Italy in April, 1939, Albania experienced an active political life and underwent 

rapid changes. In the course of such events developed intensively the political life of Ahmet 

Zog. He tried to take advantage of the contradictions between the Great Powers and 

neighbouring countries, protect Albania‟s sovereignty and integrity and keep it away from the 

contemporary conflicts. 

5 Following the deliberations of the Supreme War Council meeting in Versailles, October 7, 1918, Serb troops 

that during the war had occupied parts of northern Albania were to withdraw to the north, beyond the 

Montenegrin-Albanian border in 1913. At the beginning of 1920, certain Serbian detachments have crossed the 

frontier and advanced as far as Bojana, thus occupying the stronghold of Tarabosh. 

6 British Foreign Minister Curzon had written to the Foreign Minister Serb-Croat-Slovene, Trumbic, who had, 

however, countered that the Albanians had opened hostilities first, forcing Serbian troops to advance. [Sforza to 

Buchanan, Rome, 31 August 1920, ASE, R London, 490]. On 7 September of that year, the British Ambassador 

in Rome Buchanan informed the new Italian Foreign Minister Sforza that Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had 

proposed sending an international commission in Albania for an investigation into conflicts. This proposal was 

positively received by the British government, for which, indeed, the committee should have carried out a survey 

on the general situation in Albania and report to the Conference of Ambassadors. 

7 In fact, the Greek-Albanian border demarcation gave rise, in later years, to a spate of incidents, until the 

matter was finally resolved with the Protocol of demarcation of the Greek-Albanian border, signed in Florence 

January 27, 1925, and with the final act of demarcation of the borders of Albania, signed in Paris on 30 July 

1926. [The text of final act of demarcation of the borders of Albania ASE, P 1919-30, 733]. 

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In what can only be described as an isolated and backward corner of Europe barely emerged 

from the Middle Ages, Minister of the Interior and Prime Minister Ahmet Bey Zogolli in the 

1920s, took the crown in the land of Ghegs and Tosks as King Zogu I, and presided over a 

kingdom most noted for its blood feuds. He took significant steps for the construction of a 

national unity, and of a national consciousness that he saw as his principal task, reducing the 

impact of divisive factors on Albanian society, such as regional loyalties, the traditional 

North-South division and religious differences. King Zog oriented his kingdom to the West 

and pursued an "open door" policy. His endeavours to make Albania a developed country 

economically, militarily and culturally according to western democracy models are known. 

Despite lack of industry, perennial food shortages, limited natural resources, and a populace 

comprised mostly of illiterate tribesmen, the Albanian territory was coveted at various times 

during the inter-war years by Yugoslavia, Greece, and, in particular, Italy. The war years 

necessitated considerable vigilance towards the non sporadic propaganda and machinations to 

damage the consolidation of the Albanian independent state. Albania had to strengthen so as 

to become a threat to the attempts to seize its territories. 

In these very years, Ahmet Zog ran his own course, and became a key and determinant figure 

of Albania‟s political life. Foreign press depicted him as “the one who marked the opening of 

a new era in a country which almost was being cancelled from the map of Europe”; but it also 

called him “the terrible Ivan of the Balkans”. Why? Who was Ahmet Zog, and what did he 

represent in those difficult interwar years? What were his deeds? And what were his 

misdeeds? To respond to these questions it is necessary to make some more rather specific: 

Was Ahmet Zog the one who made a secret pact with the Yugoslav Prime Minister to sell off 

Albanian territories to Serbian Croatian and Slovene Kingdom, in exchange for the Yugoslav 

support to his counter-revolution, at the end of 1924? Was he the one who yielded up to the 

Yugoslavs Saint Naum 8 , a sacred place for Orthodox Albanians, and Vermoshi, the best 

pastures of Northern Albania for which many had fought and died in the past? 

Was Zogu the one who signed the First Pact of Tirana with the Italians, notwithstanding the 

overall discontent of honest Albanians? 

8 Albanian: Shёn Naumi, Serbian: Sveti Naum 

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Was he the one who signed the decree for the creation of the so-called “National Bank of 

Albania”, by this act offering Italy complete control of the economic and financial life of the 

country? He took from Italy a loan of 50 million gold francs, making Albania a heavily 

indebted country. Was his objective to build strategic roads and ports, and prepare Italy‟s 

invasion of the country? If this was not the intention, why then signing the Second Pact of 

Tirana, causing indignation not only of the Albanians, but also beyond in Europe, and 

particularly in the Balkans. What were the conditions of Albania when such decisions were 

taken? What was the role of other neighbouring countries, and great powers to help Albania 

overcome its crisis? 

Based on archival documents, published or not, but also on the precious work of some of the 

researchers of Albanian history of this period following is a mere attempt to answer the 

above-posed questions....... 

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CHAPTER I 

AHMET ZOG AND ITS BEGINNINGS IN THE ALBANIAN POLITICAL LIFE 

Young Ahmet during World War I 

The expanding Ottoman Empire overpowered the Balkan Peninsula in the fourteenth and 

fifteenth centuries. Turkish conquest detached all Balkan peoples from the European 

mainstream. They spoke of “Europe” as something remote. The most severe isolation was that 

of Albania, a small country in the western Balkans which remained one of Europe‟s most 

backward areas. Since the fifteenth century, the Turks had managed to uphold a tenuous and 

uneven suzerainty over Albania, despite the struggle of the Albanian people for freedom over 

centuries. During the period of National Renaissance in the 19 th century, a strong and broad- 

based movement, culminating in the "Albanian League of Prizren" (10 June 1878), 

represented the efforts of the all-Albanian union to defend their homeland. The aim of the 

League, however, was not achieved, and the Congress of Berlin in 1878 decided to divide 

Albanian territory. 

The Congress of Berlin opened a new phase in the history of the Albanian people. The 

Albanian Renaissance has its initiation in 1878, just when the European leading statesmen 

met in Berlin to decide on the destiny of the Ottoman Empire. In the wake of the Russo- 

Turkish War of 1877–78, the meeting's aim was to reorganize the countries of the Balkans. 

The war had its origins in a rise in nationalism in the Balkans as well as in the Russian goal of 

recovering territorial losses it had suffered during the Crimean War, reestablishing itself in the 

Black Sea and following the political movement attempting to free Balkan nations from the 

Ottoman Empire. 

From 1873 onward the Ottoman government was faced with a period of drought and famine 

in Anatolia, leading to widespread misery and discontent. Agricultural shortages became such 

14


as to preclude the collection of necessary taxes. This reached the point at which the Imperial 

Treasury was left without adequate funds for the business of government. The result was a 

major financial collapse which forced the Ottoman government to declare bankruptcy in 

October, 1875. 

An anti-Ottoman uprising occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the summer of 1875. The 

main reason for this revolt was the heavy tax burden imposed by the cash-starved Ottoman 

administration. Both Montenegro and Serbia intervened with armed bands. Despite some 

relaxation of taxes, the uprising continued well after the end of 1875 and eventually triggered 

the Bulgarian April uprising of 1876. On June 30, 1876, Serbia, followed by Montenegro, 

declared war on the Ottoman Empire. In July-August, the ill-prepared and poorly equipped 

Serbian army helped by Russian volunteers failed to achieve offensive objectives but did 

manage to repulse the Ottoman offensive into Serbia, and on August 26, Serbia pleaded 

European powers to mediate in ending the war. A joint ultimatum by the European powers 

forced the Porte to give Serbia a one month truce and start peace negotiations. Turkish peace 

conditions however were refused by European powers as too harsh. In early October, after the 

truce expired, the Turkish army resumed its offensive and the Serbian position quickly 

became desperate. As a result, on October 31, 1876 Russia issued an ultimatum requiring 

Turkey to stop the hostilities and sign a new truce with Serbia within 48 hours. This was 

supported by the partial mobilization of the Russian army (up to 20 divisions). The Sultan 

accepted the conditions of the ultimatum. To resolve the crisis, on December 11, 1876, a 

conference of the Great Powers was opened in Constantinople (to which the Turks were not 

invited). A compromise solution was negotiated, granting autonomy to Bulgaria, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina under the joint control of European powers. Turks, however, found a way to 

discredit the conference by announcing on December 23, the day the conference was closed, 

that a constitution was adopted that declared equal rights for religious minorities within the 

empire, based on which Turkey announced its decision to disregard the results of the 

conference. On January 15, 1877, Russia and Austria-Hungary signed a written agreement 

confirming the results of an earlier oral agreement made at Reichstadt in July 1876. This 

assured Russia of the benevolent neutrality of Austria-Hungary in the impending war. These 

terms meant that in case of war Russia would do the fighting and Austria would derive most 

of the advantage. Russia therefore made a final effort for a peaceful settlement. On March 31, 

1877, Russia persuaded the powers to sign the London Convention, which merely asked 

15

Turkey to introduce those reforms which she herself had already proposed. The powers were 

to watch the operation of the reforms, and if conditions remained unsatisfactory they reserved 

the right "to declare that such a state of things would be incompatible with their interests and 

those of Europe in general". But the Turks felt themselves in a strong position and rejected the 

proposal on the grounds that it violated the Treaty of Paris. Finally, on April 24, 1877, after 

nearly two years of futile negotiations, Russia declared war upon Turkey. After successfully 

concluding the Siege of Pleven Russian army advanced into Thrace, taking Adrianople. 

Under pressure from the British, Russia accepted the truce offered by Ottoman Empire on 

January 31, 1878, but continued to move towards Constantinople. The British sent a fleet of 

battleships to intimidate Russia from entering the city, and Russian forces stopped at San 

Stefano. Eventually Russia entered into a settlement under the Treaty of San Stefano on 

March 3, by which the Ottoman Empire would recognize the independence of Romania, 

Serbia, Montenegro, and the autonomy of Bulgaria. The Treaty of San Stefano assigned 

Albanian-populated lands to Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria. Alarmed by the extension of 

Russian power into the Balkans, Austria-Hungary and Britain blocked the arrangement. A 

peace conference to settle the dispute was decided to be held later in the year in Berlin. 

The Treaty of San Stefano triggered profound anxiety among the Albanians meanwhile, and it 

spurred their leaders to organize a defense of the lands they inhabited. In the spring of 1878, 

influential Albanians in Constantinople, including Abdyl Frashëri, the Albanian national 

movement's leading figure during its early years, organized a secret committee to direct the 

Albanians' resistance. In May the group called for a general meeting of representatives from 

all the Albanian-populated lands. On June 10, 1878, about eighty delegates, mostly Muslim 

religious leaders, clan chiefs, and other influential people from the four Albanian-populated 

Ottoman vilayets, met in the Kosovo town of Prizren. The delegates set up a standing 

organization, the Prizren League, under the direction of a central committee that had the 

power to impose taxes and raise an army. The Prizren League worked to gain autonomy for 

the Albanians and to thwart implementation of the Treaty of San Stefano. 

In July 1878, the league sent a memorandum to the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin, 

which was called to settle the unresolved problems of Turkish War, demanding that all 

Albanians be united in a single Ottoman province that would be governed from Bitola by a 

Turkish governor who would be advised by an Albanian committee elected by universal 

suffrage. 

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The Congress of Berlin ignored the league's memorandum, and Germany's Otto von Bismarck 

even proclaimed that an Albanian nation did not exist. The congress ceded to Montenegro the 

cities of Bar and Podgorica and areas around the mountain villages of Gusinje and Plav, 

which Albanian leaders considered Albanian territory. Serbia also won Albanian-inhabited 

lands. The Albanians, the vast majority loyal to the empire, vehemently opposed the territorial 

losses. Albanians also feared the possible loss of Epirus to Greece. The Prizren League 

organized armed resistance efforts in Gusinje, Plav, Shkodër, Prizren, Prevesa, and Janina. A 

border tribesman at the time described the frontier as "floating on blood." 

In August 1878, the Congress of Berlin ordered a commission to trace a border between the 

Ottoman Empire and Montenegro. The congress also directed Greece and the Ottoman 

Empire to negotiate a solution to their border dispute. The Great Powers expected the 

Ottomans to ensure that the Albanians would respect the new borders, ignoring that the 

sultan's military forces were too weak to enforce any settlement and that the Ottomans could 

only benefit by the Albanians' resistance. The Sublime Porte, in fact, armed the Albanians and 

allowed them to levy taxes, and when the Ottoman army withdrew from areas awarded to 

Montenegro under the Treaty of Berlin, Roman Catholic Albanian tribesmen simply took 

control. The Albanians' successful resistance to the treaty forced the Great Powers to alter the 

border, returning Gusinje and Plav to the Ottoman Empire and granting Montenegro the 

mostly Muslim Albanian-populated coastal town of Ulcinj. But the Albanians there refused to 

surrender as well. Finally, the Great Powers blockaded Ulcinj by sea and pressured the 

Ottoman authorities to bring the Albanians under control. The Great Powers decided in 1881 

to cede Greece only Thessaly and the small Albanian-populated district of Arta. 

Faced with growing international pressure "to pacify" the refractory Albanians, the sultan 

dispatched a large army under Dervish Turgut Pasha to suppress the Prizren League and 

deliver Ulcinj to Montenegro. Albanians loyal to the empire supported the Sublime Porte's 

military intervention. In April 1881, Dervish Pasha's 10,000 men captured Prizren and later 

crushed the resistance at Ulcinj. The Prizren League's leaders and their families were arrested 

and deported. Frashëri, who originally received a death sentence, was imprisoned until 1885 

and exiled until his death seven years later. In the three years it survived, the Prizren League 

effectively made the Great Powers aware of the Albanian people and their national interests. 

Montenegro and Greece received much less Albanian-populated territory than they would 

have won without the league's resistance. 

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Formidable barriers frustrated Albanian leaders' efforts to instill in their people an Albanian 

rather than an Ottoman identity. The Albanians' religious differences forced nationalist 

leaders to give the national movement a purely secular character that alienated religious 

leaders. The most significant factor uniting the Albanians, their spoken language, lacked a 

standard literary form and even a standard alphabet. Each of the three available choices, the 

Latin, Cyrillic, and Arabic scripts, implied different political and religious orientations 

opposed by one or another element of the population. In 1878 there were no Albanian- 

language schools in the most developed of the Albanian-inhabited areas, Gjirokastër, Berat, 

and Vlorë, where schools conducted classes either in Turkish or in Greek. 

The Ottoman Empire continued to crumble after the Congress of Berlin. The empire's 

financial troubles prevented Sultan Abdül Hamid II from reforming his military, and he 

resorted to repression to maintain order. The authorities strove without success to control the 

political situation in the empire's Albanian-populated lands, arresting suspected nationalist 

activists. When the sultan refused Albanian demands for unification of the four Albanian- 

populated vilayets, Albanian leaders reorganized the Prizren League and incited uprisings that 

brought the Albanian lands, especially Kosovo, to near anarchy. The imperial authorities 

again disbanded the Prizren League in 1897, executed its president in 1902, and banned 

Albanian- language books and correspondence. In Macedonia, where Bulgarian-, Greek-, and 

Serbian-backed terrorists were fighting Ottoman authorities and one another for control, 

Muslim Albanians suffered attacks, and Albanian guerrilla groups retaliated. In 1906 

Albanian leaders meeting in Bitola established the secret Committee for the Liberation of 

Albania. A year later, Albanian guerrillas assassinated Korçë's Greek Orthodox metropolitan. 

In 1906 opposition groups in the Ottoman Empire emerged, one of which evolved into the 

Committee of Union and Progress, more commonly known as the Young Turks, which 

proposed restoring constitutional government in Constantinople, by revolution if necessary. In 

July 1908, a month after a Young Turk rebellion in Macedonia supported by an Albanian 

uprising in Kosovo and Macedonia escalated into widespread insurrection and mutiny within 

the imperial army, Sultan Abdül Hamid II agreed to demands by the Young Turks to restore 

constitutional rule. Many Albanians participated in the Young Turks uprising, hoping that it 

would gain their people autonomy within the empire. They hoped to obtain autonomous status 

and formed a political organization around Ismail Qemali, who was in close contact with the 

Young Turks. The Young Turks lifted the Ottoman ban on Albanian-language schools and on 

18


writing the Albanian language. As a consequence, Albanian intellectuals meeting in Bitola in 

1908 chose the Latin alphabet as a standard script. The Young Turks, however, were set on 

maintaining the empire and not interested in making concessions to the myriad nationalist 

groups within its borders. Their nationalistic attitude left no room for Albanian aspirations. 

After securing the abdication of Abdül Hamid II in April 1909, the new authorities levied 

taxes, outlawed guerrilla groups and nationalist societies, and attempted to extend 

Constantinople's control over the northern Albanian mountain men. In addition, the Young 

Turks legalized the bastinado, or beating with a stick, even for misdemeanors, banned 

carrying rifles, and denied the existence of an Albanian nationality. The new government also 

appealed for Islamic solidarity to break the Albanians' unity and used the Muslim clergy to try 

to impose the Arabic alphabet. 

The Albanians refused to submit to the Young Turks' campaign to "Ottomanize" them by 

force. Their aggressive policy, interfering with traditional Albanian freedoms, generated anti- 

Turk uprisings in 1909-1910, while Ismail Qemali and the twenty five Albanian delegates 

spoke for the autonomist movement in the parliament at Constantinople. 

New Albanian uprisings began in Kosovo and the northern mountains in early April 1910. 

Ottoman forces quashed these rebellions after three months, outlawed Albanian organizations, 

disarmed entire regions, and closed down schools and publications. Montenegro, preparing to 

grab Albanian-populated lands for it, supported a 1911 uprising by the mountain tribes against 

the Young Turks regime that grew into a widespread revolt. Unable to control the Albanians 

by force, the Ottoman government granted concessions on schools, military recruitment, and 

taxation and sanctioned the use of the Latin script for the Albanian language. The government 

refused, however, to unite the four Albanian-inhabited vilayets. 

Revolts and struggles continued for the next several years. 9 In April 1912, the Albanian 

northern clans started a fresh revolt against the Turks. Within ten days over 3.000 Albanians 

had taken to the northern mountains in the vilayets of Kosovo and Shkodër. The rising had 

spread with alarming rapidity. Southern Albania also joined forces with the insurgents, and 

together they demanded autonomy and recognition as a separate government. This time the 

Albanians were victorious. The Turks, tired of conflict, conceded autonomy. 

9 For more see Duce A., L’Albania nei rapporti italo-austriaci, 1897-1913, p. 281 

19

Meanwhile, the First Balkan War broke out on 8 October 1912. The Balkan League of 

Montenegro, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria turned on the Ottoman Empire with the goal of 

driving the Turks from Europe once and for all. Russian diplomacy had succeeded in spring 

1912 to bring closer Serbs and Bulgarians. These two countries concluded an alliance treaty, 

which foresaw Albania‟s break up in its additional protocol. Soon after, the same agreement 

was followed between Greeks and Bulgarians. These two bilateral agreements made up the 

premise of the Balkan alliance to which Montenegro will be also associated. In autumn, the 

joint diplomatic action against Turkey would pass on military plans: the four states declared 

war to the Ottoman Empire. 10 The Greeks and Serbs entered Albanian territory as they 

advanced. The situation suddenly became very critical for the Albanians whose newly won 

rights of autonomy were about to be shattered. Ismail Qemali mistrusted the intentions of the 

Balkan League countries: Serbia needed access to the sea, which could reach through 

Albania; Greece pretended that the south of Albania was „Northern Epirus‟ and claimed all its 

Christians as Greeks; for King Nicholas of Montenegro, Shkodra was the sacred burial place 

of his forefathers. As a result, much Albanian territory was occupied by Serbs, Montenegrins 

and Greeks, who saw the area as legitimate spoils. 

In the face of this crisis Ismail Qemali believed that independence was the only way to save 

Albanian lands from dismemberment. He decided to take the Albanian cause before 

international opinion. After coming back from Austria, where he had spoken about the future 

establishment of an autonomous Albania and expressed his intention to address a 

memorandum to the Great European Powers containing the Albanian wishes, he hastily called 

together representatives of all the Albanian people, Moslem, Orthodox, and Catholic at Vlora, 

and declared independence of Albania on 28 November 1912 (the last of the Balkan nations 

to achieve independence). Qemali formed a provisory national government, commissioned to 

enact a series of laws for the welfare of Albania and to rule the country until the constitution 

was drawn up, then went to London to attend a conference of the Great Powers arranged to 

consider the situation created by the Balkan War. 

The demands of Serbia for territorial acquisitions on the Adriatic coast, including sovereign 

rights over a seaport in that quarter, had generated the danger of a European war. After the 

First Balkan War, the Treaty of London on 17-30 May 1913, entrusted to the six powers 

10 Ibidem 

20


(known as the Concert of Europe) to decide all matters relating to Albania, including the 

delimitation of its frontiers. 11 On 29 July 1913, the Ambassadors of Austria-Hungary, France, 

Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, adopted in London the Organic Statute of Albania, 

established as a Principality, with the guarantee of the six powers, and entrusted the 

administration of the new State to a controlling international commission. 12 With the Protocol 

of Florence of 17 December 1913, the Conference of Ambassadors then defined Albania‟s 

boundaries and its administrative and political organization. 

At the conference, Austria-Hungary and Italy wished to check the territorial expansion of 

Serbia, and thus favoured an independent Albanian state. They were, however, opposed by 

Russia and France who backed Serbian and Greek claims on the country. As a result, when it 

came to determining the new state borders, Albania was arbitrarily deprived of nearly half of 

its territory. The Russians, although contrary to independence, were not yet ready to fight for 

the sake of their Balkan clients, but they insisted that Serbia retain most of Kosovo, regardless 

of its generally Albanian population. The northern tribes of Hoti and Gruda were handed over 

to the Montenegrins, while the important towns of Pejë (Ipek), Gjakovë, Prizren, and Dibër 

passed either to Serbia or to Montenegro. After long negotiations, the preliminaries of the 

London conference were produced by May 30, 1913. These were to serve as a basis for future 

peace in the Balkans. Clearly, the Albanians considered this act an irreparably serious crime. 

In Its meeting of 8 August 1913, the Conference stated, in particular, that: 

«La délimitation sera faite sur des bases ethnographiques et géographiques; pour les 

constatations ethnographiques on établira la langue maternelle de la population, savoir la 

langue parlée dans les familles: la Commission ne tiendra aucun compte des tentatives de 

plébiscite ou d'autre manifestation politique». 13 

An autonomous Principality, sovereign and hereditary by line of primogeniture, “an 

illegitimate child of Austrian diplomacy with Italy figuring as the midwife 14 ”, and at the same 

time a mutilated Albanian State, shorn of fertile pasture lands and regions rich in minerals and 

11 Martens, Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités, series III, vol. VIII, pp. 16-19 

12 Trattati e Convenzioni, vol. XXII, p. 360 following 

13 Conferenza di Londra, 8 agosto 1913, all. a Imperiali a di San Giuliano, Londra, 20 gennaio 1914, ASE, P 

1919-30, 712 

14 Amery J., Sons of the Eagle, p.3 

21

other resources, with some 500.000 Albanian inhabitants remaining outside the borders, was 

set up under the guarantee of the six Powers, which would now select a prince. 

Who should be the head of the new state? No Albanian had so risen above his compatriots 

that they would have accepted him as king. They were unprepared for the new situation. What 

is more, they even lacked unity of purpose. Among them grew a fierce competition of who 

should be leader. By 1913, two governments were created in Albania, neither effective, with 

no accepted head of state to choose between them. 

To resolve the crisis, the Ambassadorial Conference decided to choose a foreign prince. It 

was not easy: Austria-Hungary rejected anybody favoured by Russia and vice-versa. In the 

meantime, the Provisional Government created at Vlora was acting as a stopgap, but its 

authority was very limited. Worse yet, a new contender for power had emerged in the shape 

of a fifty-year-old soldier called Essad Pasha Toptani. Head of a major landowning family in 

central Albania, Essad thought he could become president or prince. He offered his services to 

the Slavs, though Serbia and Montenegro wanted any Albanian state to be as small as 

possible. In April 1913, he allegedly sold Shkodra to the Montenegrins, after plotting the 

murder of the commanding officer, Riza Pasha, and marched south to Durrës, where he set up 

his own Central Albanian Republic. He aspired to become prince of Albania with a reduced 

territory including only Tirana and Elbasan, ceding Shkodra, Dibra, and a major part of 

northern Albania to Serbia and Montenegro, and North Epirus to Greece. 

While the new state needed peace and stability, it was experiencing quite the opposite instead. 

To forge a nation in a land where people were so divisive was never going to be easy, and the 

timing could hardly have been worse. The very mention of 1913 suggests Europe on the edge 

of the precipice, though for Albania the war of 1914-1918 is subsumed in a longer period of 

strife, commencing with rebellions against the Turks and lasting into the 1920s 15 . 

In the midst of this confusion, Ahmet Zogolli embarked on his political career. He began as a 

minor Muslim Gheg chieftain from the northern district of Mati. Son of Xhemal Pasha 

Zogolli and Sadije Toptani, he was born in Burgajet, citadel of the chieftain of Mati. In 1911, 

after his father‟s death, he became “Hereditary Governor” of Mati and chief of the clan of 

Gheg. He was only sixteen years old. In this land, a polite greeting to a lady was “Strength to 

15 Tomes J., King Zog, Self-Made Monarch of Albania, p. 22 

22


your arms!”, for Albanian clansmen scorned to be burdened by anything but a weapon. In the 

distance, towards the east of the plain of Mati, was a gentle isolated hill, well-covered with 

mulberry and chestnut trees. On its crest stood a solid rectangular building with two small 

wings facing into a courtyard. It was built into the rock and constructed of massive blocks of 

stone, quite in mediaeval style. This was Castle Burgajet, the citadel of the chieftain of Mati. 

Although not vast, it was the biggest house for miles and the only one with glazed windows. 

The interior was even more distinctive. Most Albanians sat cross-legged on rugs in bare 

white-washed rooms, but to step inside the castle living room was to enter the nineteenth 

century in all its fussiness. 16 It was here in the women‟s rooms at Burgajet that nineteen-year- 

old Sadije Zogolli (Toptani) gave birth to a son on 8 October 1895. 17 

After a long period of delay and indecision, and much bickering and quibbling behind the 

scenes, upon the proposal of Rome and Vienna the Great Powers came to an agreement that 

the Albanians should offer the throne to Prince William Frederick Henry of Wied, a 37-year- 

old army officer from a small German Principality on the Rhine, nephew of the poetess Queen 

Elisabeth of Romania – the consort of King Carol I – and grand nephew of Emperor William I 

of Germany. One month after accepting the throne on 7 March, he arrived in his provisional 

capital of Durrës and started to organize his government, appointing Turhan Pasha Përmeti to 

form the first Albanian cabinet. 18 This first cabinet was dominated by members of nobility 

(Prince Essad Pasha Toptani defense and foreign affairs, prince Gjergj Aramidhi Bey Frasheri 

16 Ibid. p. 8 

17 His father, Xhemal Zogolli Pasha had been Hereditary Governor of Mati since the murder of his half-brother, 

Riza Bey, ten or fifteen years earlier. By restoring order and unity, he had won the respect of the clan .Old songs 

related how the Zogolli had come to preside Mati over four hundred years ago, shortly after the Turks first 

conquered Albania. Ahmet went away from the valley around 1906 in order to be educated. From the age of five, 

he had been taught at home in the company of a few local boys. He latterly recalled spending his lessons 

learning Turkish and his playtimes pretending to fight the Turks. It is curious that Zog was never entirely clear 

about which schools he attended, and downright unclear about when. Information is so uniformly sketchy as to 

raise the suspicion that he wanted people to think that he had more formal education than was really the case. 

The claim that he managed to complete two years’ study in the space of each school year only confirms his 

sensitivity on the point. Ahmet was enrolled at a time at a Turkish cadet school at Monastir (modern Bitolj), a 

busy carpet-making town about eighty miles from Mati with a very mixed population. After Xhemal Pasha 

Zogolli died, Sadije sent her only son to Istanbul. While in Istanbul, Ahmet made his first political speech to an 

audience of his schoolfellows. Debates were common among students and the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 

galvanized those with any interest in politics, as prisons were thrown open, women tore off their veils, and 

banners extolled “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Justice”. A new parliament was elected (including Albanian 

deputies) with the aim of radical reform. When the Sultan obstructed it, he was swept aside. Zogolli, with his 

head full of Napoleonic France, shared in the euphoria. Everything that he had learned convinced him of the 

merits of modernisation, and even his countrymen back home assumed that change could only be for the better. 

Like them, he did not appreciate that “Union and Progress” (as defined by Young Turks) would be far from 

congenial to Albanians. Ibid. Pp. 15, 17, 18. 

18 More in Heaton-Armstrong D., The Six Month Kingdom: Albania 1914. 

23

finances, Aziz Pasha Vrioni agriculture etc.). His brief reign proved a turbulent one. After 

landing at Durrës, the Albanian local potentates came to swear allegiance to the sovereign. 

Among them Ahmet Bey Zogolli as well. Zogist sources 19 say that the chieftain of Mati had 

more than a ritual exchange of greetings with the new Prince of Albania. He saw in Prince 

William the only possibility of Albania to set up her own state. Thus, he suggested the 

immediate convocation of a representative National Assembly that would serve to calm the 

situation, and consolidate the new regime. 

Not a long time will pass and revolts led by the Turkophile Haxhi Qamili broke out in central 

Albania against foreign domination. From the outset, the Albanian Muslims had resented a 

Christian ruler. Soon the uprising spread all over Albania. William's position was also 

undermined by own officials, notably Essad Pasha himself, who accepted money from Italy to 

finance a revolt and to stage a coup against William. 

Although Zogolli was a Moslem, he remained outwardly loyal to the throne. He joined Preng 

Bibë Dodë Pasha, Azis Pasha Vrioni and Bektash Bey Cakrani, and answered to Prince 

William‟s appeal to gather forces against the insurrection. 20 He also started negotiating with 

the insurgents showing however great cunning and elasticity. 21 The negotiations broke down, 

and despite a personal appeal from the Prince, he returned to Mati, convinced that the Prince‟s 

position remained untenable. 22 From Mati he issued a manifesto in the name of 150.000 

Albanian Moslems, in which he proclaimed that the rebels were only a very small minority in 

the country, maintaining that the majority of the Moslem population was loyal to the Prince 

and willing to support him; moreover, since the insurrection was the work of foreign agitators, 

no respectable Albanian should identify himself with it. 23 

In the meantime, the Greeks attacked North Epirus. Greece encouraged the formation of the 

"provisional government of North Epirus". Although an agreement was made to grant extra 

rights to the Greek minority, the Hellenic Army occupied Southern Albania excluding Berat 

and Korçë. The Essadist insurgents joined forces with the Greeks and a general attack began. 

19 Zog‟s Royal Court, Skender Zogu and Commander Ylli Spahija in their memories 

20 ASCA, Fund 50, Letters of Prince William to Preng Pasha, Durrës, 20, 22 and 25 June 1914 

21 Shpuza G., Kryengritja Fshatare …., p. 124 

22 ASCA, Fund 886 (Prince‟s William‟s Government, 4/1, file 13), doc. 253, copy of the letter (written in 

Turkish language) of Ahmet Zog to Mustafa Kruja, 13/ 16 June 1930 

23 Op. cit. Swire J., The rise of a Kingdom, p. 229, see also Fischer B.J., King Zog and …, pp. 10-11 

24


Prince William addressed a Note to the Powers, asking them to fulfil their obligations in 

respect of Albania. He appealed to them to supply him with men and money sufficient to 

enable him to assert his kingship over his rebellious subjects. But, outbreak of World War I 

presented more problems for Prince William as Austria-Hungary demanded that he send 

Albanian soldiers to fight alongside them. When he refused, citing the neutrality of Albania in 

the Treaty of London, the remuneration that he had been receiving was cut off. Bottled up in 

Durrës by rebel forces, he left on 5 September 1914, and never came back, leaving Albania in 

the hands of the International Control Commission. Two days before he had told his subjects: 

„it is more useful if for some time I go to the west‟ 24 . As a result, the arrival of a western 

Prince did not alter the situation in Albania. Zogolli concluded that the House of Wied was 

already a hopeless cause. 

Break up of WWI 

Although it was technically neutral throughout the First World War, Albania became a 

battlefield. Serbs, Montenegrins, Greeks, Italians, and French on the Allied side, and Austro- 

Hungarians and Bulgarians 25 from the Central Powers overran the country. It suffered a series 

of betrayals from the Great European Powers. 

The primary Allied powers - Britain, France and Russia - were, by 1915, keen to bring neutral 

Italy into World War One on their side. Italy was to leave the Triple Alliance and join Triple 

Entente, as already stated in a secret agreement signed in London, on 4-5 September 1914. 

Italy however drove a hard bargain, demanding extensive territorial concessions once the war 

had been won, including Trent, Southern Tyrol, Istria, Gorizia, Dalmatia, Vlorë, Protectorate 

over Albania, part of the German Asian and African colonial empire. Following the Treaty of 

London, a secret pact between Italy and Triple Entente, signed in London on 26 April 1915 by 

24 Swire, The Rise of a Kingdom, p. 231 

25 Bulgaria enters WWI on the side of the Central Powers in October 1915, with the aim of reversing the 

outcome of the Second Balkan War and acquiring Macedonia. 

25

the Kingdom of Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Russia. 26 In exchange, parts of 

northern and southern Albania were also promised to the Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. 27 

The Treaty was signed by Sir Edward Grey and the French, Italian, and Russian Ambassadors 

in London, M. Paul Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and Count Benckendorff. With this 

Treaty, Italy would gain by the end of the war full ownership rights over Vlorë and the island 

of Sazan at the entrance to Vlorë harbour, as well as surrounding territory sufficiently large 

that it could be secured militarily to assure defence of these places, approximately between 

the Vjosë river to the north and east and as far as the northern boundary of the Himarë district 

26 

Baker R. S., Woodrow Wilson and world settlement, vol. I, pp. 52-55 

27 

Extracts from the Treaty of London, 26 April 1915: 

Article 1 

A military convention shall be immediately concluded between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Italy, 

and Russia. This convention shall settle the minimum number of military forces to be employed by Russia 

against Austria-Hungary in order to prevent that Power from concentrating all its strength against Italy, in the 

event of Russia deciding to direct her principal effort against Germany... 

Article 2 

On her part, Italy undertakes to use her entire resources for the purpose of waging war jointly with France, Great 

Britain, and Russia against all their enemies. 

Article 3 

The French and British fleets shall render active and permanent assistance to Italy... 

Article 4 

Under the Treaty of Peace, Italy shall obtain the Trentino, Cisalpine Tyrol with its geographical and natural 

frontier, as well as Trieste, the counties of Gorizia and Gradisca, all Istria as far as the Quarnero and including 

Volosca and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin, as well as the small islands of Plavnik, Unie, Canidole, 

Palazzuoli, San Pietro di Nembi, Asinello, Gruica, and the neighbouring islets... 

Article 5 

Italy shall also be given the province of Dalmatia within its present administrative boundaries... 

Article 6 

Italy shall receive full sovereignty over Valona, the island of Saseno and surrounding territory... 

Article 7 

Should Italy obtain the Trentino and Istria in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, together with Dalmatia 

and the Adriatic islands within the limits specified in Article 5, and the Bay of Valona (Article 6), and if the 

central portion of Albania is reserved for the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised State, Italy shall 

not oppose the division of Northern and Southern Albania between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece... 

Article 8 

Italy shall receive entire sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands which she is at present occupying. 

Article 9 

Generally speaking, France, Great Britain, and Russia recognise that,... in the event of total or partial partition of 

Turkey in Asia, she ought to obtain a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia... 

Article 11 

Italy shall receive a share of any eventual war indemnity corresponding to their efforts and her sacrifices. 

Article 13 

In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, 

those two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation... 

Article 14 

Great Britain undertakes to facilitate the immediate conclusion, under equitable conditions, of a loan of at least 

50,000,000 pounds... 

Article 16 

The present arrangement shall be held secret. 

Parliamentary Papers, London, 1920, LI Cmd. 671, Miscellaneous No. 7, pp 2-7 

26


in the south. Italy was also prepared to allow the northern and southern parts of Albania to be 

divided between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece, only the central portion being reserved for 

the constitution of a small autonomous neutralized state of Albania. It was further stipulated 

that the port of Durrës could be assigned to the Independent Moslem State of Albania, and 

that to Italy would be conceded the right of representation of the State of Albania in its 

relations with foreign Powers. Moreover, Italy would be bound to secure for Albania a 

territory sufficiently extensive to ensure the existence of a frontier line between Greece and 

Serbia to the west of Lake Ohrid. 28 

Italy, in view of the anarchy prevailing in Albania, sent her fleet to the port of Vlorë and 

proceeded to occupy the town. Serbian troops had already invaded most of the country. They 

had backed up the return of Essad Pasha as President, and his puppet regime at Durrës. 

Zogolli had recognized the Durrës Government, but at the same had demanded from the Serbs 

to respect traditional freedom of Mati to govern itself. Essad, however, did not accept, and 

attacked Mati, determined to the end to subdue Zogolli and his clansmen. 

The collapse of Serbia, after Bulgaria declared war to it, transformed the political situation. 

After Serbia's defeat in fall 1915 its army and many civilians flee to the sea in winter through 

a hostile Albanian population. The Serbs could no longer control Albania, and Essad had to 

withdraw from Mati. The advance guard of the Austro-Hungarian XIX Corps occupied 

Shkodra on 23 January. Austrian agents with money were sent to encourage the armed 

Albanian tribesmen to ambush attack, and help expel the Slavs. 

In January 1916, most of Albania is overrun by Austria and Bulgaria. By autumn 1916, Allied 

forces (chiefly Italian) occupy the southern third of the country, where they remained for the 

rest of the war. 

In November 1915 the armies of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria conquered Mitrovica, 

Prishtina and Prizren in quick succession. On 29 November, when Prizren has fallen, the total 

number of Serb soldiers captured during the campaign had reached the figure of 150,000. The 

Austrians conquered the northern part of the territory, while the south was occupied by 

28 Pearson O., Albania and King Zog, p. 89 

27

Bulgarians. Before entering the country, the Austro-Hungarians had issued a proclamation 

claiming that their army was entering Albania only to drive out the Serbs and the Italians. 

The Austrian authorities settled Albanians in local government, allowed them to use Albanian 

language in the course of their work and actively encourage the establishment of schools in 

the Albanian language. The same policy was applied in Northern and Central Albania in 1916 

in these regions, the Austrians even created schools for the training of teachers and gave birth 

to an "Albanian literary commission" to standardize the spelling and publish books in 

Albanian popular editions. The official policy of the Austrian Foreign Ministry as regards 

Albania was to apply the same principle as it was a neutral friendly country and not a 

conquered territory, the military considered this as unrealistic and asked for a division that 

saw the northern part, plus Kosovo, annexed by Austria-Hungary, but their plan was never 

implemented, as indeed it was never realized the idea of uniting Kosovo and Albania. 29 

However, in this atmosphere, August Kral, Austrian governor of northern Albania, invited 

Zogolli in Shkodër to join empire troops and calm down the situation in Albania. As soon as 

Essad left, Zogolli initiated a movement to bring back the Prince of Wied. He rallied his tribe 

and marched on Elbasan in central Albania which was in possession of Bulgarian troops. 30 

Firm on his idea of Albanian independence, he tried to set up a skeleton administration before 

the Austrians arrived, so that they could present themselves as a government, and try to 

negotiate for autonomy. Trying to acquire some local clients, the Bulgarians let him nominate 

the civil administration of the town. Elated with his success, Ahmet immediately marched on 

to Durrës which had been evacuated by the Allies. He telegraphed to his supporters: “Today 

we raised the national flag in our Prince‟s palace at Durazzo …”. 31 In the meantime, a 

provisional National Assembly, constituted by his supporters, elected a Commission of 

Initiative with a couple of former cabinet ministers (1914) like Aqif Pasha Elbasani who had 

29 See Malcolm N., "A Short History of Kosovo" 

Despite being separated from Albania, the territory of Kosovo occupied by the Austrians remained also 

separated from the area occupied by the Bulgarians. This division has been a source of serious political tensions 

between the two powers. When in November, the Bulgarian army's Third Division had won both Prishtina and 

Prizren, which had surpassed the limit agreed in advance by the two governments for the expansion of the 

Bulgarians, instead of delivering these areas to the Austrians, the Bulgarian soldiers settled there and settled also 

their civil administration, which was then extended to the district of Gjakova. King Ferdinand of Bulgaria rushed 

to visit the area and in February 1916 he tried to convince the Austrians that "a large part of the Kosovo 

population was Bulgarian." In April of that year, the Austrians gave up their plans, allowing Bulgaria to occupy 

Pristina and Prizren, asking only their withdrawal from Gjakova. 

30 Zavalani T., Histori e Shqipnis, p. 252 

31 Swire, The Rise of a Kingdom, p. 260 

28


never resigned, and Zogolli in the chair, with the intention to call together a national 

Assembly of duly accredited representatives from all over Albania as soon as possible. 

Finally, on 3 March 1916, after he dispatched token forces to the other towns of the south 

central region – Lushnjë, Fier, and Berat, Ahmet Bey sent out envoys with an invitation to the 

chiefs and beys of all Albania, Kosovo, Çameria, and Albanian colonies abroad, to send 

accredited delegates to the National Assembly to be held in Elbasan on the 18 th March 1916, 

which would consider the present situation of the country and take the necessary measures to 

safeguard its vital interests. 32 

The programme of the Assembly predicted to express national gratitude to Vienna and Sophia 

for allowing the national flag to be raised in Albania; to express the desire of the nation to His 

Majesty King William for his return to the country as soon as possible; and to discuss the 

manner in which Albania should be governed while awaiting the King‟s return. 33 

Given the Austria-Hungary support in 1913, Ahmet voiced confidence that she would assist 

the Albanian people in their claims to secure for their country „the expansion of a frontier line 

in accordance with the principle of nationality‟ 34 , and thus he had been premature while 

greeting them as liberators. Ahmet had written to August Kral in Shkodër, expressing the 

hope that the aims of the Assembly would have the support of his government. But a new 

Albanian client state was really not what Austria-Hungary wanted, and so the Austro- 

Hungarians forbade the Assembly to meet by all means, thereby shattering Albanian 

confidence that Austria-Hungary was only too willing to placate the country she had 

conquered. Austrian troops took possession of Elbasan before the Assembly could meet, 

replacing the Bulgarians who left for the south. They stated that all political assemblies were 

banned in times of war in the territories occupied by the Austro-Hungarian army. Moreover, a 

reported outbreak of cholera at Elbasan and quarantine orders followed by road-blocks, made 

the meeting impossible. 

Aqif Pasha Elbasani resigned and Ahmet retired to Mati. This event, however, had brought 

Zogolli to the forefront of national affairs. Through the efforts of their agent Prince Ludwig 

Windischgrätz, the Austrians convinced Ahmet to recruit and command Albanian volunteers 

32 

Dako K., Zogu the First, King of the Albanians, p. 72, see also op. cit. Tomes p. 29 

33 

Dako K., pp. 71-72 

34 

Swire, The Rise of a Kingdom, p. 262 

29

for actions against the Italians, in exchange for 50.000 levas and the rank of colonel in the 

Austro-Hungarian army, in a try to keep him busy. 35 His followers were offered positions on 

the Albanian Civil Administrative Council, the Austrian occupation regime which had been 

formed at Shkodër with August Kral. Though he had accepted, Zogolli and his men never 

really came under the command of an Austro-Hungarian colonel as they were requested to do. 

Asked about Zogolli as a collaborator, August Kral said that he had displayed a fanatical 

belief in Albanian independence: “No means were negligible to achieve this purpose. He was 

appointed an Austrian Colonel at the age of twenty-one. And I think he conceived this as a 

sacrifice he made for his country”. 36 

It was not long before the Austrian realized that Zogolli was attempting to beat them at their 

own game. While ostensibly recruiting troops, he was secretly engaged in negotiations with 

the Bulgarians in the hope of rekindling his military and administrative plans for an 

independent Albania. The Austrians, who had already recognized his capacities, feared he 

could disturb them in the future. For this reason they organized his exile in Austria. In late 

January 1917, he was invited to Vienna with a ceremonial delegation to offer Albania‟s 

compliments to the new Habsburg monarch, after the death of Franz Josef. The Emperor Karl 

granted them an audience, and the Lord of Mati was awarded the Commander‟s Cross of the 

Order of Franz Josef I. Then, on the final day, as he was about to leave his hotel, an Austrian 

officer knocked on the door telling him that “the Austrian Imperial Government thinks it 

necessary that he remains in Vienna as his presence in Albania impedes the interests of 

Austria in the country”. 37 Any attempt to leave the city would be treated as desertion. He 

understood that he was isolated and could not return to his homeland. Thus he stayed for two 

years in Vienna till the First World War ended and Austria-Hungary left Albania. 

Zogu always professed to have made the very best use of his years in Vienna. He got 

acquainted with Western society and culture. Indeed, he left Austria in 1919, coming back to 

Albania with a keener admiration for western civilization and a renewed sense of mission, 

along with fluency in German. 

35 

Prince Ludwig Windischgrätz, My Memoirs (London: 1921), p. 97, op. cit. Fischer pp. 14-15 

36 

Tomes, p. 32 

37 

Xoxe Z., 10 years of Kingdom, p. 24 – 26, see also Dako K., p. 79, op. cit Tomes 34 

30


The Lushnja Convention and Zogolli as Minister of Interior 

At the last phase of WWI, Albania was occupied by the armies of both parties. After subduing 

the Serbian army, the Austro-Hungarians took over the entire northern Albania up to Shkodër 

and some areas of central Albania. After arriving in Vlorë, the Italian army extended its 

control up to Durrës, Gjirokastër and Përmet. The allied army of Salonico, consisting of 

French, British and Italian units, attacked the German and Bulgarian forces through 

Macedonia; by the end of 1916, the French troops arrived at Korçë and at the southern coast 

of the lake of Pogradec. 38 

In November 1917, the Austro-Hungarian government published, in Albanian language, the 

text of the secret pact between Italy and France and Great Britain. This treaty, which had 

forecasted the breakup of the Albanian independent state, caused a profound shock and anger 

among Albanians. In March 1917, Italy had acted like champion of Albanian nationalism. 

Such a tactic had started with a symbolic gesture, raising the Albanian flag in the territories 

occupied by the Italian army. The 3 rd of June 1917, the Commander of the Italian forces of 

occupation, General Ferrero, emanated the Proclamation of Gjirokastra, which emphasized 

the unity of Albania under the protection of Italy. 39 

It was obvious at the beginning of 1918 that the Allies would defeat Germany. Austria- 

Hungary was leaving Albania, combated by France, while Bulgaria and Turkey capitulated by 

the end of 1918. At last, Germany signed the armistice conditions dictated by the Allies, 

bringing to an end World War I. 

The allied armies stayed in Albania until its fate was decided by the Conference of 

Ambassadors to be held in Paris. It had, however, already been destined for sacrifice by the 

countries of the Triple Entente, in the secret Treaty of London on 26 April, 1915, bribing Italy 

to the war on their side. Italy and Serbia were to get key bases in Albania. With Greece also 

on the winning side, Albania could easily end up losing most of its territories. But, by the end 


39 The text of the Proclamation was as follows: «Aujourd'hui 3 juin 1917, nous, Lieutenant-Général Jacinto 

Ferrero, sur les ordres du Gouvernement du Roi Victor-Emmanuel III, proclamons solennellement l'unité et 

l'indépendence de toute l'Albanie, sous l'égide et la protection du royaume d'Italie» (Commission chargée 

d'étudier les questions territoriales intéressant la Grèce, Paris, 4 March 1919, ASE, CPA, 357). 

31

of the war, three years later, a slice was not enough for the Italians – not if it meant the Serbs 

getting hold of a slice as well. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes disturbed Italian 

strategists, who worried that the Slavs were getting stronger. On 13 February 1918, the 

Foreign Minister, Sydney Sonnino, confirmed that the fate of Albania demanded a special 

interest in Italy, as it related to the general layout of the Adriatic. 

This was the difficult and delicate situation of Albania when Zogolli came back from Austria. 

Once in his soil, he re-established contacts with other Albanian flag-wavers, and together they 

tried to save the day. But this was not so easy. A Provisional Government, judged to be too 

accommodating to the Italians, and favoured by the bulk of Albanian notables, had been set 

up at Durrës on 15 December 1918, headed by Turhan Pasha. In February 1919, the issue of 

the de facto protectorate exercised by Italy in Albania was discussed by the Commission 

created by the Supreme Council to discuss territorial issues raised by the Memorandum 

presented on 30 December 1918 by Greek Prime Minister Venizelos. Italy supported the view 

of the inviolability of the border established by the Protocol of Florence of 17 December 

1913 40 , against the Greek claim to annex Northern Epirus. At the sitting of 4 March 1919, the 

British delegate, Crowe recalled that Italy had declared during the war, the protectorate over 

the whole of Albania and wondered: 

«S'agit-il de donner aux Albanais leur indépendance, ou bien seulement de savoir à quelle 

Nation le pays sera transféré: à la Grèce ou à l'Italie? La population consiste en grande partie 

en Albanais et en grande partie aussi en Grecs. L'Italie est-elle disposée à étendre son 

protectorat sur une population dont une grande majorité serait composée de Grecs?». 41 

The Italian delegate, De Martino, replied as follows: 

«Il n'est pas absolument exact que l'Italie ait proclamé un protectorat. Il est vrai qu'il y a eu 

une proclamation militaire à la date du 3 juin 1917. Dans cette proclamation, l'autorité 

militaire avait employé le mot "protection". Mais cette proclamation a été rectifiée par un 

discours que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères a prononcé à la Chambre peu de jours après 

et dans lequel il a précisé le point de vue du Gouvernement italien. Nous avons toujours lutté 

pour la sauvegarde de l'indépendance de l'Albanie. Nous avons toujours voulu empêcher 

40 Giannini A., L’Albania dall’indipendenza…, p. 69-70 

41 Commission chargée d'étudier les questions territoriales intéressant la Grèce, Paria, 4 March 1919, ASE, 

CPA, 357 

32


l'Autriche-Hongrie de mettre la main sur l'Albanie; c'est un de nos plus importants différends 

avec ce pays. L'expérience a démontré malheureusement que la nation albanaise qui, malgré 

sa physionomie si nette et si claire, constatée à travers des siècles d'histoire, n'a pas une 

cohésion parfaite, ne se trouvera probablement pas en condition de résister aux ambitions de 

tous les Etats qui l'environnent, soit le Monténégro, soit la Serbie, soit la Grèce. Pour cela 

nous estimons que la nation albanaise a besoin de l'appui d'une autre puissance, uniquement 

dans ses relations avec l'extérieur. Cette mission de préserver l'Albanie dans ses relations avec 

l'extérieur, c'est l'Italie qui la revendique, parce que la question d'Albanie est pour nous une 

question "adriatique", une question d'intérêt vital». 42 

Italy had become party to all agreements deciding its partitioning. Immediately after the war, 

Greece and Italy started negotiations for an agreement on their territorial claims in the basin 

of the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkan Peninsula. These negotiations ended in Paris on 

29 July 1919, when the Minister for Foreign Affairs Tittoni signed with the Greek Prime 

Minister, Venizelos, an agreement according to which: a) the Italian Government undertook 

to accommodate in front of the Peace Conference the Greek claims on Western and Eastern 

Thrace and the request for annexation of southern Albania, and at the same time, gave way to 

Greece's sovereignty over the Aegean islands occupied after the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12 

(the island of Rhodes would remain under Italian sovereignty, unless the possibility of a 

plebiscite to take place over five years), and b) the Greek government committed to support in 

front of the Peace Conference the Italian claims concerning the Albanian state and annexation 

of Vlorë and its hinterland, confirming the neutralization of the Corfu Channel already 

established by the London Conference of 1913-14; it undertook yet, if its claims in Thrace 

and northern Epirus be accepted, to withdraw in Minor Asia, to the benefit of Italian 

government, from some claims, maintaining all the other formulas in the memorandum sent 

by Venizelos December 30, 1918, at the Peace Conference. 

After the war, Italy extended its sphere of influence over almost the entire Albania, with the 

intention of establishing a protectorate exercised de facto since 1917, and to annex Vlorë. But 

the revelation in Athens for the content of the secret agreement Tittoni-Venizelos, by which 

Italy and Greece undertook to support each other's territorial claims in the Peace Conference, 

42 Ibidem 

33

caused yeast anti-Italian in Albania. Albanian nationalists seemed to be determined more than 

ever to defend at any price their sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

A Joint Memorandum of the United States, Great Britain and France, in December 19 th , 1919 

had provided that “Italy is to receive a mandate for the administration of the „independent 

state of Albania under the League of Nations” 43 . 

Exasperated by Italy‟s apparent intention to remain in occupation, her readiness to sacrifice 

Albanian territory to Greece and Yugoslavia for advantages elsewhere, and the refusal of the 

Yugoslavs to withdraw while the Italian remained, Albanians managed to convene a National 

Convention of 56 delegates in the small town of Lushnjë, on 28 January 1920. The 

assassination of Abdyl Ypi, one of the most uncorrupted Albanian nationalists, showed that 

this was not a simple undertaking. 44 Italian agents created serious obstacles. However, the 

members of the Convention constituted a fair representation of the people, but it was the 

progressive nationalist party that captured the majority of the seats, and eventually, imposed a 

purely nationalistic policy through the advent to power of its foremost leaders. 45 

The Albanians followed with great expectations the negotiations of the Peace Conference. An 

unexpected punch to them was the decision of the Supreme Court not to accept a 

representative of Albania to set out their points of view at a time when Europe‟s map was 

changing substantially on the basis of the nationality principle. With great confidence on their 

rights and on the international right, they waited patiently not only for the reconfirmation of 

the independent Albanian state of 1913, but also for the repair of the Kosovo injustice. But the 

events in Paris opened their eyes and they had to combat for their rights as European nations 

43 AMFAA, file 31, p. 48, Aide Memoire submitted by Chekrezi to the American State Secretary, 27 March 

1920. The British, French and American representatives at the Peace Conference, in a memorandum addressed to 

the Italian government, made the following proposals with regard to Albania: (i) Albania would be recognized in 

principle as an independent state; (ii) a mandate over the State of Albania would be accorded to Italy under the 

conditions implied in the Covenant of the League of Nations; (iii) a commission comprising one representative 

each from the Italian government, the League of Nations, and the State of Albania (the latter to be designated by 

the Allies) would draw up the conditions of the mandate and the organic law of the future State of Albania; (iv) 

the city of Vlorë, with the hinterland indispensable to its security and economic development, and the island of 

Saseno would be ceded to Italy in full sovereignty; (v) in the north and east the frontiers would be those fixed by 

the London Conference of 1913, however Albania should be left free to negotiate with Yugoslavia rectification 

of frontiers for local ethnic or economic reasons; (vi) Yugoslavia would have the right to construct and to 

operate railways through northern Albania north of latitude 41° 15‟, (vii) the southern frontier was still subject to 

negotiation, but a provisional line of demarcation could be adopted whereby, in substance, Greece would be 

given the district of Gjirokastër, whilst the future of the city of Korçë would be decided at a later date. Op.cit. 

Pearson p. 133-134 

44 Zavalani T., History of Albania, p. 258 

45 AMFAA, file 32, p. 49, 8 November 1920 

34


were not ready as yet to obey to the decisions of a supreme organization able to settle 

international conflicts without bias and with no distinction between greater and smaller 

countries. 

The delegates assembled at Lushnjë to express outrage at the prospect of Vlorë being left in 

Italy‟s hands and a mandate over Albania being accorded to her. They concluded that their 

country‟s cause was in a desperate position, that they had been misled in the past in the belief 

that the principles of justice and self determination would be applied to Albania, and that they 

had been wrong in remaining passive and trusting entirely in the Powers at the Peace 

Conference. They realized now that to rely on the justice of the Great Powers was to lean on a 

broken reed, and that Albanians had to be determined to make every sacrifice to oppose, with 

arms if necessary, all decisions which endangered the territorial integrity of their country and 

their complete independence. Fifty six Albanian leaders approved the Declaration of Lushnja 

– in effect a second independence declaration, by which the Albanians unanimously and 

unequivocally invoked President Wilson‟s principle of „self-determination‟ of nations, 

declaring that Albania was an independent State which was not prepared to accept an Italian 

mandate over any part of its territory, nor any form of foreign protectorate or mandate or 

limitation of its sovereignty, without the explicit consent of the Albanian people. 46 

The first act of the Convention was to overthrow the old Government, the Durrës buffer 

regime, which was done by the ballot, the members of the Convention having voted 

unanimously against its continuance in power. Through the instrumentality of the Italian 

military authorities that were in occupation of Albania, the government of Rome did its best 

to prevent the convocation of the Convention, and tried to retain in power the old government, 

so as to bring about a civil war, but the members of the government sent in their resignations, 

pledging themselves to abide loyally to the decisions of the Convention. 

The Convention went on with its work by making sweeping changes in the governmental 

system of the country, and forming a fresh and more active Provisional government. In all the 

former governments of Albania, since 1912, barring the period of Prince William of Wied, the 

head of the government was both Prime Minister and President, so that in order to change the 

ministry it was necessary to remove the head of the government. This dangerous anomaly that 

46 Ibid. file 31, p. 48, 27 March 1920 

35

had formally caused many convulsions was done away with the Convention which separated 

the two offices. The leaders of the Convention struck, at this point, on a happy combination; 

under the circumstances, it was found advisable to delegate the supreme authority to a 

Council of four, to which the name of Regency Council was given, for the purpose of 

emphasizing the determination of the people to safeguard the sovereignty of the state as 

against the attempt of the Powers to impose a foreign mandate on Albania. Of the four 

members of the Council, all of whom were old nationalist leaders and former Cabinet 

Ministers, two were Christians; (one Greek Orthodox, Dr. Mikel Turtulli, of Korçë, southern 

Albania; the other Roman Catholic, Bishop Luis Bumçi, of Lezhë, Northern Albania); and 

two Moslems; (Aqif Biçaku, of Elbasan, Central Albania, of the Reformed Moslem Sect of 

the Bektashis; and Abdi Toptani, cousin, but bitter opponent of Essad Pasha, of Tirana, of the 

Orthodox Moslem Sect). The Council elected its own chairman from among its members. 

This quatrumvirate represented the Chief Executive of Albania, but the range of its authority 

was very limited, because the real executive authority was delegated into the hands of the 

Council of Ministers or Cabinet which was composed of from six to eight members, as the 

political exigencies might require. It is to be remarked that in the formation of the Cabinet no 

attention was paid to sectional or religious considerations; there were appointed, instead, the 

most able men available among whom Ahmet Bey Zogolli. He was perhaps the youngest 

amidst the participants in the Lushnja Congress and was charged with its protection at the 

head of a civil armed force, ready to die but not allow an Italian solder pass. 47 The authority 

wielded by the Cabinet was as wide and large as in any other parliamentary government, 

being limited only by the dictates of the parliament, which was a single legislative body 

composed of the representatives of the Albanian people and who were elected by the 

population of the several districts. 

The Convention laid down also the fundamental laws for governmental change. The Regency 

Council could be removed or changed only by the Convention which was to be convoked by 

the Regency Council whenever the parliament, acting through the Cabinet, would will so. In 

its turn, the Cabinet, being responsible to the parliament, was wholly dependent on its vote of 

confidence or want of confidence. The parliament might be dissolved, if the Cabinet and the 


36


Regency Council were in accord on its dissolution, on condition that the people were directed 

to elect representatives to the new Parliament within a short time. 

It was agreed to call the National Convention in session for the purpose of making definitive 

arrangements as to the form of government, whether a republic or a constitutional limited 

monarchy under some European Christian Prince, 48 - which would necessarily bring about the 

abolition of the Regency Council, immediately after Albania had been recognized by the 

Powers. 49 

From this brief sketch of the governmental structure of Albania one may realize that the era of 

the reign of order that had set in Albania was due to the wise measures taken by the 

Conventions, in addition to the general conviction that pervaded the Albanian people to the 

effect that internal disorders were more deadly and more dangerous than their worst outside 

enemies. It was this conviction that kept in power the Lushnja government when it had no 

military means to compel obedience, but on the contrary was to face with the hostile Italian 

troops of occupation. It was again this conviction that made the people pay voluntarily their 

taxes to the government under Italian occupation, when the employees of the government had 

no money to pay them; and they did so for more than three months, that is to say as long as 

the Italians were in possession of all the success of revenue. Strong in its position, high in the 

confidence of the people, the Lushnja government set out to abolish and wipe off all former 

regional and sectional discriminations. Christian prefects and sub-prefects had been appointed 

to govern provinces where the majority was Moslem, and vice-versa. And yet, firm as the 

hand of the government was, it was nevertheless tempered with the spirit of toleration and 

justice, as it was evidenced by its action in voluntarily granting communal autonomy and 

liberty to half a dozen Greek-speaking villages that made up the district of Himara. It had also 

made it publicly known that it was ready to grant the same liberties to any other community 

that would give sufficient proof against their misuse. The Convention, thus, reaffirmed 

Albanian statehood, and reminded the Great Powers that they had already recognized the 

Albanian independent state since 1913. 50 




37

Twenty-four-year-old Ahmet Bey Zogolli of Mati, Minister of the Interior in the Provisional 

government with Sulejman Bey Delvina as Premier, was now taking the lead in the national 

movement. “The decisions of the Convention must be enforced and without loss of time. I am 

marching upon the capital, those who wish to remain may do so”, pronounced Zogolli 51 , who 

had achieved an office which carried with it control of the police and gendarmerie and 

Commander-in-Chief of the Albanian armed forces, though there was as yet scarcely any 

organized force other than his followers and an almost inexistent Albanian gendarmerie: a 

paramilitary force created by Dutch officers in Prince William‟s day and supposed to include 

3000 men. Tirana was chosen as provisory capital on geographic grounds in view of its 

central position inland, yet with access to the port of Durrës, but distant from the disturbed 

frontier regions of the country and from the Italian influence, which was particularly felt 

along the coast. Zogolli was given the urgent task of ensuring law and order, to enable the 

new government‟s authority to be extended, and it was his duty to see that the decisions of the 

Convention were enforced throughout the country, in anticipation of the withdrawal of the 

foreign troops. Consequently, as soon as he had been sworn into office he made known to the 

Albanian people, by a circular sent to all the prefectures of the country, the reason why the 

Convention had assembled and the decisions it had taken. 

When the Provisional Government established in the capital, it could only have power over 

the area between the Rivers Vjosa and Mati. All regions of Albania that had been controlled 

by the Durrës puppet government i.e. Italy, including the city itself, now came under the 

orders of the new Delvina government, except Vlorë and its surroundings. The administrative 

apparatus with Albanian civil servants did not change; it simply obeyed now to Tirana 

government. In the meantime, Korça, Pogradec and Shkodra were under the control of the 

French military troops. The area across the Drini coast had been delivered to the Serbs by the 

French General Louis Franchet d'Espérey. The other prefectures, including Vlora, were under 

the military command of Italy. A small part in the south was taken over by the Greeks. 

Foreign intrigues and propaganda had divided the Albanians as never before. Words like 

Gheg, Toskë, Turkophil, Grekophil, Serbophil, essadist, Mohammedans, orthodox, catholic, 

irredentist etc. had become very common. The administration was much heterogeneous, and 

regional working systems were different from each other. 

51 Dako K., Zogu the First, King of the Albanians , p 88 

38


As Minister of the Interior, Zogolli first tried to assert the authority of the Provisional 

Government by setting up a small but effective gendarmerie and a homogeneous 

administration system all over the country. The national government appointed him as Prefect 

of Shkodra as well. 52 Thus, in late February, he led his warriors north with the aim of securing 

Albania‟s largest town. An inter-allied occupation force was soon to be withdrawn, and 

rumour suggested that Serbian troops (with French connivance) had made preparations to 

seize the town. This was what Zogolli aimed and succeeded to prevent. Together with Hoxhë 

Kadri Prishtina, the Minister of Justice managed to forestall the Serbs. On 12 March, the allies 

marched out of the town after formally transferring control to the town council. Next 

morning, the council swore allegiance to Tirana. 

The situation in the “autonomous region of Korçë” also got through a critical phase in May 

1920. An unofficial news was spread that the French army was going to withdraw and Greek 

troops were going to take its place. Albanians prepared to combat. The Supreme Council in 

Paris considered as necessary to advise Greece not to take any such actions since Albania‟s 

frontier questions was still negotiating. This time, Athens government did not oppose. An 

agreement, known as the Protocol of Kapshtica, was signed between an Albanian delegation 

and the Greek authorities, on 28 May 1920. 53 Greece agreed that Korça remained to Albania 

on condition that Greek schools did not close. The French troops left and Tirana sent its 

employees to take control of the region. 

While Zogolli tried to stabilise the northern frontier, his colleagues came close to losing the 

very heart of the country to a revolt by adherents of Essad Pasha Toptani. In reality, Essad 

Pasha under the auspices of a tacit understanding between Italy and Greece, and with 

Yugoslav money, had attempted to overthrow the Albanian government, for the purpose of 

leaving the country without any defence abroad and in the throes of anarchy in the interior, at 

a most critical period of the life of the Albanian nation 54 . Happily the attempt failed to 

produce the results contemplated by Italy and Greece, but the event was very characteristic 

and might be repeated at any time, owing to the fact that the troops of one of the conspiring 

52 The French government showed once more its hostility towards Albania and its support of Serbia allowing 

Serbs to occupy the Mountain of Tarabosh and the coast of Buna river. In this way, Serbia gained another strip 

of the Albanian territory apart from the “strategic line” in the north-east. Zavalani T., History of Albania, p. 259 


54 AMFAA, file 28, Letter of the Commissioner of Albania to the US to H.E. the Secretary of State, Washington 

D.C., 7 May 1920 

39

nations, Italy, were still in Albania, ready to sustain and abet any attempts directed against the 

Albanian people. 

Essad himself remained in Paris and a government delegation was sent there, at the 

suggestion of Zogolli, to try to negotiate with him and discover precisely what he had in mind 

with regard to the fate of his country. The delegation did not expect to meet with any success 

but undertook the mission purely to gain time, while united forces were gathered from each of 

the administrative districts of Albania to confront the threat. A local agreement was signed 

with some of the rebels, who then dispersed, but the insurrection expanded and became very 

dangerous. However, Zogolli managed to destroy the movement. After repulsing this attack, 

the Interior Minister decreed draconian penalties for subversion. Not long time would pass 

and sensational news came from Paris: a young Albanian revolutionary student named Avni 

Rustemi, who was a member of the Committee for the Defence of the Nation, had shot him 

dead on 13 June 1920. His death was felt to be so opportune, and speculation that Zogu had 

connived at the murder only enhanced his reputation. If it were for the other members of the 

cabinet, Essad would most probably hold a seat in the government. 55 

The elimination of Essad coincided with another major turn of events. During April 1920, 

Italy had withdrawn its troops from Durrës and Shëngjin, seeing as Albanians had intensified 

the armed attacks against them. They were concentrated on the defence of Vlora, the port near 

the Straits of Otranto. The cession of Vlora and of its hinterland to Italy was deemed a deadly 

blow not only for the integrity of the Albanian State, but also to its very existence. The 

Albanian government had offered to satisfy Italy‟s demand for safety in the lower Adriatic the 

lease of the isle of Sazan as well as its right to establish a naval base in the interior of the Bay 

of Vlora. It could not go farther for one more reason: Greece‟s and Yugoslavia‟s claims for 

additional Albanian territory were largely based on their presumed right to be provided with a 

compensation for the Italian possession of Vlora. Moreover, Vlora was considered the heart 

of Albania. This is why on 9 June, a surprise attack by 3.000 Albanians led by the “National 

Defence” Committee, overran the Italian outlying positions and forced the Italians back into 

the town. The Tirana government denied responsibility for what was supposedly a 

spontaneous uprising, avoiding thus liability if the military attack proved unsuccessful, and 

resume, if necessary, diplomatic talks which were interrupted on 25 May. In truth, it had 

55 Ibid., file 28, Pandeli Evangjeli to Albanians at Bari, 2 May 1920 

40


already taken notice and accepted the attack plan of the Committee. It had promised the 

Committee material support, and its Minister of the Interior played a secret role in supplying 

the guerrillas. Finally, on 2 August 1920, Italy agreed to evacuate its army within a month. 

Although Albanians attributed this exclusively to their efforts, among the reasons for retreat 

were malaria and dysentery in Vlora, ministerial changes in Rome, and strikes and mutinies 

all across Italy. Giovanni Giolitti had succeeded Francesco Nitti as Prime Minster of Italy. 

Although he would have liked to retain possession of Vlora, Giolitti realized than an attempt 

to do so would prove fruitless, and so he decided to bring to an end the whole unpromising 

enterprise. 

In the north and east, the Serbs were again in the offensive. They were still in occupation of a 

zone of territory on the Albanian side well beyond the frontier line of 1913. French 

complaisance had allowed them to occupy further positions in northern Albania when the 

French troops were withdrawn from Shkodra, and General d'Espérey had handed over Mount 

Tarabosh and Buna River line to the Yugoslavs, although he had received no authority to do 

so. 56 Expansionists in Belgrade had published maps showing all of northern Albania within a 

Greater South Slav kingdom resembling the Serb empire of the fourteenth century. 

Consequently, the Albanians of Kosovo, fearing that when the frontier was defined they 

would be handed over to Yugoslavia had organized a Committee under the Presidency of 

Hasan Bey Prishtina, and disturbances of the peace continued to occur along the northern and 

eastern frontier sectors. As the Yugoslavs had promised to withdraw if the Italians left Vlora, 

they were now asked to do so but refused, reoccupying Kosovo and setting about its forcible 

„pacification‟ in reply and advancing towards Tirana from the east; whereupon Mati and 

Dibra counter-attacked supported by Zogolli‟s Albanian militia, fell upon the Yugoslav forces 

in those districts, driving them over the 1913 frontier, though the Albanians did not cross the 

line themselves. The Yugoslavs evacuated Dibër, and Hasan Prishtina forced them to retreat 

in the region of Shkodër 57 . The Yugoslav forces quickly recovered, however, pushing the 

Albanians back beyond their original positions. Zogolli resorted to intrigue and diplomacy, 

opening negotiations with the Yugoslavs while at the same time advising the government to 

address urgent notes to the powers. He was convinced that Albania had neither the military 

might nor the diplomatic sway to pursue its claim to Kosovo with success in the near future. 


57 Pearson, King Zog, A Self-Made…., p. 159 

41

What the nation urgently needed was peace. Thus he tried to get the Serbs to withdraw from 

Albania by promising to restrain the Kosovar guerrillas. Through intermediation of the fiancé 

of his sister Nafije, from Kosovo, Ceno Bey Kryeziu, he assured the Yugoslavs that he would 

personally work against Kosovo irredentism in exchange for a secession of hostilities 58 . In the 

meantime, the Italian government addressed a note to Belgrade asking the Yugoslavs to halt 

their advance on Albanian territory, since the Albanian frontier was in the hands of the Allied 

Powers and was to be decided by them only. The British Foreign Office also made similar 

representations in Belgrade against such actions. Furthermore the Albanian government had 

sent a representative to Cetinje to engage in direct negotiations with Belgrade. 

Fully aware of the necessity of recognition, the Albanian government decided to apply for 

admission to the newly formed League of Nations. On 12 October 1920, Pandeli Evangjeli, 

the chief member of the Albanian delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris addressed a 

formal request for admission to the League. 59 His request was accompanied by a 

memorandum which pointed out that Albania had been declared an independent State both by 

the Conference of Ambassadors, held in London in 1913, and by the Protocol of Florence of 

that year 60 . 

There was considerable opposition to the admission of Albania coming mainly from the 

Greeks and the Yugoslavs. 61 The protests that Albania was not a well-defined political entity 

were supported also by France. The application for admission, received on 19 October by the 

Secretary General of the League, Drummond, was considered as regular and submitted to the 

Fifth Committee of the Assembly. At that time, Italy had not yet recognized the Albanian 

government of Sulejman Bey Delvina, with whom had in fact established relations and had 

concluded the preliminary Protocol of Tirana on August 2, 1920. On November 5, 1920, 

Italian Foreign Minister, Sforza, sent to the head of the Italian Delegation to the League of 

Nations, Tittoni, the following statements about the attitude to adopt in relation to the 

admission of Albania: "Obstructing would be in contradiction with our statements about the 

independence of Albania and favoring it could even undermine, in respect to the allies and 

58 

Daniel Ravani, Zogu I, König der Albaner, Zeitschrift für Politik (November 1931), p. 497, op. cit. Fischer, p. 

25 

59 

ASCA, Fund 251, file 33, 1920. Letter of the Head of the Albanian delegation in the Peace Conference of 

Paris, Pandeli Evangjeli to E. Drummond, 12 October 1920 

60 

Fischer, p. 25, Pearson, p. 160 

61 

Puto A., Problemi i statusit të Shqipërisë në Lidhjen e Kombeve dhe në Konferencën e Ambasadorëve në vitet 

1920-1921, Studime Historike, n. 3, 1965, p. 14 

42


pending resolution of Adriatic, the Albanian question in relation to the Treaty of London 

(Article 7) 62 to which we must meanwhile retain its value” 63 . 

The Albanian delegation, headed by Fan Noli, in response to comments by the Greek and 

Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation about the lack of an Albanian government recognized by other 

states 64 , had adduced in favor of its proper application for admission the recognition of the 

Tirana government by Italy. The Albanian delegation defended its thesis mainly in the 

international framework based on the fact that Italy had a Minister Plenipotentiary in Albania 

and that the Rome Government had concluded an agreement with the government of Tirana. 65 

A few days later, Sforza clarified to Tittoni the Italian government's position on Albania: 

"Royal Government has not accorded formal recognition to the Provisional Government of 

Albania, although not contrary to direct its policy so as to promote Albania‟s independence, 

ever since by doing so it will safeguard the direct Italian interests. Relations of Italian agents 

with Albanian ones stemming from Albania‟s military occupation by Italy, during the war and 

armistice by the Royal Government, shall be deemed in fact relations interceding between 

these agents and Albanian authorities that actually are in power. As a result although Castoldi, 

Minister Plenipotentiary, is in Durres as an unofficial agent responsible to maintain such 

relationship, he is not equipped with letters of credence nor was ever accredited to Albanian 

government. Similarly, the Royal Government has no Consuls neither in Shkodër nor to Vlorë 

where two unofficial agents are in charge of the protection of Italian interests and thus 

without exequatur. Tirana agreement had to be concluded with the said de facto Albanian 

Government to regulate matters related to return of our troops from Vlora accordingly 

mobilization. The Royal Government considers that this agreement is in respect of the simple 

nature of res inter alias acta. 66 

Despite these obstacles, Albania was finally admitted as a full member, due largely to the 

South African Delegate, Lord Robert Cecil, who became the principal advocate of her cause. 

He emphasized the fact that Albania had the necessary characteristics of a perfectly 

62 

Article 7 of the London Treaty of 26 Apreil 1915, provided that: „L ' Italie sera chargée de représenter l ' Etat 

d ' Albanie dans ses relations avec l ' étranger“. (Trattati e Convenzioni, v. XXIII, p. 288). 

63 

Sforza to Tittoni, Rome, 5 November 1920, ASE, P 1919-30, 703 

64 

Puto A., Problemi i statusit …., p. 10 

65 

Ibid., Tittoni to Sforza, Geneva, 23November 1920, h. 21.00 

66 

Ibid., Sforza to Tittoni, Rome, 26 novembre 1920 

43

constituted State, and had given evidence that she was a State that desired to live. Albania 

had, in common with other Balkan nations, suffered and aid should be given to her 67 . 

67 Official Journal of the League of Nations, 4 December 1920 

44


CHAPTER II 

THE ROLE OF ZOGU IN BUILDING THE NEW ALBANIAN STATE 

Zogu the Minister of War and Prime Minister 

In the early 1920s, in the undoubtedly anarchic Albania there were two main groups, 

apparently irreconcilable, which characterized the evolving of Albanian society. Reactionary 

beys came to the fore in the Progressive Party, leaving most westernizers in the Popular Party. 

They could not be considered political parties in the Western sense, however, since both 

presented identical vague programs supporting reform, education and the material 

development of the country. 

On 20 November 1920, the government of Sulejman Delvina resigned and the National 

Council, the Parliament established at the Convention of Lushnjë, also dissolved itself. The 

Council of Regency decided to proceed with a general election for a new National Council. 

Delvina‟s resignation, almost immediately after the Yugoslavs had been persuaded to halt in 

their advance into northern and eastern Albania, was due ostensibly to quarrels among the 

ministers. But it was most likely engineered by Zogolli who hoped to make his move in the 

ensuing crisis 68 . 

Delvina‟s government has been credited with numerous achievements. Possibly the most 

significant one was its successful handling of the threat of foreign intrigue, and internal 

insurrection, due primarily to Zogolli, who had perhaps been somewhat too successful. The 

immediate problem facing Delvina‟s new government was to force the Italians to leave the 

country. The Assembly rejected any plans for a mandate or protectorate for Albania, and on 3 

68 Vlora, Lebenserinnerungen (Memoirs), p. 140, op. cit. Fischer p. 26 

45

June 1920 the Italian high command was sent an ultimatum demanding that it hand over the 

towns of Vlorë, Tepelena and Himarë to the new Albanian government. The disdainful 

Italians totally ignored the ultimatum. Around three thousand peasants were therefore 

encouraged to attack the Italian troops. The Italians were eventually forced to sign an 

agreement with the Albanian government which led to their final withdrawal from alla 

Albanian territory except the island of Sazan on 3 September. In the meantime, Yugoslav 

units had advanced to a strategic line inside the 1913 frontier, pending the decision of the 

Conference of Ambassadors which had by then be reconvened. Unable to dislodge the 

Yugoslavs through military means, Zogu used his personal connections in Belgrade to assure 

the Yugoslavs that he would personally work against Kosovar irredentism in exchange for a 

secession of hostilities. 69 The ever hopeful and incredibly persistent Essad Pasha had, 

meanwhile, presented himself at the Peace Conference as the only legal representative of 

Albania. 

After the general election in which a system of indirect voting provided ample scope for 

fraud, Delvina vacated his seat to Ilias Vrioni, who came from a prominent landowning 

family, and represented the winning Progressive Party. His government consisted primarily of 

the beys who controlled the Christian and Moslem peasantry in the western and central plains 

as well as people who became known as bureaucratic beys who had served in one capacity or 

another in the Ottoman administration or the army 70 . 

Zogolli, holding no more the post of the Interior Minister, joined the opposition Popular 

Party, which included also Bishop Fan Noli whose orthodox deputies had initially supported 

the Progressives. Though prominent, he was never well enough integrated to be called a party 

leader. What is more, he soon became dissatisfied with his position in the Popular Party, and 

decided to search for other means to reach his goal of political power. He found such a 

vehicle in the “Clique”, a secret society formed well before 1914. When Zogolli gained 

control of it in 1920, the Clique attracted most of the Popular Party‟s leader and a number of 

chieftains. It included members of the intellectual classes of southern Albanian with Eshref 

Frashëri as its best politician, reinforced by such prominent Kosovo chieftains as Bajram 

Curri and Hasan Prishtina 71 . Frashëri made an alliance with Zogolli considering him as the 

69 Op. cit. Vickers M., The Albanians: a modern history, p. 95 

70 Dako K., p. 102, op. cit. Fischer p. 26 

71 FO 371/7330 (C818/818/90): Durazzo 5 October 1923, op. cit. Fischer p. 28 

46


strongest man to keep north Albania under control and obeying to the central government. 72 

Zogolli and the Clique consummated their marriage of convenience and hoped to use one 

another temporarily. Zogolli was now in the position to make his bid for power. Surprisingly, 

later his own ranks formed opposition against him. The leaders of that opposition were Hasan 

Prishtina and the Muslim Regent, Aqif Pasha, who feared Zogolli‟s growing influence in the 

region. 

In the meantime, the Albanian state borders continued to be at risk. In southern Albania, 

Greek irregulars put Muslims to flight in order to show how Greek it all was to compilers of 

population statistics. In the north-east, refugees streamed out of Kosovo. The Yugoslav 

Government evicted ethnic Albanians to make way for Serb colonization, and Kosovar beys 

ended up in Tirana, demanding retaliation. The Albanian government fully convinced of the 

lack of the Yugoslav will to hold fair and realistic negotiations, addressed once more a public 

complain to the Secretary General of the League of Nations. 73 At the session of 25 June of the 

Council of the League, Fan Noli set forward on behalf of the Albanian government the 

occupying policy of Albanian territories by Yugoslavia and its heavy consequences for the 

Albanian people. 74 The Yugoslav representative, Jovanovic, in his intervention at the Council 

tried to defend the “right” of Yugoslavia to keep occupied after 1918 a part of the Albanian 

territory – the so called “demarcation line” - and reject the responsibilities of the Yugoslav 

government for the continued aggression to the Albanian population. 75 

A dangerous situation grew even worse in July 1921. The Mirdita clans with Gjon Marka 

Gjoni, from Prizren 76 , announced their secession from the rest of Albania, and proclaimed the 

establishment of the Mirditë Republic. The Yugoslavs had given arms and money to Marka 

Gjoni 77 , and at the same time had flared up once more the hostilities between Albania and 

Yugoslavia. 78 In order to dispute a possible redefinition of the northern border, they attempted 

72 

Op. cit. Zavalani T., Histori e Shqipnis, p.272 

73 

ASCA, Fund 251, file 51, 1921, Letter of the Albanian delegation in Paris addressed to the Secretary General 

of the League of Nations E. Drummond, 29 April 1921; see also Simonard A., p. 372 

74 

Ibid., file 149, 1921, Speech of Fan Noli at the Council of the League of Nations, 25 June 1921 

75 

Ibid., file 41, 1921, Speech of the representative of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, Jovanovic, at the Cuncil 

of the League of Nations, 25 June 1921 

76 

Zavalani T., p. 264 

77 

Vickers M., Albania …., p 103 

78 

Ibid., p. 265; ASE, 1919-30, 700, Montagna to Tomasi della Torretta, Athens, 2 August 1921, h. 21.30: 

“Mirdita separatist movement has failed: Marka Gjoni took refuge in Serbia, I have learned here that the 

47

to sow disaffection in Albania itself by instigating the Mirdita clan to revolt against the Tirana 

Government. The then Belgrade “Tribuna” newspaper unveiled the plans of Pašić‟s 

government by writing that “Yugoslavia must occupy northern Albania unless it wants its 

borders become mere imaginary lines” 79 . 

Onn 25 June 1921, after its admission to the League of Nations, Albania drew the attention of 

the Council, under Article 11 of the Covenant, regarding the situation with neighboring 

countries (Greece and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State), which constituted a threat to peace. 80 On 

6 August 1921, again under Article 11 of the Covenant, the Albanian government drew the 

attention of the Council on events in the region of the Mirditë, which threatened to undermine 

the peace with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. In September 1921, Albania again submitted to 

the Council the situation in Mirdita where Marka Gjoni incited the population against the 

government of Tirana and trying to invade the region, helped by two majors of Serbian Army 

and 1200 Yugoslav comitaji. On 16 July 1921, Marka Gjoni addressed from Pristina a 

telegram to the Italian Foreign Minister, Tomasi Della Torreta, in which - as communicated 

by the same Tomasi Torreta to the Italian Agent in Albania, Castoldi on 21 July 1921 - he 

informed that: 

“Twelve flags of Mirdita decided not to recognize the government in Tirana breaking all ties 

with it and proclaimed the Republic of Mirdita, unprotected by none but with a program ready 

to reach agreement with Greece, Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. It asks that the 

Republic of Mirdita is recognized as an independent state.” 81 

While to many Albanians the obvious response in this case was a full scale uprising in 

Kosovo 82 , Zogolli and his followers believed that this entailed too great a risk. In an unofficial 

capacity, he suggested two options: either send a commission to treat with the Mirditë or send 

a force of at least 8.000 men to crush Marka Gjoni‟s formidable force of 2.000 tribesmen. 

The division of opinion cut across party lines, and finally the Government decided to send 

some 1.200 men, not enough to effectively deal with the situation. Nevertheless, at first all 

movement was viewed with much sympathy in Belgrade; Greek government has provided no response to demand 

recognition of the revolutionary government of Mirdita”. 

79 According to “Journal de Geneve”, 6 August 1921, ASCA, Fund 246, file 35, 1921, p. 14 

80 ASCA, Fund 251, file 51, 1921, Letter of the head of the Albanian delegation in Geneve addressed to E. 

Drummond, 7 July 1921; ASCA, Fund 263, file 35, 1921, p. 12-13 

81 ASE, 1919-30, 700, Tomasi della Torreta to Castoldi, Rome, 21 July 1921, h. 24.00 

82 ASCA, Fund 251, file 39, 1920, pp. 7-8: There existed in Shkodër the Committee for the Protection of 

Kosovo,which was preparing a revolution that would break up in Yugoslavia. 

48


went well and Orosh, the capital of Mirdita, was captured, whereas Marka Gjoni fled to 

Yugoslavia. 83 The Albanians succeeded in driving the insurgents and the Yugoslavs back 

once, but the unrest in Mirdita were being gradually merged with the rest of the border 

clashes between Albanians and Yugoslavs. In September, the Government dithered helplessly 

while the Serbs intervened in support of their Mirditë clients, and the surrounding area was 

overrun. The Yugoslavs and their allies remained in possession of this territory until after the 

decision of 9 November 1921 on the borders of Albania, the Ambassadors' Conference asked 

the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to withdraw troops that were beyond the Albanian 

boundaries. 84 

At this point, the already hard pressed Vrioni regime had been weakened by the Mirditё crisis. 

Although Ilias Bey was an honest man, a patriot and even something of a liberal, his 

weakness of character and inability to make decisions had created an intolerable situation. 

Zogolli did not wait long to take advantage of the chaos and drew up plans to overthrow 

Vrioni. 85 But as he moved to consolidate his support within the Clique, a point of serious 

contention arose which eventually split the organization. The problem was Kosovo. Zogolli 

was firm in his belief that Albania should first establish itself as a viable state before pursuing 

irredentism. Indeed, in August 1920, while Dibra patriots were fighting to free the Albanian 

territories under control of the Yugoslav forces, the leaders of the Committee “National 

Protection of Kosovo” believed that it was the right moment to free not only the Albanian 

territories within the borders established in 1913, but Kosovo as well, by means of armed 

insurrection. To this end, the committee tried to provide arms which would be sent to the 

patriotic circles in Kosovo and used for its freedom and union with Albania. But Delvina‟s 

83 Ibid., Montagna to Tomasi della Torretta, Athens, 2 August 1921, h. 21.30; see also Milo P., p. 142 

84 On 7 November 1921, the Ministers of France, Britain and Italy in Belgrade, Clément-Simon, Young and 

Manzoni, sent to the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Pasic, the following collective Note Verbale: «L'attention de 

la Conférence des Ambassadeurs a été appelée sur la situation actuelle dans l'Albanie septentrionale. Des 

renseignements que la Conférence a reçus il ressort que le Gouvernement Serbe-Croate-Slovène aurait entamé 

des operations militaires contre l'Albanie et que ses troupes auraient pénétré en territoire albanais. Les 

Puissances estiment que ces opérations ne sont en rien justifiées. Elles viennent d'inviter le Gouvernement Grec 

à cesser toute action militaire dans le Sud de l'Albanie. Elles tiennent à insister de nouveau auprès du 

Gouvernement Serbe-Croate-Slovène pour qu'il s'abstienne de toute opération contre l'Albanie et qu'il retire 

celles de ses troupes qui auraient franchi la frontière. Elles tiennent d'autant plus à voir le Gouvernement Royal 

se conformer à cette demande que la Conférence des Ambassadeurs est sur le point de prendre une décision 

fixant les frontières d'Albanie. Les représentants des Gouvernements de France, Grande Bretagne et Italie sont 

également chargés de faire savoir au Gouvernement Royal que la Conférence des Ambassadeurs attire en même 

temps l'attention du Gouvernement Albanais sur la nécessité de ne point se départir de son calme et de prevenir 

toutes agitations sur la frontière». Manzoni to Tomasi della Torreta, Belgrade, 14 November 1921, ASE, P 1919 

– 1930, 704 

85 See also Zavalani T., Histori e Shqipnis, p. 273 

49

government (Zogu was member of the government‟s cabinet) did not approve such an 

initiative as it deemed inappropriate the circumstances, thus generating international 

complication harmful for Albania. 86 This position was appropriate for the time. The initiative 

could give ground to Belgrade to undertake an open aggression against Albania, which could 

endanger the existence of the Albanian independent state. “Based on the good relations with 

Yugoslavia”, the Albanian government had proposed to the Yugoslavs to set up a joint 

commission for borders‟ control, settling of eventual incidents and exchange of prisoners of 

war as well as sending to Belgrade an Albanian delegation which would “lay the foundation 

of a sustainable peace between the two friendly peoples” 87 . The same policy was followed 

also by Vrioni‟s government. Newly established, it has addressed a note to the Yugoslav 

government stating that “one of the main objectives of its program was building friendly and 

sincere relations with Yugoslavia and all other neighbouring countries...” 88 , asking to the 

Yugoslav government to respect the Albanian territorial integrity and evacuate the Albanian 

territories occupied by the Yugoslav troops in 1918 and in 1920 89 . 

The Kosovo chieftains in the group naturally took exception to Zogolli‟s position. Hasan 

Prishtina, Bajram Curri and others hoped that by direct or indirect association with the chain 

of intrigue continually being carried out against the Yugoslavs, they might succeed in 

regaining Kosovo at an early date. In pursuance with this policy, they disassociated 

themselves from Zogolli‟s attempt to overthrow Vrioni and aligned with those forces, 

primarily the northern Catholics under Gurakuqi, who were being financially supported by 

Italy 90 . In fact, the headquarter of the “National Protection of Kosovo” Committee was in 

Rome, and Gurakuqi, Curri and Prishtina were “declared friends of Italy and Fascism”. 91 

Undaunted by this setback, Zogolli and his truncated Clique decided to attempt to overthrow 

Vrioni regardless. However, he could not do so alone. An emergency coalition known as the 

Sacred Union formed in order to oppose Vrioni. Zogolli thereupon allied himself with it. He 

hoped to be prominent personality in the Sacred Union Cabinet, but he was opposed by the 

86 

ASCA, Fund 252, file 115/1, 1920, p. 312; see also History of Albania, Vol. III, Tirana, 1984, p. 236 

87 

Ibid., Fund 251, file 39, 1920, p. 23, 60 … 

88 

Ibid., file 33, 1920, “Note of the Albanian government addressed to the Yugoslav government”, 13 December 

1920 

89 

Ibidem 

90 

AA Politische Abteilung II, PO Bd. 1: Belgrade, 22 June 1921, op cit. Fischer, p. 30 

91 

ASCA, Fund 251, file 39, 1920. See also Micheletta L. “La resa di conti. Il Kosovo, l’Italia e la dissoluzione 

della Jugoslava (1939-1941), p. 34 

50


Regent Aqif Pasha. 92 Vrioni, who had attempted to hang on to his position by rearranging his 

government, quickly fell as a result of pressure from this new group. After he resigned the 

premiership, a new government formed with Pandeli Evangjeli as Premier. At start, the 

compromise worked quite well for Zogolli appointed Minister of War. He also took joint 

command of an expeditionary force to go and treat with the Mirditë concerning the still 

unresolved Mirditë Republic question, which brought him to a position of considerable 

power. The post of Commander-in-Chief of the Albanian national forces, at the age of 26, 

afforded him the opportunity further to strengthen his position. 

Meanwhile, a series of events had occurred. Intervention of the President of the United States 

of America Woodrow Wilson, who had come to the Paris Peace Conference to enshrine the 

principle of self-determination and build an international system in which small nations could 

flourish, had frustrated the project of partitioning Albania among her neighbours (The 

Albanian question need to be discussed separately from the question of Fiume – “La question 

Adriatique”, had declared the American President); Albania‟s admission into the League of 

Nations on 17 December 1920; further revision of the special Italian interests in Albania; and 

intervention of David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of His Majesty‟s Government, who 

telegraphed to Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League at Geneva 93 , followed by 

angry diplomatic protests to Belgrade. 94 Such events brought rapid international recognition 

for the new government and Albanian independent State. With the Paris Declaration of 9 

November 1921 the Conference of Ambassadors had decided to bring the Albanian question 

to a close. On 9 November 1921, the Ambassadors' Conference adopted the Decision on the 

borders of Albania, so conceived: 

«L'Empire britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon, Considérant qu'il y a lieu de confirmer le 

tracé des frontières de l'Albanie, tel qu'il a été établi en 1913 par la Conférence des 

Ambassadeurs de Londres; Considérant, d'autre part, que les frontières méridionales de 

92 See also Pearson O., Albania and King Zog: independence, republic and monarchy 1908-1939, p. 173 

93 “Continued advance of Yugoslav forces into Albania being of nature to disturb international peace, His 

Majesty’s Government desire to call the attention of the Council thereto, and request that you will take 

immediate steps to summona meeting of the council to consider the situation and to agree upon measures to be 

taken under Article 16, in the event of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government refusing or delaying to execute their 

obligations under the Covenant. Ambassadors’ Conference has now decided frontiers of Albania, which will at 

once be notified to interested parties”. (Signed D. Lloyd George, 7 December 1921). Op. cit. Pearson O. Albania 

and King Zog …., pp. 173-174: see also Simonard p. 389, Swire p. 385 

94 See Zavalani T., Histori e Shqipnis, p. 264 

51

l'Albanie ont été fixées sur le terrain par la Commission de délimitation qui a rédigé le 

Protocole final de ses travaux à Florence, le 17 décembre 1913, et que la Commission de 

délimitation des frontières Nord et Est a dû interrompre ses travaux en 1914 à cause des 

hostilités, Décident: I. Les Gouvernements signataires de la présente Décision reconnaissent 

le Gouvernement de l'Albanie, constituée en Etat souverain et indépendant. II. Une 

Commission composée de quatre Membres, nommés par les Gouvernements signataires de la 

présente Décision, sera chargée, dans le plus bref délai, de tracer sur le terrain la ligne- 

frontière Nord et Nord-Est de l'Albanie, dans les conditions indiquées ci-après. III. A l'effet 

d'assurer les relations de bon voisinage entre les Etats situés de part et d'autre de la ligne- 

frontière à tracer, ladite Commission devra tenir compte, autant que possible, des limites 

administratives et des intérêts économiques locaux. Elle devra, notamment, rectifier le tracé 

arrêté en 1913 par la Conférence des Ambassadeurs de Londre». 95 

Thus, it reaffirmed its borders decided in the Treaty of London in 1913. On 9 November, the 

Ambassadors' Conference adopted, together with the Decision on the borders, the Declaration 

on the special interests of Italy in Albania, whose draft was approved at its meeting on 

September 28: 

«L'Empire britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon reconnaissant que l'indépendance de 

l'Albanie ainsi que l'intégrité et l'inaliénabilité de ses frontières, telles qu'elles ont été fixées 

par leur Décision en date du 9 novembre 1921, est une question d'importance internationale; 

Reconnaissant que la violation des dites frontières, ou de l'indépendance de l'Albanie, pourrait 

95 ASE, CPV, 302, Ambassador’s Conference, Paris, 9 November 1921; see also Official Journal of the League 

of Nations, December 1921, p. 1195 – 1. Albania was recognized by the Principal Allied Powers as a Sovereign 

and Independent State. 2. The frontier line traced by the London Conference of Ambassadors in 1913 was 

confirmed. The southern frontiers of Albania had been delimited on the spot by the Boundary Commission which 

drew up the Protocol of Florence on December 17 th , 1913. The delimitation on the spot of the northern and 

eastern frontiers, which had been interrupted by the war of 1914, was to be executed by a Delimitation 

Commission consisting of four representatives of the Principal Allied Powers. 3. The 1913 line was to be 

rectified, in the northern and eastern sectors, at four specified points, which three rectifications to the advantage 

of Yugoslavia and one in favour of Albania: (a) to the north-east of Shkodër the frontier would be slightly 

modified so as to guarantee the approaches of Podgorica; (b) a slight rectification of the frontier in favour of 

Yugoslavia would be made in the neighbourhood of Prizren; Albania would thus lose Gorë on her eastern 

frontier with 50,000 inhabitants; (c) the road from Dibër to Struga would pass entirely through Yugoslav 

territory; (d) the district of Lin would be wholly within Albania, thus assuring economic communications 

between Elbasan and Korçë along the shores of Lake Ohrid. The Conference definitely assigned to Albania the 

two provinces of Korçë and Gjirokastër as they were overwhelmingly Albanian, thus obliging Greece to return 

twenty-six villages to Albania. However the two Albanian villages Hoti and Gruda were still included wholly 

within Montenegro. 4. The Delimitation Commissioners were empowered to take advisers from the States on 

either side of the frontier line and to consider requests from the Governments concerned. See Pearson O., 

Albania and King Zog…, pp. 175-176 

52


constituer une menace pour la sécurité stratégique de l'Italie, Sont convenus de ce qui suit: I. 

Au cas où l'Albanie se trouverait dans l'impossibilité de maintenir son intégrité territoriale, 

elle aura la liberté d'adresser au Conseil de la Société des Nations une demande d'assistance 

étrangère. II. Les Gouvernements de l'Empire britannique, de la France, de l'Italie et du Japon 

décident, dans le cas susdit, de donner pour instructions à leurs Représentants dans le Conseil 

de la Société des Nations, de recommander que la restauration des frontières territoriales de 

l'Albanie soit confiée à l'Italie. III. En cas de menace contre l'intégrité ou l'indépendance, 

aussi bien territoriale qu'économique, de l'Albanie du fait d'une agression étrangère ou de tout 

autre événement, et au cas où l'Albanie n'aurait pas recours dans un délai raisonnable à la 

faculté prévue à l'article I, les Gouvernement susdits feront connaître la situation qui en 

résultera au Conseil de la Société des Nations. Au cas où une intervention serait jugée 

nécessaire par le Conseil, les Gouvernement susdits donneront à leurs Représentants les 

instructions prévues à l'article II. IV. Au cas où le Conseil de la Société des Nations 

déciderait, à la majorité, qu'une intervention de sa part n'est pas utile, les Gouvernements 

susdits examineront la question à nouveau, s'inspirant du principe contenu dans le préambule 

de cette Déclaration, à savoir que toutes modifications des frontières de l'Albanie constituent 

un danger pour la sécurité stratégique de l'Italie». 96 

Hence annexing to Italy the isle of Sazan, 5 miles off Vlora, as a naval base and recognizing it 

the right to a direct action to preserve its special strategic defense interests in the Adriatic 

under diplomatic situation existed before the Italian initiative for Albanian independence. 97 

96 Ibid., CA 151 

97 On 6 August, the new Italian Foreign Minister, Tomasi della Torretta, informed Longare Bonin that he had 

sent to the Italian Ambassador in London, De Martino, the following instructions on the formula proposed by 

Italy to the Allies for the recognition of special interests in Albania: “1. Allies recognize Albania as an 

independent state. 2. For Italy, the preservation of Albanian independence is a vital economic and strategic 

interest related to its defense of the Adriatic. 3. In this effect, since Italy took the initiative of spontaneous 

formation of an independent Albanian nation state has the duty to ensure that it consolidates and develops. 4. If 

the Albanian state would be lacking, despite a favorable attitude of the allies Italy, it is recognized to Italy the 

right to a direct action to preserve its special strategic defense interests in the Adriatic under diplomatic situation 

existed before the Italian initiative for Albanian independence.” Tomasi della Torretta a Bonin Longare, Rome, 6 

August 1921, ASE, CP, 12. The Conference of Ambassadors decided to adopt the “draft formula” on the special 

interests of Italy, but postponed the entry into force at the time the decision on the Albanian border. On 9 

November 1921, the Ambassadors' Conference adopted the decision on borders of Albania, whose art. I stated 

that: «Les Gouvernements signataires de la présente Décision reconnaissent le Gouvernement de l'Albanie, 

constituée en Etat souverain et indépendent». The Conference also decided that the Declaration on the interests 

of Italy in Albania came into force simultaneously with the decision on borders of Albania. Ambassadors’ 

Conference, CA 151, Parigi, 9 November 1921, ASE, CPV, 302. 

53

The Yugoslav troops withdrew to pre-war frontier. 98 By then Zogolli was still in Mirdita, 

where he had already enjoyed a good deal of success convincing the sub-leaders of the 

Mirditë tribe that Marka Gjoni was acting as a Yugoslav agent and that their loyalty should 

remain with Albania. A League of Nations Commission of Inquiry reached him on November 

19, and came to the same conclusion regarding Marka Gjoni. On November 28, Zogu had 

been authorized to extend a general amnesty to those who had taken part in the abortive 

Mirditë Republic. 99 The sub-leaders, accepting Zogolli‟s word of honour, agreed to this 

amnesty and made their submission to the government. 

But while Zogolli was in Mirdita, his success in Mirditë aroused fears among his political 

opponents that he would strengthen his already powerful position now with the support of the 

Mirdita as well. They were convinced that his aim was rule as a dictator and reduce the 

traditional power of regional leaders. 100 Consequently anti-zogists led by two Regents, Aqif 

Pasha and Mgr. Luigj Bumci, a northern Catholic bishop, organized a coup d’état. 101 They 

dismissed Evangjeli and appointed Hasan Prishtina, member of the Kosovo Committee and 

predicator of war as the only means to achieve union of Kosovo with Albania, as Prime 

Minister. 102 Not only was he a rabid of Kosovo irredentist with violent pro-Italian and anti- 

Yugoslav sentiments, but since the break-up of the Clique, he had become violently anti- 

Zogolli. He immediately proceeded to take steps against the Clique. He gave orders for a 

serious of arrests and replaced Zogolli with Bajram Curri, who at the time was guarding the 

Yugoslav frontiers with 500 government troops. The situation deteriorated. Not only 

Albanians, but also foreign chancelleries reacted adversely. The disintegration of Albania, 

less than a month after her diplomatic recognition, had threatened to reopen the Adriatic 

question at the very time when it was supposed to be coming to a close. 

As soon as he received notice, Zogolli led his warriors, including mainly members of his own 

tribe of Mati, into Tirana and reached the capital in four days, on 12 December 1921. A part 

of the population and politicians had already burst into protests against the Council of 

Regency and demanded Prishtina‟s resignation. Zogolli‟s supporters within the capital, by 

arguing that Evangjeli had been illegally and forcibly removed, and that Hasan Prishtina and 

98 Manzoni to Tomasi della Torreta, Belgrade, 14 November 1921, ASE, P 1919 – 1930, 704 

99 See Pearson O., Albania and King Zog..., p. 184, Simonard p. 388, Swire p. 377 

100 Zavalani T., p. 273; Pearson O., p. 184 

101 Dako K., p. 115; see also Pollo S. and Puto A., The History of Albania... 

102 Fischer B., pp. 32-33; see also Simonard p. 420, Swire p. 379 

54


his entirely Gheg cabinet were in the pay of the Italians, were able to stir up widespread 

opposition to the new government. As a result, Hasan‟s two day old government was shut 

down. Zogolli and his army entered Tirana unopposed and took control of the capital, left 

without Government after Prishtina's flee. For a few days he reigned as virtual dictator, 

substituting his own men for the government gendarmerie who were temporarily imprisoned 

against the mild protests of the tactful interim Prime Minister, Idhomene Kosturi, appointed 

by the Regency Council. In effect he carried out a coup d’état. 103 But once in control of the 

immediate situation, he moved to legally divest his already vanquished opponents of any 

status they might have had. On 22 December, the Parliament dismissed the Regents Aqif 

Pasha and Mgr. Bumci, and the Kosovar MPs as conspirators. This resulted in the resignation 

of the other two Regents who protested the dismissal of their colleagues. Zogolli took the 

opportunity to appoint four of his minions to the vacant posts. Furthermore, a law was passed 

setting up a High Court with retroactive powers to judge any minister or deputy acting against 

the Statute of Lushnjë. A new cabinet was elected on 25 December, headed by Xhafer Ypi, a 

landowner from Korca and a member of the Clique. International reaction was favourable. 

The young chief of Mati had shown himself to be decisive. Indeed the Prime Minister Ypi 

was merely a figurehead, for Zogu had effectively seized control. The British Minister Harry 

Eyres, one of the first foreign diplomats posted in Albania, and later Zogu‟s best adviser and 

confidant, believed that Ahmet Bey was „the moving spirit of the Cabinet‟ and „a natural 

leader of men‟ 104 . 

For the second time, Ahmet was given the post of the Minister of the Interior, a post which 

emerged as the most powerful. He had already understood its potential, and thus the first use 

he made of it was to stabilize his position by extending his influence to include groups that 

had hitherto been opposed to him. He turned for support to feudal beys, and those northern 

chieftains which had not joined the Kosovo ones. He ingratiated himself with Shefqet Bey 

Verlaci, Albania‟s wealthiest landowner, signing a marriage contract with him and 

announcing his engagement to his daughter. At the same time, he resorted to the time 

honoured tradition of “peace-money”, a method which had been used by Austria, Serbia and 

103 Pearson O., Albania and King Zog, p. 186-187; see also Fischer B., King Zog and … , Simonard A., Essay 

sur…. 

104 FO 371/7332, Annual Report 1921 

55

Montenegro to influence the clans. Chieftains of major tribes were given the rank of colonel 

in the army and paid in a regular basis. 

Accordingly, the Minister of the Interior took a lot of measures to set up and expand 

gendarmerie. He ordered the disarming of civilians 105 , arguing that „Albania would never 

know peace, until the number of guns in private possession was greatly reduced‟. This 

operation was successful in the centre and in the south of Albania, but it was a bold move 

with considerable risk in the north, where the highlanders considered this as an arbitrary 

infringement of their lawful right. A rifle was part of a mountaineer‟s dress. What is more, the 

leaders of the Kosovo Committee were determined to resist assumption of power by Zogolli. 

He had also ordered to lift the deputy mandates to Bajram Curri and Hasan Prishtina, leaders 

of the “Kosovo National Protection” Committee and wanted them dead. 106 They had planned 

with D'Annuzio, during the reign of Carnaro, military action for the liberation of Kosovo. 107 

At the time, Italian agents were at work encouraging the struggle of the Kosovars to weaken 

Yugoslavia 108 and undermine Albania, justifying this way a protectorate. A map with the 

Albanian ethnographic borders was then circulating in offices, cafés etc., and this cherished 

irredentism. Zog had blocked the action of Curri and Prishtina and had prevented the landing 

of arms and ammunition sent to St. John of Medua with two sailing ships. 109 Apart from this, 

his being selective as to who was to be disarmed, allowing his tribe of Mati to keep their 

weapons while demanding that rival tribes, particularly the Kosovars, but above all 

inhabitants in the border zone with Yugoslavia 110 surrender theirs, had a contrary effect, rather 

than preventing a northern uprising, this convinced his opponents to move even sooner. In 

addition, Ypi‟s and Zogolli‟s efforts to establish good relations with the Yugoslav 

government 111 arose the anger of the Kosovo Committee leaders. So by the end of February, 

105 

See The History of Albania, vol. III, pp. 258-261; see also Milo P., Shqipëria dhe Jugosllavia..(Albania and 

Yugoslavia), p. 151 

106 

Ibidem 

107 

Micheletta L. “La Resa dei conti....”, p.34; see also more in Buccarelli M., “Delenda Jugoslavia. 

D’Annunzio, Sforza e gli intrighi balcanici” del ’19 – 20, in Nuova Storia Contemporanea 

108 

See Tomes J., King Zog, a self-made…., p.50; ASCA, Fund 251, file 39, 1920, p. 7 

109 

Micheletta L., “La Resa dei conti....”, p.34 

110 

The History of Albania, vol. III, pp. 258-261 

111 

In reply to the de jure recognition of Albania‟s independent state by the Yugoslav government [ASCA, Fund 

251, 1922, file 93, Telegram of the Prefecture of Shkodër to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tirana, 9 April 

1922], the Albanian government considered this act as a sign of the “friendly relations, which have started and 

will develop between two peoples” [ASCA, Fund 251, 1922, file 93, Telegram of the Head of the Albanian 

Government, Xhafer Ypi, to N. Pašić, 29 April 1922]. Both Albanian and Yugoslav governments tried to 

demonstrate their readiness to develop normal relations between them – for this s. Milo P., Shqipëria dhe 

Jugosllavia, p. 150 

56


they demanded the restoration of the Sacred Union government, determined to overthrow the 

Ypi-Zogolli government by force. They began to join forces with several other adherents to 

their cause. But the insurrection was badly organized, with the rebel leaders‟ advances 

uncoordinated. 

Bajram Curri and his men attacked the governmental forces, tool control of Tropojë and 

surrounded Krumë. 112 He headed for Shkodër, invited the leaders of Shkodër to join forces 

with him, but they refused to participate and advised him to abandon his project. The military 

operation, which had started on 14 January 1923, within the Albanian territory, on 27 January 

extended further including the neutral zone between Albania and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav 

and Albanian governments had asked to the Ambassadors‟ Conference, by the end of 

December 1922 and the beginning of January 1923, the disintegration of the neutral zone, 

which had become the shelter of the anti-zogist democratic patriots and Albanian insurrection 

groups in Kosovo fighting against the Yugoslavs. To eliminate this common risk, the 

governments of Tirana and Belgrade agreed to coordinate their actions. Thus, the Yugoslav 

government allowed the Albanian government to locate its military forces in the neutral zone 

in order to subdue the anti-zogist insurrection movement. 113 

However Bajram Curri came close to Shkodër, there was no battle for the city, for his men 

now refused to advance any further. “… He realized that public opinion was against him and 

his fellow-insurgents, and like a real patriot he withdrew with no bloodshed.” 114 Halit Lleshi‟s 

band crossed the Yugoslav frontier from Dibër and marched west to capture Elbasan, but they 

were surrounded at Martanesh by government troops. Elez Isufi, a chieftain of predominant 

influence in the mountain district of Dibër, a brave fighter but illiterate, tired of the sufferings 

of his people under Slavic occupation, managed with his men to reach on the threshold of 

Tirana. They defeated the government forces, occupied the outskirts of Tirana, and entered 

the city. The members of the Regency Council, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and most of 

the Deputies fled over the hills to Elbasan. Zogolli was the only member of the government 

not to flee from the capital. He took the command of the garrison of Tirana into his hands and 

rallied a tiny army, led by Captain Osman Gazepi. After three days of continual fighting in the 

112 ASCA, Fund 252, file 1, 1823, Telegram of the Prefecture of Kosovo to the Ministry of Interior, 8 January 

1923; see also The History of Albania, vol. III, p. 262; Milo P. p. 155 

113 ASCA, Fund 252, file 190, 1923, Telegram of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs in Tirana, 30 January 1923 

114 The Near East, 8 October 1922 

57

streets, he forced Isufi to retreat into a corner of the capital. Hasan Prishtina had meanwhile 

collected a sizable army and reached the outskirts of Tirana too, threatening the city from 

three sides. Had the British Minister Harry Eyres not arrived from Durres and interceded with 

Elez Isufi, the insurgents would have taken over the capital. Eyres believed that because the 

leaders of this movement were pro-Italian, their victory would increase Rome‟s influence on 

Albania. He succeeded in convincing Isufi that he was in error as the instrument of a 

conspiracy which was only harmful to his country. He promised a safe pardon for Isufi and 

his men, and respected this agreement to the end. With the primary threat gone, Zogolli was 

able to quickly defeat the remaining rebel forces, concentrating now the government‟s troops 

against Hasan Prishtina. In a night attack, he dispersed his force and the revolt came to an 

end. Zogu was hailed only by some as the “Saviour of the Nation”. For his part, he held that 

Harry Eyres had saved not only the government and the city from bloodshed and devastation, 

but, more than likely Zogolli‟s life as well. This is why thereafter he regarded Eyres as his 

personal informal adviser and confided in him. This honour was transferred to a certain 

extent, to other British Ministers as well. 

More than once Harry Eyres, an almost retired diplomat who had passed his entire working 

life in British consular service in the Ottoman Empire, proved to be precious to Ahmet. 

Experience had taught Albanians to approach most great powers with hostility. Italy had tried 

to annex the country. France was too friendly with Yugoslavia. Russia had long been a Pan- 

Slavic foe. There was yet widespread faith in British disinterestedness 115 , despite HMG 

having been signatory of the Treaty of London which established Albania‟s disintegration. 

Anyway, too far from Albania, Great Britain seemed not to have direct political and territorial 

claims. It represented a great democratic nation, and a guardian of democracy in the 

international context. But what is more, Sir Aubrey Herbert and Edith Durham, staunch 

friends and champions of the Albanian people throughout their struggle for freedom and 

independence 116 , were still fresh in their memories. This was a good reason for Ahmet to trust 

in the advice and collaboration of Harry Eyres any time he was dubious about the behaviour 

of Albania‟s neighbouring countries like Serbia, or particularly Italy. Mr. Eyres had always 

something to say to him, and willingly offered his aid and advice in settling down conflicts, 

despite the foreign office did not approve the extent to which he interfered. 

115 Tomes, p. 43 – 44; 

116 See Fitzherbert M., The man who was Greenmantle, chapter 14, 'The dear journey's end' 

58


After the rebellion, the Ypi Government went on in the same course of action, with Zogolli 

continuing to be the major pillar of the Cabinet. A military court was set up to try those who 

had taken part in the rebellion, and thirty-two were executed. In particular, the Yugoslav army 

attacked furiously the Albanian population, murdering and slaughtering, robbing and pursuing 

beyond their land more than 3.500 Albanians. 117 As a result, many of Zogu‟s opponents fled 

abroad. Fan Noli resigned from the Cabinet in disapproval of his authoritarian methods. He 

acknowledged that he could no longer work with him, declaring that Zogolli must be removed 

by force. Xhafer Ypi succeeded him as Minister of Foreign Affairs, while remaining Prime 

Minister. 

Zogu‟s suppression of this insurrectionary movement added greatly to his reputation. He 

gained a considerable amount of prestige. Given that who might conceivably have opposed 

him within the government had resigned, he hoped to completely dominate. In truth, with the 

exception of the Minister of the Interior, the government lacked talent. Not more than a few 

months passed before rumours of new problems emerged. The government became unpopular 

among even the common people of the south, although southerners made up most of it 118 . 

Hence Xhafer Ypi resigned as Prime Minister, but was elected to fill the vacancy in the 

Council of Regency caused by the resignation of the Bektashi Moslem member, Ymer Vrioni. 

Zogolli‟s influence became indispensable, so that in December 1922, he assumed the 

premiership himself while keeping the interior portfolio as well. In his first speech as Prime 

Minister to the Parliament on 2 December 1922, he appealed to public opinion promising to 

strengthen democracy, draft a new constitution, reorganize the army and civil administration, 

develop economy especially trade by attracting foreign capital, make a religious reform, 

combat malaria, and take measures for health improvement. The present Government „shall 

realise all patriotic sentiments‟ he declared, „especially our idea of building upon an 

occidental state with western civilization‟ 119 . And he started this process from himself, since 

the very first measure of westernization he took was to change his name from Ahmet Bey 

Zogolli in Ahmet Zog (meaning “bird” in Albanian language), lifting the Turkish honorific 

Bey and suffix – olli, (-oglu), meaning “son of”, considering them as relics of Ottoman times. 

117 

ASCA, Fund 252, file 1/1, 1923, Telegram of the Prefecture of Kosovo to the Ministry of Interior, 23 

February 1923; “Politika”, 15 March 1923 

118 

FO 371/7330, Durazzo 23 August 1922, op. cit. Fischer p. 38 

119 Dako K., p. 122 

59

An obvious sign of favouring western model, and leaving behind Turkish traditions; an 

intelligent change from a personality, considered by many as rude and authoritarian, but 

pretty capable politically, so that he would be the arbiter of the Albanian political life for 

more than fifteen years. 

The Constitution, which was approved only a few days after his vow in the parliament, 

became his first dominion weapon. He started his job making Tirana officially the capital of 

Albania. Such a choice shows that he sought to keep Albania away from foreign interferences. 

Durrës and Vlora were easily reachable by the Italians, whereas Shkodra was mostly 

populated by Austrophil Catholics with plenty of prejudices against the Serbs. He tried to 

manoeuvre in between Rome and Belgrade in order to neutralize even temporarily the 

Yugoslav interference and pressure, which were manifested in various forms. 120 

Zogu‟s undertaking to build a new country according to western models was very difficult 

though. Since the end of the war, Albania had made commendable efforts to escape misery 

and anarchy. To become a modern nation, however, in a very few years she had to take the 

great step forward which separated Middle Ages from the XX century. She needed to rebuild 

everything. It was immediately necessary to set up a political framework, but it was not that 

easy as there did not exist a middle class in Albania. How was she to pay for an army, a police 

force, a civil service, schools, hospitals, roads and economic development? Financial means 

were lacking. 

At the time, those who were to make the reforms confronted with two fundamental questions 

that needed immediate answer. Was Albania to start without delay its organization according 

to „western‟ models, on the basis of a democratic parliament and of a European 

administration? Or, on the contrary, would she walk ahead step by step, trying initially to 

raise the national and political awareness of the country, jumping then to another political and 

economic situation like Montenegro did prior to 1914? 

The regime established by Zog was much more biased towards the first line trying to forge 

ahead, i.e. to speed up ahead without stopover. The opposition complained that Zog was 

120 See Milo P., p. 155; see IDD, 7 th Series, Vol. I, 1922-1939, doc. 78, p. 42, Italian Minister in Durrës to the 

President of the Council and Foreign Minister Mussolini, 7 November 1922 - “Like Italy cannot forget 

unredeemed brothers in Fiume and Dalmatia, Albania cannot forget the Albanians living under Serbian 

domination in Kosovo region” – Ahmet Bey Zogolli to Italian Minister in Durrës. 

60


skipping over to the second step without taking the first one, hence giving the country a mere 

western polish. To western diplomats, however, “incompetence, corruption, suppression and 

terrorism had deep roots in Albania, and the only person capable of building a new Albanian 

state was Ahmet Zog” 121 . 

Ahmet was all along aware of Albania‟s economic, military and political weakness, and at the 

same time, he had never ignored the dangers of Italian, Greek and Serbian intrigues. In view 

of this fact, in November 1922, he had informally sought the help of Count Moltke of 

Denmark, the League of Nations‟ envoy to Albania, and of the British chargé Robert Parr 

(Eyres was away for a while) to give a mind to the situation in the country, and advise him on 

what could follow i.e. all risks whatsoever. Parr had then suggested that the best advice was 

that Albania, in any situation, appealed to the League of Nations. He relied on the conviction 

that if such a recommendation came from Count Moltke, and His Majesty‟s Government 

backed it, not only the morale of the Albanian Government would be high, but also it would 

rather seek support on the League of Nations than on a single power. 122 Parr, first of all, 

alluded to the dangerous likelihood that Albania could fall prey to either Rome or Belgrade, 

giving rise to jealousies and adversary reactions, and perhaps creating a conflict over the 

small and fragile country. What is more, the prevailing opinion was that whichever neighbour 

would show concern for it; it would only try and make it a colony, rather than defend its 

sovereignty. Under protection of the League of Nations instead, its independence and 

territorial integrity could be more guaranteed. 

The Albanian Government had first solicited aid to Great Britain, deeming it a power that had 

no direct interests in Albania. As early as 14 January 1922, the Primer Ypi had sent a note to 

Heathcote Smith, the British representative at Durres prior to Eyres, asking His Majesty‟s 

Government to nominate a British finance expert that would take care of the organization of 

the Albanian finances 123 . The presence of a British administrator at the Albanian Ministry of 

Finance would make it easier for the Albanian Government to be given a loan by a Great 

Power or a big European consortium. The Foreign Office transmitted this note to HM 

Treasury, as the competent financial authority, asking for its qualified opinion, but at the same 

time it attached a memo according to which “… politically, we (the FO – D.H.) do not favour 

121 DBFB, FS, vol. XXII, doc. 823, 12 November 1922 

122 DBFB, FS, vol. XXII, doc. 817 

123 FO 371/7328, C 650/90, 14 January 1922 

61

the proposal” 124 . It also added the annotation “No Distribution”, which showed that the FO 

would categorically reject it. By doing so, the British tried to avoid drawing the anger of Italy, 

France, Yugoslavia and Greece, thus considering Albania a mere geographical term, on which 

they could not hold up especially against Italy. The British averted the mistaken impression 

that HM Government was attempting to have a predominant role in Albania by sending there 

a financial advisor. Hence, they also refused the request of George Young, former employee 

of the Foreign Office, who had been privately contacted by the Albanian Ambassador to 

London, to go to Albania in the capacity of administrator of finances. 

After the negative responses from London, the Albanian Government addressed to the League 

of Nations for an interest-free aid. The Albanian Prime Minister Ypi had written to the 

Secretary General of the LN that “the Albanian Government, fully convinced that political 

development depends overall on economic progress, requests to the League of Nations the 

extension of its support also in the economic field, nominating experts that shall view the 

situation in Albania and make proposals concerning the necessary steps to be taken to 

encourage development of natural resources and attract foreign investments”. Subsequently, 

the Financial Committee of the League sent to Albania Prof. Albert Calmes, a 

Luxembourgian financial expert, who drafted and presented a thorough report on the 

economic situation in the country. He reached the conclusions that urgent efforts were needed 

for Albania‟s recovery, and suggested as immediate measures to be taken: a) a 40-year loan 

of 50 million gold francs at low interest which was going to be used on public works and 

reclamation; b) a bank of issue created by foreigners, with Albanian participation however, 

and under regular control of the government, which would bring monetary chaos to an end; c) 

he recommended the League to nominate a financial advisor to Albania, who would help 

organize the Albanian finance administration, and structure the operating costs avoiding thus 

unnecessary expenses 125 . But the League had no funds to grant a loan. It neither sent any 

international group of financial experts to help establish the bank of issue nor guaranteed to 

foreign banks ready to invest in Albania 126 . 

In February 1923, trying to attack the immediate economic problem, Zogu re-appealed for a 

major loan to the League of Nations. The League Commission of Inquiry which had been sent 

124 FO 371/7328, C 1189/650/90, 26 January 1922 

125 Vllamasi S., Ballafaqime politike…., p. 210 

126 Zavalani T. Histori e Shqipnis, p. 274 

62


to Albania to investigate the Mirdite Republic and the border question in December 1921 had 

already made preliminary suggestions regarding the economic problems in Albania. Dr. J.J. 

Sederholm, the financial expert on the commission, submitted his final report in May 1923, 

strongly supporting Zogu‟s application for a loan. He concluded that: “Albania has achieved 

independence when the whole world is impoverished and she finds herself therefore 

financially at a disadvantage in comparison with the situation with which the other Balkan 

states found themselves when they achieved independence. In their case they generally found 

some Great Power able and willing to befriend them and to afford them financial assistance. 

Albania depends on the League for impartial political support” 127 The League took Dr. 

Sederholm‟s recommendations under advisement but turned down the proposal for a loan. 

Albania was considered uncreditworthy. It was in a position to offer as security for a loan 

nothing more than its natural resources as a state. Having exhausted all avenues of direct 

assistance, the League simply suggested that the Albanian government be more frugal with its 

meagre financial resources. In an effort to assist the government to this end, the League 

appointed the Dutchman Jan Hunger, as financial advisor. Mr. Hunger arrived in Albania in 

June, by which point the economic condition of the country had weakened considerably. 

An important problem which needed immediate solution was the creation of the Albanian 

bank of issue. For this, Zogu charged his Minister of Finance Kol Thaci to travel to some 

countries where he hoped to find foreign banks willing to undertake the foundation of the 

Albanian bank of issue. Several institutions came forward with proposals, but the conditions 

they put forth were not feasible, thus the financial advisor of the LN recommended to the 

Albanian Government not to consider them at all. In the meantime, the Italian representative 

in Tirana Marquis Carlo Durazzo was trying to obtain the approval of the Albanian 

Government, and create a new Italo-Albanian bank, for which the Italians would grant 2,5 

million liras 128 . While Zogu rejected his proposal, the Foreign Office had also rejected Eyres‟ 

proposal to establish in Albania a British bank that would support the commercial activity 

between England and Albania 129 . In such a situation, in August 1923, Hunger designed a 

project for the creation of a State Bank that would have the monopoly of issuing banknotes 

for fifteen years. Its capital would amount to 15 million gold francs or 600,000 pounds. He 

127 Official Journal of the League of Nations (May 1923, 4th year, No. 5), p. 504, op. cit. Fischer, p. 49, 

128 FO 371/8535, C 8660/1380/90, 4 May 1923 

129 FO 371/8535, C 10630/5277/90, 3 August 1923 

63

went to Geneva hoping that the Economic Sector would help him find the necessary capital. 

He expected to provide one third of the sum in London, one third in Rome, and one third in 

Paris. The Foreign Office agreed to help him find the money, or else Italy could provide the 

entire sum, and so Italians would control the Albanian State Bank. It intermediated with the 

Bank of England, however it refused because of the limited economic guarantees that Albania 

could offer 130 . Who would lend money to such a fragile regime? Only countries with ulterior 

motives. Yugoslavia offered small sums – but only if loans were secured with border territory, 

which was politically impossible. 

In February 1922, Zogu made his initial step to curb the disastrous trend, when he 

implemented a hastily drawn customs tariff which significantly increased import duties 

making the cost of foreign goods on the Albanian market almost prohibitive. But before any 

positive effect could be generated, Italy, the principal supplier of Albania‟s needs as well as 

the main customer for her products 131 , exerted pressure on the government to recall the 

prohibitive duties, because there was not an agreement between the two governments which 

could regulate Italo-Albanian commercial exchanges in preferential manner. 

Rebuffed by the League, foreign banks and other governments, the remaining option was the 

sale of commercial concessions to foreigners. The Albanian Government had already started 

to avoid the LN financial advisor. During his work in Albania, Hunger had submitted a series 

of reports both to the League and to Albanian Government. He had emphasized more than 

once the necessity for drastic and far-reaching changes. He had gone on to point to alarming 

abuses within the government and state bureaucracy, and demanded complete reorganization 

of the entire state administration, particularly of the Ministry of finance and of the Albanian 

army. Drastic spending cuts and tax reforms had been his prescription. But Hunger‟s far- 

reaching suggestions would have been extremely practical and wise for a state with a 

considerable degree of political stability. For Albania in 1923, however, they would have 

undoubtedly resulted in the immediate overthrow of Zogu‟s Government. Hence, Ahmet 

rejected his proposals as politically impossible, frankly doubting that the beys and chieftains 

would tolerate any government which set out seriously to tax them. Hunger had looked at the 

situation in Albania through the eyes of a westerner, unable to comprehend complexities of 

Albanian politics, and the connection between expenditure and the longevity of Zogu‟s 

130 FO 371/8536, C13714/13714/90, 20 September 1923 

131 Albania Economica, 1927 

64


government. The Prime Minister was looking for financing, not western lessons in 

frugality. 132 As a result, Hunger was either ignored or obstructed. Important road contracts 

were granted without his knowledge and concessions were sold to foreigners without his 

advice. Accordingly, in May 1924, his contract was terminated, contrary to its articles 4 and 

5, four years before it was due to expire 133 . Much to the chagrin of the League, the 

government claimed that because of the increasingly adverse financial conditions, it could no 

longer afford to pay his salary. So ended Albania‟s brief experience with the League of 

Nations and its last chance to receive impartial foreign aid. 

At this point, Zogu decided to play right the remaining card of concessions. The Italians and 

the Austrians had detected traces of coal, silver, copper, oil, asphalt and bitumen during the 

war, but the prospects were interrupted after the occupation troops left. Considering that 

statistic data was missing, only big companies would risk and invest in Albania. Only 

westernizers like Italy, Germany, Great Britain, and United States of America could thus 

come. His Majesty‟s Government tried not to intervene directly on Albanian Government‟s 

behalf in very delicate situations, yet it showed greater interest when one of its biggest oil 

companies was trying to get the only concession which excited real interest: the right to 

prospect for oil. By the end of 1920, London had proposed to Vrioni Government to grant to 

the Anglo-Persian Oil Company the prospecting rights over 200,000 hectares. As early as 

1921, the Albanians had signed a preliminary agreement with D‟Arcy Exploration, a 

subsidiary of Anglo-Persian Oil Company, hoping to awake the interest of other powerful 

countries. The oil, however, would not bring the long-waited peace to Albania. Political 

intrigues and manipulations, always present there, would intensify as a result of this new 

motive. In 1922, the American Standard Oil Company, which had its monopoly on the sale of 

oil derivatives in the Balkan countries, came to Albania. It feared to lose its position if 

D‟Arcy Exploration would discover sufficient oil reserves for rentable investments. 

Moreover, France and Italy lodged diplomatic protests to the British Government, for it 

owned a controlling stake in Anglo-Persian. The Italian press described the Tirana 

government‟s concession to Britain as the supreme insult, and a brutal low to the interest of 

Italy 134 . “This is one more illustration – remarked the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for 

132 Fischer, p. 51 

133 Mousset A., L’Albanie devant l’Europe, p. 40 

134 Idea Nazionale, March 18 th , 1921 

65

Foreign Affairs Sir Eyre Crowe on 26 November 1921 – of the teething troubles that this 

poisoning octopus is causing to us, and a further confirmation of the fact that it is to our 

advantage to conclude an overall agreement with these unscrupulous rivals” 135 . 

By spring 1923, Zogu seemed very much inclined to the British company. He shared the same 

view with the popular party according to which the oil might turn to their benefit. It had to 

become a new means of attracting the interest of the British Government on Albania, which 

for the moment was lacking a powerful sponsor in the international arena. Nursing such hopes 

had also been the British representative, Harry Eyres. At a meeting with the Secretary General 

of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he had shown willingness for a direct access of 

the British capital to Albania. According to him, British interest in the country might help to 

secure her international position” 136 . But while Zogu was ready to close the deal, the 

opposition within the parliament, headed by Fan Noli who had just returned from the USA, 

started a powerful campaign against the ratification of oil concessions to the British company. 

Zogu feared that his Government would fall. The concession required ratification by 

parliament, but, while Standard Oil lobbyists were being so open-handed and Italian ones so 

menacing, deputies could not be trusted to pass the bill even on a confidence vote. He 

therefore resorted to delay while distracted by other problems 137 . 

135 DBFP, FS, vol. XXII, doc. 660, no 4 

136 AMFAA, file 75, p. 2, 1923 

137 Tomes, p. 55 

66


Albania and the Hanging Questions with Yugoslavia 

In terms of foreign policy, under the guidance of Harry Eyres, Zogu strived to stabilize 

Albania‟s foreign relations. While his political opponents favoured a strong and inflexible 

policy targeted at recovering lost territories given away to Yugoslavia and Greece by decision 

of the European Powers, and even ready to face the threat of a new war, Zogu was convinced 

to pursue an anti-irredentist policy, avoiding any political adventures in Albania‟s relations 

with Greece and Yugoslavia, preferring tranquillity and security. He wanted a moderate 

policy and interior stability in Albania so that to ensure power for him within the country. His 

cunning and his ambitions were already known to Albanians, but not only. 138 Such a position 

he had also shown as a Minister of Interior when together with the Prime Minister Xhafer Ypi 

had asked for the intermediation of the Great Powers and of the League of Nations to 

establish diplomatic relations with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. On 7 January 1922, they 

had asked to the French government, through its consul in Shkodër Jean Beugin Billecocq, to 

intermediate with Belgrade so that the Yugoslav government formally recognized the 

Albanian government and set up relations of good neighbourhood between the two 

countries. 139 Following, Ypi‟s government promised to send an economic mission to Belgrade 

immediately after establishing diplomatic relations. 140 On 16 January 1922, the Albanian 

Foreign Minister ad interim Spiro G. Koleka addressed a request to the League of Nations 

stating that “Albania remains loyal to its promises for peace and friendly relations with the 

neighbours .... It is our wish to overcome past disagreements and plea the League of Nations 

to make its good service in order to ensure re-establishment of diplomatic relations between 

Albania and Serbia” 141 . Later on, Fan Noli as Minister of Foreign Affairs presented a formal 

request to Belgrade to recognize the Albanian government. 142 The next step was a greeting 

telegram on occasion of the Serbian King Alexander‟s engagement. 143 Indeed these small 

138 The History of Albania, vol. III, pp. 258-261; see also Milo p. 151 

139 Ministère des Affaires Etrangéres de France, Archives diplomatiques, vol. 19, Telegram of the French 

Consulate in Shkodër to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 1922 – op. cit. Milo, p. 

147 

140 ASCA, Fund 251, file 93, 1922, Note of the Albanian Permanent Secretary to the League of Nations 

addressed to the Secretary General E. Drummond, 16 January 1922 

141 Milo P., p. 148 

142 Ibidem 

143 “Shqipëria e re”, 26 th February 1922 

67

steps prepared the ground for the formal establishment of diplomatic relations on 25 March. 

Two weeks later, on 12 April, the Yugoslav Prime Minister appointed Nastas Iliç as chargè 

d’affaires in Tirana till the arrival of the minister plenipotentiary. 144 The Albanian 

government considered this act as a sign of the “friendly relations which have started to 

develop between the two peoples” 145 . 

This policy towards Serbia was obvious even in his first speech to Parliament when Zogu 

announced his ambitious programme saying that “…with neighbouring nations we will be 

friends; we will respect them, and at the same time asking them to respect our political and 

economic independence as well as the integrity of our territory”. 146 Greatly suspicious of Italy 

and Yugoslavia and not at all sure about Greece, he initially aimed at strict neutrality verging 

on isolationism, but in the feverish climate of Adriatic politics his every action came under 

scrutiny. Did he incline to Rome or Belgrade? Eyres told how “Ahmet Bey almost with tears 

in his eyes implored him to believe that the Government was neither Serbophil nor Italophil, 

but purely Albanophil” 147 . 

The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom presented 

good cooperation opportunities of common interest for both countries such as: final 

demarcation of the border line; development of commercial exchanges especially among 

border areas; development of water and ground transport; regulation of Buna River‟s flow etc. 

Both parties made small steps to show their good will to develop normal relations. In January 

1922, Yugoslav ships could sail freely in the waters of the Shkodër Lake in the route Rijeka- 

Shkodër; regular telephone and postal services between the two countries were established. 148 

The “Serb-Albanian Bank” with a capital of 10 million dinars was established in Cetinje in 

April, and there was a project to open its branches in Durrës and Shkodër. The Yugoslav press 

started to publish less tendentious news and comments on Albania. Public declarations of the 

Foreign Minister Ninčić on the Yugoslav foreign policy towards Albania were different from 

that of his predecessor Popovic. 

144 

ASCA, Fund 251, file 93, 1922, Note of the Yugoslav Prime Minister N. Pašić to the Albanian Prime Minister 

Xh. Ypi, 12 April 1922 

145 

Ibid., Telegram of the Head of the Albanian government Xh. Ypi to N. Pašić, 29 April 1922 

146 

DakoK., p. 111 – 114, op. cit also Pearson p. 203 

147 

Tomes, p. 56 

148 

ASCA, Fund 251, file 93, 1922, Telegram of the Prefecture of Shkodër to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 

April 1922; Ibid., file 253, Telegram of the Prefecture of Shkodër to the Ministry of Interior, 5 January 1922 

68


The Albanian Government endeavoured to settle the hanging border question with Yugoslavia 

at the very beginning of their peaceful contacts. Eyres had repeatedly recommended to Zogu 

closer relations with Italy, in response to his piteous accounts of border troubles. He believed 

this was an obvious counter-balance to pressure from the Serbs. But Zogu initially showed 

reluctance. He was convinced that Italian agents continued to finance his fiercest opponents, 

the hard-line Kosovars, in order to sharpen conflict with Yugoslavia. “The Italians want a 

government which will purely and simply install them in Albania,” he had remarked, “and 

unfortunately for our country there are people at their disposal” 149 . For that reason, first he 

tried to settle by himself the old scores with Yugoslavia. In hunc effectum, he appointed to 

Belgrade General Ali Riza Kolonja, a well-known and mature politician, as if wanting to 

demonstrate to Serbs that he placed good neighbourly relations above any disagreement. 

Later, keeping on the same line, he would hail the victory of Primer Pašić‟s radical party at 

the elections of March 1923, reiterating Albania‟s determination to tread a path of moderation 

and of good neighbourhood with Yugoslavia 150 . The Albanian Government wanted the 

question of Kosovo to strengthen and not “to disturb the friendly relations” between the two 

countries 151 , driving the Serbs to believe that they were trying to resolve amicably the 

problems with Yugoslavia 152 . Naturally, Kosovar irredentists called him the cat‟s paw of 

Yugoslavia. “Today they dominate half the Albanian nation and territory” – he had 

acknowledged grimly. But what could in fact be done for Kosovo? In a message issued by the 

Supreme Council of Regency, presenting a picture of the achievements of the government 

under Zogu‟s Premiership, it was stated that “the government was using all its power and 

diplomatic measures to recover autonomy for this lost territory” 153 . Kaçak violence was more 

likely to wreck the Albanian state than to redeem the lost province. Thus, he better sought 

peace with Yugoslavia, regardless of his feelings. What he feared more were the Albanian 

gangs headed by his opponents rather than the Serbs. That‟s why from the very beginning he 

tried to eliminate them shuffling the state apparatus. He ordered the disarmament of the 

population in the border areas with Yugoslavia and pushed the Supreme Council to lift their 

149 

Central European Summary, FO 371/8535, 11 May 1923, op. cit. Tomes p. 56 

150 

ASCA, File 181, p. 251, Ahmet Zog to Nicola Pašić, 20 March 1923 

151 

Ibid., Fund 251, File 190, p. 251, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Albanian Legation to Belgrade, 25 February 

1923 

152 

AMAE, Europe 1918 – 1929. Albanie vol. 5, Report of the French Military Attaché in Belgrade, Paris 22 

November 1923 

153 Dako K., 125-126 

69

MP mandates to the leaders of the Kosovo National Defence Committee. 154 In autumn 1922, 

the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Ninčić proposed to Ahmet Zog (at the time Minister of 

Interior) a secret agreement which consisted in: physical elimination of Bajram Curri and 

Hasan Prishtina; expulsion from Albania of Macedonian fugitives; return of Mirdita separatist 

elements headed by Marka Gjoni who had sheltered in Yugoslavia; and a must for Yugoslavs‟ 

approval when giving economic concession to foreign companies. 155 

Notwithstanding the establishment of diplomatic relations, lack of trust and instability which 

characterized both parties in their mutual contacts did not immediately evade. The 

consolidation of the independent Albanian state, recognition of the Albanian government by 

other governments, especially by Great Powers, arrival of new diplomatic missions to Albania 

and a great demand for concessions provided Zog with a broad manoeuvre diapason. Belgrade 

followed with great attention these changes in Albania showing its support and 

“contribution” 156 for the creation of the Albanian independent state. Contacts between 

members of both governments were growing. However, behind such a benevolent facade, 

there was Belgrade‟s firmness to fulfil those agreements which according to Yugoslav 

officials, Ypi‟s government had approved but had not implemented. Thus, in October, the 

Yugoslav government reiterated its request for the return in Albania of Marka Gjoni and his 

500 Mirdita fugitives. One month later, the Yugoslav government complained that Albanian 

officials obstacle Yugoslav emigrants to come back to Yugoslavia and that most Kosovar 

Albanians had been employed or had joined the gendarmerie in the border areas with 

Yugoslavia. 157 The relations between Tirana and Belgrade worsened yet when Yugoslavia 

sheltered Albanian political immigrants and vice-versa. Ninčić had the mere suspect that the 

arrival of the Italian representative in Albania, the Marquis Durazzo, had caused a cooling of 

relations between the Albanian government and the Serb-Croat-Slovene, and affinity with 

Italians was perceptible. On his side, Zog had told to Marquis Durazzo that “the attitude of the 

new government towards Yugoslavia would be resolute. Like Italy could not forget brothers 

mocking Fiume and Dalmatia, Albania could not forget that Albanians live under Serbian 

154 

Histori e Shqipërisë (History of Albania), vol. III, pp. 258-261 

155 

Milo P., p. 152 

156 

ASCA, Fund 251, file 93, 1922, Ninčić’s declaration in the League of Nations “..... we (Yugoslavia) have 

greatly contributed to the creation of the Albanian independent state”, Telegram of the Albanian Legation in 

Belgrade to the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, Tirana, 5 October 1922 

157 

ASCA, Fund 251, file 93, 1922, Telegram of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, Tirana, 5 October 1922 

70


domain in the region of Kosovo”. The relations between the governments of Tirana and 

Belgrade were now much less cordial. 158 

In fact when Zog became Prime Minister at the beginning of December 1922, at a situation of 

existence of significant Zogist opposition within the National Council and people's discontent, 

he sought to manoeuvre between Rome and Belgrade, with the attempt to neutralize even 

temporarily Yugoslavia‟s pressure and interference. The need to approach and coordinate 

actions with Yugoslavs became immediate when in January 1923, Curri and Prishtina, at the 

head of hundreds of highlanders and refugees from Kosovo, attacked the government forces 

and took control of Tropoja and surrounded Kruma as well. They organized a rebellion 

against the Serbs in the so-called neutral zone after Albanian and Yugoslav governments had 

asked to the Conference of Ambassadors to abolish it 159 . To avoid this common risk the 

Albanian and Yugoslav governments agreed to coordinate their actions. The Serbs allowed 

the Albanian government to penetrate with its military forces in the neutral zone to destroy 

the anti-Zogist rebellion. 160 So the command of the military forces of Tirana government 

acted against insurrection in full agreement with the Yugoslav forces. The uprising led by 

Bajram Curri e Hasan Prishtina, found in the middle of two fires, despite of its resistance, 

could thus be subdued. 

But Zog had not taken into consideration the Yugoslav counter-attack. It was much more 

ferocious, with a lot of slaughtering and displacing to Turkey about 3.500 Albanians 161 . In 

such circumstances of genocide, murder and prosecution against Kosovar Albanians, Zog 

could not stay indifferent as that was a matter relating to a very sensitive national problem 

which “put the government in a very difficult position” 162 . For that reason, the Albanian 

government called for immediate interruption of violence and barbarism 163 . In response, 

158 th 

IDD, 7 Series: 1922-1935, vol. I, doc. 78, p. 43, Albanian hopes for an ardent Italian policy towards 

Jugoslavia, Minister Durazzo to the President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, Durrës, 

7 November 1922 

159 

See Milo, p. 156 

160 

ASCA, Fund 251, file 190, 1923, Telegram of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, 30 January 1923 

161 

Ibid., File 1/1, p. 252, Report of the Prefecture of Kosovo to the Ministry of the Interior, 23 February 1923 

162 

Ibid., Fund 252, file 190, 1923, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Albanian Legation in Belgrade, 25 

February 1923 

163 Ibidem 

71

Belgrade considered Kosovo as its internal affair, and Albania‟s interference as 

inopportune. 164 

The Albanian Government decided then to intercede with the League of Nations in Geneva 165 

to make Yugoslavia stop the reprisals and claim responsibilities for the committed crimes, 

however Zog had never trusted at a real involvement of the League in favour of Albania. This 

is why he addressed to Great Britain through Eyres to whom he had told that “we can only 

look to England to help us and though your country is desirous of shaking us off into the 

hands of the League we still cling to her skirts and implore her aid 166 ”. 

Zog tried by all means to maintain stabilized relations with Yugoslavia. The overall 

atmosphere of the Albano-Yugoslav relations by spring 1923 seemed peaceful. In truth, it 

continued to be burdened with many accumulated problems, inherited and newly emerged as 

a result of the clash among conflicting interests. It was the time when many foreign 

companies had arrived in Albania trying to penetrate into the new Albanian economy. Among 

these there was also the Italian capital wanting to break in with industrial enterprises, forestry 

concessions, railway conventions and other commercial agreements 167 . Belgrade felt at risk in 

two directions: first, the economic penetration could be followed by political access, and 

second, the weak Yugoslav capital could not compete with big Italian, French, British, and 

American etc. companies. Furthermore, relations between the two countries were also 

disturbed by the question of Saint Naoum and Vermosh. 

One more issue which contributed to tension was the conflict which aroused by the end of 

1923 concerning the nomination by Belgrade authorities of a Serbian archbishop at the head 

of the orthodox church of Shkodër. It seemed at first as it were a mere religious conflict. It 

was a political matter indeed. In September 1922, the General Congress of Orthodox 

Albanians, convened in Berat, had proclaimed the establishment of the Albanian 

Autocephalous Church and its independence from the Constantinople Ecumenical 

Patriarchate 168 . It meant that it was the highest Orthodox Church authority with the capacity 

to nominate Orthodox ecclesiastics in all of the Albanian regions. The Albanian 

164 

Ibid., The Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Interior, 13 March 1923 

165 

Ibid. p. 252 

166 

FO 371/7331, Eyres to Curzon, 15 June 1922 

167 

ASCA, Fund 251, file 190, 1923, Telegram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Albanian Legation in 

Belgrade, 25 February 1923 

168 “Shqipëri e re”, 24 September 1922 

72


Autocephalous Church had been recognized also by the Constantinople Patriarchate in 

November 1922. 169 

There existed in Shkodër an Orthodox church for about 1.500 Slavic immigrants located in 

the town and in its provinces. This church like all of the other Orthodox churches existing 

before the creation of the Albanian independent state was under the jurisdiction of the 

Constantinople Patriarchate. Soon after the agreement between the two patriarchates, the 

Slavic Orthodox Church of Shkodër passed on the jurisdiction of Belgrade Ecumenical 

Patriarchate and under direct control of Ipech Archbishopric, without acknowledgement and/ 

or approval of the Albanian government. Following the creation of the Albanian 

Autocephalous Church, this status should have obviously come to an end. Accordingly, the 

nomination of a Serbian bishop in Shkodër, soon after the creation of the Albanian 

Autocephalous Church, was not occasional. It was an act meant to demonstrate the spiritual 

protectorate of Belgrade over those few Slavic believers in Shkodër. It was an open rejection 

to the newly-created Albanian Autocephalous Church. As such the highest authority of this 

church opposed it and the bishop was not allowed to take his post. 170 Therefore the matter was 

no more religious and both governments were involved in a conflict which was about to cause 

rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The Albanian government sent a 

note to Belgrade informing the latter about the creation of the Albanian Autocephalous 

Church and accordingly of the new juridical and canonical condition of the Slavic Orthodox 

Church and of the Albanian citizens of Slavic origin in Shkodër. 171 It informed the Yugoslav 

government about its position not to allow any violation of the authority of the Albanian 

Autocephalous Church. 172 In Albania, it was a right of the head of the Ecclesiastic Supreme 

Council who was at the same time head of the Albanian Autocephalous Church to nominate a 

bishop. Yet, at the beginning of April the conflict became even more severe. Pašić menaced 

openly the Albanian government to break up diplomatic relations between the two countries 

and call back the Yugoslav legation to Tirana if the question of the Serbian bishop in Shkodër 

169 Ibidem, 31 December 1922 

170 ASCA, Fund 252, file 27, 1923, Report of the Prefecture of Korça to the Ministry of Interior, 18 January 

1923 

171 ASCA, Fund 263, file 46, 1923, Note of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Legation in Tirana to the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, 7 February 1923 

172 Ibid., Note of the Albanian Foreign Affairs Ministry to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Legation in Tirana, 21 

February 1923 

73

emained unresolved. 173 As a first step, Belgrade withdrew its chargé d’affaires Ilic from 

Tirana. 

Found to face these intimidations, the Albanian government called for help of the British, 

French and Italian governments and addressed to the League of Nations as well. 174 The Great 

Powers, in coordination among them, advised both parties to show mutual moderation and 

understanding. 175 Following, Belgrade decided to return to Tirana its chargé d’affaires and 

considered the question of the Serbian bishop as merely ecclesiastic and a matter for 

discussion between the Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade and the Albanian 

Autocephalous Church. 176 On its side, the Albanian government declared that it would not 

prevent the Serbian bishop to Shkoder to hold mass as a guest and make his personal religious 

needs. 177 

Another disputed question in the Albano-Yugoslav relations of this period was also the 

political emigration. Both governments, Zogu‟s and Pašić‟s, used political emigration at times 

to intimidate and create difficulties to each-other, but very often they sacrificed it to the 

interest of mutual cooperation. There existed in Albania the “Kosovo National Defence 

Committee” and many patriots from Kosovo who aspired to its liberation and union with 

Albania. Likewise, there lived as political immigrants also a small number of refugees from 

Montenegro, who were against the annexation of Montenegro with the Kingdom of the Serbs, 

173 

Ibid., Telegram of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tirana, 8 April 1923 

174 

Ibid., Telegram of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Albanian Legations in Rome, Paris and 

Geneva, as well as to the Ministers in Belgrade and Durrës, 6 April 1923 

175 th 

IDD, 7 Series, 1922-1935, vol. I, doc. 684, p. 483, The President of the Council and Foreign Minister, 

Mussolini, to the Ambassadors in Paris, Romano Avezzana, London, Della Torretta, as well as to the Ministers 

in Belgrade, Negrotto Cambiaso, and in Durrës, Durazzo, 6 April 1923: “...The Albanian Legation, on behalf of 

its government, asked me to intervene in Belgrade with moderation tips about an issue between Yugoslav and 

Albanian Governments that has intensified in recent days to the point that it may cause rupture of diplomatic 

relations between the two countries. The question is about a Serbian Orthodox bishop whom the Belgrade 

government is holding to Shkodër and to which the Orthodox element in the region is very little connected. The 

Albanian government, while showing very conciliatory in form, contrasts this Yugoslav interference which, 

although embodied in religious matters, has obvious political repercussions especially in view of the region and 

the environment in which it occurs. The Albanian government claims autonomy for the Albanian Orthodox 

Church and therefore its independence from Yugoslav authorities. The Yugoslav government contends that such 

autonomy has not been ratified by the supreme Orthodox authority of Constantinople and claims the right to 

administer the Orthodox region of Shkodra. 

The political motive by the government in Belgrade does not need demonstration. Without going into details of 

the case ....... I think it would be prudent in order to avoid that dispute escalates into open conflict, as the 

Marquis Durazzo show fear, that Great Powers intervene in Belgrade as well as in Durres with counsels of 

moderation and mutual surrender. For obvious reasons of expediency it rather be a collective pitch instead of 

our own in isolation...... 

176 

ASCA, Fund 252, file 27, 1923, Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Interior, 12 June 

1923 

177 

Ibid., The Albanian Interior Ministry to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 June 1923 

74


Croats and Slovenes, as well as some revolutionary actionists of the Internal Macedonian 

Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). Belgrade government complained that Albania had 

become a sanctuary for Kosovo “criminals”, Montenegrin refugees and fugitives and leaders 

of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). The Prime Minister Pašić 

and Foreign Minister Momcilo Ninčić alleged that Kosovars were present also in the 

Albanian Parliament and that the Committee for the National Defence of Kosovo was in close 

relations with IMRO to work together against Yugoslavia. Soon after Zogu came into power, 

especially after his election as Prime Minister, the Yugoslav government insisted on 

neutralization of the activity of this immigration and its expulsion from Albania. They 

affirmed that approach of the Albanian government of this matter was looming ahead the 

future relations between the two countries 178 . In March 1923, Pašić asked from the Albanian 

government to prevent Macedonians to enter Albania. 179 In June, the Foreign Minister Ninčić 

held a speech in the Yugoslav parliament calling attention to some complaints against the 

Albanian government and stating that accomplishment of Belgrade‟s claims was the main 

requisite for holding normal diplomatic relations between the two countries. 180 

In response to these complaints, the Albanian government took some measures addressed to 

fulfil Yugoslav requests. As regards the “Kosovo National Defence Committee” and its 

members, Zogu had even previously taken limited and prosecuting measures. He responded to 

Belgrade that Kosovars in Albania were not affecting governing processes 181 at all. In the 

meantime, as if to convince the Serbs, he gave orders to dismiss some Kosovar border 

officials in the regions of Kruma and Luma, but he declared in relation to the Kosovar MPs 

that the government had not the authority to lift their mandates. Trying to appear neutral, he 

also invited Todorov and Čaulev, exponents of the Macedonian Committee, to leave Albania. 

Further, Zog claimed also from Yugoslavia, based on the principle of reciprocity, to refuse 

asylum to his political opponents and take back Gjon Marka Gjoni, Hamid Toptani, Shale 

kaçaks and all other emigrants who had raised arms against the Albanian Government 182 . 

Belgrade had always sheltered a contingent of Albanian anti-national elements in order to use 

178 

Ibid., file 183, p. 251, Report of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade to Foreign Ministry, 12 May 1923 

179 

Ibid., Fund 251, file 183, 1923, Telegram of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, Tirana, 22 March 1923 

180 

Ibid., file 191, The Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Office of the Prime Minister, 26 June 1923; for 

more see also Milo P. “Shqipëria dhe Jugosllavia ....”, p. 163 

181 

ASCA, Fund 251, file 183, 1923, p.252, Foreign Ministry to Albanian Legation in Belgrade, 12 July 1923 

182 

Ibid., file 181, p.251, Foreign Ministry to Albanian Legation in Belgrade, 29 June 1923 

75

them in favour of its political objectives about Albania. Marka Gjoni and his followers were 

still hosted in Yugoslavia after the separatist movement in 1921 and were sponsored and 

incited against Albania. 

In May 1923, Yugoslavia fomented an uprising at Shalë, in northern Albania, to force Zogu 

resolve their hanging questions to its advantage. The Government managed to suppress it, but 

its organizers could cross the border and join the gang of Marka Gjoni. From there, they 

attacked Albanian frontiers very frequently, greatly disturbing the population and the 

government forces 183 . The Yugoslav press started a wide campaign in support of this 

movement which it considered as a revolt. 

Provocation and subvention of separatist movements by Yugoslav agents in Albania was a 

well-known policy of Yugoslav government. Belgrade and Tirana could hardly develop 

sincere relations. Yugoslavia did never stop accusing the Albanian Government for “lack of 

good will” in finding the solution for their border question. Meanwhile, the Albanians were 

even more convinced that Belgrade would for no reason make the smallest effort and consider 

also the Albanian side of this matter. The Shalë movement served to Yugoslavs to make 

pressure on the Albanian government and make it compromise to their advantage on the 

disputed questions still unresolved which might have generated rupture of diplomatic 

relations. Indeed it played an important role in the special consideration that Ahmet Zog made 

to claims by the Yugoslav government. He finally agreed on the recurrent request for 

repatriation of the Mirditas hosted in Yugoslavia since 1921. They had become a heavy 

economic burden to Belgrade. So, about 600 Mirditas came back to their town in May. 184 As 

regards Marka Gjoni, Belgrade insisted on a “dignified” return as a political worthy 

accompanied by Serbian employees and not treating him like an ordinary fugitive. 185 

But what is more, in May-June 1923, Belgrade started a diplomatic attack targeted to cancel 

the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of 6 th December 1922 on the Monastery of 

Saint Naoum (Shën Naum), and the timing is not occasional. Border dispute between the two 

countries grew even worse to this point, which would merely settle in August 1925. 

183 Ibid., file 27, p. 252, Report of the Prefecture of Korcë to the Ministry of the Interior, 18 January 1923 

184 Ibid., Fund 251, file 63, 1923, Telegram of the Prefecture of Kruma to the Ministry of Interior, 10 May 1923 

185 Ibidem 

76


Prior to final border demarcation, cartographers from an International Boundary Commission 

assigned to map them, had come across three debatable points: Vermosh, the Monastery of 

Saint Naoum, and fourteen villages in Korça district. As regards Vermosh and the fourteen 

villages, they had approved unanimously their attribution to Albania, but as to the Monastery 

of Saint Naumi, a great Orthodox Christian shrine, also a place of pilgrimage for Bektashi 

Moslems that stands on the south-eastern edge of Lake Ohrid, commanding both the Korçë- 

Pogradec-Elbasan road and the head of the Devoll valley, the votes were split fifty to fifty. It 

was since 1913 that this sticking-point was persisting. The Protocol of London had defined 

Albanian border in this part as “the western and southern shores of the Lake of Ochrida, 

extending from the village of Lin up to the Monastery of Sveti Naoum” 186 , giving thus ground 

to obfuscation whether the latter was to be attributed to Albania or Serbia. The question was 

only of importance because certain religious traditions connected with the Monastery made it 

a place of pilgrimage for all the surrounding country. The region in which the Monastery is 

situated was occupied by Serbian troops in 1913. The Serbs were forced to evacuate the 

district during the First World War, but had returned in 1917. No mention was made of it in 

the border rectification of the region of Lin, made by the Conference of Ambassadors in its 

confirmatory decision of November 9 th , 1921. Albania was now demanding the adjudication 

of Saint Naoum in her favour. After careful consideration of ethnical and geographical 

characteristics, the commission then had finally concluded that the Monastery of Saint Naoum 

would go in with Albania. After taking cognizant of such a conclusion, also the Conference of 

Ambassadors in Paris assigned it to Albania on 6 December 1922. In April 1923, France, an 

ardent supporter of the Serbs, contested the decision on the pretext that it impugned both the 

Protocol of London of 1913 and the Paris Declaration of 1921. Like France, the Serbian 

Croatian and Slovene Government as well laid before the Conference of Ambassadors a series 

of observations regarding the tracing of the Serb-Albanian frontier, some of which concerned 

the assignment of the Monastery of Saint Naoum. Basing its argument mainly on ethnical and 

moral grounds, the Yugoslavs demanded that the decision of December 6 th , 1922, had to be 

reconsidered. They claimed to have discovered fresh documents which proved that the 

Monastery had been assigned to them in 1913, and that further information had also been 

obtained which they alleged to have given them a vested right to the place. 

186 Pearson O., p. 203 

77

The question was then entrusted to a Committee of Judicial Advisers, demanding their 

interpretation of the Protocol of London of 1913. However, it came to no conclusion. On the 

one hand they pronounced judgement that Saint Naoum should not be included within 

Albanian territory, but at the same time they expressed a second opinion that a revision of the 

decision of December 6 th , 1922, would create a deplorable precedent. 187 Therefore, Shën 

Naum will hang for a long time over the relations between the two countries. 

Revolution in Albania, Government of Fan Noli and the “Triumph of Legality” 

Independent Albania had experienced an unprecedented eighteen months of relative peace in 

autumn 1923. Within his narrow remit as Interior Minister, Zogu could claim success: 

a) the northern and north-eastern frontiers of the country had been protected, allowing their 

final demarcation, though unfortunately parts of Albanian territory had been grafted on to 

Yugoslavia; 

b) the policy of disarmament of the clans had caused the disappearance to some extent of the 

immemorial custom of the blood-feud, which had caused so much misery among the 

Albanian people, and had thus produced a general reconciliation of vendetta and at the 

same time obedience to law of order, in full understanding of the authority of the State, as 

well as recognition of the cardinal duty of enlistment in the ranks of the army for military 

service. 

At the same time, as Premier he had managed to gain confidence of the world civilized 

nations on his governing capabilities, which was a matter of the greatest importance. What is 

more, he had established cordial relations with Yugoslavia, Greece and many other countries. 

Yet he had failed to solve either of his internal basic problems: state finances worsened by the 

month, and his relations with the Clique grew even more strained. The parliamentary situation 

was already precarious. For months, Zogu vacillated over when to press the oil concession to 

a vote. Failure to ratify the Anglo-Persian contract was a serious blow to him just as he had 

been absolutely banking on it. At this point, he had clearly reached an impasse. Opposed not 

only by common interests coalition which were against any political or social innovation, he 

187 Note on the deliberation of the Conference of Ambassadors concerning the allocation of the Monastery of 

Saint Naoum. League of Nations Document, C.293, M.94, June 12 th 1924 

78


also ran across dark activities of foreign governments interested in a destabilized Albania, 

which were also supported by political opponents working to his disadvantage. In these 

circumstances, his main priority was to ditch them before they ditched him, secure a 

submissive chamber, and ratify the vital oil concession. Hence, he decided to call a general 

election for a Constituent Assembly, so that people could express their opinion on the 

government‟s programme of reforms, the new political regime, thus revising the Lushnja 

Statute, and at the same time consider ratification of the oil concession to the Anglo-Persian 

Oil Company. 

Campaigning began in an atmosphere of considerable excitement with his manifesto, 

published on 16 November, which promised a new constitution based on “all those political 

principles which are found in the freest countries”, and called for “a party of ideas whose 

discipline will be soldierly to effect great reforms and drastic economies which are 

desperately needed if the life of Albania is not to flicker out” 188 . He decided to break away 

from the Popular Party, and planned to form a government drawn from one strong party solely 

under his personal leadership. In so doing he believed his position in the country would 

strengthen. He secured the support of tribal leaders from mountain regions of the north and of 

many landowners in central and southern Albania, as well as of younger army officers. He 

was convinced that in a country where vendettas and tribal warfare were the rule, the real 

power lay with whoever possessed the military means to impose their authority. The chief of 

Mati thought that it better „conduct the government of the country through those means and 

men of his own class as it had been conducted for centuries‟ 189 . So he could take control of 

the most important governing instruments, creating his own ideal state. 

His appeals meant nothing to frustrated Kosovars, jealous beys, and disenchanted liberals who 

were intent on his downfall, thus they consorted together to spoil his plans. Furthermore, his 

cabinet colleagues were carrying out a fierce propaganda against him, consequently growing 

popular discontent with his authoritarian style of government. They knew that an organized 

Zogist party would spell the end of their influence, therefore they fomented a number of plots 

against him. 

188 FO 371/8535, Parr to Curzon, 20 November 1923, op. cit. Tomes p. 60 

189 FO 371/8535, Eyres to Curzon, 27 October 1923 

79

The first conspiracy was the campaign launched at the end of the month by Major Shefqet 

Korça, prominent member of the Clique and commander-in-chief of the gendarmerie. He put 

it about that Zogu was planning to install a large number of members of his party in the 

Constituent Assembly, who were totally unfit to represent the voters. He invited gendarmerie 

officers throughout the country to ignore commands from Zogu and obstacle his adherents 

from winning seats. During this period of constant pressure from the opposition, Zogu 

renounced the portfolio of Minister of the Interior, retaining though the highest office of 

Prime Minister. 

He decided to strike back Korça on the spot, appealing to the Council of Regency to dismiss 

him on the ground that the gendarmerie commander-in-chief was abusing his powers by 

interfering in politics, but he met with unexpected opposition from the Regent Sotir Peçi 

supported by four Ministers of his cabinet, who all menaced resignation if proceedings were 

taken against the conspirators. Given that a mass resignation was not in Zogu‟s interest as it 

would have necessitated the recall of the old parliament thereby indefinitely postponing the 

new elections, he tried to avoid it. Gossip swept that the Premier would be shot on the podium 

during the Independence Day march-past. The political situation in the country was getting 

from bad to worse. Ahmet was facing with a military coup d’état by the former War Minister, 

Colonel Ismail Haki, who had engineered a plot to assassin the Prime Minister and declare a 

military government. Many of the officers involved were lieutenant colonels, the highest rank 

in the Albanian army, who could be tried by no one except superior officers. Therefore, they 

were responsible to no court unless special powers were obtained from Parliament. A legal 

deadlock had been created. 190 

Zogu again turned to the British Legation. Eyres was away, but he outlined his three options 

to the chargé Robert Parr which included: either resign and surrender to leave the field to the 

Clique; or play for time, make a compromise with the Clique so to keep his status-quo and 

then gradually counter-attack; or he could use those government forces faithful to him, and 

with the support of his tribe, the Mati, and of a great number of younger army officers not 

willing to obey orders by their superiors if those involved rebellion against the established 

government, strike hard at once, crush the rebels, and hang the ring-leaders 191 . Most probably 

190 Fischer, 54-55 

191 FO 371/8535, C 21309/1380/ 90, Parr to Curzon, 1 December 1923, op. cit. Dibra p. 228, Tomes p. 61, 

Fischer p. 55 

80


he would have adopted the last option and rid himself of the Clique‟s anguish once and for all, 

were it not for a series of considerations, including the fact that it might entail semi- 

dictatorship given that his cabinet ministers and at least two of the regents would oppose him. 

The first option was out of character for him. He therefore leaned towards the second 

alternative 192 , also on the recommendation of the British diplomat, whose guiding principles 

made no little impression upon Zogu. Parr persuaded Ahmet first that it was vital to maintain 

stability of the Government in Albania, and second, that it was necessary for him to 

scrupulously avoid any unconstitutional means, if he wanted to remain trustworthy in the eyes 

of his people, and of foreigners as well. He was also clever enough to realize that foreign 

money in loans and investments, so badly needed in Albania, would not be forthcoming if 

politically chaotic conditions continued ad infinitum. 

The Clique was initially reluctant to compromise, trusting in their military superior position. 

Central government was paralysed, and local gendarmerie officers and prefects had received 

carte blanche to practice all sorts of electoral fraud on their own initiative. They were not 

only determined but were also liberally supplied with funds. Zogu felt dismayed yet not 

despairing. Urging restraint, Parr informally called together the senior diplomatic envoys of 

Britain, Yugoslavia, Italy, and the USA and let it be known that if Zogu was overthrown, 

these four nations would refuse to recognize a Government which came to power 

unconstitutionally 193 , even if a certain specious legality were given to it by the fact that 

ministers of the previous cabinet and two of the regents lent it their support. 

Belgrade also showed great interest on the elections in Albania. It was obvious that it 

supported Zog with whom had negotiated agreements, while openly unveiled its reservations 

towards the opposition which was represented by elements contrasting zealously interference 

by Yugoslav government in Albania and its objectives. On the eve of the elections, Ninčić 

made a speech in the Yugoslav parliament stating that: “it is in the interest of the Serb-Croat- 

Slovene state to see a victorious Albania over the difficulties caused by the parliamentary 

regime” 194 , showing full support to Zogu. Furthermore, the Yugoslav press carried out a real 

campaign in favour of Zog with articles including his services to Yugoslavia. “He – wrote 

“Novosti” newspaper – sent away Hasan bey Prishtina, our greatest enemy .... gives us secret 

192 Ibidem 

193 Tomes, p. 61 

194 Historia e Shqipërisë, Vol. III, p. 277; see also “Ora e Maleve”, 20 December 1923 

81

news on the moves of our adversaries ... under his government, most of our enemies have had 

a bad time in Albania” 195 

The tough stance adopted by the foreign representatives saved the situation of the serious 

conflict prior to elections. Once more Zogu had been rescued by a movement which had been 

initiated by the British representative, sparing thus a bloody rebellion. All parties were then 

agreed that a compromise had become necessary. The gendarmerie patrols were withdrawn 

and the immediate danger of civil war was averted. 196 Both parties immediately set to work 

rigging the elections. 

The poll conducted at the end of November turned out to be the last genuinely contested 

general election in Albania during the entire Zogu‟s regime, with none of the major groups 

receiving a clear majority. Zogist partisans however emerged the victors. His personal party 

controlled forty seats in the reconstituted House of 102. The rest were distributed between 

Noli‟s and Gurakuqi‟s democratic followers, the Clique, the Christians, the conservative beys 

and many with no particular allegiance 197 . Yet it was not until 23 February 1924 that deputies 

gathered to elect a new government. The Foreign Office was relieved to see Albania back to 

stability, and that neighbouring Yugoslavia or Italy had not interfered. Parr‟s engagement was 

considered just and thought-out, still Harold Nicolson 198 , Senior Official in the Foreign 

Office, would later write to Eyres not to get too much involved in the Albanian internal 

politics, which could awake Rome‟s jealousy. 199 

It may seem that all ended well, but the crisis that followed was the gravest since March 1922. 

The tension had more aggravated following the signing of the pact between Italy and Serb- 

Croat-Slovene Kingdom in January 1924, according to which Fiume passed over to Italy. By 

doing so, Belgrade wanted to displace Italy‟s attention from Albania 200 . The pact was 

195 ASCA, Fund 251, file 184, 1923, “The Albanian Government. Who is the Prime Minister”, Article of the 

Yugoslav newspaper “Novosti”, 15 December 1923; see also Milo P,. p. 166 

196 FO 371/8535 (C21309/1380/90), Durrës, 1 December 1923, op. cit. Fischer, p. 56 

197 Fischer, p. 57 

198 Well known as a historian of diplomacy and diplomatic thinker. 

199 FO, 371/8535 

200 In fact, the Italian government had not committed, neither indirectly, to abandon its well-known interest in 

Albania, which had also been pronounced by the Conference of Ambassadors in its decision of 9 November 

1921. Pastorelli P., “Italia e Albania 1924-1927”, Origine Diplomatiche del Trattato di Tirana del novembre 

1927, p. 19-20; “Albanian concerns have no really any serious reason to be. ………friendship pact is not 

directed against third parties and still less against Albanians. I must express my big surprise against artificial 

interpretations undisclosed after I have concretely showed my friendship to the Albanian government. As for 

question Naum, the Italian government has not made commitments of any kind having to be called for this the 

82


interpreted as a secret alliance with Belgrade against Albania and as a real threat to its 

borders. 201 Some newspapers wrote about Italy‟s consent to Yugoslavia on Shkodër‟s 

occupation. 202 

As a result, Zogu could not have the majority needed to be re-elected Prime Minister and 

create his own cabinet. Worse yet, the same day of convening the Constituent Assembly he 

was wounded in an assassination attempt while walking up the steps of the Parliament 

building. The assailant was Beqir Valteri, a Mati young man and member of a group called 

Bashkimi, the Union of young radical Albanians formed by Avni Rustemi, the assassin of 

Essad Pasha. They considered Zogu a Young Turk and a danger for the future of Albania. No 

government was elected that day, but Zogu summoned up strength, and mounted the platform 

as if to proceed with the business in hand. He asked the President of the Parliament, Eshref 

Frashëri, to take his chair and call the session to order. He then addressed the Assembly in a 

loud voice: “Gentlemen, this is not the first time in the world that such a thing happens; such 

incidents take place everywhere; so there is no reason for excitement, and the situation must 

be taken calmly. I ask my friends to leave it alone and deal with it afterwards” 203 . The attempt 

against his life convinced Zogu that his position had become precarious, and that if he did not 

retire he ran the risk of being removed by force. So after a year and two months as Primer, he 

resigned on 25 February. A few days later, a predominantly Zogist ministry was formed by 

Shefqet Verlaci, Zogu‟s to be father-in-law. The only privileges made to opposition were 

three posts in the new government. 204 However in and out office he remained the focal point. 

The creation of the new Albanian government and Zog‟s removal from power caused great 

discontent in Belgrade. The appointments of Luigj Gurakuqi and F. Rushiti, who represented 

Ambassadors’ Conference….” IDD, 7 th Series, 1922-1935, vol. II, doc. 601, p. 419, The Presdient of the Council 

and Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Durrës, Durazzo, Rome, 29 January 1924; see also Pastorelli 

P., p. 20 

201 Yugoslav and Italian press, followed by the European one, wrote that Mussolini and Pašić had concluded a 

compromise: in exchange for Fiume, the SCS Kingdom would occupy Shkodër. [ASCA, Fund 251, file 103, 

1924, News from the Yugoslav newspaper “Jugosllavenski list”, the Italian newspapers “La Tribuna”, “Il 

Piemonte”, “Mondo”, “Drita”, 24 February 1924]; more yet, there were Albanian concerns about news 

according to which Pašić had asked Mussolini to support Belgrade claims on the monastery of Saint Naoum and 

Vermosh. [ASCA, Fund 251, file 64, 1924, Note of the Albanian Legation in Rome to Mussolini, 25 January 

1924]. 

202 Chicago Tribune; IDD, 7 th Series, 1922-1935, vol. III, doc. 51, p. 36, The President of the Council and 

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, to the Minister Durazzo, in Durrës, Rome, 7 March 1924; Ibid., p. 42, 

Minister Durazzo to the President of Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, 8 March 1924; 

203 Pearson p. 217, Tocci T., Il Re, p. 87, Fischer, p. 58 

204 Histori e Shqipërisë, Vol. III, p 281 

83

the opposition, at the new the government‟s cabinet, and of Ilias Vrioni who was considered 

by Belgrade as a proitalian in the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, were enough to the 

Yugoslav Foreign Minister to affirm that “the Albanian government was formed by 

Yugoslavia‟s enemies” 205 . Zog‟s removal from power was considered as a failure of the 

Yugoslav politics in Albania. 

Yet Zog‟s political opponents led by Bishop Fan Noli were not pacified by his resignation, 

contending that his influence persisted. Like Zogu, Verlaci was not well-liked to democrats, 

with whom he sought in vain to compromise. They considered that shifts in the Cabinet had 

produced no real change of the regime, which was a mere continuation of the former 

administration. Government‟s weakness and its inability to deal rapidly with deteriorating 

conditions did little to increase its general popularity. Discontent with the government grew 

higher when eight weeks later, on the 20 th April, Avni Rustemi, the leader of Bashkimi and a 

prominent member of Noli‟s Democratic Party, recently elected also as Deputy to the 

Constituent Assembly, was gunned down in the street. Everyone assumed that Zogu had 

Rustemi killed in revenge for the attack on him. Anti-Zogists insurgence followed all over the 

country. The Opposition turned the incident to their advantage. The Democrats and some of 

the Populists in the parliament invited honourable deputies to join an alternative assembly at 

Vlora and demanded that Zogu leave the country. Noli and his followers believed that now 

they had enough support and ammunition against Zogu to move on the government. It was 

obvious that Zog was the power behind the throne and they would never be able to gain 

control as long as he remained in the country. 

A nation-wide armed rebellion broke out against the government. Verlaci resigned the 

Premiership by the end of May. His successor, Ilias Vrioni, could not even take office, when 

opposition deputies from northern Albania signed a manifesto drawn up by Luigj Gurakuqi, 

calling for open revolt. The British Minister, Harry Eyres, attempted to reconcile the two 

factors in the Albanian Parliament, but the revolution was spreading too rapidly 206 . Rexhep 

Shala, the commander of the forces in northern Albania, a chieftain of Shalë who wanted 

Shkodër to be the capital city, joined by Bajram Curri and Elez Isufi took the offensive 

against the government‟s troops loyal to Zogu. Colonel Qazim Qafëzezi, Noli‟s military 

adviser, also mobilized the forces under his command throughout the southern zone. He was 

205 Milo P., p. 170 

206 United States Document 875.00/148,op. cit. Pearson p. 222 

84


immediately joined by Major Shefqet Korça who concentrated his troops in the regions of 

Vlorë and Berat. Not all insurgents were driven by the same objective though. National spirit 

prevailed in the south, which to some extent witnessed political awareness of the southerners. 

Whereas northerners, especially those coming from highlands, were mainly driven by their 

primitive tribal instinct, which rose above any sort of state authority, either Albanian national 

state or Turkish or Serbian ones. They would come up against any kind of centralization that 

would annihilate their tribal way of thinking, and against any kind of unification that would 

vanish their customs and traditions. 

Vrioni found himself without a way out. He invited Zog to take the command and gave him 

complete authority. But the situation was hopeless anyway. He still had some six hundred 

clansmen and gendarmes behind him, and called the citizens of Tirana together to ask for 

support. But the majority of the inhabitants turned their backs on a losing cause. Tirana was 

surrounded by the rebels, and he ultimately decided to surrender. Everyone of importance had 

already left town in a rather undignified manner, and this caused the worst impression among 

all classes of Albanians 207 . As the white flags went up, Zogu and his dwindling band did the 

same. He fled to Yugoslavia to await the right moment to return. 

Really discontented and disappointed of Zogu‟s failure, Eyres, who had placed far too much 

faith in his capacity for intrigue, sent in a pessimistic report to the Foreign Office, alluding to 

the heavy clouds looming on the future of the country: internal divisions, still disputed 

borders, lack of capable men and experienced patriots, and especially the financial failure. 

Together with the diplomatic representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia, he had openly made 

any efforts in support of the government urging it first to a severe repression and then to a 

resistance to the bitter end. 208 Fully convinced on Zogu‟s abilities, he considered his failure a 

fatality. In his opinion, Ahmet Zog was a firm hand in the leadership of Albania. Now he 

predicted a dark future for the country. In such exceptional circumstances, he believed that 

there existed three prospects for Albania: either Italian protectorate, or split the country into 

three parts among the neighbours, or bring it under foreign financial control. 209 He was 

207 FO 371/9639 (C9654/28/90), Durrës, 10 June 1924, op. cit. Fischer p. 62; 

208 IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, doc. 143, p. 146, Minister Durazzo to the President of the Council and Minister of 

Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, Durrës, 7 giugno 1924 

209 Eyres‟s report to the Foreign Office, in April 1924, when referring about Yugoslavia‟s campaign against the 

independent Albanian state, had also been very dark: “It is obvious that the Serb-Croat-Slovene government is 

trying to create troubles in Albania thus contrasing the Albanian border cause in the Conference of 

85

confident that Great Britain would never allow a solution that would disregard Albanian 

sovereignty, and consequently produce new conflict areas in the Balkans. He believed also 

that Greece would absolutely have been contrary to such a solution. As regards Italian 

protectorate, he had told Minister Durazzo that “as long as most Albanians would not agree 

with it, it would make Italy establish a permanent military domain with heavy financial 

burdens for her” 210 . Hence he proposed arbitration by the League of Nations, though it proved 

unacceptable to both sides. 211 

Eyres‟ report received great attention in the Foreign Office. It was a report which enabled 

“understanding of what happened, what is happening, and what is about to happen in 

Albania” 212 . Indeed arbitration by the League of Nations was the best choice. But the situation 

in the country of the eagles was too much complicated, and it would prove fruitless in any 

case. The conditions were different from 1922, since there was big doubt whether Albania 

represented an interest for the League to take such a responsibility again 213 , and also because 

the League could pass to Italy the political mandate on Albania pursuant to the Paris 

Declaration November 9 th. . After Zogu‟s failure and the Opposition‟s triumph, Eyres left 

Albania and came back to London. By doing so he showed clearly his disapproval and 

abandoned his supporting role. 214 

The new regime was a motley coalition of Shkodra Roman Catholics under Italian influence, 

northern Moslems, angry with Zogu‟s religious tolerance, Orthodox Christians from south 

and central Albania, who could not any more stand a Moslem head of government, liberals, 

Kosovars, opposition beys and mutineers, who had nothing in common but their shared hatred 

and envy of Zogu. They had at their head, however, an extraordinary polymath: His Grace 

Fan S. Noli, Bishop of Durrës, leader of the Democratic Party, League of Nations delegate, 

Ambassadors” – and so asking for British intervention. DBFP, 1 st Series, vol. XXVI, Telegram of the British 

Minister in Durrës to the Foreign Office, 6 April 1924; IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, doc. 262, pp. 155-157, Eyres’ 

point of view on the Albanian question, Minister Durazzo, in Durrës, to the President of the Council and 

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, Durrës, 14 june 1924 

210 Durazzo’s opinion in this regard was cautiously in favour to Noli’s support - IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, doc. 

262, pp. 155-157, Eyres’ point of view on the Albanian question, Minister Durazzo, in Durrës, to the President 

of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, Durrës, 14 june 1924 

211 DBFP, 1 st Series, 1919-1939, FS, vol. XXIV, doc. 45, 15 February 1924 

212 Ibidem; however “the ideas expressed by the British representative, while appreciated because they come 

from someone who has deep knowledge of the country are not held in high regard by the Foreign Office, which 

in recent times seems to care little for Albania” – IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, doc. 380, p. 215, The Ambassador to 

London, Della Torretta, to the President of of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister Mussolini, London, 

10 July, 1924 

213 Worth of mention here is the League’s disillusion when Zogu sent away its advisor for lack of funds. 

214 AMFAA, file 380, p. 67, 1 June 1924 

86


Bachelor of Arts, biographer of Scanderbeg, translator of Stendhal, Maupassant, and Molière, 

liturgist, composer, and orator. 215 A Harvard graduate, an idealist dreaming to establish in 

Albania a progressive democratic state according to the USA model, he began the process of 

reforms, however lacking any practical experience of governance. Elected Prime Minister, on 

17 June 1924, he promised solemnly to govern through parliamentarianism and democracy. 

He issued a proclamation stating that the successful revolution was a protest against 

illegalities and corruption of the previous regime and against its efforts to perpetuate the 

feudal privileges of the nobility and of large landowners. He declared that the new 

government aimed to unseating the landed aristocracy from their positions of power, and 

transform Albania into a democracy dedicated to progress and establishment of political 

freedom. His liberal declarations were however addressed more to Europe than to Albanians, 

in desperate attempts to obtain recognition of his regime, and hoping to develop good 

relations specially with the neighbouring countries and with the Great Powers. 

In the meantime Yugoslavs were being very sceptic as to reduce relations with Albania into 

merely neighbouring. King Alexander was not satisfied with the attitude of the new 

government that not only would suppress but perhaps even encourage some agitation by 

armed gangs at the border. 216 This was reflected adversely on relations between the two 

governments and maintained an atmosphere of distrust. Thus Yugoslavs refused recognition 

mainly because of Kosovo irredentist leaders like Bajram Curri and Luigj Gurakuqi, known of 

old as Serbofobs, but what is more, they were convinced that Noli was a tool in Italy‟s 

hand 217 . Belgrade‟s scepticism grew even further when the Bulgarian government posted to 

Tirana as its diplomatic envoy a former head of a Macedonian Bulgarophil organization. 218 

Both France and England did not show any haste in recognizing the Albanian government. 

The French government, meanwhile, did not recognize the government of Fan Noli, being not 

"a modification of regime but a mere change of government," according to the opinion that 

215 Tomes, p. 67 

216 IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, p. 243, doc. 420, The President of the Council of Minister and Foreign Minister 

Mussolini to the Regent of the Legation in Durrës, Rome, 1 st August 1924 

217 For this reason that King Alexander was confident of an Italian action of persuasion which might help make 

Albanians abbandon a "sterile policy of pinpricks" that did not facilitate the relationship between the two 

countries – IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, p. 243, doc. 420, The President of the Council of Minister and Foreign 

Minister Mussolini to the Regent of the Legation in Durrës, Rome, 1 st August 1924 

218 Ibid., p. 323, doc. 536, The Chargè d’Affaires in Belgrade, Sola, to the President of the Council and Minister 

of Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, Belgrade, 10 October 1924 

87

the Director-General for Political Affairs and Trade of the Quai d'Orsay, Peretti de La Rocca, 

expressed to the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Romano Avezzana. 219 Foreign Office had 

decided not to take any decision on recognition of the new Albanian government. It was 

considered appropriate to let go a few more time as not being fully confident that the order 

was fully restored in Albania. Because news had reached the Foreign Office of small clashes 

near Dibra, and the figure Ahmet Korça, a member of the new government, was not 

considered completely reassuring. 220 Hence the Foreign Office decided not to recognize 

Noli‟s government unless Parr reported that it was an effective government representing the 

entire country. 221 They also feared for the question of petroleum concessions, given that Noli 

maintained rather close ties with the Albanian-American group “Vatra” which represented the 

interest of the Standard Oil Company. In such a situation, while gauging the real import of 

Great Britain‟s de jure recognition, Noli did not hesitate to drag in the ratification of the oil 

concession contract with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. He declared to the British diplomat 

at Durrës that the Albanian Parliament would soon pass the oil concessions obtained by the 

British company in March 1921. Robert Parr wrote then to the Foreign Office: “I ignored the 

blackmail and answered that I had not received any explicit direction with regard to 

recognition of the new government. In my personal opinion, however, His Majesty‟s 

Government should act upon the extent to which the revolutionary government has been 

accepted by the Albanian people, and how moderate its policies are”. 222 

Italy, on its side, preferred to delay an answer to Noli‟s request for recognition of the new 

government. Mussolini had advised the Italian minister in Durrës that “in the strictly formal 

point of view might be preferable to delay response to the statement of Fan Noli in order to 

eliminate doubt that it meant our recognition of the new Albanian government....” 223 

However, in a letter addressed to Noli who had previously informed him of the new situation 

in Albania, Mussolini had expressed “assurances that Italy would continue to contribute to the 

peaceful development and prosperity of the close and friendly country” 224 , thus showing 

219 st 

ASE, 1919-30, doc.718, Romano Avezzana to Mussolini, Paris, 1 July 1924 

220 th 

IDD, 7 Series, vol. III, 1922-1935, p. 188, doc. 322, The Ambassador to London Della Torretta to the 

President of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister Mussolini, London, 23 June 1924 

221 

FO 371/9639, C 9204/28/90 

222 

Dibra P., p. 246 

223 th 

IDD, 7 Series, vol. III, 1922-1935, p. 178, doc. 305, The President of the Council of Ministers and Foreign 

Minister Mussolini to the Minister Durazzo in Durrës, 21 June 1924 

224 

Ibid., pp. 178-179, doc. 305, The President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, to the 

Minister Durazzo, in Durrës, Rome, 21 June 1924; see also p. 179, doc. 306, The President of the Council and 

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, to the Albanian President of the Council, Noli, Rome, 21 June 1924 

88


sympathy for the new Albanian government. 225 This did not imply an absolute formal 

recognition of the new government. Furthermore, in June 1924, the Italian government agreed 

with Belgrade a joint statement, to be transmitted simultaneously to the press stating that: “On 

occasion of the events in Albania, the governments of Rome and Belgrade have had an 

exchange of views based on their pact of friendship and cooperation. Both governments were 

thus able to establish that the purpose of their policy is to undertake anything that might 

impede or simply embarrass the development of an independent Albania. They therefore 

consider this fight inside Albania as an Albanian internal affair" 226 . It was obvious that the 

new Albanian government, even if recognized by the Powers, could be considered but a 

provisional and revolutionary government from the constitutional perspective, at least until 

the convening of the new Assembly. It was therefore indispensable for the government of 

Tirana to return as soon as possible in the orbit of legality. Indeed, a subsequent government 

could deny the validity of the commitments made by a revolutionary government. 227 

But Noli proved soon that he had no experience of governing and no means of fulfilling his 

vast ambitions. Moreover, he lost confidence of the foreign chancelleries when his first act on 

taking Tirana, instead of a general amnesty that would make the new „democratic‟ 

government trustworthy 228 , was to release Zogu‟s assailant Valteri, and set up a political court 

which in due course sentenced to death in absentia Ahmet, Verlaci and Vrioni. Lesser 

opponents all over the country were also sentenced to imprisonment and their properties were 

confiscated. That is Noli‟s government, contrary to its unveiled political views, showed to be 

much autocratic and less civilized and reliable. No country recognized it. There were rumours 

at the beginning that the only country to recognize it was Greece but they revealed to be 

untrue. 229 Italy, Yugoslavia and the USA, each for different reasons and under the influence 

of Harry Eyres, held their pledge 230 to withhold recognition from any cabinet formed 

225 th 

On 10 June 1924, Mussolini in a telegram to the Minister Durazzo (IDD, 7 Series, vol. III, p. 149, doc. 249), 

following the Italo-Yugoslav joint declaration on the situation in Albania, had somwhow shown support to the 

new Albania government: “I have reason to hope that the Albanians finally will understand the absolute loyalty 

with which Italy has acted in their regard and how effectively the conclusion of the Italo-Yugoslav pact, which 

finals had then raised so absurd suspicions, is especially advantageous to Albania.The new Albanian 

government coming to power will thus find, because of us, an international situation that will allow it to engage 

in the reorganization and consolidation of the State which is our primary and long wish”. 

226 

Ibid., doc. 244, p. 146, The Chargé d’Affaires in Belgrade Sola to the President of the Council of Minister 

and Foreign Minister, Belgrade, 7 June 1924 

227 

Ibidem 

228 

The Near East, 29 September 1924 

229 

Historia e Shqipërisë (History of Albania), vol. III, p. 235 

230 

(made during the election campaign seven months earlier) 

89

unconstitutionally. He also tried by all means to undermine Noli‟s reforms by persuading 

everybody around him that agrarian reforms were a dangerous Bolshevist innovation. 231 

Dismayed from foreign hostility, Noli addressed to the League of Nations for a financial loan 

of 100 million gold francs, which "would enable Albania to stand on its own feet”. His speech 

in Geneva on 10 September, during the Fifth General Assembly of the organization, was 

really remarkable when he dared to criticize the League of Nations for failing to settle the 

threat facing Albania on its land borders. 232 But his manner showed a lack of diplomatic tact 

and offended some of members. Thus he failed to secure the desired loan and came back 

empty-handed. The situation he found in Albania was chaotic. His regime was unravelling. 

His supporters kept on reminding him that “promises should never remain mere words but 

that the program should be put into effect 233 . Kosovars were angry at lack of progress on 

frontier revisions; the Clique was conspiring as usual. Curri and Gurakuqi rejected plans for a 

republic. The promised programme was not carried out. Most importantly he failed to grapple 

with the issue of land reform. 

Noli encountered resistance to his program from people who had helped him oust Zogu, and 

he never attracted the foreign aid necessary to carry out his reform plans. Without a loan he 

hardly knew what to do. The agrarian reform, military modernization, education of the 

Albanian women, and investments in other international business funds proved very 

unrealistic for a country with anarchy in the place for centuries. 

What is more, at a time when no western European country was recognizing his regime and in 

the context of his attempts to establish contacts with the foreign world, on 28 June 1924, he 

made the error to reopen negotiations with Moscow (which had remained pending since a 

year ago by Zog‟s government) 234 and establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, a 

bitter enemy of the Serbian ruling family. Belgrade began making wild allegations that the 

Albanian regime was about to embrace Bolshevism. Balkan monarchies were all vehemently 

anti-communist. They feared that Soviet Russia would secure a hold in Albania which she 

planned to use as a centre of Bolshevik propaganda for the explicit purpose of fomenting 

revolution throughout all of the Balkan countries. Noli, on his side, had initially assumed that 

231 Swire, pp. 445-449, Letter of Noli to Joseph Swire 

232 Historia e Shqipërisë (History of Albania), vol. III, p. 236 

233 Dielli, Boston, 2 August 1924 


90


communism could not reach Albania from a country so geographically far. But the arrival of 

numerous diplomatic and consular officials in Tirana aggravated the situation. European 

chancelleries lodged severe protests to the Albanian government, especially Belgrade, which 

reported to the Powers that Bolshevik agents were already contributing to perpetuation of 

factional internal strife in Albania through connections with members of the Kosovo 

Committee. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister Ninčić had admitted in an interview with the 

French Press that “we are facing a unique situation in which perhaps is possible to interfere, 

to a certain extent, in the internal affairs of another country, that is, we are facing the menace 

of Bolshevism. Fan Noli is completely in the hands of the Bolsheviks and we have been 

provided with information that, in agreement with the Bulgarian Bolsheviks, he is ready to 

march upon our southern provinces”. 235 Other western European countries like Great Britain, 

Norway, Greece, Austria, Sweden and Denmark had established diplomatic relations with 

Moscow. However, the step undertaken by the Albanian government generated a really strong 

reaction by western and Balkan press as well as by respective chancelleries of these countries. 

When Noli realised the consequences of this action and asked to the Russians to postpone the 

opening of their diplomatic representation 236 , the exiled Zogu was actively preparing a 

comeback. As soon as he arrived in Belgrade, he established contacts with the Prime Minister 

Pašić, his personal assistant Gavrilovic, the Chief of Staff, General Gaic, and other Yugoslav 

senior public and military officials 237 , and while scrutinizing every single move of Noli from 

Hotel Bristol in Belgrade 238 , he was trying to convince the Yugoslav Government with 

various arguments for intervention 239 . He was joined by many Albanians who had immigrated 

to Yugoslavia, well known as separatists and ex-supporters of Essad Pasha, like Taf Kaziu, 

Marka Gjoni, Zef Ndoci, Preng Previzi, Maliq Bushati, Luigj Shantoja etc. 240 He assured 

himself of the Yugoslav‟s aid by inducing them to believe that, if they were to help him return 

235 Macartney and Cremona, Italy’s foreign ….., p. 103, op.cit. Pearson p. 231, Le Matin, 15 April 1927, Le 

Temps, 15 April 1927 


237 His contact point in Belgrade was his friend Branco Lazarevic, Head of Albania‟s Section at the Yugoslav 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

238 ASCA, File 207/8, p. 2, Report of Shkodra Prefecture, 8 December 1924; Fund 251, File 260, Report of the 

Albanian Legation in Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 June 1924; Daily “Gazeta e Korçës”, 8 

July 1924; Daily “Koha”, 26 July 1924 

239 Ibid., File 260, p. 252, Report of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 

June 1924 

240 Ibid., Fund 249, File I, p. 566, Report of the Albanian Military Attaché in Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, 17 July 1924 

91

to power, he would grant them territorial concessions. Marincovich, the Foreign Minister, 

recognized his counter-revolutionary potential, and it fell to Pašić and Ninčić to agree the 

details. In exchange for their backing, the Serbs wanted the southern shore of Lake Ohrid, 

because of the monastery of Saint Naumi, but nothing was put in writing. 

The Serbs treated Zogu like a statesman rather than like an ordinary political asylum seeker. 

The governmental press spoke of Zogu as “a spiritual friend of Yugoslavia who has always 

confirmed such a feeling”. 241 Zogu‟s accommodation in Belgrade and several declarations by 

him and his men as soon as he entered Yugoslavian territory apparently stirred Rome‟s 

jealousy and concern. Not a long time would pass and Mussolini unveiled that Belgrade was 

acting against the spirit of Rome‟s Pact 242 . (The Italo-Yugoslav pact signed in Rome, in 

January 27, 1924 sanctioned the annexation of Fiume to Italy, with some adjustments to 

boundary lines, while the Delta and Porto Baros were attributed to Serb-Croat-Slovene 

Kingdom) 243 . The pact had set out that when international troubles would jeopardize the 

common interests of both countries, their Governments would work together to decide on 

measures to be taken. Such a pledge was reiterated later through an Italo-Yugoslav a public 

statement declaring the agreed views of the two governments with regard to the situation in 

Albania, on 9 June 1924, at a time when Noli‟s followers were approaching Tirana. In full 

compliance with Rome‟s Pact, the governments of Rome and Belgrade made a joint 

declaration of agreement “to treat the revolution as an Albanian internal affair, and to pursue a 

policy of disinterestedness towards the events in the independent state of Albania”. 244 (A 

similar communiqué was to be repeated also in December). Mussolini, inter-alia, had balked 

at helping Zogu, when his secretary, Jak Koci, acted on his behalf in Rome, asking for “Italy‟s 

support, a donation of 2 million lire, upon the promise of an Albanian foreign policy that 

would guarantee it definite control of the Adriatic 245 ”. The Duce‟s insistence on a formal 

241 

Ibid., Fund 51, File 257, Report of the Albanian Legation to Belgade to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1924 

242 

Historical Documents and Materials from People‟s War for Freedom and Democracy 1917 – 1941, Doc. 172, 

p. 161 

243 th 

Pastorelli P., Italy and Albania 1924-1927, p. 41; see also IDD, 7 Series, vol. II, p. 407, doc. 587, Aide 

Memoire of the President of the Council and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, to Vittorio Emanuele II, Roma 23 

gennaio 1924 

244 

“The Italian Government and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government having had an intimate exchange of ideas 

about the situation in Albania have found complete agreement of the respective points of view in the sense that 

the objective of their policy is not to do anything that might impede or otherwise embarrass the development of 

an independent Albania. Thus they consider struggles in Albania as an Albanian internal affair” – IDD, 7 th 

Series, vol. III, p. 146, doc. 244, The Chargè d’Affaires in Belgrade, Sola, to the President of Council and 

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, Belgrade, 7 June 1924; see also "Pastorelli P., Italy and Albania …, p. 29 

245 

Nolfo E. di, Mussolini …, p. 176 

92


contract prevented any deal. Italians however could not forget that Zogu had played a leading 

part in driving them from Vlora. 

No doubt that Italian concern had nothing to do with the democratic government‟s destine, 

nor with breaking international rules on interstate relations, rather with avoiding jeopardize 

Italian interests in Albania. Seeing that the Serbs were preparing to intervene in support of 

Ahmet Zog, Italian diplomacy threatened to claim from the League of Nations the application 

of the Paris Declaration, recalling that the Albanian question had been resolved once, and in 

whichever case of serious troubles, Italy had the mandate to intervene if Albania would be 

unable to settle them itself. 246 Upon instructions by Mussolini, the Italian Chargè d'Affaires in 

Belgrade drew the attention of Serb-Croat-Slovene Government revealing that any 

participation or consent to the intrigues of the partisans of Ahmet Bey Zogolli cannot be 

regarded but as a breach of the formula of non-intervention in internal affairs of Albania. He 

had added that Mussolini was not a protector of any Albanian government, but that certainly 

he could not allow artificially shaped movements to generate new concerns and threaten peace 

in the Balkans. 247 

Pašić‟s riposte to Mussolini‟s complaint that the Yugoslav Government had but granted 

asylum to Zogu and to his followers, and that “no attack on Albania would be launched from 

any Yugoslav territory” 248 , however did not ease the already created tension between the two 

countries. Neither did Zogu‟s declaration in an interview given to the Yugoslav press “that he 

was not planning a strike suit at Albania from Yugoslavia, since he would never abuse her 

hospitality”. 249 The Yugoslav Prime Minister persisted on giving assurances that also the 

Yugoslav government was determined not to encourage any hostile act against Albania 250 ; the 

Yugoslav government still wished to maintain the commitment taken with Italy in June not to 

interfere in the internal affairs of Albania; the Yugoslav government did not intend to obtain 

from any Albanian government privileges whatsoever; the government had formally declared 

that in no case it would in Albania under any pretext; where action was necessary in the 

246 

DBFP, FS, vol. XXVI, doc. 276, 3 December 1924 

247 th 

IDD, 7 Series, vol. III, p. 353, doc. 588, The Chargè d’Affaires in Belgrade, Sola, to the President of the 

Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, Belgrade, 26 November 1924 

248 

Historical Documents and Materials from People‟s War for Freedom and Democracy, 1917-1941, Doc. 172, 

p. 161; “Koha”, 26 July 1924 

249 

“Koha”, 26 July 1924 

250 th 



93

future, the government itself would not promote it without first consulting the Italian 

Government, and have with it a full exchange of ideas; the Yugoslav government shared the 

view that everything concerning Albania did not concern but only two countries: Italy and 

Yugoslavia 251 . In declaring that no activity by bands of irregular soldiers would be tolerated, 

and that “orders would be sent to border authorities not to countenance any preparation for 

invasion”, Ninčić emphasized that the Yugoslav government was willing to make similar 

statements with the Italian government as in January and June. Belgrade reported, however, 

that Noli‟s government did not offer any perspective for stability and at the same time was 

enabling agents of Moscow to cause a revolution in the Balkans from which Yugoslavia could 

quit shattered; contrary, a government headed by Ahmet Zog, a strong man, one with the gift 

to become powerful and the only real leader in a country like Albania could achieve it. 252 

Indeed, Pašić and Zogu, despite of their declarations, continued with an open cooperation 

policy to overthrow Noli‟s government. The mercenary bands of Hysni Dema, Muharrem 

Bajraktari, Fiqri Dine and Taf Kaziu, in collaboration with Prizren‟s Prefect Stojan Dajic, 

would frequently come from Yugoslavian territory and provoke incidents and armed clashes 

within Albanian frontier. 253 At this point the Italian diplomats assumed that it was time to 

make their move. Here is the origin of Rome‟s initiative for a meeting between Mussolini and 

Ninčić. 254 Italian historiography explains that Mussolini was really concerned seeing the 

Serbian plans realized. He became even more tense reading that the official Yugoslav press 

was chorusing “to enter Albania forcibly”. Yugoslav propaganda and corruption action in 

Albania was taking more and more anti-Italian proportions. It's not an exaggeration to 

estimate that in total the various Yugoslav authorities in Shkodra, Durrës, Korça and the 

border military offices were spending money for two to three hundred thousand per month not 

counting distribution of arms piecemeal. 255 

251 th 



252 

DBFP, vol. XXVI, doc. 285, 11 December 1924 

253 

Historical Documents and Materials from People‟s War for Freedom and Democracy, 1917-1941, Doc. 169, 

p. 159; “Bashkimi”, 15 July 1924 

254 th 

IDD, 7 Series, vol. III, p. 357, doc. 593, The President of the Council and Foreign Minister Mussolini to the 

Chargè d’Affaires in Belgrade Sola, Rome, 28 November 1924 

255 

Ibid., p. 348, doc. 579, The Minister Durazzo in Durrës to the President of Council and Ministero f Foreign 

Affairs, Mussolini, Durrës, 23 November 1924 

94


The arrival of Ninčić in Rome to participate in a meeting of the Council of the League of 

Nations 256 , scheduled to be held on 8 December, was accounted a good occasion for talks on 

the delicate issue of the attack against Albania. Ninčić accepted the invitation and arrived in 

Rome on 10 December. 257 Regardless of the Italian media coverage of this visit, the official 

statement, issued on 13 December, was nothing but a mere reiteration that both governments 

were standing by their previous commitments of the last June reaffirming their will to act in 

respect of one another, and committed not to contrast or prevent the Albanian development. 

It seemed that nothing had changed in Rome‟s or Belgrade‟s position towards Albania, 

although an incursion into Albania from Yugoslavian soil was about to occur. Zogu had 

managed to convince the Serbs on the danger of Noli‟s “communist” government to Albania, 

and to the Balkans as well. Moreover, he had told the Yugoslav officials that Noli was 

receiving Italian money via the Vatican. When the Bishop had stopped in Rome on his way to 

Geneva 258 , the implication appeared obvious to the Yugoslavs who, regardless of Mussolini‟s 

assurances that Italy would never have sympathy with the Albanian nationalism in Kosovo, 

feared future consequences from a government made up of the most ardent Kosovar 

nationalists. Hence, if the Kosovo Committee and the Bolsheviks endorsed the new regime, it 

had to be anti-Yugoslav. More yet: the Serbs were banking on a future Albanian state acting 

as Yugoslavia‟s cat‟s paw. They did not therefore hesitate to back up Zogu‟s triumphal return. 

In truth, Mussolini was initially inclined towards recognition of Noli‟s government. He was 

open to the new Albanian government, with no intention to proceed though, since he would 

not run counter the British and French governments which had already formulated a common 

negative stance. 259 Later, in July 1924, Rome, taking advantage of the internal difficulties of 

the Albanian state and of its isolation in international context, proposed to the Albanian 

government the conclusion of a political agreement between the two countries. Such an 

agreement would place an Italian protectorate over Albania either de facto or de jure. 260 Tefik 

256 Ibid., p. 363, doc. 603, The Minister in Belgrade, Bodrero, to the President of the Council and Minister of 

Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, Belgrade, 6 December 1924 

257 Puto A., Demokraci e rrethuar …, p. 217-218 

258 Indeed Mussolini refused to meet Fan Noli and the Albanian Minister of Finances Thaci, passing through 

Rome, on their way to Geneva. IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, doc. 460, p. 269, The President of the Council and 

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mussolini, to the Regent of the Legation in Durrës, Marchetti, Rome, 22 August 

1924 

259 More detailed notes on this are at Pastorelli P., Albania and Italy 1924-1927, pp.40-42 

260 Historia e Shqipërisë (History of Albania), p. 241 

95

Mborja, Noli‟s representative in Rome, affirmed that Mussolini, in addition to general 

assurances of sympathy for the government, had expressed his support to grant an Italian loan 

of one hundred million "and beyond" to Albania; and also back Albania as concerns its border 

issue in order to solve it possibly in its favour within the year; would be willing to consider 

the sale to Albania of a quantity of weapons and ammunition, and what is more he had talked 

about the possibility of a political pact between Italy and Albania. Much to the fury of 

Mussolini, this could not be kept secret from diplomatic circles of European countries. Their 

governments claimed clarifications from Rome. 261 Mussolini then accused the Albanian 

government not only for divulgation of secret information but also for imperfection: 

“Lies in the fact that it reached to me the echo of the effect caused here and elsewhere from 

what Mr. Mborja has reported and above all from disclosure, really inexplicable, of the news 

that he has forwarded, with obvious imperfections, to that Government. I consider it useless to 

underline - and you Sir are going to convey this to Bishop Fan Noli – that such a disclosure 

and the exaggerated amplifications on results of a general conversation I had with the 

Albanian charge d‟affaires, cannot but only help to create a very delicate state of affairs, that 

is, undoubtedly, neither will them encourage nor favour to promote a practical realization of 

the assistance that the Royal Government was possible to grant at the time and in the way that 

was appropriate to the said situation.....” 262 

Mussolini considered this event as a lack of Albanian government‟s good will to come to an 

agreement with the Italian government. This incident gave cause for Italy to definitely ignore 

recognition of the democratic government. 263 

In the second half of July, provocations from bands of Albanian political fugitives in 

Yugoslavia were so recurrent as the Albanian Government had to call for the intervention of 

the Great Powers in order to make Belgrade put an end to its policy. 264 Noli‟s government 

protested also against Belgrade‟s tolerance towards actions of Albanian political fugitives and 

261 IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, p. 230, doc. 400, The Regent of the Albanian Legation in Durrës, Marchetti to the 

President of the Council and Foreign Minister Mussolini, Durrës, 23 July 1924 

262 Ibid., p. 253, doc. 434, The President of the Council and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, to the Regent of the 

Legation in Durrës, Marchetti, Rome 9 August 1924 

263 Milo P., Shqiperia…; Puto A., Demokraci e …., pp. 63-71 

264 ASCA, Fund 249, File I, p. 566, Fan Noli’s Telegram to the Great Powers and to the Secretary General of 

the League of Nations, 19 July 1924; see also Historia e Shqipërisë (History of Albania), vol. III, 1912-1939, pp. 

236-245 

96


pretended their dislocation from Albanian border zones. 265 Despite all this, as reported by the 

Albanian Ministry of Home Affairs in the first half of August, “criminal deeds from fugitives 

were increasing, contrary to promises made by the Yugoslav Government”. 266 The 23 rd of 

August 1924, the Albanian Legation informed from Belgrade that “Yugoslav Government 

was offering all its moral and material support to Ahmet Zog and Albanian immigrants living 

in its territory, encouraging and calling them to pull their forces together”. 267 

When Zogu first arrived in Belgrade, it was said that he would have not stayed for so long, 

but would have moved somewhere in Dalmatia or Vienna, where his family had been located. 

Summer passed but he never left Hotel “Bristol” instead. At the beginning of September, he 

“rent a house by the coast of Topcider for 12 thousand dinars per month”, which meant that it 

was not his intention to leave Belgrade. Together with his friends, he spent a lot of money 

(about 30 golden napoleons per day) on amusements. “These last days he bought a beautiful 

car, so he is not anymore driving by Belgrade streets with the car that the Yugoslav 

government set at his disposal” 268 . On the basis of these observations, the Albanian Legation 

in Belgrade had concluded that “Ahmet was preparing and taking all measures for an 

aggression against the current situation in Albania” 269 . Not so long time would pass and 

another information would follow from Belgrade saying that “Ahmet possessed quite a lot of 

financial means, offered to him by easily implicit source” (the Yugoslav Government – 

D.H.) 270 . Likewise, the Albanian Legation in Vienna informed that “Ahmet‟s family had 

departed a day before for Belgrade in company of Ceno Beg” 271 . 

By November 1924, everyone believed that Zogu‟s return was very close. Supported by his 

warriors, the Mati, Albanians from Dibra, Tetova, Gostivari and Krusheva (Yugoslavia‟s 

declared enemies and patriots trusting in a future greater Albania), and the remnants of 

265 Ibid., Fund 251, File 257, Telegram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Albanian Legation in Belgrade, 

Tirana, 9 August 1924 

266 Ibid., Report of the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tirana, 6 August 1924: 

“aktivitetet e të arratisurve, përkundra fjalëve të dhanuna prej qeverisë jugosllave, vijnë tue u shtue” - (“the 

activities of the fugitives, contrary to the news given by the Yugoslav government, are growing…). 

267 Ibid., File 283, Report of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 23 

August 1924 

268 Ibid., Fund 251, File 257, Report of the Albanian Legation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 September 

1924 

269 Ibidem 

270 Ibid., File 287, Report of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 October 

1924 

271 Ibid., File 257, Telegram of the Albanian Legation in Vienna to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, 9 September 

1924 

97

Wrangel's army, anti-Bolsheviks in refuge in Yugoslavia, he reappeared in Albania with the 

conviction to eject Fan Noli's government from Tirana 272 . “I have received the news that in 

the last days … political propaganda in favour of Ahmet Zog is having a lot of support on the 

ground, including south and southeast borders 273 ” – reported the Italian Minister at Durrës to 

his government. Five hundred white Russian soldiers, experts in open-field combat, and five 

thousand Albanians made up the army with which Zogu marched in to Tirana. On 12 

December 1924, a new uprising broke up in Shkodra. It was the revanche of June‟s displaced 

clan. The new rebels accused Noli of being very inclined towards Italy, and of throwing the 

doors open to foreign influences. Soon, the uprising reached the right coast of Drini and the 

rebels arrived in Lezha. Other forces surrounded Vlora. In the meantime Myfit Libohova and 

Koço Kota, sheltered in Greece, started their armed action in the Greek-Albanian border 

without being bothered by the Greek government. 274 Noli, hopeless, called for support first to 

Great Britain, France and Italy (as under signers of the November 1921 documents on the 

recognition of Albania‟s independence and of its state political borders) and then to the 

League of Nations, but his appeals fell on deaf ears. 275 After two weeks of fighting, Zogu 

entered the capital of Albania as liberator from the “communist plague”. Fan Noli could reach 

Vlora, and then left for Italy. 

Italy seemed not to pose a threat anymore. Italian efforts to stop Zogu‟s attack from 

Yugoslavia encountered the recurrent Nincić declarations that “the attitude of the Yugoslav 

government on the Albanian question was clearly established in the statements repeatedly 

made by both the Royal Government and the Italian Government. The purpose of our policy 

in Albania is to help develop an independent Albanian state and we consider the current 

events as purely internal Albanian affair” 276 . The Albanian diplomatic envoy in Rome, Tewfik 

Mora, had already realized in his meeting with the Secretary General of the Italian Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs Senator Salvatore Contarini that Rome could do nothing more for Albania. In 

fact, Rome government was no more interested on Albania which had done a big political 

272 th 

Ibid., File 2, p. 5, doc. 2842, Durres, December 1924; IDD, 7 Series, vol. III, p. 348, doc. 579, The Minister 

Durazzo in Durrës to the President of the Council and Foreign Minister Mussolini, Durrës, 23 November 1924 

273 

Ibid., File 1, p. 5, doc. 2381/229, Report of the Italian Legation at Durrës, 9 November 1924 

274 

Historia e Shqipërisë, (History of Albania), vol. III, 1912-1939, p. 241 

275 

Ibid. pp 243-244 

276 th 

IDD, 7 Series, vol. III, p. 386, docs. 638, 639, The Minister in Belgrade Bodrero to the President of the 

Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mussolini, Belgrade, 24 December 1924; see also ibid., pp 380-381, 

doc. 628, 629, 631, The Chargè d‟Affaires in Belgrade, Sola, to the President of the Council and Minister of 

Foreign Affairs Mussolini, Belgrade, 20 December 1924; The Minister in Belgrade Bodrero to the President of 

the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mussolini, Belgrade, 21 and 22 December 1924 

98


mistake not to grasp the opportunity to be “protected” by Italy in case of foreign 

intervention. 277 Not only Italy had turned its back to Noli, but in no way it could hamper the 

Serb disguised intervention 278 . The same was reported by the Albanian diplomat in 

Belgrade 279 . 

It was a particular moment for Italy as well. Mussolini had to deal with internal problems and 

leave aside his interest in Albania for a while. Anyway, he was convinced that if Zogu 

succeeded, he would naturally owe his victory to Belgrade and most probably privilege them. 

This would greatly weaken his position in Albania, bearing in mind that the Albanian society 

at large had a strong antipathy towards the Serbs. For this, he felt quite sure that he would be 

bound to turn to Italy for counter-balance, which meant restoring the equilibrium. 280 

Great Britain, on her side, seemed satisfied with the “tranquillizing of the Adriatic”. Eyres 

had adopted a hostile position towards Noli‟s government, reporting that a government 

coming into power through unconstitutional means could only generate instability in Albania 

and in the Balkans. According to the British diplomats, maintenance of the fragile equilibrium 

in the Adriatic was depending mostly on consolidation and stabilization of the Albanian state. 

Because of its geographical position, Albania might complicate the scenario between Italy 

and Yugoslavia, which were the two nations mostly concerned by Albanian instability. Given 

they had more than once attempted to create a favourable position for further intervention in 

Albania, its political and economic emaciation could make penetration easier, which would 

consequently reinvigorate their conflict for supremacy in the Adriatic. Eyres had concluded 

that Albania‟s geographical position could easily put it in trouble with its neighbours as long 

as its government was unstable 281 . As a result peace in the Balkans was also to be at risk. In 

these circumstances, it was vital for Albania to have a leadership capable of well-balancing 

the Italian and Serbian influences and endowed with the wisdom to take advantage of their 

conflict of interests. He believed that Albania‟s independence would be safe only if its leaders 

knew how to get protection from one country against the other. The British wanted the 

preservation of an integral Albanian state rather than subject it to absolute Italian influence. 

277 Historia e Shqipërisë, (History of Albania), vol. III, 1912-1939, p. 241 

278 AMFAA, file 567, p. 45, 1924; see also IDD 7 th Series, vol. III, p. 368, doc. 609, The President of the Council 

and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mussolini to the Minister in Durrës, Durazzo, Rome, 10 December 1924 

279 Ibid., file 103, 1924 

280 DBFP, vol. XXVI, doc. 209, 23 December 1924 

281 Ibid., FO 371/9644, 30 May 1924 

99

Their objective was to maintain stability and regional balance among Balkan powers. The 

Foreign Office and especially its Minister at Durrës were confident that Zogu was the one 

who had brought the necessary stability to Albania, i.e. he was the right person to be 

supported. Eyres suggested a stronger central authority able to face all difficulties and make 

the union solider. He considered Zogu‟s “heavy-handedness” in compliance with the then 

development and requirements of Albania 282 . (It should not be forgotten though that Zogu had 

always been in favour of granting the oil concessions to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and 

this, inevitably, had affected his personal relations with Eyres.) 

Apparently with no obstacles to his plans, Zogu assumed power with the title of Commandant 

General, and proclaimed the state of emergency pending the creation of a new government. 

His seizure of power became “The Triumph of Legality”, as its alleged objective was purely 

to restore the legal Government. In truth, he had left six months ago to avert civil war; now he 

had come back to restore the constitution. Eyres was enthusiastic and very optimistic about 

the return of Ahmet Zog in Tirana. He explained to London that …. Ahmet Bey had returned 

with the determination to create an eligible government for his country, “even though he shall 

meet plenty of difficulties in finding suitable collaborators. He is not revengeful, and a great 

many of those who left Albania would have been totally free from political pressure if they 

stayed. He is now re-establishing order in the country, and people welcome his powerful 

hand 283 ”. 

This was partly true. Zogu‟s best friend Saraci would not agree with Eyres. In his memories, 

Ahmet‟s concerns from early 1925 onward were: first, how to become richer as soon as 

possible; second, how to humiliate and suppress by all means any single patriotic Albanian, 

and how to hinder progress in his country 284 . 

It is true that initially Zogu declared that nobody would suffer arbitrary political charges. The 

general opinion was that unlike Noli who had passed a law against his political adversaries as 

soon as he came into power, Ahmet was having a good start. He was certainly more skilful. 

He knew that this way foreign recognition of his government would be easier. Iliaz Vrioni, 

who had been Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs prior to June revolution, 

resumed office on 3 January 1925. He was quickly persuaded to resign. Xhafer Ypi, the 

282 Dibra, p. 240 

283 DBFP, vol XXVI, doc. 308, 29.12.1924 

284 Saraçi Ç., King Zog of Albaia, Inside story….., p. 58 

100


Bektashi Moslem member of the Council of Regency, who had also returned to Tirana from 

Yugoslavia, asked Zogu to reconstruct the Cabinet and assume the position of Prime Minister. 

This may be considered an intelligent move: Noli had forced Vrioni to leave Albania, before 

the latter resigned. What is more, he had neglected to hold an election, and so the Albanian 

people had been denied the opportunity of declaring their sympathies. Therefore it can be said 

that Vrioni had technically continued to be Prime Minister also during Noli‟s regime. Since 

his government had been recognized by the foreign powers, Zogu also had the right to be 

recognized as successor of a legitimate Prime Minister said to have been appointed in 

conformity with the constitution. Ahmet did not call for the election of a new Constituent 

Assembly, but called instead for what remained of the Assembly elected in December 1923 to 

be reconvened, so that tranquillity and harmony might be restored as quickly as possible. 

“The new government is going to re-establish processes of law and order, which have been 

dangerously disrupted in Albania; it will stop spreading dangerous ideas, too hostile to the 

State, Bolshevik ideas ........., the new government‟s policy is going to be a brutal struggle 

until these ideas be extirpated from Albania 285 - Zogu declared in his opening speech to the 

Assembly. 

On 21 January 1925, the National Assembly, over which his control was now virtually 

complete, deliberated on the adoption of a Republican Constitution. Sixty two of the sixty 

four deputies abolished the phantom monarchy, and so for the first time in history, an 

Albanian Republic was proclaimed. Ten days later, on 31 January, Ahmet Zog was elected 

first President of the Albanian Republic by acclamation in the National Assembly. 

Since start Zogu tried his best to assure Italians that he was not an instrument in the hands of 

Belgrade 286 . As soon as he was elected President, at a meeting with the Italian minister at 

Durrës, the Marquis Carlo Durazzo, he made much extensive statements “recognizing as 

useful and even indispensable for Albania to give Italians primarily economic interests 

overriding the place they deserve. Recalling their early collaboration, he expressed confidence 

that the Italian initiative will show to be more courageous and active” 287 . He did so under 

285 Pearson, p. 241 

286 For this see IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, 1922-1935, docs. 654, 674, 679, 681, pp 398, 415, 417 , 418 

287 IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, 1922-1935, doc. 654, p. 398, The Minister in Durrës, Durazzo, to the President of the 

Council and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, Durrës, 3 January 1925 

101

Harry Eyres‟ suggestion. 288 Rome was actually outraged by the rapidity and complete success 

of Zogu. Mussolini feared that Serbs could benefit from the situation in Albania and secure a 

predominant position there. 289 Hence, soon after Zogu‟s return, the Italian minister in 

Belgrade, upon instructions from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had insisted that the 

Yugoslav government issue a statement in which to pledge its alienability to a government not 

wanted by Albanians in toto. 290 Finding themselves under compulsion, the Serbs had then 

declared that “Yugoslavia had been but a mere disinterested spectator during the events in 

Albania”, and guaranteed to treat all related to Albania in full agreement with the Italian 

government and in conformity with the Pact of Rome. 291 

Mussolini was quite hesitant at the beginning whether to recognize the government of Zog, 

but after several attempts he sent to him the following message: “I sincerely hope that Your 

Excellency‟s government action may assure the friendly assistance of Italy, which will 

continue to explain all possible effective action for a successful consolidation of Albanian 

independence in the interests of both countries.” 292 

Zogu started reorganization of Albanian state institutions according to a superficial 

resemblance of the USA model. His formal appointment as President was for a period of 

seven years from February 1 st . The new constitution would give him more power in the 

decision-making process. Eyres reported to the Foreign Office that “…..the President has 

asked for special competencies to deal with particular economic matters; he will dissolve the 

Constituent Assembly, and take measures to replace it with a Senate of 9 or 10 members, and 

a Lower Chamber of 15 members” 293 . (While referring this to the Foreign Office, his concern, 

most probably, was about the Anglo-Persian Oil Co.). It is obvious that the effect of the new 

constitution was to emasculate the Chamber of Deputies and empower the President, who 

could veto legislation without appeal. “The real purpose of the move”, remarked Harry Eyres, 

288 

DBFP, vol. XXVI, doc. 310 

289 th 

IDD, 7 Series, vol. III, 1922-1935, doc. 660, 665, pp. 404, 407, The President of the Council and Foreign 

Minister, Mussolini, to the Minister in Durrës, Durazzo, Rome, 7 January 1925, 10 January 1925 

290 

Ibid., doc. 687, The President of the Council and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, to the Chargè d’Affaires in 

Belgrade, Barbarich, Rome, 24 January 1925 

291 

DBFP, vol. XXVI, doc. 302; see also IDD, Series, vol. III, 1922-1935, doc. 694, p. 426, The Minister in 

Belgrade, Bodrero, to the President of the Council and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, Belgrade, 25 January 1925 

292 th 

IDD, 7 Series, vol. III, 1922-1935, doc. 687, p. 422, The President of the Council and Foreign Minister, 

Mussolini, to the President of the Council and Foreign Minister ad interim, Ahmet Zogu, Rome, 26 January 1925 

293 

DBFP, vol. XXVII, doc. 20, 27 January 1925 

102


“is of course, to legalize Ahmet‟s position as virtual position of the country, and this is 

thoroughly understood 294 .” 

The first reform undertaken by Zogu was the abolition of the Ministry of War and its 

replacement by a General Command of National Defence of the armed forces, and the 

complete disbandment of the Albanian army which had participated in politics and taken sides 

against him in June. Zogu planned to pack it with Zogists, as in fact he did with the entire 

civil administration. He replaced the army of 5.000 men with a militia of 3.000 and a force of 

2.000 irregular volunteers from Dibra and Mati who had given him support in the counter- 

revolution against Fan Noli. He explained that “the keystone of the arch of his building was 

gendarmerie” 295 , but his desire to seek foreign assistance in its reorganization would bring 

him under intense pressure from the Italians 296 , who would certainly attempt to infiltrate their 

control of the force. Anyway he firmly rejected any Italian interference. The President needed 

to stop the security forces furthering any political interests but his own. Thus, he appointed 

Colonel Michael Stirling 297 , the Adviser to the Minister of Interior, to take on the additional 

duty of Inspector-General of the Albanian gendarmerie, and sent him to London to recruit half 

a dozen gendarmerie inspectors. In the sphere of public order, Zogu declared, “Englishmen 

alone possess the requisite racial characteristics”. 298 They were to be Albanian State servants, 

for the British government was not in any way involved in their appointments. 

What next needed immediate action was withdrawal of the appeal submitted to the Council of 

the League of Nations by Fan Noli on December 18 th , against Yugoslav violation of the 

Albanian frontier. 299 In hunc effectum, the representative of the Albanian government at the 

League of Nations sent a letter to the Secretary-General seeking to prevent the Council from 

discussing the question of Yugoslav intervention in the re-establishment of Ahmet Zogu. 

With the return of Ahmet bey Zogu in power the question of oil concessions in Albania is 

back on the agenda. Indeed, not a long time would pass before the Albanian Parliament 

294 

Ibidem 

295 

Eyres to Chamberlain, FO 371/10657, 18 February 1925 

296 th 

For this see IDD, 7 Series, vol. III, 1922-1935, docs. 666, 670, pp. 408-409, Exchange of telegrams between 

the President of the Council and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, and the Minister in Durrës, Durazzo, Durrës and 

Rome, 10 and 12 January 1925 

297 

Ibid., doc. 666, p. 408, The Minister in Durrës, Durazzo, to the President of the Council and Foreign 

Minister, Mussolini, Durrës, 10 January 1925 

298 

Eyres to Chamberlain, FO 371/10656, 17 February 1925 

299 

Official Journal of the League of Nations, May 1925, p. 642 

103

finally ratified the oil concession agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 300 . The 

contract with this Company was “of supreme importance to Albania”, he said. 301 Again 

Mussolini protested. 302 Keener than ever that the prospecting rights should go to Italian firms, 

he complained immediately to the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Austin Chamberlain. 303 But 

the British Company had paid out most of the money needed to hire mercenaries for his 

counter-revolution, 50 million dinars, as an advance on oil revenues, and Zogu ought to keep 

his promise. 

On 2 March, the National Assembly adopted the new constitution. It placed the change from 

the Monarchical to the Republican form of government. The Parliament was the legislative 

body, consisting of a Chamber of 57 popularly elected deputies, and a Senate or State Council 

of eighteen members, of whom twelve were elected and the remaining third were appointed 

by the President. 304 Like in the USA, the President had extremely wide executive powers. He 

was Head of the Council of Ministers and commanded the armed forces. He completely 

controlled the Cabinet, with no limitation placed on his power to dismiss Ministers. Bills 

might originate and be prepared in either the Chamber or the Senate, but only the President 

could propose amnesty laws or bills calling for an increase in expenditure. He had an absolute 

right of veto, without restriction, on legislation submitted by Parliament, and could dissolve 

the Parliament and call for fresh elections. He had the sole right to initiate constitutional 

changes and to appoint or dismiss all officers of the armed forces, high officials, judges, or 

public prosecutors. 305 

Even though Zogu was becoming more powerful than ever, he was not quiet for as long his 

opponents were free. Thus, he broke his self-announced truce and started intimidation of 

Kosovo Committee, the Clique, and Bashkimi, with the goal to eliminate all opposition. He 

ordered the dispersal of the National Committee for the Defence of Kosovo, operating from 

Shkodra. Hence it could no longer function in Albania. Then, he charged his brother-in-law, 

Ceno Bey Kryeziu, to stamp out Kosovar guerrillas in close conjunction with the Yugoslav 

300 th 

For this see also IDD, 7 Series, vol. III, doc. 701, pp. 434-438, The Regent of the Legation in Durrës, Sola, 

to the President of the Council and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, 31 st January 1925 

301 

Eyres to Foreign Office, FO 371/10657, 5 February 1925; op. cit. Tomes p. 79 

302 th 

IDD, 7 Series, vol. III, doc. 705, p. 441, The President of the Council and Foreign Minister Mussolini to the 

Regent of the Legation in Durrës, Sola, Rome, 3 February 1925 

303 

Ibid., doc. 720, p. 451, The President of the Council and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, to the Ambassador in 

London, della Torretta, Rome, 15 February 1925 

304 

For more see History of Albania, vol. III, 1912-1939, pp. 248-252 

305 

See also Puto A. & Pollo S., The History of Albania, pp. 198-199 

104


army. 306 Ceno Bey, an uneducated Yugoslav citizen, but a key figure of his triumph, a trait 

d’union between Zogu and Pašić, and one of the principal Kosovars to cooperate with the 

Serbs, Governor of Shkodra, Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, and later Minister of 

the Interior, served Belgrade‟s interest more than a Serb. Once rid of Bajram Curri, a sworn 

enemy of Yugoslavia, Kryeziu managed to capture those few Yugoslav exiles who had found 

shelter in Albanian territory. Two of them, in reward for whom Belgrade had promised large 

sums of money, were executed without trial. Some Viennese magazines of the time published 

a photo of the two hanged men with Ceno Bey in the middle. He had obviously made it to 

show the Serbs how devoted he had been in fulfilling his duty. 307 By the time, the Special 

Tribunal for Political Offences had passed death sentences on the ousted leaders in absentia, 

several had already been killed. Luigj Gurakuqi, the former Minister of Finance in Noli‟s 

government, was gunned down outside a café in Bari. (His assassin, said to be a political 

agent, was then tried before an Italian court which acquitted him of the charge). In the 

meantime, Zogu ordered the dissolution of Bashkimi as a “revolutionary and Bolshevik 

organization”. Noli managed to reach Vienna, protected perhaps by his international fame, but 

he was anyway convicted, in absentia, of misappropriation of State funds, since his 

government had carried off about a million gold francs of public money when its members 

fled into exile. Zogu worried about the survival in Italy of Hasan Prishtina; for years, they 

were to plot against each-other. Anyway, he forgave lesser enemies, men whom he ceased to 

fear. 308 

In April and May, the Albanian people supposedly gave its verdict in a general election, in 

order to legalize the government‟s position. “I assure you that there will be no push and pull 

on the part of the Government”, Zogu had sworn. “The elections are free and must be free 

…..everybody should understand and feel the sovereign power of the people, for which I have 

the greatest respect 309 ”. In fact, it was largely uncontested as all the leaders of the opposition 

had gone into exile, and the turnout failed to reach the 20 per cent. The government‟s victory 

was therefore complete. More important was the ceremonial gathering of 540 Gheg chieftains 

of the northern clans from the mountain districts of Shkodra, Kosovo and Dibra. Zogu advised 

them to keep away from foreign intrigues, to entrust the enforcement of law of the state, and 

306 

History of Albania, vol. III, 1912-1939, pp. 252-253 

307 

See Saraçi Ç., King Zog of Albania, Inside story 

308 

Tomes, p. 75 

309 

Dako K., Zogu the First, King of the Albanians, p. 136 

105

to treat their people as a father treats their children. They gave Zogu their besa 310 promising to 

serve him faithfully and to support him against the enemies of the State as long as he 

continued to rule the country with the intention of protecting its interests, regardless of his 

personal ambitions. 

Now that the question of regime was finally settled, it was supposed that a new era of relative 

tranquillity would dawn on Albania. Early in 1925, Zogu‟s political strategy, far different 

from the one followed the first time that he was Prime Minister, had two main objectives: one, 

how to eliminate any single obstacle in his way to strengthening personal authority (which 

probably he had resolved through intimidation and physical elimination of all his political 

opponents), and two: how to carry through the necessary reforms, and transform Albania into 

a civilized and developed western nation. With regard to the former, the article of Faik 

Konica, one of the best Albanian intellectuals of the time and President of Vatra, in the 

newspaper Dielli, expressed to some extent the attitude of Zogu‟s opponents towards his new 

government in the following terms: 

What should we do? We can do either one of two things: on the one hand we can 

keep our peace; on the other, we can back up the new government, not because of 

its programme but in order to bring about peace and order. Those who claim that 

Zogu is a traitor should look about, and they will discover that the majority of 

Albanians might be described as traitors. I put forward the following thesis: a 

man who has the backing of the majority of the people has a right to rule that 

people. The Albanian people do not want reform and reformers, they do not want 

new things, nor people who strive for new things. 311 

The latter appeared a rather impossible undertaking for two reasons, of social and economic 

nature. As Konica emphasized in his article, the Albanians had always lived according their 

tribal costumes, and never had they accepted reforms of any kind. Maiora premunt: even with 

a powerful leader as Zogu, who could earn the respect of 540 northern chieftains, financial 

support from abroad was a requisite. Was there any foreign country to invest in Albania, 

which had shown but great instability in the space of a few years? If yes, would it be interest- 

free, or on the contrary, there would be a dark end behind? 

310 

Besa – promise, the given word of Albanians (it has never been translated into other languages, since it 

belongs only to the Albanian culture – D.H.) 

311 

Dielli, 8 January 1925, op. cit. Pearson p. 240 

106


Ahmet Bey Zogolli 

Ahmet Zog, his mother Sanije together with Albanian Moslem priests 

107

Ahmet the Minister of Inerior 

Young Ahmet in Vienna 

108


Fan Stilian Noli 

Bajram Curri 

109

Ahmet, his mother and his sisters 

110


Queen Geraldine 

King Zog and his two nephews 

King Zog and Galeazzo Ciano, 

Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs 

111

King Ahmet, Queen Geraldine and Ahmet’s sisters 

112


CHAPTER III 

ZOGU’S ATTITUDE AFTER THE “TRIUMPH OF LEGALITY”, 

Zogu’s Political Stance towards the Neighbours 

Zogu‟s return to power drew different reactions of Yugoslavia and Italy. The former was 

really content and confident that it had managed to achieve a difficult but important 

undertaking, i.e. the protection of its interests in Albania. Unlike the Serbs, the Italian public 

opinion and government looked morose for how things went. The events in Albania got a bad 

press, which carried the news with a feeling of regret. What happened reminded them of “the 

non distant repulse of Italians from Vlora”, and worse yet “the same people of then had come 

to power”. The Duce habitually cited the Italian withdrawal from Albania in 1920 as one of 

the humiliations to be erased by Fascism: “When I heard of the evacuation of Valona, I wept. 

And that is not just a rhetorical phrase”. 312 The impression conveyed was that with Zogu‟s 

return Yugoslavia had gained what she had previously lost with Fiume. Back in 1923 Eyres 

would have rejected such a belief. His opinion on Zogu‟s government of that period excluded 

any leaning towards Yugoslavia. In a secret letter to the Foreign Secretary George Nathaniel 

Curzon 313 , on 6 June 1923, he had emphasized: “….I dare say that it is not correct to speak of 

Serbophil tendencies of the Albanian government. More than once I have objected their intent 

to get support from one of the neighbouring countries; furthermore, their policy has been 

favourably disposed to develop friendship relations with Greece, Yugoslavia, or even Italy, 

however their methods sometime may have been very poor”. 314 

312 Tomes p. 78 

313 1 st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston 

314 FO 371/8535, Dibra op. cit. p. 226 

113

The Serbian Croatian and Slovene government, unable to support financially a weak Albania, 

believed that helping Zogu to return to power, he would grant the Yugoslavs more political 

concessions, avoiding, thereby, a future Italian influence which sooner or later would bring 

about landings of Italian troops in Albania, so greatly feared by them. On the other hand, 

Mussolini was convinced that the precondition for Italian expansion in north-east Africa and 

the Middle East was informal domination of the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean, thus 

balancing French supremacy in western Mediterranean. The first obstacle to this strategy was 

Yugoslavia, a bumptious new creation with the audacity to act like a regional power. The 

Duce decided to cut the Serbs down to size, and Albania could yet be the means to do it. No 

opportunity should henceforth be missed to bolster Italian influence in Tirana. 

Belgrade was familiar with the Italian aims, yet the Yugoslavian ruling circles were aware of 

their powerlessness to keep Italy away from Albania. This is why they launched the idea of 

splitting it between the two countries. When King Alexander went to Paris in January 1925, 

he met with the Italian Ambassador there, and suggested an eventual sharing of their spheres 

of interest in Albania. 315 The Italian government rejected such a proposal in the light of the 

guarantees offered by Zogu, and further, because it was necessary to bring the entire Albania 

under tight control in order to realize its projects in the Balkans. The sharing idea was rejected 

also by Great Britain, in pursuance with the line of its politics in the region. Instead, His 

Majesty‟s Government tried to keep under control this rivalry between the two, and safeguard 

peace in the Balkans. Everything, however, depended on Zogu‟s prospect, and on his 

approach. In December 1925, Eyres reported to the Foreign Office as follows: “I really do not 

know what is going to happen with this country, but it is my conviction that either the Serbs 

or the Italians wish for an unstable Albania, and will dedicate all their efforts to this 

goal….Anyway, I shall do everything to keep Zogu going straight, in the right direction. 

However there exists but a slight hope, I should try for it nevertheless”. 316 Because of the 

delicate position of Albania in between two rather powerful neighbours, which could easily 

spark off a conflict, Eyres suggested Albania‟s neutralization: the country‟s integrity ought to 

be guaranteed together or individually by Italy, Serbian Croatian and Slovene Kingdom, and 

Greece, as countries mainly and directly concerned in Albania, and by Great Britain and 

315 Milo, pp. 334-335, Fischer, p. 105 

316 DBFP, vol. XXVI, doc. 312, n. 5 

114


France, as the only Great Powers left in Europe 317 . But Albania was too weak to protect its 

neutrality against any possible violation. Moreover, however state borders had been decided, 

they had never been satisfactory to Albanians, and could thus be subject to looting and clashes 

among Albanians and Serbs at any time. In such circumstances, the Foreign Office concluded 

that Albania‟s neutrality might cause war rather than peace. Consequently, Great Britain 

suggested that it was advisable to try and keep the hands of all neighbours off Albania, and 

refer the most important issues to the League of Nations before a certain state engaged itself 

in that country. 

Once in the President‟s office, Zogu, besides reorganizing state power, sought to define the 

main lines of his foreign policy. In the normal course of events he should have been biased 

towards Yugoslavia because of its contribute to the counter-revolution, and above all for the 

sake of his agreement with Pašić. Yet, either Rome or Belgrade was doubtful about his 

attitude after coming to power. Regardless of his absolute and formal assurances to the Italian 

Minister Marquis Durazzo, and to Eyres, in January 1925, that no conditions had been 

imposed on him, and what is more, no compromise of any kind had been made with Pašić, 

Rome had collected enough information to raise doubts about a secret agreement signed 

between Zogu and Pašić, which allowed Yugoslavia to get the foot in Albania‟s door. 318 

Mussolini could not put up with such a situation which could hinder the achievement of his 

goals in the Balkans. From the beginning of January he had made it clear that the Italian 

government was determined to do anything to guarantee what had been already defined in 

international acts with regard to Albania i.e. Italy‟s privileged position. He advised the Italian 

envoy at Durres that he would refuse to recognize Zogu‟s government unless he proved to be 

independent, and guaranteed Italy the position it was expecting. 319 In a telegram to Durazzo 

the 7 th January 1925 Mussolini seemed particularly concerned when highlighting that: “The 

very special circumstances in which Ahmet Zog‟s comeback in Albania and to power took 

place, as Your Excellency has frequently pointed out, have persuaded our public opinion that 

cross-border Serbian or Yugoslav Albanian most likely official circles have accommodated 

317 FO 371/ 10654, 9 January 1925 

318 Milo, p. 333 

319 Ushtelenca I., Diplomacia …, p. 62 

115

him…. He may be bound by promises which might limit his independence against Belgrade, 

and thus forced to further Serbia establish its predominant position in Albania.” 320 

The Final Decision on the Dispute over Saint Naumi and Vermoshi 

between Albania and Yugoslavia 

What was in effect the verity of the secret pact between Zogu and Pašić in August 1924? 

While in Belgrade, Zogu managed to convince the Serbs to help him overthrow the 

democratic government. His decision to stay in Yugoslavia and ask for Belgrade‟s support 

came as a result of his old relations with Yugoslav political circles since World War I and 

following. These relations had never interrupted not even when he was in power. Belgrade 

was interested to establish in Albania a pro-Yugoslav regime and Zogu, despite of his well- 

known cunning and lack of loyalty, was for the time the right person to do it. On his side, 

Zogu had realized that Belgrade only in those circumstances would really support him with all 

means to return to power. He also was convinced that the only comeback way was military 

intervention, which could merely start from Yugoslav territory. 

Striving to meet his immediate needs for financial means and armament for his troops, he was 

led to the finalization of a secret pact with the Yugoslav would be Primer Pašić. At the time, 

Pašić was in opposition, yet with a good chance to come to power soon. The truth is that there 

is no written document that would prove the existence of such an agreement. However, the 

contrary is to be excluded, since it has been signed by two men who were neither in power 

nor plenipotentiary (Zogu was an emigrated Premier, while Pašić was in opposition). As 

stated by the researcher Zivko Avramovsky, it was a “gentlemen agreement”. 321 This opinion 

stands stronger keeping in mind other similar agreements concluded before by Zogu. In 1922, 

Zogu had made a verbal agreement with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, whose articles Ninčić 

had wrote down in a document preserved until today in the Yugoslav archives. Likewise, in 

August 1924, Zogu had not agreed to write a secret letter to Mussolini upon the latter‟s 

request asking for financial support. Hence, this unveils that often and willingly Zogu 

preferred not to sign written agreements. More yet: if such an agreement would really have 

320 Cici A., Marrëdhëniet …., p. 62, op. cit. IDD, vol. III, n. 660, pp. 404-405 

321 P. Milo, p. 298 

116


existed in paper, Belgrade would not continue to keep it secret in 1926-1927 when its 

relations with the President of the republic of Albania had seriously aggravated and such a 

document would have compromised his before his people and the Great Powers. 

A similar document with the agreement Zogu-Pašić has been preserved in the Albanian State 

Central Archive 322 . Another similar sixteen-point document has been presented to and viewed 

by Mussolini. 323 The latter had arrived quite the same time from two sources. In the second 

half of November 1925, General Bodrero had sent a telegram reporting to have been 

transmitted by the Italian Defence Attaché in Belgrade Visconti Praska the text of a secret 

agreement made between Zogu and Pašić in August 1924. 324 About two months later, on 9 

January 1926, the Italian Chargé d’Affaires in Albania Assereto transmitted to the Italian 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the same document reporting that “a person with authority who 

might be very well-informed” had given to him, in strict confidence, a copy of the agreement, 

between Ahmet bey Zog and Pašić. 

One of the main points of the pact sets out that “The Albanian Government shall avow before 

the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris that it rejects any claim of sovereignty over the 

Monastery of Saint Naumi and the locality of Vermoshi and Kelmendi, which shall remain in 

possession of Yugoslavia”. 325 The question of the Albanian frontier at Shën Naum had long 

322 

ASCA, Fund 251, File 105, pp. 4-5, 1925 

323 

Pastorelli P., “Italia e Albania 1924-1927…..”, pp. 221-222 

324 

Ibid., p. 220 

325 

ASCA, Fund 251, File 105, p. 3 

The content of Zogu-Pašić agreement found in the Albanian State Central Archive is identical with the one 

mentioned by Pastorelli: 

1. Albania shall join Yugoslavia in personal Union. 

2. At the Head of the Albanian State shall be Ahmet Zog, who shall then recognize the Karadgeorgevic 

dynasty. 

3. The government of Belgrade shall guarantee the support, by all its diplomatic and military means, of 

Ahmet Zogu as head of Albanian state life, from now allocating to him an annual income. 

4. The Albanian Ministry of War shall be abolished and Albania shall never have the right to have a 

national army. 

5. Albania shall keep but a strong gendarmerie with the only task to maintain domestic order and suppress 

any hostile movement against Ahmet Zogu and the regime established by him. 

6. This gendarmerie shall also recruit Russian military of the former army of general Wrangler who are 

now in Yugoslavia. The government of Belgrade is committed to support the gendarmerie with 

financial means and arms. 

7. Among officers of this gendarmerie there shall be those Yugoslavs and others considered to be persona 

grata by the Serb Croatian and Slovene government. 

8. Albania and Yugoslavia shall establish a custom union on the basis of which imports and exports of 

goods between the two countries shall be free. Also, circulation of citizens between the two countries 

shall be free and without passports. 

117

een discussed. In June 1924, the Conference of Ambassadors had decided to submit it to the 

Council of the League of Nations. Such a decision was taken on suggestion of the British 

government which maintained the view that the frontier had already been fixed by the 

Decision of December 6 th , 1922. The Council of the League considered it and came to the 

conclusion that the issue had turned on a purely legal question, namely whether the decision 

of the Ambassador‟s Conference, which allocated the Monastery to Albania was final. The 

Council thus voted to refer the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the 

Hague, in almost precisely the same terms as it had been presented by the Ambassador‟s 

Conference, and both parties to the dispute accepted the recommendations of the Council to 

request an advisory opinion. The Court was supplied with all the relevant documents, and 

heard oral statements by representatives of the Yugoslav and Albanian governments, and also 

of the Greek government. The advisory opinion, which was unanimous, stated that the legal 

foundation of the decision of November 9 th , 1921, was to be found in the fact that the 

Principal Allied Powers, acting through the Conference of Ambassadors, were empowered to 

render a decision as was recognized by the League and the States concerned; also that the 

decision of December 6 th , 1922 was based on the same powers of that of November 9 th , 1921, 

and had the same definitive character and the same legal effect. the Court then discussed the 

contention of the Yugoslav government that it had a vested right under the decision of 

November 9 th , 1921, by reason of the confirmation by that decision of the frontier of 1913, 

and came to the conclusion that the Protocol of London of 1913 could not be regarded as 

9. Yugoslav representations abroad shall take upon themselves the responsibility to protect Albania‟s 

interest in those countries in which Albania does not have diplomatic and consular offices. 

10. The Albanian Government shall declare at the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris that it rejects any 

claim for sovereignty over the Monastery of Saint Naumi and the locality of Vermoshi and Kelmendi, 

which shall remain in possession of Yugoslavia. 

11. The Orthodox Albanian Church shall separate from the Costantinople Patriarchate and join the orthodox 

hierarchy of Belgrade; likewise the Head of Albania‟s Mufti shall depend on the Yugoslavian one. 

12. The Albanian Government shall be bound not to nurse a nationalistic policy and show no interest in the 

Albanian element out of its state borders; likewise it shall be bound not to shelter in its territory 

Kosovars and other elements known for or merely suspected of anti-Yugoslav feelings. 

13. For any political and commercial Treaty or concession that Albania shall intend to make with other 

countries, she is bound to ask for Yugoslavia‟s consent. 

14. In case of war between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria or Greece, the government of Belgrade shall have the 

right to recruit in Albania up to 25.000 volunteers and send them in the Bulgarian and Greek frontiers 

together with its own army. 

In case of war between Yugoslavia and Italy, Albania shall maintain neutrality in favour of Yugoslavia. 

In case of war proclaimed by Italy and Greece against Albania, the Yugoslav army shall have the right 

to occupy the entire Albanian soil with in order to keep the Albanian territorial borders safe from any 

eventual Geek invasion as weel as guarantee the security of the Adriatic coast from an Italian invasion. 

15. The Albanian Government shall not declare war against any country without previous concordance with 

Yugoslavia. 

16. This treaty is secret and shall not be unveiled without consent of both parties. 

118


definitely attributing the Monastery of Saint Naumi to Serbia. It was therein provided that the 

region “as far as the (jusqu‟au) Monastery of Saint Naumi” should be attributed to Albania, 

and the Court found that it was impossible to affirm which of the two equally possible 

interpretations of the expression “jusqu‟au” – the inclusive or the exclusive interpretations 

should be selected. As regards the new facts alleged to exist by Yugoslavia, the Court found 

that they consisted merely of documents to which the members of the Conference had access, 

and which moreover did not prove that the Monastery of Shën Naumi had been attributed to 

Serbia in 1913. 326 The advisory opinion was invested with such authority that even the 

Yugoslav delegate in the League of Nations felt obliged to agree also in spite of his earlier 

objections. The Council promptly adopted the recommendation unanimously. 

Yugoslavia however refused to carry out the decision of these three international institutions. 

At that very moment, neither the League of Nations nor Albania had the means to force 

Belgrade to evacuate Albanian territories and abide by the decision of the League. In order to 

avoid conflict, it was decided to wait for an alternative settlement to be looked out by the 

concerned countries. 

In view of these facts, it was obvious that Saint Naumi had played a very special role in 

obtaining Yugoslav support for Zogu‟s return. In fact, since the beginning, everyone had 

suspected that there had been underhand dealings between him and the Yugoslavs, and that he 

had to pay his price in exchange for their support. When Serb senior officials had asked to the 

Conference of Ambassadors not to insist on the recommendations of the League, explaining 

that the Yugoslav government was hopeful of reaching an agreement with Albania about 

Sveti Naumi - exchange it for one or two any border villages of probably “doubtful 

nationality” - it confirmed all suspicions. The Yugoslav researcher Zh. Aveamovsky had 

reached the same conclusion while referring to a report written by an employee of Albania‟s 

section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, who had served for several years in the 

Albanian Legation in Tirana. 327 Based on this, Avramovsky had, on his side, made his own 

synopsis on the secret agreement between Zogu and Pašić: 

326 Permanent Court of International Justice, no. 9, p.23, 4 September 1924, op. cit. Pearson pp. 229-230 

327 Arhiv Jugosllavije, Fund 37, fascicle 379, report of I. Vukovic for the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 

Affairs of Yugoslavia M. Stojadinovic, Belgrade, 3 February 1939 op.cit. Milo p. 302 

119

a) Zogu shall not refuse Yugoslavia‟s Saint Naumi‟s annexation and would once 

more raise the question of Vermoshi pastures and of the lanes driving there. 

b) Zogu would share out the “Kosova National Defence” committee, and all kaçaks 

(guerrillas) acting in Yugoslav territory would be found ordinary and not political 

guilties. 

c) The Yugoslav Government would guarantee its influence over Albanian Orthodox 

Church. 

d) Zogu promised to resolve the question of Serbian schools in Shkodër and in the 

Vraka village as well as shall open schools in the Macedonian villages in the 

district of Korça. 

e) Both parties have reached an agreement to start commercial negotiations, conclude 

the relative agreement and immediately review border retail business. 

f) Zogu had promised to open a bank of mainly Yugoslavian capital in Albania. 

g) Albania would not conclude any agreement or accept any credit for the 

construction of its railway without previously consulting the Yugoslav 

Government. 

h) The Yugoslavian ships would have a privileged position in Albanian harbours and 

in the lakes of Ohrid and Shkodër. 

Although this version may seem more moderate it does not shadow Belgrade‟s intention to 

establish in Albania a pro-Yugoslav regime. The previous version, found at the Albanian 

archives, is most probably the first draft presented to Zogu aiming at transforming Albania 

into a Yugoslav region with a limited local autonomy with Zogu as its ruler. Avramovsky‟s 

version might be indeed the agreement concluded following negotiations between the parties. 

It was Zogu‟s style to manoeuvre not to get involved in compromising documents, yet in the 

second agreement (if so concluded – D.H.) he had done nothing but slightly improve the 

seriously humiliating clauses of the first version. 

The truth is that on 21 st February 1925, short after Zogu came into power, in a letter addressed 

to the Chargé d’Affaires of the Serbian Croatian and Slovene Kingdom to Tirana, the new 

Albanian government informed the Yugoslav authorities that it deemed the question of Shën 

Naumi and Vermoshi as one and the same question, and proposed an exchange of territories 

120


for its final settlement. It was ready to cede the territories of the Monastery of Shën Naum and 

Vermosh in exchange for the region of Banisht in Dibra and the plain of Has near Prizren. 328 

And this suited everyone, but Albania. Great Britain deemed it not worth the risk of a real 

conflict on this issue at a time when the Serbs were going to have it at any cost, and when 

Albania was unable to take itself any action. 329 By May 1925, Yugoslavia seemed to agree to 

cede to Albania the village of Peshkëpi, and renounce its claims over the plain of Vermoshi in 

exchange for the Monastery of Saint Naum and the upland of Vermoshi. 330 Hence, the 

Yugoslav-Albanian talks, held under the great pressure of the Conference of Ambassadors 

and upon compromises proposed by it, brought forth a settlement on 5 October 1925, 

according to which Saint Naum was ceded to the Serbian Croatian and Slovene Kingdom in 

exchange for the village of Peshkëpi with 60 houses and 300 inhabitants, and for some other 

small concessions: the field of Çërava, the Church of the Blessed Water (Ajazma), and the 

strategic hills no. 961, 965, 807, 868, which surrounded the building of the Monastery, and 

the watch-tower of the Yugoslav border guards. In the north, in exchange for the western 

woody valley of Vermosh, Albania got back the valley of Velipojë, the pastures of Libohova 

and a few smaller concessions. 331 The Serbian authorities initially were unwilling to make all 

these concessions. They had agreed to cede to Albania but the village of Peshkëpi and a part 

of Libohova. However, they soon changed their position, and agreed to make a deal with 

Albania. What had happened in the meantime? At the beginning of August, Belgrade had 

gotten wind of a secret agreement between Albania and Italy. Thus it had no interest in 

deteriorating its relations with the Government of Tirana. Instead, it was more inclined to 

close this matter in order to be able to effectively contrast a future closeness between Rome 

and Tirana. 

The Albanian Legislative Assembly approved the compromise agreement at a joint sitting of 

the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on 14 October, and definitely ratified the cession of 

the territory to Yugoslavia, including the Monastery of Saint Naum. The Albanian 

Government informed the Conference of Ambassadors of the completion of this agreement 

328 

ASCA, File 107, p. 251, Note of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Yugoslav Chargé d’Affaires 

in Tirana, 21 February 1925 

329 

DBFP; vol. XXVI, doc. 305, n.6, 25 December 1925 

330 

ASCA, File 730, p. 249, Report of the Albanian Chargé d’Affaires to Belgrade, P. Pekmezi, to Ahmet Zog, 30 

April 1925 

331 

Ibid., File 728, p. 249, Report of the Chairman of the Legislative Assembly to the Council of Ministers, 20 

July 1925 

121

and entrusted to them the demarcation of the frontier. The frontier question was finally closed 

on 30 July 1926, on the basis of the new Protocol which had been signed at Florence on 

January 27 th , 1925, ratified in Paris by the delegates at the Conference of Ambassadors of 

France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, and countersigned by the representatives of Albania, 

Greece, and Yugoslavia. 332 Thereby, fourteen years from to its independence, Albania was no 

more a “geographical term”. With this act, Zogu paid a part of the price for his Yugoslav aid 

in December 1924. The frontier question was finally closed, but the rectifications continued to 

cause tension between Albania and her neighbours. 

Relations with Greece and Turkey 

The Greek government, although they had been the only state to recognize Noli, assumed 

presumably that Zogu would be easier to deal with. They had allowed Zogist forces to 

organize their attack in Greek territory. In August 1924, Noli had appealed to the League of 

Nations on the continuing insistence of Greece on the expulsion of Albanian Moslems from 

Çamëria and Macedonia and the confiscation of their goods. Furthermore, the Albanian 

government had stated to the Secretary General of the League that, since more than 20.000 

Albanian Moslems had been forced to leave their homes and abandon their property in 

Greece, it would have no alternative but to expel the Greek speaking population of southern 

Albania in order to be able to receive the persecuted refugees from Çamëria. In such 

circumstances, Greece, which had never accepted the decision of the London Conference of 

Ambassadors in 1913, awarding all of Northern Epirus to Albania, most probably believed 

that Zogu could be a better partner, and thus had no objections when Koço Kota, a Minister in 

Vrioni‟s government, and Myfid Bey Libohoha organized their forces in Florina and Janina 

respectively, in order to attack from there Korça, Gjirokastra, and Saranda in December 1924. 

Greece had long tried to be rid of the Albanian minority within her frontiers, who were for the 

most part Moslems inhabiting the province of Çamëria. The defeat of the Greek army in Asia 

Minor in the Second Greco-Turkish War had led to the exchange of populations between 

Greece and Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne 1923). A large number of Greek Orthodox Christians 

had already fled their homes in Turkey; after the treaty, the problem was aggravated. Between 

1.3 and 1.5 million Greeks left their homes in Asia Minor and migrated to Greece, and around 

332 Ibid., File 65, p. 251, Protocol of the delimitation of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovene – Albanian frontier at 

Florence, 26 July 1926 

122


400.000 Turks, among them also a great number of Albanian Moslems, moved from Greece 

to Turkey. These were known as Çamëriots or Çams, and were recognized by all impartial 

authorities as being certainly of Albanian race; but although Greece had declared it did not 

intend to proceed with an exchange of Moslem Albanians who “inhabit a district perfectly 

well defined, namely Epirus”, she claimed the right to expel them from her territory on the 

ground that they were Turks. The Greek authorities proceeded to deport the Çams to Turkey, 

hoping thereby to silence Albania in her claim to this territory which she had lost to Greece in 

1913. Thousand of Moslem Çams were to be expelled, thus causing a serious depletion in the 

numbers of the Albanian minority in Greece. 

When Zogu came into power, the Greeks realized that on the contrary to what they had 

initially believed he was not easy to deal. At the very start, he endeavoured to pursue a good 

neighbouring policy with Greece. In January 1925, his government reconfirmed Albania‟s 

Declaration concerning the protection of Minorities, which had been signed by Fan Noli in 

October 1921, and ratified by Albania in February 1922, which outlined that Albania as a 

member of the League of Nations was under obligation to recognize and safeguard the rights 

of minorities there in virtually all respects. The Greek minority was treated equally by the 

government in every respect. The Albanian government had granted the Greek minority in 

Albania the right to elect its deputies in the Albanian parliament, to open its schools in Greek 

language (their teachers were paid by the Albanian government), and to freely practice their 

religion. 333 Despite all the good will demonstrated by the Albanian government, the Greek 

authorities continued in the same path concerning the treatment of the Albanian minority in 

Greece. The Greek administration tried by all means to assimilate the heterogeneous 

population that lived near its borders. Certain measures were taken in order to alter the 

„ethnic‟ character of these territories. Tens of thousands who were natives of Macedonia and 

Epirus were forcibly deported in Asia Minor, as if they were Turks. Instead, those who 

remained in Greece were subjected to vexatious and oppressive treatment in order to force 

them to leave their homes. In the meantime, many destitute victims of the supposed Greco- 

Turkish exchange of populations were flooding into Albania and the government was finding 

it almost impossible to deal with the problem. 

333 ASCA, Italian Legation, File 56, article of the newspaper “Democracia”, 17 September 1927 

123

Moreover, when in January 1925, the International Boundary Commission, sent to Albania by 

the League of Nations for the delimitation of the Greco-Albanian frontier, gave its decision 

confirming in full the 1913 line, Greece continued to claim its right over Northern Epirus, 

which was again awarded to Albania. The Greco-Albanian frontier had but one modification 

consisting of the fourteen villages along Lake Prespë, which had been occupied by the Greeks 

with a view to their forcible incorporation into Greece, but which were now included formally 

within the Albanian state. The Greek government argued that the Greeks in Albania were 

nearly ten times the number of Albanians in Greece, though it seems that a fatal confusion 

was made there between Greeks proper and Albanian Christians who belonged to the 

Orthodox Church, whereby all Orthodox Christians in Albania were taken for Greeks and all 

Moslems in Greece were liable to be taken for Turks. 

In the face of such atrocities Zogu could not stay indifferent, despite the Greek support to his 

counter-revolution. He gave orders to inform the Greek representative in Tirana that if Greece 

continued to pursue her policy of driving out the Moslem Albanians from Çamëria, the Greek 

minority in Albania would be expelled in retaliation. The Greek minority had always been 

granted special rights in Albania, whereas the Greek authorities had not taken the same stand 

on the Çam minority regardless the friendly predisposition and the recurring demarches of the 

Albanian government. Moreover, the Albanian delegate at the League of Nations, Mehdi 

Frashëri, was told to appeal for League‟s intervention without delay. Prior to him, in the 

October 1925 session, the Albanian Minister to Paris Ilias Bey Vrioni had strongly protested 

to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, at the time also head of the Mixed 

Commission for the settlement of the question of Çamëria, complaining about the partiality 

shown by this Commission in resolving the very delicate question of the exchange of 

populations between Greece and Turkey. The Albanian representatives had collected 

considerable documentation on the brutal displacement of Moslem Albanians, the agreement 

between Greece and Turkey to exchange 5 thousand Çam with 5 thousand Greeks from 

Istanbul, and on the atrocities of the Greeks as well. Indeed, the members of the Commission 

were not very familiar with the real situation of the Albanian minority in Greece, since the 

information they possessed had been provided only by the Greek authorities. Moreover, they 

124


had given great importance to the statements of Orthodox priests and Moslem muezzins, 

becoming thus instrument of Greece and Turkey. 334 

By February 1926, Ahmet Zog sent to Athens Xhemil Dino, well-known Albanian diplomat, 

to hold talks with the Greeks, and find the way for the settlement of the question of Çamëria 

and subsequently for the improvement of bilateral relations. In response, the Greek authorities 

put forward a series of requests among which: the ratification of the Albanian borders with 

the territories inhabited by Greek minority annexed to Greece; the commitment of the 

Albanian government not to make any territorial modification unless primarily agreed by the 

Greek government; Albania must grant concessions to Greece, and recognize to Greeks living 

in Albania the right to hold Greek passports as well. None of these requests was accepted by 

Zog, and Dino left Athens without reaching a deal. 335 

When the Greek Premier-Dictator, General Theodoros Pangalos, came into power, by the end 

of February, the situation of the Albanians in Greece seemed to lightly improve as he decided 

to dissolve the Greek societies that were agitating for the annexation of “Northern Epirus”, 

and voluntarily ceded to Albania a block of sixteen Albanian villages in the neighbourhood of 

Korçë, in the interest of a correct ethnographic frontier. He was himself an Epiriot of 

Albanian origin, and had no desire to retain Albanian inhabited territory. In the course of an 

interview given to the Albanian political journalist Naso Kiri, he referred to the once current 

belief that all Orthodox Albanians were Greeks as “an erroneous and exploded idea. Since 

this theory has gathered speed downhill, and has reached the depths of tiresomeness, I have 

proceeded to dissolve the North-Epirot societies, which have, so to speak, touched bottom in 

this sort of mental aberration. Everyone recognizes the services which the Northern Epiriots 

have rendered to the Greek hypothesis, but super-patriotism is as dangerous as patriotism is 

beneficial.” 336 

This change in the Greek politics towards the Çam reflected also upon the press, which started 

to highlight in bold the good treatment of the Orthodox Greeks in Albania, inviting the Greek 

334 

Ibid., MFA, File 74, p. 14-18, Report of the Albanian Minister to Paris Ilias Bey Vrioni to the Albanian 

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 20 October 1925 

335 

Ibid., Italian Legation, File 52, p. 1-4, Report of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Italian Legation 

in Durrës, 25 February 1926 

336 th 

Times, March 9 , 1926, op. cit. Pearson p. 256-257 

125

government to win the friendship of the Albanian government and people. 337 Meanwhile the 

Mixed Commission at the Council of League of Nations, in response to Frashëri‟s appeal to 

stop the exchange of population between Turkey and Greece, declared that the Moslem 

Albanians of Çamëria could not be exchanged with the Greeks of Asia Minor. The Greek 

Foreign Minister, Lucas Rouphos, admitted before the Council that the Albanian complaints 

concerning the treatment of the Albanian minority in Greece were reasonable and he 

undertook to rectify them. 338 For a while difficulties were settled amicably concerning the 

intrigues of refugees and the attempt by Greece to include the Moslem Albanians of Epirus in 

the exchange of populations with Turkey. During the second half of 1926, the Albanian and 

Greek governments were signatories of a Treaty which embraced a series of agreements with 

regard to commerce, postal services, consular relations, extradition, and the rights of the 

Albanian minority in Greece, including compensation for the expropriation of their property. 

On request of the Albanian government, the Greek authorities granted amnesty to all Moslem 

Albanians charged with political crimes, and allowed their free circulation in Albania. 339 

In such a climate, the President Zog - although a Moslem – asked the Ecumenical Patriarchate 

of Constantinople to send to Tirana the Archbishop Chrysanthos, the Metropolitan of 

Trebizond, to reopen negotiations for the establishment of a statute for the Albanian Church 

which would preserve the prerogatives of the Patriarchate. A provisional settlement was 

reached between the Patriarchate and the Albanian government on the status of the 

autocephalous Albanian Orthodox Church, accepted by Greece also, recognizing the use of 

the Albanian liturgy and the choice by the Albanians of five bishops to form a synod. 

(However, this agreement satisfied none of the parties to it, especially the Albanian nationalist 

clergy, who demanded back their independence at all costs and effectively procured its 

denunciation. A complete rupture of relations ensued, to the extent that the Patriarch, in 

refusing autocephalic status to the Albanian Church, imposed on it a position of inferiority in 

relation to the churches of the other Orthodox States.) 340 

Yet the Albanian minority question continued to cause friction and misunderstanding, and the 

League Council failed to insist on the fulfilment of Greek promises. The lifetime of General 

337 Ibidem 

338 Official Journal of the League of Nations, September 1925 

339 ASCA, Italian Legation, File 52, p. 1-4, Report of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Italian 

Legation in Durrës, 25 February 1926 

340 Times, June 1 st 1929 

126


Pangalos‟ government was too short to claim victory. The succeeding Greek governments 

took a long time over the ratification of the concluded agreements. They were left untouched 

in the shelves of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs for almost two years. In the meantime, 

the Greeks disregarded their commitments, strengthening the denationalizing policy towards 

the Albanian minority in Greece. By the end of the same year, the Albanian government 

intervened on behalf of the Çamëria population, so that they could benefit from the agrarian 

reform which was being carried out in Greece. 341 But the expropriation of land and the 

unscrupulous settlement of the Greek refugees coming from Turkey was one means to 

assimilate the territories that were incorporated after 1913. Thus the Albanian government‟s 

appeals fell on deaf ears as the Greek State continued to expropriate the Çams without any 

compensation, which caused further deterioration of their economic condition. The Greek 

press also restarted its campaign for the union of the so-called Vorio-Epirus with Greece, 

claiming Korça and Gjirokastra, at a time when Greek societies for the annexation of the 

Northern Epirus also reinvigorated and recommenced their activity. Although the existence of 

an Albanian minority (Arvanites) in Greece could not be doubted, the Greeks used all means 

to assimilate them. 

Relations with Turkey 

The coming into power of Ahmet Zog coincided with the coming into force of the Pact of 

Friendship between the government of Albania and the Republic of Turkey, signed since 

November 1923, then under the Presidency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. By sending a friendly 

letter to Kemal Pasha on this occasion, President Zog made a first step for the establishment 

of diplomatic relations with Turkey. The mutually-agreed forced exchange of populations 

between Greece and Turkey, which had began in the early 1920's, and included also the 

deported Albanians from Northern Epirus, as well as the displaced Kosovars who have found 

shelter in Turkey, constituted perhaps a major reason for Zogu to set up special and friendly 

relations with the President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 

In 1923, the Albanian government had signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the Turkish 

Republic, but for the greater part of the year the Turks had persisted in refusing to recognize 

341 ASCA, Italian Legation, File 56, Report of the Italian Legation to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 

February 1927 

127

the Albanian consul at Istanbul, consequently no Albanian could enter Turkey. Only by the 

end of the year, an Albanian delegation went to Ankara and now concluded a Pact of 

Friendship with Turkey, providing for mutual consular representation, and regulating the 

question of the right of Albanians to stay in Turkey and their allegiance when there. Anyway, 

it was only at the beginning of 1925 that this Pact came into force, and in 1926 Albanian and 

Turkish diplomatic agencies opened at Ankara and Tirana. For at least two years, Zogu and 

Kemal Pasha developed cordial relations. 

In Search of Economic Aid to Overcome the Crisis 

- Economic Orientation towards Italy 

Once elected President and feeling safe from his adversaries, the most important issue which 

would guarantee Zogu‟s continuity was finding the financial means for the construction of his 

new state. Albania, having failed to obtain a loan from the League of Nations, President Zog 

realized that significant economic development could only be achieved by foreign help and 

above all by foreign money. 

He first addressed to Belgrade for a loan of 30 – 50 million dinars, and some light armament 

for the needs of the Albanian army. The talks were unfruitful. There might have been various 

reasons behind: perhaps, the Yugoslavs feared that the arms could sometime be pointed 

against them; perhaps because their economic condition was not consolidated at the moment; 

or maybe they continued to keep alive the wish for a possible break up of Albania between 

Yugoslavia and Italy; or, perhaps they were expecting from Zogu first to put in practice his 

promises made in the secret agreement of August 1924. The truth is that Yugoslavia could not 

provide the necessary loans. However, Zogu was not very willing to become more dependent 

on Yugoslavia, although he had secured power largely with Yugoslav assistance. Not only he 

dreaded too much the Yugoslav intentions, but also he was fully aware that if he fell entirely 

into their hands, his power and his influence would vanish right away. Albanian patriotic anti- 

Serb feelings, and further, reaction of his overseas neighbour would make impossible for him 

to maintain his position. Hence, he showed great cunning in living down the accusation that 

he was simply a usurper imposed by Serbian bayonets, a traitor who had sold out the 

Kosovars and the Albanian territories in order to gain the presidency. He coped successfully 

with the meandering ramifications of diplomacy, and avoided doubts about his particular 

128


relations with Yugoslavia. He followed the easiest way to shed the Serbophil label: showing 

partiality for Italy notwithstanding previously he had assured Eyres by saying “Believe me, 

never will I fall into the arms of Italy”. 342 In every way, he was compelled to turn to Italy, 

much against his own inclination, as it was the only country willing to supply the too much 

indispensable financial support, keeping in mind that problem of Albania was essentially one 

of money. 

The United States of America were very far, and had no immediate interests to invest in 

Albania. France, on the other side, could offer nothing, given its alliance and links with 

Belgrade. Great Britain refused also to invest in Albania. What is more, the Foreign Office 

blocked a loan of two million pounds which would have been provided by a private British 

company C.E. Tidswell & Co., and was to be used in public works for a period of time yet to 

be decided. This company had been contacted by Mehmet Konica, the Albanian Minister in 

London, and had first held negotiations with Noli‟s government for the establishment of an 

Albanian National Bank. Part of the capital of this Bank would have been German, although 

the British would have had complete control of it. It would have issued Albanian banknotes, 

and set up the Albanian Development Corporation which was to act as mediator and 

counsellor of the Albanian government, with a capital of 150.000 pounds of which the 

Albanian government would have owned 10-15 percent. 343 In February 1925, wanting to 

proceed with its project, this company had started negotiations with Zogu. When most 

probably very close to the conclusion of an agreement, it informed both Eyres and the 

Department for World Trade. 344 But the Foreign Office hesitated to reply at once, taking some 

time to further examine the project. In May, the Albanian Minister in London met with the 

Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and asked for the support of His Majesty 

Government to this company in the establishment of an Albanian National Bank, which meant 

also providing a loan to Albania. The Albanian Minister informed among other that Ahmet 

Zog had already held negotiations with the representatives of the company, and had agreed its 

proposed scheme. 

342 Swire, p. 460 

343 FO371/10658, C2350/1768/90, 8 February 1925 

344 FO371/10658, C2148/1768/90, 13 February 1925 

129

The loan could not be provided unless the Bank of Great Britain gave its moral support, 

which would have never ignored the wish of HMG. The Under Secretary Nicolson had 

underlined that “…..I am really greatly doubtful whether the State Secretary shall approve 

such a proposal. All this would bring about a storm of protest by Italy, with which we have 

already friendly relations. On the other hand, this would mean to act against the present 

financial policy of the Treasury and of the Bank of Great Britain, and we intend to do so only 

for questions of a vital political importance. In the end, this would put us in such a position 

towards Albania, which we are not willing to have in no way. HMG cannot guarantee for this 

project.” 345 Such a stand was purely political, since the Department of World Trade had 

expressed no objection in February. 346 As soon as C.E. Tidswell & Co. was informed about 

the Foreign Office decision on 3 June, it decided not to go on with the project any more. 

Once more, the Council of the League rejected the financial support to Albania 347 , after that 

Albanian government, through its representative to the League of Nations Mit‟hat Frashëri, 

had made a new appeal to the League on 15 December 1925. 

At this point, there was no other solution but address to Italy. This way she was given the 

opportunity of securing a political hold on Albania, while Zogu managed to strengthen the 

foundations of his new regime, establish order in the country, and above all provide the 

necessary foreign diplomatic, politic and financial support for Albania. He preferred Italy to 

Yugoslavia, also because he felt safer to be in relation with a bigger state and geographically 

distant, rather than with a country with which Albania had a common frontier line. For Italy 

and Albania were divided by the sea, Zogu believed that the former could not interfere into 

the Albanian interior affairs like Yugoslavia had previously done by organizing anti-Albanian 

bands and committees, or by using other Balkan methods. Any such attempt on the part of 

Italy would immediately become public. 348 Stemming from the agreement of 1921, it was to 

Italy‟s benefit to respect Albania‟s integrity and independence, and to further consolidate the 

Albanian state in every respect. Yugoslavia, on the contrary, would use all means to prevent 

this consolidation. At last, such a solution was also the most logical from the economic point 

of view. Italy needed the Albanian goods, unlike Yugoslavia and Greece which had the same 

345 FO371/10658, C7159/1768/90, 27 May 1925 

346 Ibid., C2563/1768/90 

347 FO371/10655, C15307/300/90, 15 December 1925. 

348 Swire, p. 459-460 

130


agricultural products as Albania. At the same time, Italy had the necessary economic 

potentials to make big investments so greatly needed in Albania. 

Therefore, whilst the negotiations for various concessions were on the way, Italy agreed to 

finance the foundation of an Italian dominated National Bank of Albania. A Banking 

Convention, to operate for fifty years, was signed by the Albanian government with Il Credito 

Italiano, heading a group of Italian financials who were permitted to establish a central bank 

that was to be authorized to introduce an Albanian currency based on the gold franc, and to 

issue paper money. Until now there had been no national coinage in Albania, since she had 

relied on the circulation of several foreign currencies including 20 franc gold pieces (known 

as napoleons), 10 franc gold pieces, British sovereigns, Austro-Hungarian silver kroner, and 

Maria Theresa silver dollars. 

On 12 May 1925, the Albanian government signed an agreement with Italy which established 

a new process of Italian penetration. Albanian consent was given to the granting of wide 

concessions to several Italian-controlled companies also as a compensation for the Italian 

discontent with the concessions given to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. With this 

agreement, Zogu permitted the Italians to carry out the prospecting and exploration of 

Albania‟s natural resources in the form of her forestry and mineral products. 

Mussolini had appointed Alessandro Lessona in Rome and Ugo Sola, who replaced the 

Marquis Durazzo as Italian Minister Plenipotentiary in Tirana, to conduct the negotiations for 

Italy with Myfid Libohova, the Minister of Finance, and his brother Eqrem, the Albanian 

Minister in Rome, who were entrusted by Zogu with the negotiations for the Albanian 

National Bank concessions and for the raising of a loan. Agreement was now reached with the 

Italian financial group headed by the government controlled Il Credito Italiano, initially 

supported by the Swiss Trade Bank, the Belgium Bank for Foreigners and some small 

Yugoslavian banks, and whose chairman Dr. Mario Alberti, took upon himself the 

responsibility to become the President of the National Bank of Albania 349 , agreed also by 

President Zog. Mussolini, who appreciated this positive sign from Zogu, led Il Credito 

349 DBFP, vol. XXVII, Doc. 173, Ovey (Rome) to Chamberlain, 14 September 1925 

131

Italiano to believe that the Italian government would guarantee for the loan that this bank in 

collaboration with other banks of Rome would grant to Albania. 

The second part of the agreement made Albania economically dependent to Italy for the entire 

period between the two world wars. It was a loan of 50 million gold francs in Italian lire (£ 

3,300,000) at 13% interest that the Italian government granted to Albania through an Italian 

state corporation set up on purpose called La Società per lo Sviluppo Economico dell’Albania 

or SVEA (Society for the Development of the Economy of Albania) that determined such a 

dependence. It was organized by the Albanian National Bank, but controlled by Il Credito 

Italiano. By a rapid rise in value of the Italian lira on the foreign exchange the Albanian 

government made an immediate profit of 12,000,000 gold francs; thus the sum to be expended 

was 62,700,000 gold francs. 

The Italians recognized that Albania was quite unable to meet her obligations in making the 

payments on the loan regularly, but this did not concern them. The Albanian government was 

assured that it would have to pay no interest for five years. Moreover, President Zog was 

promised that he would never be pressed to meet his obligations, so anxious were the Italians 

to obtain his signature, and so important, politically, this agreement was for them. The money, 

however, was loaned under conditions that permitted Italy to gain a predominating influence 

in Albanian affairs. The proceeds of the loan were to be spent under Italian supervision by the 

SVEA which received exclusive rights to undertake road-building, to dredge harbours, 

particularly carrying out improvements at Durrës, and to assign other public works 

construction in Albania. The security for the loan were the Albanian state monopolies – salt, 

matches, cigarette paper, and playing cards – and the customs and excise duties. In addition, 

Albania undertook for forty years to take no action in granting concessions to other interests 

without first consulting Italy and obtaining her express approval. The service of the loan, 

interest and principal, was subsequently guaranteed by the Italian Treasury by a royal decree 

of the Italian State. 350 

Zogu‟s acceptance of the financial support by Italy alarmed the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and 

Slovenes. He was accused of ignoring a sense of gratitude towards the Yugoslavs for the 

“generous” aid that he had received from them when overthrowing the government of Fan 

350 Pearson, pp. 251-252, Fischer pp. 163, 208, Swire, p. 462 

132


Noli. 351 The conclusion of this agreement caused the apprehension also of France, and of the 

United States of America. They feared the increasing Italian first economic and later political 

influence in Albania. The British diplomats, on their side, were well aware of the political 

effects of this loan. “There is no doubt on the political character of this concession, which 

seems to award Italy with an oppressive position on the Albanian finances. It is a real pity that 

the League of Nations could not provide this loan. By not doing so, Italy was the only country 

where the political advantages could balance the serious commercial risks of this 

agreement.” 352 

The British diplomats knew that Mussolini was and would have always been determined to 

secure Italy a certain position in Albania. His insistence for the conclusion of the financial 

agreement showed his strong determination to win an immediate access to the Albanian 

finances. Zogu and Albania could not succeed without a loan. Undoubtedly, it would have 

been much better if the League of Nations rather than Italy would control this loan. Now that 

Italy had taken the financial risk of the loan upon herself, the only hope was that Anglo- 

Persian concessions were to be so profitable as to make Albania jump to her own feet, thus 

enabling her to pay out their Italian lender. London seemed to be cognisant of the course the 

events could take, and she was not agreed on that. The Italians, on their side, tried to take 

advantage of the pleasant affair that they were having with the British under the protection of 

Chamberlain, and neutralize any “private” initiative of British origin to be developed in 

Albania. 353 That is why in February 1925, there was a deterioration of the relations between 

Great Britain and Italy concerning Albania. By this time, Zogu, also afraid of an excessive 

expansion of Italy in his country, endeavoured to take measures in order to reduce it. 

Therefore, not only he had granted to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company the concession over a 

considerable Albanian territory, but he had even invited the British to organize the Albanian 

gendarmerie. During the first part of 1925, the Italians seemed to have let aside the political 

and military penetration in Albania, being most concerned about their interference in the 

Albanian finances. However, not a long time will pass before Mussolini showed his 

discontent about the agreements that the British had concluded or were about to conclude with 

Zogu. 

351 Zavalani, p. 284 

352 DBFP, Series IA, Vol.I, Doc. 165, n. 4, Parr to Chamberlain, 30 January 1960 

353 Quaroni P., “La Valigia Diplomatica”, p. 113 

133

CHAPTER IV 

ZOGU, ITALY AND BRITISH DIPLOMACY 

Zogu and Anglo-Italian Disagreements over Albania 

Anglo-Persian Oil Company 

Once President of Albania, Zogu who was convinced that Italy had been the author and 

inspirer of the events of June 1924 overthrowing him from power, and following his policy of 

approaching the British in the belief that they had no direct interests in Albania, offered to the 

latter a tobacco concession of which the Italians were kept in the dark, the organization and 

administration of the Albanian gendarmerie, and an oil concession. The last one was an 

agreement which could not be ratified by the Albanian government in the autumn of 1923. 

The contract with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was „of supreme importance to Albania‟ - 

he said so at a meeting with Harry Eyres, stating to the British Minister that the immediate 

ratification of this concession had been a condition when he had accepted the office of the 

President. 354 This was kept secret in the government‟s offices because of the strong Italian 

pressure to prevent it from happening. Most probably this enlightens a fact mentioned by 

many authors that APOC, to the knowledge of the British Government also, had supported 

financially Ahmet Zog to come back into power. 355 No written document has been found as 

yet to legitimate such a thesis. Anyway, on 10 th February 1925, the Albanian government 

ratified the oil concession agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which had been 

signed in March 1921. Perhaps Zogu chose that particular moment to repay his debt to APOC 

by satisfying their concession requests. Such a decision is hardly to be explained otherwise. In 

354 FO 371/10657, C1734/1435/90, Eyres’ Secret Report to the Foreign Office, 5 February 1925 

355 Op. cit. Fischer, p. 88, op. cit. Bland W. A tangled web. A history of Anglo-American relations with Albania, 

p.28, op. cit. Milo P., 

134


that particular moment, the new Albanian government and parliament had much serious 

problems to resolve rather than ratifying APO concession. 

The original agreement had given Anglo-Persian the monopoly of exploiting Albanian 

oilfields, but on account of official protests from Italy, France and the United States, the 

ratification covered a much modified concession, which restricted Anglo-Persian prospecting 

to 250,000 hectares. Playing diplomacy, Zog claimed that British pressure was responsible for 

the move. Mussolini, who decided that the time had come to pursue a more aggressive policy 

in Albania, complained to the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain. In the 

debate for oil concessions in Albania were now involved only Italians and British. The 

conflict on these concessions made up the first disagreement in a spirit of good relations 

existing between Italy and Great Britain. Confrontation loomed for a day or two in February 

1925. Although the British Foreign Secretary would have preferred not to force Mussolini, 

hoping to civilize him through tolerance of his foreign policy, he could not move against 

Anglo-Persian which had already invested large sums. Finally, direct Anglo-Italian talks, by 

March 10, resulted in confirmation of the Anglo-Persian 250,000 hectares and in 50,000 

hectares being earmarked for a subsidiary of Italian State Railways. The concessions were for 

sixty years. The Italian Ministry of Communications formed the Azienda Italiana Petroli 

Albanesi (A.I.P.I.) to undertake the survey and development of the Albanian oilfields. 

In his efforts to escape total Italian political and economic domination, Ahmet Zog wanted to 

have a British economic presence in Albania that would counterbalance the Italians. What he 

really wanted was a British commitment to protect his country from attack. In January 1925, 

the Italian Foreign Ministry had presented to the Albanian government a memorandum 

including nine very important points previously approved by Mussolini. On 20 January, 

Salvatore Contarini, relying on his conviction that the conditions were satisfactory in Albania 

to allow Italian penetration, presented to Mussolini his nine-point action plan which included: 

1. Ratification of Italo-Albanian Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed in Rome in 

1924, granting Italy “most favoured nation” status in Albania. The agreement 

stipulated that neither Albania nor Italy should permit trade concessions to be awarded 

to any other country or foreign company that could be detrimental to the interests of 

either signatory of the treaty; 

135

2. Granting Italy the right to survey and develop Albanian oilfields; 

3. Participation of Italy in Albanian public works; 

4. Prospecting and exploitation of Albania‟s natural resources in the form of her forestry; 

5. A 19-year extension of the fishing licence at the lake of Scutari to the Italian Fabiano 

company; 

6. Granting to the Italian company Sigma the exploitation of the mine of Memaliaj; 

7. Reconfirmation of the agreement permitting Italian-controlled companies to carry out 

the prospecting and exploitations of Selenica‟s mineral resources; 

8. Resolving the dispute between the Albanian Government and Italian company Silba 

on the Llogara‟s sawmill; 

9. Foundation of an Italian dominated National Bank of Albania. 

Of these, only two were of special importance: point 2 on the right to survey and exploit 

Albanian oilfields, and point 9 on the foundation of an Italian dominated National Bank of 

Albania. By the end of January, after careful consideration of the Italian government requests, 

the Albanian government decided to approve 8 of them. The Italian oil concession did not 

pass because Zogu had promised it to the APOC. 

On 30 January Eyres informed Foreign Office that Prime Minister Ahmet Zog would have 

passed APO concessions to the Assembly next 2 nd February. Such a notice caused great 

tension in Rome. Keener than ever that the prospecting rights should go to Italian firms, 

Albania would „feel the power of Italian discontent‟, Mussolini had warned. 356 The Italian 

Government was really worried about the news reaching Rome that the British were 

penetrating Albania. At this point gets off to a start a dispute amidst British and Italians over 

the oil concessions in Albania. The Albanian Government had informed Harry Eyres on the 

tête-à-tête that the Chargé D’Affaires of the Italian Government in Durrës, Ugo Sola, on 4 

February 1925, had had with the Albanian Foreign Minister Myfit Libohova: “Granting the 

oil concessions exclusively to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and passing it to the Assembly 

will be considered a hostile conduct towards the royal government, which, in such a case, 

could adopt a position of extreme hesitation.” 357 Sola had further threatened that his 

356 FO 371/657, Graham (British Ambassador in Rome) to Foreign Office, 11 February 1925 

357 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, Doc. 3, Eyres to Chamberlain, 4 February 1925 

136


government would have banned any support to Albania provided by the League of Nations 

and would have developed a strong press campaign against it throughout Europe. 358 On 19 

February, Ugo Sola, in a telegram sent to Rome underlined that “only an unexpected arrival in 

Albania of representatives of our banking and industrial interests …. could paralyse the 

British”. 359 The Italian diplomat also complained that Yugoslav and British representatives in 

Albania were working together to prevent Italian penetration in the country. 

Eyres, on his side, sent urgently a secret telegram to Foreign Office as Sola had also accused 

him for setting under pressure the Albanians regarding oil concessions. The Albanian 

Government, on the other side, rightly considered Sola‟s threats very dangerous thus the 

Foreign Minister Libohova wanted to know from the British diplomat what kind of diplomatic 

or other support the Albanians could receive from His Majesty‟s Government if Italians keep 

on with such behaviour. Zogu needed an answer from his friend Eyres in order to handle 

Italian pressure. Not very sure of a positive response from his Ministry, Eyres had added that 

“if Zogu toes the line, this could mean end of Albania as an independent state” 360 . According 

to him, APOC had agreed not to include in her concession the territory of 4000 hectares in the 

south of Vlora requested by the Italians. 

The British diplomats were really surprised with such behaviour of the Italians. They believed 

that according to the explanations given by HMG Board of Commerce, the APO concessions 

were not a monopoly as the Albanian Parliament had declared the country “open territory” to 

all oil companies bidding for oil concessions. Hence the Italian intimidation was completely 

inexcusable. “We have all rights to be extremely angry with the Italians and initiate tough 

counteractions. Anyway, there are some objections arising before us: first, with the formula of 

1921 we have recognized a predominant Italian interest in Albania. It is true that if this 

formula is applied now, Albania‟s economic independence is menaced, but also it is true that 

this formula makes us cede to Italy a mandate for the restoration of Albania‟s situation… 

Second, if we accept the Italian challenge, we inevitably become responsible for Albania. It is 

not fair to promise Albanians our diplomatic support at a time when we are well aware that 

such a support will be merely platonic. Third, if we undertake a strong action line we could 

358 No written document had been left by Sola containing such threats. 

359 ASCA, F.LI, no. 76, Ugo Sola to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 February 1925 

360 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, Doc. 3, Eyres to Chamberlain, 4 February 1925 

137

meet a severe press campaign in Italy, France and the United States of America. I doubt that 

an oil concession with uncertain benefits is worth of such concerns and blows” – Nicolson 

had deduced. 361 Sir Eyre Crowe, on his side, had also stated that “Certainly the conduct of the 

Italian Government is not tolerable … Unluckily this issue comes out at a moment when 

relations between our two countries are seeing their best days since the end of the First World 

War”. 362 The question frequently posed in the Foreign Office was if HMG was in a position to 

insist on its demands and rights concerning this issue. Meanwhile, Eyres, on a secret telegram 

to Miles Lampson 363 , had written that he could not understand Mussolini‟s outburst. “... I 

have not made any pressure on Albanian Government. It had decided absolutely on its 

initiative though I cannot deny that this is the outcome of our previous policy. The Albanian 

Government trusts on us and only us because they are grateful for what we have done in the 

past. British influence in this country at present is well-accepted not only by the government 

but by the people as well, and if they were allowed would have handed themselves entirely 

over us by tomorrow.” 364 

Immediately after consulting the Trade Board of British Government, Chamberlain prepared 

his instructions on how the Albanian Government should have replied to Italians and 

conveyed them through Eyres: “You have to advise the Albanian Government to respond to 

the Italian ultimatum as following: 

1. Unlike Italians doubt, the Albanian Government has encouraged APOC to exclude 

from its conceded zone the area requested by the Italians. (Indeed, it was APOC 

making such a proposal.) 

2. The concession is in no way exclusive and a monopoly, but merely a business and 

rightful transaction, which the Trade Board is ready to support by all means. 

3. Passing the project to the Assembly is not a rash decision keeping in mind that the 

contract has been signed four years ago. 

4. The Albanian Government believes these explanations will convince the Italian 

Government that going on with its threats, verbal or non-verbal, would mean 

infringing the sovereignty of an independent and friendly state. 

361 

FO 371/10656, C1 714/1435/90, 4 February 1925 

362 

Ibidem 

363 

Sir Miles Wedderburn, British diplomatist and First Baron Killearn 

364 

FO371/10657, C2373/1435/90, Eyres to Lampson (FO), 7 February 1925 

138


Chamberlain informed both Eyres and the Albanian Government that precise instructions had 

also been provided to the British ambassador in Rome. 365 The State Secretary had asked 

Graham to personally meet Mussolini and explain to him what the nature of the concession 

was and ask for the confirmation of Sola‟s declaration. If so, Graham, on behalf of His 

Majesty‟s Government, had to express surprise on how the Italian Government could menace 

an independent and sovereign state with terrifying political intimidations only because the 

latter wanted to grant to a British company a fully rightful business concession, and convey 

HMG‟s indignation for such an attitude. Such a stance taken up by Mussolini would pose a 

serious contrast to the policy of excellent openness and frankness which was inspiring the 

friendly communication between Chamberlain and Mussolini on Albanian gendarmerie. 

HMG wants to work in full harmony with the Italian Government in Albania and everywhere, 

but not against British legitimate interests which it has the right and task to defend”. 366 

Following Chamberlain‟s instructions, Graham lodged a harsh protest to Mussolini who 

denied the existence of such an idea of Italy blocking British interests. On his side, Mussolini 

made serious accusations against Zogu as a man determined to oppose and ignore Italy and 

preferring the friendship and support of another power. According to Mussolini, the Italian 

public opinion would have not tolerated this and if Ahmet Zog continued his way, Italian 

discontent would be obvious. 367 

According to the information collected by Graham, the entire matter was as follows: 

Over 1924, the Italian Government had asked for an oil concession of 40.000 hectares for the 

Italian State Railways. This was a separate request from the first one for an area of 4.000 

hectares in the south of Vlorë, reported by APOC as excluded from their concession. Zogu 

had stated to Italians that he could not grant the concession since that area had already been 

left aside for APOC. Ugo Sola had been instructed from Rome 368 to inform Zogu that a 

365 DBFB, Vol. XXVII, doc. 35, Chamberlain to Eyres 

366 Ibid., doc. 36, Chamberlain to Graham, 7 th February 1925 

367 IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, doc. 705, p. 441, The President of the Council and Foreign Minixter, Mussolini, to 

The Regent of the Legation in Durrës, Sola, Rome, 3 rd February 1925 

368 Ibidem 

139

definitive decision on the aforementioned concession ignoring Italian claims would had been 

considered as a hostile attitude. 369 

Mussolini had stated to Graham that if the areas for which APOC and Italians had applied 

were not interconnected and did not cover each-other, the Italian Government would have 

accepted the ratification of APO concessions. On the contrary, if both parties were pretending 

the same area, he expected negotiations to be held between Italians and British. According to 

Graham, “Mussolini was underplaying APOC‟s arguments and the legitimacy of its claims”. 

He considered the Italian Government‟s observations as face saving and window dressing. 

Graham‟s conviction was that “if the Italian public opinion hears of British concessions in 

Albania and that Italy is not benefitting from them, the Italian Government would found itself 

in a position not so favorable. On the other hand, if Italy also is to benefit from them, Italians 

might get an overall sense of satisfaction. But if Zogu decides to play strong and grant the 

concessions exclusively to APOC ignoring Italian protest, Albania will most obviously incur 

Italy‟s wrath and he (Graham – D.H.) could do nothing in Rome to stop it”. 370 

Nicolson and Lampson met with Sir John Cadman, APOC‟s technical advisor and previously 

at the head of His Majesty‟s Petroleum Executive to talk about the core of Graham-Mussolini 

conversation. Sir Cadman said that APOC was the only company that knew exactly the zones 

rich of oil, and he was confident that this was still undisclosed. The Italians were aware of 

this. APOC was convinced that even if Italians had the right to show the zones they were 

pretending not to be included in the APO concessions, they would hesitate to give an answer 

claiming from APOC to be the first to declare the areas required by them and then say that 

those were exactly the same areas they (the Italians – D.H.) wanted. According to Cadman 

more definite and less tolerant tactics had to be adopted with the Italians and tell them that 

“initially we had the opportunity to prospect for minerals in a territory of 200,000 hectares. 

We have reduced it to 100,000 hectares stemming from our respect for you. We are ready to 

make it 50,000 ha, but we cannot go further 371 ”. Apparently this could push Italians even 

more on the wrong side, but on the other hand APOC affirmed to have seen enough of the 

369 IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, doc. 701, p. 434, In a telegram of 31 st January to the President of the Council and 

Foreign Minister Mussolini, Ugo Sola, Regent of the Legation in Durrës, reported that Eyres, aiming to 

guarantee APO concessions passed by the Assembly, had promised the British support for a loan of £3 million of 

the League of Nations to Albania. 

370 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 39, Graham to Chamberlain, 11 February 1925 

371 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 39, no. 6, 12 February 1925 

140


Albanian territory and that those 50,000 ha were eventually the territory to be exploited for 

prospects, thus their generosity was not exaggerated. APOC, although willing to make an 

agreement with Standard Oil, did not see any good reason in doing the same with the Italians. 

They (APOC) had decided to send a representative to advise Graham, although they were not 

clear what could generate from the “talks”. Their belief was that they were the pioneers in this 

business and that there was no any reason for Italians to enter at late eleven and take 

advantage of the experience, work and expense of a British company. “If Italians had wanted 

the oil, they should have entered Albania the first”. 372 At this point, it is obvious that the 

Foreign Office was asking to APOC to show tolerance towards Italians for the sake of Anglo- 

Italian good political relations, but APOC was not so willing to do so as costs for oil 

prospects, about 31.000 pounds, had been quite large. 373 

Mussolini had promised Graham that soon would have sent a written reply on how he 

considered this issue. He sent it, on behalf of the Italian Government, on 13 February 1925. In 

it, he had reiterated that it was not the intention of the Italian Government to oppose APO 

concessions. It was merely safeguarding the Italian interests. According to him, the 

concessions wanted by APOC made up a real monopoly. The Italian Government was 

inclined to find a solution out of friendly talks and avoid a public debate, taking into account 

that the Italian public opinion was highly suspicious of this issue. It believed that an 

agreement was possible, which would not have deprived the British oil company of its 

expected earnings, but at the same time would reasonably defend the Italian interests. Trying 

to avoid misunderstandings and public debates, the Italians deemed necessary to suspend the 

procedure of British concessions in Tirana until such an agreement was concluded. They were 

convinced that HMG would send the proper instructions to its representative in Durrës who 

would advise Zogu to temporarily postpone the ratification of APO concessions. The Italian 

Government needed to know as soon as possible whether this agreement had to be signed 

between the foreign ministers or among delegates from APOC and Italian State Railways. 374 

372 Ibidem 

373 FO 371/10657, C1737/1435/90, 5 February 1925 

374 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 41, Graham to Chamberlain, 13 February 1925 

141

While intergovernmental talks were going on relating to this issue, the Italian Government 

received the news that Ahmet Zog had secretly passed the APO concession package to the 

Albanian competent parliamentary Commission. 375 

Likewise the Italian representative in Albania had been informed that oil concessions were 

about to be ratified by 15 February 1925. He immediately informed Rome. Very angry, 

Mussolini pretended from the British representative to Rome that HMG intervenes to 

postpone the procedure. He was concerned that if it unveiled in Italy, it would have generated 

an outburst of anger feelings that could weaken the positions of the Italian Government. 376 

If the information coming from Tirana were true, HMG found it impossible to stop the 

Albanian Government and Assembly from exercising their right in the very last moments. 

Also, it could not prevent APOC to finally receive what it had been waiting so long i.e. the 

approval of oil concessions. Indeed, it seems that British Government wanted first to have its 

concessions and then, after feeling secure, start talks with the Italian Government for the 

proposed compromise. 

Chamberlain was aware of the rage that oil concessions ratification could cause on the Italian 

people. In order to save Mussolini‟s face, he proposed that if the concessions were granted to 

APOC with the right for oil and mineral prospects over a territory of 100.000 ha, it might 

choose half of the territory and cede the other half to Italians. In fact, this was a technique to 

get rid “by fair means” of Italian claims over the concessions wanted by the British. Italian 

claims could be kept in check this way. According to Chamberlain, the difficulty might rise 

with the Albanian Government, which could show objections on granting a zone to Italians 

given that Mussolini‟s attitude had clearly demonstrated the political Italian objectives in 

Albania, unlike the British Company which had merely commercial ones. “This issue must be 

dealt with the greatest maturity” – Chamberlain had said. 

At start, the Foreign Office informed the Italian Government that it had not the necessary time 

for the requested mediation with the Albanian Government. Anyway, trying to fulfill the 

reasonable wishes of the Italians, it asked which areas they exactly wanted in Albania. If 

375 Ibidem 

376 Ibid., doc. 44, Graham to Chamberlain, 14 February 1925 

142


those coincided with APOC‟s, the FO would then have made the aforementioned proposal. 

Following, it was up to the Italian Government to negotiate with the Albanian Government on 

the concession of the right for mineral prospect in the territory already conceded to APOC. 

Chamberlain made it clear that a compromise could be difficult to achieve if Italians did not 

tell which exactly the zones they wanted were. 

On the other hand, the Foreign Office did not hesitate to deduce that HMG considered legally 

and morally unjustifiable the endeavors of the Italian Government to limit the economic 

liberty and independence of Albania through intimidation and violence and hamper the 

commercial activity of British subjects. HMG would have not tolerated such a violation of the 

British rights despite of friendly sentiments frequently expressed by Signor Mussolini which, 

on its side, HMG had been attentive to pay him back in his own coin. “On the basis of these 

principles, HMG is inclined to help Signor Mussolini to handle any criticism received by his 

extremists. However, Signor Mussolini must understand that there is a point I cannot go 

beyond and that my very conciliating conduct in both cases, concerning the gendarmerie and 

oil concessions as well, is an urgent appeal for mutual good will from his side”. 377 

On behalf of the Italian Government, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

Senator Contarini replied promptly to HMG saying that it had never been his government‟s 

intention to oppose APOC‟s contract. It simply wanted to avoid that Italian Government 

found itself in front of a concluded fact which would definitely exclude the Italian interests in 

oil fields in Albania. Thus, Italians took immediate action and sent their experts in order to 

decide the zones Italy wanted to obtain. 378 

Eyres informed Ahmet Zog on the situation of Anglo-Italian relations and on the last British 

proposal. Willing to maintain the British support, Zogu showed submission to the proposals 

of the British Government and told Eyres that it was his pleasure to do something that could 

save Mussolini‟s face, at the same time taking the assurances that nothing would happen to 

put him at odds with France and the United States of America, which had lodged strong 

protests against APO concessions. He had stated that he would send a note to Mussolini to 

explain that he was not stirred by any unfriendly sentiment towards Italy. On the contrary, it 

377 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 45, Chamberlain to Graham, 14 February 1925 


143

was his long wish to satisfy Mussolini with any possible means. Apart from the oil concession 

which for a matter of honor of the Albanian Government had to pass to the parliament, he was 

ready to take into account with a friendly spirit any contract for which the Italians would 

apply. 379 The British influence over the Albanian Government is obvious taking into 

consideration that the British were the first to intervene to grant concessions to Italy. 

Eyres was concerned about Zogu‟s attitude towards the ratification by the parliament of APO 

concessions and his determination to successfully cope with it because of the opponents 

around him. He did not know what to do unless any instructions arrived: encourage or not the 

concessions‟ approval. If yes, the company would have benefited, but what could have 

happened to Albania? “Mussolini is capable of anything”. After a period of hesitation, he 

reached the conclusions that lacking instruction on the contrary, he had to fulfill his mission 

and make an effort in favor of the commercial interests of British subjects. “Ahmet needed 

but my support. Hence, once I told him to go ahead, he passed the concessions to the 

Parliament without delay”. 380 The agreement with APOC was ratified on 16 February 1925 

during the afternoon session of the Constitutional Assembly, with 50 votes in favour and 6 

contrary, following a short debate. 

In the meantime, the Italian Government has not yet proposed the wanted zones. Having 

difficulties in determining which the zones were, and the same time have not a single idea on 

the zones to be conceded to APOC, it suggested to HMG to open immediately the 

negotiations between the experts. Since HMG asked for an instant reply, the Italians proposed 

that Shkumbin river to be the dividing line. The zones on the north of this line could be 

APOC‟s, whereas those on the south would be granted to Italians. 381 

For British diplomats, it was obvious that Italians wanted their own concessions and not 

APOC‟s. Behind this there were political objectives. The division proposed was not at all 

based on experts‟ point of view rather on political ones as it was not sure whether in the south 

of Shkumbin there was oil. The proposal sounded like a division of zones of influence. 

Furthermore, by doing so, the Italians might avoid the Yugoslav doubts since they were not 

asking for zones in their frontier. 

379 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 49, Eyres to Chamberlain, 17 February 1925 

380 Ibid., doc. 55, no 6, Eyres to Lampson, 18 February 1925 


144


Chamberlain did not accept the Italian proposal finding it unachievable. He kept on insisting 

that Italians choose the zone of 50.000 ha, otherwise no friendly agreement could be 

concluded between them. 

It was now obvious to the FO officials that Italians were no more pretending that APO was 

legally wrong or that its concession in Albania was challenging from the commercial point of 

view. Their presumption, at least as it seems, was that Italy had a priority political interest in 

Albania and on view of its friendship with Italy, Great Britain must give in a part of such an 

important concession. They had alluded to the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of 

1921. However, that decision pledged Italy to respect Albania‟s economic independence, and 

if Albania was interfered with exploiting her oil resource its own way, subsequently her 

economic independence was violated. Thus, the decision of 1921 seemed to be against and 

not in favor of the Italians claims. 

Knowing for a fact that APOC‟s prospects would be only over 50.000 ha and trying to avoid 

any incident over this issue, the FO stood on its first proposal. However it had required from 

the Italian Government to declare the exact zones, it doubted Italians knew which the best 

zones were. Most probably, they would wait and watch the zones chosen by APOC‟s before 

declaring their own wishes. Anyway, the British Government showed careful consideration 

before making the proposal to the Italian Government. In order to demonstrate the non- 

monopoly character of its concessions, the British thought of playing with the card of the 

Albanian government. “….We must not forget the Albanian Government – Chamberlain had 

said. – In the end, it is a matter of their territory. Most probably, they will not appreciate the 

fact that we are giving in to Italians 150.000 ha of 200.000 ha approved to APOC. Hence, let 

us not state the last point to Italians before the consultations with the Albanian 

Government”. 382 

By saying that a British company cannot exploit the territory and the rights of a foreign 

country, Chamberlain justified himself trying to avoid a conflict on the division of 200.000 

ha. This had to be a topic for discussion between the Albanian and Italian parties. What 

382 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 51, Memorandum of Mr. Nicolson on Italy, Great Britain and Albania, 17 February 

1925 

145

APOC might do was to inform the Albanian Government that it did not want a part of the 

total concession and as a result could cede it to a foreign company. 383 The Albanian 

Government would in this way enter the joke covering up all traces of the monopoly character 

and safeguarding the prestige of APO concessions. Anyway, Italy needed careful 

consideration as Mussolini was capable of sudden outbursts as well as joining the Americans 

for such issues concerning the concessions as “monopoly”, “open doors” etc. “I feel sorry for 

this – told Graham – at a time when the relations since your visit here has been uniformly 

good and there exist a fruitful cooperation in some other more important fields”. 384 

After London‟s move, the Italian Government was hesitating as to keep on insisting for 

negotiations while it was not sure whether to accept the zones APOC was ready to concede or 

rather join the Americans and oppose the fairness of APO concessions with the goal to put an 

end to criticism. Undoubtedly, this might raise the reputation of the Italian Government in the 

country. On its side, the FO continued in the direction of finding a friendly solution of good 

understanding, but fist Italians needed to determine their zones. 385 

Ahmet Zog accepted the solution suggested by HMG concerning his relations with the Italian 

Government and appreciated the idiom of diplomacy used in this occasion, but on the other 

hand he demanded from the British diplomacy a promise to protect Albania from likely 

attacks following Italian intimidation. Eyres considered such a request totally impossible 

saying that Zogu must pretend nothing more from HMG in this phase of development of the 

events. He added that the jargon used had been as strong as it could be allowed when a 

government addressed to a friendly nation. So, Eyres did not at all deny the common Anglo- 

Italian interests and Zogu had to bear this into mind. 

However Zogu was determined to keep on the same rout concerning the measures he deemed 

necessary for the recovery of the country as if he allowed himself to be intimidated, he better 

renounced every hope for success and withdraw from the political scene. Zogu affirmed to 

Eyres that he was aware of the necessity to avoid conflicts with his neighbors as well as his 

desire to develop peaceful relations with them under the condition to be allowed the freedom 

to act the way he believed right for his country. He denied the observation on his pro- 

383 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 56, Chamberlain to Graham, 19 February 1925 

384 Ibid., doc. 60, no 4, Graham to Chamberlain, 21 February 1925 

385 Ibid., doc. 58, Graham to Chamberlain 

146


Yugoslav tendencies and stated that he was making all efforts to establish good relations with 

the Italian Government, however suspects in the Italian embassy continued. 386 

Meanwhile, a bad episode occurred in the Anglo-Italian relations because of the ratification of 

APO concessions in Albania. Immediately after receiving the notice on the ratification by the 

Albanian Parliament of APO concessions, on 19 February 1925, the Italian Ambassador in 

London Pietro Paolo Tomasi, Marchese della Torretta, obeying to Mussolini‟s instruction, 

made an abnormal note to Sir Lampson accusing HMG for pressure over the Albanian 

Government for the ratification of the concessions and Chamberlain for having not taken into 

consideration the Italian request for postponing the deadline of this ratification as well as for 

his tendency to put Italians in front of a concluded fact, bringing into question the legitimacy 

of the ratification. 387 So HMG was accused for mistrusting the Italians. Lampson categorically 

denied these accusations. The day after, upon Chamberlain‟s directive, Sir Crowe called 

Marchese della Torretta in the FO and asked him to report to Mussolini that his information 

was entirely false and that the Italian Government had to withdraw these accusations as soon 

as possible. “As a result of my personal talks with Mussolini when I was in Rome, I had 

created the opinion that the Italian Prime Minister sincerely wished to promote friendly 

relations with the Great Britain and support the policy of cordial and loyal collaboration in 

terms of matters of common interest. As this position coincided exactly with my desires and 

hopes, in all difficult matters regarding Albania, I have shown consideration for the position 

of Mr. Mussolini and for the Italian suspects and interests which often have exceeded 

Mussolini‟s right, to demand or expect from the British Government ….. Mr. Mussolini 

should know that both parties are needed to establish a real friendship. I have done my part 

and I am confident that Mussolini also will give the rightful consideration to this declaration. 

In these moments when we have demonstrated our good will to strongly insist with the British 

parliament to pass the Convention of Jubal Anderson and when we were taking into account 

its concessions regarding the inter-ally debt (Italy had a debt of £554 million) it seems to be 

particularly improper that Mussolini issued offensive notes over our heads. If Mussolini 

continues to be self-assured of addressing or dictating us as if we are a third-hand power, he is 

making a fatal mistake.” The Marchese della Torretta continued defending the position of his 

386 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 55, Eyres to Chamberlain, 8 February 1925 

387 IDD, 7 th Series, vol. III, doc. 728, p. 456, The Ambassador in London, Della Torretta to President of the 

Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, 20 February 1925 

147

government, which according to him felt “offended”. Crowe, on his side, replied that it was 

HMG that felt slighted after it had treated Mussolini with consideration and good will and had 

been recompensed with an outrageous accusation. Marchese della Torretta was asked to 

immediately withdraw the declaration. 388 

Not at all sure that Tomasi would convey the message to his government, Graham was asked 

to lodge a strong protest to the Italian Government. Faced with this serious statement of the 

British Government which complicated Anglo-Italian relations, Senator Contarini, known for 

his moderated manners in the Italian foreign policy, made a step back right away and 

underlined once more his surprise on how the situation had came to a head, reiterating the 

friendly sentiments of his government for HMG and the will to avoid any prejudice in the 

existing relations. “Italians have no objections to the British oil concessions in Albania. On 

the contrary, we better see a British company present in Albania rather than some other 

foreign company, but because of the particular Italian interests in Albania on the basis of its 

geographical vicinity and other, and in order to escape the reaction of public opinion, not any 

Italian Government will ever permit these concessions to pass without first ensuring the 

corresponding concessions to Italy. In no way has HMG been accused of double dealing or 

cunning and it is unthinkable any such scenario may be presented”. 389 Chamberlain accepted 

the assurances of the Italian Government and not in his interest to aggravate the situation, 

informed the Italian ambassador in London that he considered the episode already closed. 390 

He told his collaborators that he would be pleased to forget this episode and continue the 

friendly talks as long as Mussolini would account for his actions with the same loyal 

collaboration. 391 In the FO, it was clear that Italians would certainly appreciate the 

participation in the British concessions, but they were interested to have their own concession 

as a result of political effects. Chamberlain was doubtful whether Contarini had previously 

agreed with Mussolini “who would risk triggering off even with more stirring developments”. 

Tomasi‟s statement was believed to be a direct action of Mussolini who had not informed his 

close colleagues like Contarini. 392 

388 

DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 6, Chamberlain to Graham, 23 February 1925 

389 

Ibid. doc. 59, Graham to Chamberlain, 21 February 1925 

390 

Ibid. no 6 

391 

Ibid., doc. 6, Chamberlain to Graham, 23 February 1925 

392 

Ibid., doc. 66, no 4, Chamberlain to Graham, 27 February 1925 

148


Finally, on 23 February, the Italian Government delivered to Graham the Italian map and the 

statement on the zones the Italians wanted. 393 Broader interests in the European framework, 

the need to maintain the alliance with Italy against the rivalry with France and the recognition 

of Italian priorities in Albania, made England withdraw and think of an Anglo-Italian 

compromise over the oil concessions in Albania. However Chamberlain would have preferred 

to satisfy even more Mussolini, hoping that such a line could serve to moderate his other 

orientations in the foreign policy, the British Foreign Secretary could not ignore APOC‟s 

interests, which had already invested large sums in Albania. 394 Thus Chamberlain, by the end 

of February, had designed a compromising and contracting draft-agreement with the Italian 

party, but which was yet being kept secret. It was the continuation of talks for compromise 

since before the 19 February episode. On these talks, neither Albania nor other powers 

interested in Albania knew anything. According to this draft, first APOC had to cede three 

quarters of the zones given for exploration under this contract. Second, as regards the 

remaining 50.000 ha which APOC intends to exploit, it had to give in to Italians its 20% 

according to the agreement among APOC, Anglo-Italian Corporation and Manzi Fe on 27 

January 1921. This would have been completed in two phases. In the first phase, APOC had 

to renounce its claims over 150.000 ha and so offer to the Albanian government the 

possibility to meet not only the Italian requests but also the French and American when and if 

there were such requests. In the second and last phase, there would have been direct 

negotiations between APOC and Anglo-Italian Corporation with the view to ceding them a 

part from the final prospecting zones. With regard to the first offer, APOC was not submitting 

any big loss as the deadline for the exploration in these zones would have soon ended. 

Moreover, APOC knew perfectly where the oil zones were. Hence, the proposal did not at all 

affect the British interests. 395 This is also testified by Colonel Stirling, a British officer who 

was in Albania in this period with the mission to organize the Albania gendarmerie. 

According to him, APOC as soon as it had taken the concession by the Albanian Government, 

had dug for oil in several places and had discovered oil straits in the low hills in the north of 

Vlorë. Several wells had also been opened. The quantity of the oil was considerable, but its 

quality was very low. The oil was as thick as it was quite impossible to draw it. Thus it 

needed a refining elaboration before drawing and carrying it on the shipping ferries. In the 

393 

DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 60, Graham to Chamberlain, 23 February 1925 

394 

Fischer B., op. cit. p. 101 

395 

DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 62, Chamberlain to Graham, 23 February 1925 

149

world market prices all this was not cost-effective for the company. Hence, according to him, 

the concession was ceded to Italians who accepted on the spot. In Italy, there was not any oil 

near the sea so that it could be used for the ships in case of war. Therefore, the thirst of the 

Italian Government to possess Albanian oil, although not very economic, was more a primary 

strategic need. 396 

The British proposal for participation of the Italians in the British oil concessions in Albania 

opened the path to the Italian capital for penetration with priority in the little country and this 

was a disaster for Albania and Zogu himself. This proposal instantly caused the American 

reactions against this compromise implying an American participation in them. The reaction 

against this compromise in Washington was really strong. The American believed that it had 

been the Italian intimidation to make the British give in the participation in their concessions 

and that that had already lost this opportunity because of their aggressive manifestation in 

London on this matter. Such a belief was contrasted in the FO, bringing in mind to the 

Americans that there existed an early agreement between APOC and an Italian company since 

1921 for a division of the concessions in Albania. It was about the agreement with Manzi Fe 

in February 1921, which validity by then might not be recognized any more. But it served as a 

very good argument for the proposed compromise. 397 

With respect to the American reaction, Nicolson reported on 28 February “….we may have 

troubles with the Americans about the “open door” policy. Need to realize that this American 

unilateral policy cannot be applied for Albania. If the Albanian Government had refused to 

allow the American companies to carry out prospects in Albania, the State Department might 

then have something to say in Tirana. But since two American companies have made a mess 

in there for several months and one of them has actually asked for a concession of 150.000 ha, 

they really cannot complain”. 398 

396 Walter Francis Stirling & Sigfried Sassoon, Safety Last, London 1953, pp. 155-156 

397 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 68, Lampson to the First Secretary of the USA in London, 26 February 1925 

398 Although an American geologist had come to Albania by the end of 1921 and during 1922, no application for 

any concession had been made to the Albanian government until Sinclair Consolidated Oil Company made an 

offer in September 1922, one year and a half after APOC had been given the concession. This was followed by 

an application in October of Standard Oil Company, slightly modified by another proposal in February 1923. 

The overall position of the Albanian Government was that they were not free to welcome proposals for oil 

concessions since APO concessions were about pass in the parliament. The Albanian Government kept its 

promise. The Minister of Public Works received also other proposals from other companies, but they were not 

transmitted to the Council of Ministers. Later, they were used as a lever to provide modifications in the 

agreement with APOC. In 1925, the British made use of the fact that these companies showed up in the field 

150


“… That because admitting to an independent country that it cannot grant mineral 

concessions at its own will is quite absurd. For instance, supposing these 50.000 ha which are 

to be provided to APOC actually make up the entire oil resources in Albania, then according 

to the “open door” policy, Albania must split up such a small zone among any foreign 

countries. What indeed the American mean with the “open door” is that when they are 

provided with a concession themselves, the door is closed to others, however when another is 

provided with a concession, the door must remain open so as to accept but America”. 399 This 

doctrine was considered entirely fanciful; as a result it was decided not to be taken seriously 

into account. 

The State Secretary had agreed with the representative of APOC that the FO would inform the 

latter when, according to their opinion, the time was ripe to start straight negotiations in Rome 

in relation to the oil concession in Albania. Soon, a telegram from the British ambassador in 

Rome arrived reporting that the Italian government was ready to begin talks without delay. 

Meantime, the Foreign Office informed Mr. John Cadman, APOC‟s representative, to proceed 

in Rome and get in touch with the Italian interests. During the talks, it was foreseen to refer 

also to the 1921 compromise as a good argument against the American accusations. “You 

have to apply to Manzi Fe as the first connection between you and any Italian interests on 

which you are going to negotiate. I agree that Manzi Fe has little importance apart from the 

fact that it dates back in 1921… Most crucial is to reach such a regulation that can guarantee 

you as much as possible in case of future political troubles in Albania, and above all we have 

to be mindful not to play rights into the hands of the American opposition wasting the Manzi 

Fe talks and starting new ones”. 400 

Meanwhile, on 10 March 1925, the Italian minister in Durrës provided from the Albanian 

Government the concession of 50.000 ha for oil prospect of which 30.000 ha had to be 

selected for exploitation. Zogu signed this agreement on the basis of the new competencies of 

the President of the Republic according to which ratification in the parliament was no more 

necessary. This concession would have no effects on APO concessions. The Italian 

much after the concessions had been given to APOC, thus occupying a secondary place. APOC had the priority 

in the selection. (doc. 73, Eyres to Chamberlain, 5 March 1925) 

399 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 68, no 7, FO, Nicolson, 28 February 1925 

400 Ibid., doc. 72, Nicolson to j. Cadman, 3 March 1925 

151

ambassador asked for Eyres collaboration and the latter showed willingness to cooperate 

within his capacities. The FO approved Eyre‟s conduct and asked to be shortly informed on 

where the Italians zones were. The concessions were given to the Italian State Railways. 401 

Cadman arrived in Rome on 11 March. Together with Ambassador Graham, they met with 

Contarini and an oil expert of the Italian State Railways. Negotiations were held in a spirit of 

friendship. The difficulties rose only about convincing the Italians that APOC could not give 

in to them certain zones. They could only give them back to the Albanian government and so 

Italians could negotiate. It seemed that all was then clear for the Italians. Contarini assured 

Graham that they had not been provided from the Albanian Government with any particular 

zone, but only a concession of 50.000 ha with reserve of the rights already given to APOC. 402 

(The 11 th of March, according to an urgent report of Eyres to the FO, APO concession of 

200.000 ha was signed.) 403 In the FO, this fact is considered as very satisfactory. C. Howard 

Smith minuted: “…Moreover this confirms that Ahmet is playing fair with the APOC card 

and the concessions for the Italian Railways has been well thought out as to keep them apart 

from the selected zone from APO”. 404 

The negotiations in Rome continued for an entire week. The difficulties were presented 

mainly from the Italian oil experts. But Contarini exerted a moderated and constructive 

influence on them by explaining that the completion of this act had more a political 

significance rather than a mere agreement for earning profits. A week after, a satisfactory 

agreement was concluded which was signed between Mussolini and Cadman in the presence 

of the British diplomatic representative in Rome, Graham. At the same time, there was an 

exchange of letters between the Italian government and APOC, according to which the former 

was bound to comply with the principles of mutual cooperation and create to the company 

facilitating conditions for the distribution in Italy of its oil products. APOC was offered also 

the option to share up to 45% in some Italian company established to the purpose of 

distributing the Albanian oil in Italy. 405 

401 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 76, Eyres to Chamberlain, 10 March 1925 

402 Ibid., doc. 79, Graham to Chamberlain, 10 March 1925 

403 PRO, FO 371/10657, C3574/1435/90, 11 March 1925 

404 Ibid., C3666/1435/90, 13 March 1925 

405 Ibid., FO 421/308 (Confidential) + FO 371/10657, C4090/1435/90, Graham to Chamberlain, 20 March 1925 

152


In order to leave no doubt to the Albanian government on the Anglo-British collaboration 

regarding the concessions, APOC asked from the FO that the Albanian Government be 

informed in general terms about the agreement reached with the Italian government. Hence, 

Eyres received instructions on the 5 th of May to explain to the Albanian Government that of 

late APOC had been convinced that before doing business in Albania it was necessary to 

agree on some points with the Italian government. 406 

Following the agreement between APOC and the Italians on the oil concessions in Albania, 

on the spot appeared the French, who asked for participation in these concessions. On 3 April, 

the French representative in London voiced the objection of the French Government to the 

APO concessions in Albania. According to the French Government, this concession made up 

a real monopoly, first because to APOC had been granted the right of choosing itself the 

50.000 ha of the territory containing oil; and second because the Italian Government had 

managed to be provided the same concession from the Albanian Government only thanks to 

negotiations with APOC. The French regarded the concession in conflict not only with the 

“open door” policy, but also with the spirit of San Remo agreement of 25 April 1920. 407 

In these circumstances, the French Government wanted from HMG to interfere with APOC so 

that Crèdit Gènéral des Pètroles, which represented the French interests in Albania, be 

provided with the same treatment. On his side, Chamberlain tried to explain to the French that 

negotiations with the Albanian Government on this concession dated back in 1921 and that 

territory for oil prospects had been reduced maximally since then, rejecting this way the 

accusation that such a concession was a monopoly. On the other hand, taking into account the 

Italo-French disagreements, HMG rushed to cancel the French impression of a British support 

of the Italian interests in Albania. Chamberlain said to the French that he was convinced that 

this concession granted after direct talks between APOC and the Albanian Government made 

up in no way a violation to the “open door” principles and to the San Remo agreement. The 

fact that Italians as well had been granted a concession was enough to demonstrate that 

granting concessions to APOC did not exclude other parties to be provided with oil 

406 FO 371/10658, C5841/1435/90, 30 April 1925 

407 This was an agreement reached on the 24 th April 1920 between M. Philippe Berthelot, Director of Political 

and Commercial Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Prof. Sir John Cadman, Director in Office 

of HMG Petroleum Department. Its main principle was cooperation where oil interests could be mutually shared 

fruitfully. This agreement had been confirmed also by both then prime ministers. 

153

concessions in Albania. Hence, HMG refused the possibility to interject with APOC on behalf 

of the Crèdit Gènéral des Pètroles, because it was up to APOC to decide how to deal with the 

concession it had been provided with. 408 It is obvious that the answer given to the French is 

definitely the contrary to what Italians had received from HMG. 

On 18 July 1925, Eyres informed the FO that Standard Oil Company had been provided with 

a concession from the Albanian Government for oil prospects in Albania and that the 

concession had passed to the parliament the 15 th July. The concession for the prospect period 

was 80.000 ha and within two months had to be selected 50.000 ha for permanent 

exploitation. According to Eyres, these developments had absolutely undermined the 

complaints of the American and Italian Legations that APO concessions constituted a 

monopoly. 409 It can be presumed that such a move was advanced by Eyres to the Albanian 

Government in order to safeguard the peaceful relations among HMG and other pretending 

governments, since there has been found no any reaction of HMG against this concession. On 

the contrary, it seemed to have been welcomed. 

The 1 st of August, the Albanian Government and the Chargé d’Affaires of France exchanged 

the notes which provided the French Government with a possibility to choose within one year, 

starting from 11 August 1925, among all oil zones in Albania which would not have been 

included in one of the four concessions already granted to APOC, Italian State Railways, 

Standard Oil Company and to the small British group Rushton. Later, a contract was signed 

according to which the rights given to the French Government could be passed on to a French 

oil company or to any other financial group. 410 

After providing with concessions also the French company, the diplomatic battle on the oil 

concessions to Albania came to an end. At the same time, this showed a withdrawal of the 

British presence in Albania opening the road to the penetration of the Italian capital and 

consequently to the strengthening of the Italian political and economic domination. All this 

was in compliance with the goals of the British foreign policy to maintain friendly relations 

with the fascist Italy in order to find the same cooperation spirit as regards more important 

issues for the then British diplomacy. 

408 DBFP, Vol. XXVII, doc. 111, Chamberlain to the French Ambassador, 20 April 1925 

409 Ibid., doc. 5, Eyres to Chamberlain, 18 July 1925 

410 Ibid., doc 161, Parr to Chamberlain, 11 August 1925 

154


On his side, Ahmed Zog tried to play an important role with the oil concessions. His intention 

was to sell them good and avoid dependence on Italian capital. But not much time will pass 

and interests on Albanian oil will fade as no considerable oil will be found in Albania. Zog 

will try by all means to get the British support and avoid the Italian penetration, but as I told 

before Albania was not a priority of British diplomacy. This will be seen also in Zogu‟s 

request to train his gendarmerie by British officers. 

British Officers in Albania 

The qualified work of the Albanian gendarmerie after the return into power of Ahmet Zog, in 

January 1925, has frequently been a topic of discussion for many. British officers are those to 

whom main credit is given for organizing and running it. Anyway, it has never been examined 

who these British officers were; when and how they arrived in Albania; what their relation 

with His Majesty Government and the Foreign Office was; who selected them; why British; 

how it was possible that at a time when Italian interests and influence in Albania were 

growing more and more, British officers were allowed to penetrate Albanian armed force and 

train it. 

Apart from finding material resources necessary for the recovery of Albanian economy, 

Ahmet Zog aimed at establishing an effective gendarmerie seeing as one of his first decisions 

for the reorganization of power was the dissolution of the Albanian national army and the 

creation instead of a militia force. 411 This decision was taken not only because of the 

involvement of a major part of the army in the events of 1924 beside the opposition, but also 

he considered its existence very costly and unnecessary for the little and so economically 

weak Albania. Zogu‟s governing was principally based on the armed forces of gendarmerie 

and militia. 

After the dissolution of the Albanian army, the establishment of a new force that would keep 

order in the country was a fundamental requisite for the time. The Albanian Government 

411 History of Albania, Vol. III, Tirana 1984, p. 310 

155

elieved that engagement of a small number of European officers in the organization and 

direction of the gendarmerie was an essential need as well. Which European country the 

officers would come made up not a minor problem for Zog. There were only 9 officers 

needed who were thought to go two in each of the four would-be centers of the gendarmerie 

administration. 412 The entire gendarmerie would be under the control of the general 

command, in chief of which there would have been a general Albanian commander and a 

foreign inspector. Taking into consideration that the number of the foreign officers would 

have been so small, it was believed that there could not have existed a harmonious 

collaboration among them if they were from different countries. Ahmet Zog was convinced 

that, in that particular position of Albania, no one would really help her but British officers. 413 

France was untrustworthy because of its relations with Yugoslavia and as a consequence its 

officers also were unreliable. Obviously, Serb and Italian officers were out of Zogu‟s mind for 

the time being. If it were not for the fear of Italy‟s interference, Austrian officers could have 

been suitable. Of course, German officers were not acceptable after the First World War. 

Scandinavians, Dutch and Swiss could be reliable, but according to the British Colonel 

Stirling, advisor to the Albanian Home Ministry since 1923, none of them possessed special 

military qualities which were substantial for the task they needed to carry out. Their work 

experience in Albania, but also in other similar countries, had shown that they were out of 

place in a country like Albania. Some time ago, the League of Nations financial consultant, of 

Danish origin, had failed in understanding the Albanian reality of time and finding a solution 

for the Albanian economy. It was Zogu‟s concern that the Americans had close relations with 

the Albanian-Americans who were highly influenced by Bishop Fan Noli. Based on a mere 

elimination analysis, Zog had reached the conclusion that his solution was entirely limited to 

the British. 414 Zogu‟s main aim was to draw Great Britain closer to Albania, considering it a 

country without direct political or territorial interests in Albania. In view of his friendship and 

relations with Eyres, Zog believed that British diplomats were the only to really support 

Albania. On the other hand, by choosing the British, he aimed at balancing the Italian 

influence and presence in Albania. 

412 One in the Northern zone with its center in Shkodër, the East zone with its center in Peshkopia, the Central 

zone with its center in Tirana, and the South zone with its center in Përmet. Ibid., p. 315 

413 DBFP, First Series, Vol. XXVII, C 1570/763/90, doc. 34, Chamberlain to Graham, 7 February 1925 

414 Ibidem 

156


Since 1923 Colonel Sterling had come to Albania upon request of the Albanian government at 

a time when Ahmet Zog was Prime Minister and Home Minister. He was advisor (inspector) 

to the Home Ministry and had established closed relations with Zogu. Once back in the 

position of the President of Albania, in January 1925, Zogu appointed Colonel Stirling as the 

General Inspector of the Albanian Gendarmerie. 415 Security and order in the country were 

very important for his continuity. For this, he asked Stirling to intervene with the British 

Government to provide some British officers who would be given the responsibility to 

reorganize together with him the Albanian armed force. 

The 25 th January 1925, Stirling left Albania and went to London to make all efforts to fulfill 

his commitment of finding the right persons to be involved in the establishment of the 

Albanian gendarmerie. The War Office was the first place to which he addressed. 416 He 

presented a concise report on the situation in Albania including its indispensable need of a 

well-trained gendarmerie, the importance of a solid Albanian government for the peace in the 

Balkans and the negative factors of selecting the officers from other countries. At the end of 

his report he had expressed his disbelief about HMG allowing a nucleus of German officers to 

be established in the heart of the Balkans at a time when it remained the only alternative if the 

British would have refused the request. 417 The War Office consulted with the Undersecretary 

of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Harold Nicolson. The Foreign Office found it very difficult to 

argue the logics of the exposé on the situation in Albania made by Colonel Stirling and agreed 

on the necessity of an effective gendarmerie at a time of a serious anarchy was prevailing in 

Albania. 

What was the official position of HMG about the proposal? Very little has been mentioned 

this issue in the Albanian historiography. Indeed it was not an easy decision to be made. 

HMG found itself in a difficult position. Independently of the country these officers would 

have come from, HMG could not neglect that the organization plan of the gendarmerie 

according to a European model was of great importance. Furthermore, the British diplomats 

415 McColl R., British Mission in Albania, Quarterly Review, vol. 271, London, October 1938, p. 308; Bland 

W., A tangled web…., op. cit. p. 30; DBFP, First Series, vol. XXVII, C 816/52/90, Durrës, 9 January 1925, 

Letter of Eyres addressed to the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Austin Chamberlain; Stirling W.F., Safety 

Last, p. 131 

416 Stirling W. F., op. cit. p. 132 

417 Ibidem 

157

knew well that the involvement of British officers in such a matter would cast doubt on the 

Italian government. The reason for this was very simple. 

Great Britain, following its policy of avoiding the domination of the old continent by one of 

the Great Powers, on one side established good relations with Italy trying to make of her a 

good ally against France which was claiming hegemony on the continent, on the other, it was 

making all diplomatic efforts, with no direct clashes with the Italian government, to stop the 

process of transforming Albania the first base for the Italian fascism from where to dominate 

the Balkans and beyond. Despite of this general tendency of the then British diplomacy, in 

November 1924, the Tories return into power in London. Their policy to calm tensions with 

the fascist Italy combined with the difficult position of Mussolini because of Mateotti crisis, 

marks the beginning of a British-Italian “détente”, focused mainly on the colonial issues, 

which later climaxed on the Locarno Pact, signed by Mussolini in October 1925. 418 In such a 

good spirit of relations, a few weeks after the first meeting, the first clash of economic and 

commercial interests in Albania between British and Italians arouse because of oil 

concessions. It showed that the promised collaboration was rather a diplomatic affair. Just 

when the Foreign Office was endeavoring to further develop the “détente” initiated in 

December and building relations with Italy upon mutual tolerance, but at the same time trying 

not to sacrifice the interests of its commercial subjects in Albania, arrived in the Foreign 

Office the proposal of Col. Stirling for the contribution of 9 British officers in the 

establishment and organization of Albanian gendarmerie. Obviously this raised doubts and 

discontent in the official Rome. 

Although they knew that Col. Stirling was an employee of the Albanian government and that 

FO had nothing to do with its appointment, they felt bound to take a stand especially when he 

asked for their assistance and advice. At the beginning, Nicolson was convinced not to favor 

the proposal. “…. first, because I do not want to have, even indirectly, anything to do with 

Albania‟s internal affairs, and second, I cannot understand how, in the present circumstances, 

the Albanian government can ever pay decent salaries to these British officers”. 419 However 

Nicolson could not stop Col. Stirling from finding his officers because according to the 

Foreign Recruitment Act, the FO could not ban British former-officers who did not actually 

418 Cassels A., Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, Preface 

419 FO 371/10656, C 1208/763/90, 26 January 1925 

158


serve to their government, from serving the police of an independent state in friendly relations 

with Great Britain, like Albania. On the other hand, there was another concern which 

Nicolson took into consideration: “If we discourage the scheme, this would mean that all of 

the respected men would refuse the offer and instead all adventurous and unworthy men 

would accept. The outcome would thus damage our prestige”. 420 

In these circumstances, it was decided to advise the War Office not to encourage at all Col. 

Stirling‟s proposal. Such an attitude had to be explained to the media that Col. Stirling was an 

employee of the Albanian government and that the FO had nothing to do with his 

appointment. Moreover, it was decided to make a strong appeal to the Colonel to search for 

his officers in another country and not in England. 421 

Subsequent to Stirling‟s determination and arguments, several days later, this dry-cut decision 

started to acquire new nuances. Austen Chamberlain himself, in his notes of 3 February 1925, 

wrote referring to this matter: “This raises a difficult issue. Albania is an independent state. 

Both Italy and Serbia have declared their willpower to support Albania‟s independence and 

for this reason none would allow the other to win or pretend a dominating influence there. 

The only chance of the country in these conditions is to have a rather effective government 

aiming at keeping order and supporting those developments that can afford financially. From 

this point of view, the Albanian government has been wise to dissolve its useless army and is 

dealing with the establishment of a small but effective gendarmerie. No doubt they have the 

right to expect that this gendarmerie requires foreign officers if it is to count. As regards 

qualification, indisputably the Albanians have the right to reach at the conclusion that they 

must be British officers or no one else.” 422 As far as the stand that FO and HMG were going 

to take in this case, Chamberlain wrote “….We have done nothing to encourage the Albanian 

government come to this conclusion. This decision is their spontaneous act. We are not at all 

responsible for this. However, can we put our veto to this scheme notwithstanding we believe 

that it is so indispensable for the country? We would really assume a great responsibility if we 

stop the Albanians from taking such a measure, which is fundamental….. We would drive her 

(Albania – D.H.) to guaranteed destruction because Italians would rather prefer a broken up 

420 Ibidem 

421 Ibidem 

422 FO371/10656, C 1570/763/90, 3 February 1925 

159

Albania than British officer to be employed and keep it united. I agree that it is not desirable 

to follow this course.” 423 

In the Foreign Office, trying to avoid an evident involvement of British Government in this 

issue, it was discussed to propose to the Albanian government to ask to the League of Nations 

to select European officers, perhaps British, for the establishment of its gendarmerie. But 

British diplomats knew that in such a case the decision-making would be in the hands of the 

Council of the League, and for this decision the vote had to be unanimous. Italy, being a 

member of the Council, would certainly oppose the selection of a British officer and thus 

Italy‟s obstacle would not give way to any other solution apart from that of Swedish or 

Danish officers, who, according to British experts, were not able to meet the requirements of 

Albania and of her government in that period and only British officers could do it. “Hence I 

advise – wrote Chamberlain – not to obstruct Col. Stirling in the selection of his 9 officers. I 

fully realize the feeling this is going to cause in Italy however it remains an experiment that 

the Albanian government has decided to make by its own initiative.” 

Colonel Stirling, on his side, keeping in mind the special interests of Italy in Albania, had 

informed about the request of the Albanian government the British Ambassador in Rome R. 

Graham. The latter, afraid of Italy‟s reaction which was very sensible of the Albanian 

question, suggested the FO not to support the proposal without first consult with the Italian 

government. 

Graham‟s suggestion is considered just in the Foreign Office. While Col. Stirling is in 

London, Chamberlain asks Graham to inquire about the stance of the Italian government on 

this proposal of the Albanian Government. He is asked to find the possibility to explain to 

Mussolini, with whom Chamberlain wants to be frank, the position of the British government 

on the proposal. What Chamberlain proposes that Graham conveys to Mussolini is quite 

different from what was circulating at the FO rooms. The aim of Graham-Mussolini meeting 

was indeed to spot the reception of the Italian government and on its basis prepare a response 

for Col. Stirling. According to the version prepared for Rome, “….Col. Stirling - who had 

personally gone into service of the Albanian government unbeknown to HMG and out of 

keeping with its open policy of nom-interference in the Albanian domestic affairs – must be 

warned that if he felt bound to act under the orders of the Albanian government as one of its 

423 Ibidem 

160


officers, he should clearly realize that he is acting so under his own responsibility and the 

responsibility of the Albanian government, and that HMG is in no way mixed up with this 

issue”. 424 

The main concern of Chamberlain is to assure Mussolini that there is no any political project 

of any kind in his mind and that if the Albanian government and Col. Stirling go on with their 

plan, any British gendarmerie officer appointed to Albania are going to keep away from all 

kinds of activity not deriving from the duties in the police, and that in any case, HMG, on its 

side, is going to remain absolutely loyal to its policy of avoiding both political troubles and 

claims for a special position in Albania. “In the same way, HMG trusts on the Italian 

government and, if Albanian government manages to achieve its plans, it will not support any 

factionalist opposition to the benevolent activity of the gendarmerie only because it is trained 

by British officers”. 425 

In this period relations between HMG and Italian government had already become worse 

because of the oil concession issue. The Italians had strongly protested by the Albanian 

government against granting more concessions to British commercial subjects, and in 

particular to Anglo-Persian Oil. Chamberlain was deluded by such an attitude from Mussolini 

as he had shown to be open with him especially after their friendly meeting in Rome, the 7 th 

December 1924. 

Mussolini‟s reaction on the arrival in Albania of British officers came immediately on 11 

February. He considered this as interference in the Italian interest zone. The Italian 

government, involved also in the conflict on oil concessions, complained of being in the 

middle of a serious crisis because of Albania. It deemed opponents of the Italian 

government‟s policy had accused the Foreign Ministry for apathy and lack of interest as 

regards Albania, sacrificing Italian historical interests and claims and abandoning it to foreign 

influences. 426 But this was a mere demagogy if we keep in mind that in this period, after 

Matteoti‟s crisis, Mussolini‟s governance was entering the phase of totalitarianism and his 

opponents had no weight. 

424 

DBFP, First Series, Vol. XXVII, C1470/763/90, Chamberlain to Graham, 7 February 1925 

425 

Ibidem 

426 

DBFP, First Series, Vol. XXVII, C2069/11435/90, Graham to Chamberlain, 11 February 1925 

161

In the meeting with Graham, Benito Mussolini considered inappropriate the time to discuss 

about the Albanian gendarmerie. However, he appreciated Chamberlain‟s friendly action and 

agreed with the letter of reply prepared by Col. Stirling. But at the same time he strongly 

opposed the recruitment of any foreign officer for the Albanian gendarmerie for the time 

being as this would stir the Italian public opinion thus strengthening the impression that he 

was giving Albania up to the foreign influence. “We have to keep into mind that the new 

gendarmerie is going to take the place of the Albanian army and I never can explain how this 

can be trusted to foreign control. There will be an outburst of feelings and it will be even 

worse in Belgrade” – said Mussolini. He insisted not to support this scheme. 

Mussolini‟s position did not come unexpected to Chamberlain. He was aware of his 

standpoint. Thus he advised to inform Col. Stirling on this very serious situation and suggest 

him to talk again with the Albanian government before definitely commit him with the 

officers and ask them to re-examine their position towards Italy prior to making any final 

decision of which they had then to take full responsibility. At any case, Chamberlain would 

provide them with various facilities concerning the equipment through the British legation in 

Durrës. 427 

Chamberlain did not want to further deteriorate relations with Italy, but on the contrary he 

tried to soften and turn them in his favor. Hence he informed Mussolini on the great will of 

HMG to really gauge the import of the phenomenon and Mussolini‟s difficulties and thus 

consider the question of the Albanian gendarmerie as an internal affair of the Albanian 

government. 428 

The next day, on 13 February, Chamberlain met with Col. Stirling. This was not an ordinary 

event for a Foreign Minister. Stirling was very surprised of how a Crown Minister had 

stooped as to give explanations to the head of a state like Italy about the decision of a HM 

citizen. 429 Chamberlain tried to justify his motives and convince Stirling to give up going to 

Albania, but the latter showed very firm on his idea. “In Albania, – said Stirling – the 

establishment of a stable government and administration is a matter of life or death. This 

427 Ibid., C2063/763/90, 11 February 1925 

428 Ibid., C1570/763/90, Chamberlain to Graham, 13 February 1925 

429 Stirling W., Safety’s last….., pp. 132-133 

162


scheme is its last chance. If it fails, there will be no order, the government will lose its 

credibility, and the series of popular uprising will start again. Such a crisis would generate but 

the breakup of Albania, which would create much more serious problems to British 

diplomacy than this dispute with Italy over the gendarmerie”. 430 On persistence of the Foreign 

Minister, finally Col. Stirling accepted the suggestion of the Foreign to make another trip to 

Albania and re-discuss the entire situation at a tête-a-tête with the Albanian President before 

signing the contracts with the already selected officers. The main request should have been 

either not to apply this scheme as it was going to generate conflicts or postpone it for a better 

period. 431 

Though Col. Stirling was not a HMG employee, Chamberlain dictated the letter to be sent to 

the Albanian government to him. The Foreign Office decided that Eyres should also know 

about this message and instructed him to inform the Albanian government on the core of what 

had happened between Chamberlain and Mussolini regarding the gendarmerie scheme and 

explain to them the risk of the commitment of the British officers in Albania after the evident 

animosity by Mussolini. The issue had become complex because of oil and tobacco 

concessions, both disagreeable to Italians and both raised as sharply. These two issues – 

according to British experts – could reach to an agreeable solution, if treated out of the 

framework of the tensioned relations with Italy concerning gendarmerie. 432 Tolerance on the 

matter of gendarmerie was considered by the British as a good tactic to impose a good mutual 

will and establish a spirit of friendship with Mussolini as regard oil concessions which 

represented the direct British interests in Albania. 

In the meantime, the Foreign Office was articulating much clearly its position and decided not 

give to Col. Stirling any official assistance for the recruitment. Eyre Crowe, FO State 

Undersecretary, on 13 February 1925, in a letter addressed to Col. Stirling, among other 

wrote: “….HMG supports the establishment of an effective police force in 

Albania….However, you must be aware that HMG‟s policy is not to take special 

responsibilities regarding Albanian interior affairs. This is why it did not accept the request of 

the Albanian government for a financial advisor. Your nomination has been made without 

430 Ibidem 

431 FO 371/10656, C2117/76390, 13 February 1925 

432 DBFP, First Series, Vol. XVII, doc 43, no. 2, C2063/90, 13 February 1925 

163

informing HMG and on initiative solely of the Albanian government. HMG cannot offer 

British officers for the Albanian gendarmerie. The Albanian government must adopt other 

schemes. On the other hand, we are not able to stop the Albanian government from employing 

British subjects not in service of the British government. It is entirely up to you to undertake 

this action if considered right in your capacity as an agent of the Albanian government. 

However, if you decide to go on with your scheme, it must be clear that the responsibility is 

yours and of the Albanian government. If you and the British subjects that are going to be 

gendarmerie officers will encounter problems stemming from your situation in the Albanian 

government, do not ask for the help of HMG to get you out of this situation….” 433 This meant 

that FO would not obstacle the recruitment of former British officers not related to HMG. It 

was obvious that British diplomacy would not allow that Albania fell “entirely” into the hands 

of Mussolini. So, it was interested in the presence of the British subjects in Albania, but given 

the political opportunism in the relations with Italy it had to keep an official distance from this 

issue. 

As soon as he received the message of the Foreign State Secretary, Eyres asked for a meeting 

with Ahmet Zog to talk about the recruitment of former British officers in the Albanian 

gendarmerie. 434 Zog, on his side, said that the letter of Chamberlain to Col. Stirling had really 

disappointed him, but he was even more disappointed that Col. Stirling had come back to 

Albania without accomplishing his mission. Moreover, he told Eyres that he had been fully 

prepared on the obstacles put forward by Italy, whose policy aimed at impeding Albania‟s 

rehabilitation. But he hoped to have better things from HMG, from which he had not 

requested any support, but only good neutrality. He said he was himself convinced that there 

was no other rational alternative but his scheme on gendarmerie. Eyres appealed to him for a 

more moderate language and suggested that it would be better if the application of his plan 

was postponed at least for a short period of time. However, Zog seemed determined in his 

scheme even if HMG would not officially support him. 

Over ten days, Col. Stirling, in a totally independent manner, recruited nine former British 

officers, no longer in service, who had no more dealings with HMG and no responsibilities 

433 FO 421/308, C 2063/763/90, 13 February 1925 

434 17 February 1925 

164


towards it. They were mainly colonels, major and captains. 435 That is, the British military 

mission in Albania was not an official mission, since this idea was prevented by the strong 

reaction of Mussolini. 

British officials carried out their mission in Albania. Each of them had signed a two-year 

contract with the Chief of the Gendarmerie. Until autumn 1926, the gendarmerie was led by 

Col. Stirling and later by Major-General Jocelyn Percy, while Col. Stirling remained as 

adviser to the Ministry of Interior. These officers put the uniform of the Albanian state from 

which were also paid. They kept continuous contacts with the Albanian government. They 

travelled throughout Albania and collected an amazing amount of first-hand information on 

anything in the country. Each month, each of them sent to Ahmet Zog a full report on his 

district, which included not only the problems of the gendarmerie, but any movement and 

events of interest as well. Every week General Percy had a private meeting with Zog. All this 

served to control Italian ambitions in Albania. Accordingly throughout the duration of their 

stay, the Italians were putting pressure on the Albanian government to interrupt the activity of 

this mission in Albania and replace it with an Italian mission. Zog did not see the presence of 

British officers to head the Albanian gendarmerie only as a challenge to the Italian influence 

and a strong argument against the Yugoslav accusations for interference of Italy in this sector, 

but at the same time as very valuable to prevent the possible alliances of the gendarmerie with 

Belgrade in case of turmoil in the country against him. All times when their contract was to be 

renovated Italians would increase their pressure on Zog to interrupt them. Greater the political 

and economic dependence of Albania to Italy, as greater the pressure. In spite of Zog‟s 

efforts, in 1929, seven officers returned to England, while General Percy with the others who 

stayed, left Albania in 1938. 

435 Stirling, Safety’s last …, p. 133 

165

The First Tirana Pact 

As already seen, Yugoslavia, with the support offered to Zogu, tried to attract Albania in its 

orbit. With this action, Yugoslavia aimed to make Albania a vassal in order to counterbalance 

the Italian influence in the Adriatic and keep Serbia safe from the Bulgarian Irredentism in 

Macedonia. But this coup irritated Mussolini, who acted to bring Albania under Italian 

influence. Economic negotiations were initiated with Zogu, which brought to the March 1925 

agreement: it was founded then the National Bank of Albania with funds provided by the 

Italian Credit (Credito Italiano) under government‟s pressure, and the society for the 

economic development of Albania (SVEA - Società per lo Sviluppo Economico dell’Albania), 

which granted a loan of 50 million gold francs to the government of Tirana to fund public 

works and economic initiatives. 

The bank was founded in Rome on September 2, 1925 and its capital was fixed 12.5 million 

gold francs. By the distribution of shares and bylaws, Italy secured almost total control over 

the conduct of the institution. The initial plan forecasted that 49% of the capital was reserved 

for private Albanian citizens, 26% to the Italian group, and the remaining share to Swiss, 

Belgium and Yugoslav groups; while, in fact, this distribution was to change due to the 

Albanians who attributed to Italy their shares and, in some agreements between Alberti 436 and 

the Commercial Bank of Basel, Italian participation ended up to be around 80% of the 

capital. 437 

When Zog assumed the Presidency, all economic projects and infrastructure development 

depended on foreign funding. Mussolini seized this moment. In 1926, Italy collected a 

strangled Albania by an endemic deficiency, which it tried to uplift thanks to the SVEA loan 

and another loan in installments of 100 million gold francs, without interest and no repayment 

date. The Society for the Economic Development of Albania, which the issuing bank 

436 Mario Alberti (1884-1939) was one of the most eminent figures of Trieste irredentism and a most appreciated 

economist. Employeed during the Italian war by the Credito Italiano, he became general manager. He dealt with 

numerous international offices (delegate to the Versailles Peace Conference, expert conference of Genoa and 

Cannes, delegate in the mission to negotiate war debt with the United States in 1925) and was the first president 

of the National Bank of Albania. 

437 The documentation on the agreement and correspondence between Stringher, Alberti and Koechlin Hoffman 

is in the Archivio Storico Unicredito Italiano, file 2051 “National Bank of Albania”, edition I “Convention and 

Statute”. 

166


according to the conventions of 1925, agreed to establish, should have granted to the Albanian 

state a loan to cover the execution of public works to be guaranteed by the revenues from 

customs and monopolies of the country. 438 The loan, accredited in Rome at the headquarters 

of Bank of Albania, would be gradually paid in relation to the progressive development of 

public works provided. 

The operation, ordered personally by Mussolini 439 , was exquisitely political: well aware of 

Albania‟s lack of ability to pay, the Italian representatives sought to reclaim the loan 

guarantees to gain control first on the trade and then on the entire administration of the 

country. The possibility of the failure of Albania was not only held into consideration, but 

even considered from the outset of the negotiations a necessary precondition for the 

realization of benefits of public policy. The Italian government also released a subsidiary 

guarantee for the loan repayment in case of default by Albania. 

No doubt that the new orientation of Zogu‟s foreign policy caused a harsh reaction especially 

to Yugoslavia. It tried to stop Zogu in its path towards the “new friendship” with Rome and 

endeavoured to have as many favors according to the secret agreement of August 1924. The 

Yugoslav government used then all its lines of espionage in Albania, in the northern zones in 

particular, to encourage anti-government and separatist movements, in order to seed hatred 

and panic. 440 But the diversion of Belgrade had adverse effect. Pressures and intimidation 

from Yugoslavia and fear from Belgrade‟s revenge pushed Zog more and more on the knees 

of Italy 441 . 

The Yugoslav government had high hopes on Zog, but these hopes were extinguished with 

the passage of time. It was clear that Zog had already changed the course of his foreign 

438 Repayment of the loan was secured by the proceeds of the state monopoly on salt, paper, cigarettes and 

matches, for an annual sum provided for in 8.5 million francs (where the revenues had not reached that figure 

Albanian state undertook to finance the shortfall with proceeds from other taxes or business. (Article 25 of the 

Convention of 29.05.1925). In this regard Mario Alberti, the first president of the National Bank of Albania, 

stated that "the formula was drafted in extremely vague terms with the purpose to allow Italy full freedom of 

action in case of any lack. 

439 See IDD, 7 th series, 1922-1935, vol. IV, doc. 63, p. 48, The President of the Council and Foreign Minister 

Mussolini to the Minister Durazzo, in Durrës, Rome, 15 th July 1925 

440 Milo P., Albania and Yugoslavia...., p. 341; see also IDD, 7 th series, 1922-1935, vol. IV, doc. 109, p. 82, The 

Chargè d’Affaires in Durrës, Assereto, to the President of the Council and Foreign Minister Mussolini, Durrës, 

25 August 1925 

441 See IDD, 7 th series, 1922-1935, vol. IV, doc. 101, p. 77, The Albanian President of the Council of Ministers 

Ahmet Zogu to the President of the Council and Foreign Minister Mussolini, Durrës, 19 August 1925 

167

policy. Its direction was now Italy. Mussolini was trying to set up the Italo-Albanian relations 

according to the model of the British-Portuguese relations. He had chosen as his main and 

only interlocutor Ahmet Zog 442 with whom he was quite convinced to reach his goals. 

Negotiations with Zogu aimed at concluding a secret military treaty for which Albania was 

offering to Italy its territory in case of war with Yugoslavia, as well as economic concessions 

(oil, agriculture, establishment of the Issuing Bank of Albania with Italian capital). 443 In the 

heart of the pact, munch desired by Mussolini, was the so-called protection of Albania in the 

context of the bad relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, under Zog‟s regime. The treaty 

was signed in August 1925. It forecasted also to include all Albanian speaking territories, 

Yugoslav subjects as well. 444 Soon after, Mussolini, upon Zogu‟s request, would intervene 

with the Yugoslav and Greek governments to induce them to abandon support of partisan 

action of Albanian exiles as well as movements and tendencies directed against his 

government. 445 

It is true that Zog, complaining that was being threatened by his neighbours, undersigned the 

secret military pact, but in October of the same year he was obliged to refuse its content. This 

is not because he was against what had previously accepted, but because of the internal 

political crisis which forced him to change “the government charged for fraud and financial 

abuse” 446 . The discontent of the population and discredit by the press of his policy so far, had 

undermined his political position in Albania. 447 In the meantime, in Italy the success did not 

make possible overcome the uncertainties that still remained in the areas of Palazzo Chigi: 

fascist diplomacy appeared in fact still divided between the line of the Secretary General for 

Foreign Affairs, Salvatore Contarini, aimed at consolidating Italian influence in Albania 

442 th 

See IDD, 7 series, 1922-1935, vol. IV, doc. 63, p. 48, The President of the Council and Foreign Minister 

Mussolini to the Minister Durazzo, in Durrës, Rome, 15 th July 1925 

443 

On the negotiations for the conclusion of the secret treaty, conducted confidentially by the MP Alessandro 

Lessona, see Lessona A., Memorie; see also Borgogni M., “Tra continuitá e incertezza. Italia-Albania(1914- 

1939), pp. 90-91 

444 

For the military secret treaty see Jacomoni F., Il patto di Tirana 1926, “Rivista di Studi politici 

internazionali”, 1953, p. 235 

445 th 

IDD, 7 series, 1922-1935, vol. IV, doc. 109, p. 82, The Chargè d’Affaires in Durrës, Assereto, to the 

President of the Council and Foreign Minister Mussolini, Durrës, 25 August 1925; doc 113, p. 86, The President 

of the Council and Foreign Minister Mussolini to the Minister in Belgrade, Bodrero, and to the Regent of the 

Legation in Athens, De Facendis, Rome, 29 August 1925 

446 

See Cici A., Marredheniet italo-shqipatre..., p. 75 

447 Historia e Shqipërisë, vol. III, p. 324 

168


through economic penetration, and that part of diplomats already “fascist”, which strived to a 

complete and quick subjugation of the country. 448 

Having an unstable and uncertain political character, but strong political ambitions, however 

Zog tried not to lose the help of other states, and his old friends. He tried to step back after a 

very fast approach of the Italians with too many demands that would have granted them a 

privileged place in Albania. He found support not only on the Yugoslav representative, 

Lazzarovich, but also on the British, Eyres. 449 Yugoslavia, with the support of France, was 

trying to create the Balkan Locarno according to the Western Locarno principles, in order to 

ensure sustainable peace in the Balkans. 450 However, the powerful Italian operations, 

penetrating not only the Balkans but also beyond, made impossible such initiative. 451 Italy 

was the only country to economically invest in Albania and no doubt it would soon take 

measures to recover its capital. 

Meanwhile, Yugoslavia continued to hope that Italy could not take over political power in 

Albania and that Albania would remain independent. This was perhaps the reason why she 

refused a new plan for the partition of Albania, proposed by Italy in January 1926, according 

to which Yugoslavia would take that part of Albania until Shkumbin River, while Italy would 

take the other part. In March 1926, Nincić proposed to finalize a new treaty with Italy to 

resolve the Albanian question, so that Italy and Yugoslavia did not enter into conflict: a 

proposal rejected by Rome. Concerned about the position of Italy in Albania, Belgrade started 

trade negotiations with Albania, during which the Albanian representative declared that 

between Albania and Italy there were only trade relations. In this spirit, in June 1926, Zog, 

being faced with pressure from Mussolini to sign a political pact, concluded with Belgrade the 

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation as well as the Consular and Extradition Conventions, 

which were immediately ratified by the Albanian parliament. But events with Italy ran at an 

448 

Borgogni M., Tra continuità e incertezza. Italia e Albania 1914-1939, p. 90; for this see also Cici A. 

Marrëdhëniet italo-shqiptare …, p. 74 

449 th 

IDD, 7 series, 1922-1935, vol. IV, p. 148, doc. 198, The Chargè d’Affaires in Durrës, Assereto, to the 

President of the Council and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, Durrës, 14 December 1925 

450 

Ibid., p. 159, doc. 222, The Minister in Belgrade, Bodrero, to the Head of Government and Foreign Minister, 

Mussolini, Belgrade 10 January 1926; p. 160, doc. 223, The Minister in Belgrade, Bodrero, to the Head of 

Government and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, Belgrade, 15 January 1925 

451 

Mussolini judged premature the idea of a Balcan Locarno and was contrary to a combination including 

France. Ibid., doc. 237, p. 168, The Head of Government and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, to the Minister in 

Belgrade, Bodrero, Rome, 7 th February 1926 

169

unthinkable speed and Belgrade understood this much later when its reaction was already 

powerless. 

In the open rivalry between Italy and Yugoslavia on a complete domination in Albania in 

early 1925, among the Albanians was clear the concept of closer relations with Italy than with 

the other land neighbour. Zog had shown himself available to the efforts of Italian fascist 

leaders that sought to develop an active policy on the other side of the Straight of Otranto, in 

order to solve the node represented by military-strategic control of the Adriatic basin 452 . 

However the Albanian leader was in favour of a military assistance from Italy, he was aiming 

at forging an “equal” defensive agreement with Rome 453 . Thus negotiations between Rome 

and Tirana were longer and much more complex than expected, also because of Albanian 

president‟s negotiating skills and voices of contacts between him and Belgrade. 454 

Since February 1926, the new envoy of Palazzo Chigi in Tirana, Pompeo Aloisi, who 

resumed negotiations abandoned for some time by Mussolini, fully committed to achieving 

the “Danubian understanding” and after that waiting for detailed and exact information of 

1924 Zogu-Pašić agreement 455 , was faced with Zogu‟s requests for further financial support, 

arms and Italian military officials to be used in the organization and training of the Albanian 

armed forces 456 . The beginning of 1926 was very difficult for Albanian finances regardless of 

the aid received from Italy till then. 457 But what is more, Aloisi took note also of the rejection 

of Zog to recognize the declaration of the Conference of Ambassadors in 1921 that attributed 

452 See Borgogni M., Tra continuità e incertezza. Italia e Albania 1914-1939 

453 IDD, 7 th series, vol. IV, 1922-1935, doc. 101, p. 77, The Albanian President of the Council of Ministers, 

Ahmet Zogu, to the President of the Council and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, Durrës, 19 th August 1925, asking 

for a “a closer agrrement between the two States…. in anticipation of the many possible dangers for the 

independence and integrity of Albania…” 

454 Indeed, the rapprochement with Albania was framed in the broader attempt by the Italian government to 

establish a “Danubian understanding” intended to reimpose the eastern border, the system of guarantees 

approved in October 1925 by the Conference of Locarno, hoping that Italy might be the guarantor power. Op. 

cit. Borgogni M., Tra continuitá e incertezza..., pp. 91. 109; Biagini A., Storia dell’Albania Contemporanea, pp. 

118-119; Cici A., Marrëdhëniet shqiptaro-italiane…. For a more detailed explanation see: Pastorelli P., Italia e 

Albania…. , form p. 225; IDD, 7 th series, vol. IV, 1922-1935, doc. 336, pp. 243-244, Yugolsva apprehensions of 

possible events in Albania – The Minister in Belgrade, Bodrero, to the Head of Government and Foreign 

Minister Mussolini, Belgrade, 13 th June 1926 

455 ASCA, Fund 251, file 105, 1924, pp. 4-5; see also Pastorelli P., Italia e Albania…, pp. 221-222 

456 IDD, 7 th series, vol. IV, doc. 334, p. 243, Subordination of the acceptance of Ahmet Zogu‟s request for a new 

lown prior to the signing of the Italo-Albanian political agreement – The Head of Governemnt and Foreign 

Minister, Mussolini, to the Minister in Durrës, Aloisi, Rome, 13 th June 1926 

457 ASCA, Prime Minister‟s fund, file III/900, Letter of the Ministry of Finances to the Presidency of the Council 

of Ministers, no. 323/III, 22 nd January 1926. 

170


to Italy the role of Albania‟s independence guarantor 458 , which has been included in the draft- 

agreement proposed by the Italian party. Zogu was decided to sign a political agreement with 

Italy, from which was taking a considerable financial support, and he was convinced of the 

importance of this document to Albania 459 , but he was equally determined not to refer to the 

Paris Conference in it. He accepted neither version (A) which aimed at transforming Paris 

Declaration into a treaty of Italian protectorate over Albania nor version (B) which included a 

short preamble referring in general term to this declaration. 460 In order to save time, the 

Albanian President showed readiness to meet and talk personally with Mussolini, as soon as 

the interior situation in Albania could allow it, in all probability in September, with whom he 

could sign any kind of political agreement between the two governments, written by 

Mussolini himself, but not referring to the Paris Declaration. 461 

Such a rejection was not well-received by Mussolini who exploded in anger writing to Alosi 

that “Mr. Ahmet Zogu must be convinced that for Italy the Paris Declaration exists and will 

always exist, independently whether Albania likes it or not. 462 Rome‟s instructions for the 

Italian representative in Durrës were strict: “if the Albanian president would accept neither 

version (A) nor version (B), negotiations should be interrupted immediately” 463 . July marked 

the climax of the Italian pressure on Zogu, who received a telegram from Mussolini saying 

that “given constant prevarication of Mr. Ahmet Zogu, I consider now detrimental to the 

Italian dignity the combination of political negotiation wanted by me above all in the interest 

of Albania…. 464 ”. 

458 

Ibid., doc. 337, pp. 245-246, Italo-Albanian relations: wish of Ahmet Zog to meet with Mussolini prior to 

signing the Italo-Albanian agreements. His offer for an preliminary secret agreement including Albanian 

political military and financial action. Opportunity to adhere to these requests. The Minister in Durrës, Alosi, to 

the Head of Governemnt and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, Durrës, 18 th June 1926; Lessona A., p. 93; Jacomoni, 

pp. 235-236; History of Albania ... , vol. III, p. 262 

459 

Pastorelli P., Italy and Albania...., p. 307 

460 th 

Ibidem, pp. 309-310; IDD, 7 series, vol. IV, 1922-1935, doc. 337, p. 245, The Minister in Durrës, Aloisi, to 

the Head of Governemnt and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, Durrës, 18 June 1926 

461 

Ibidem 

462 th 

IDD, 7 series, vol. IV, 1922-1935, doc. 340, p. 247, The Head of Governemnt and Foreign Minister, 

Mussolini, to the Minister in Durrës, Alosi, Rome, 20 th June 1926 

463 

Ibid., doc. 345, p. 252, The Head of Governemnt and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, to the Minister in Durrës, 

Alosi, Rome, 24 th June 1926 

464 

Ibid., doc. 365, p. 270, The Head of Governemnt and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, to the Minister in Durrës, 

Alosi, Rome, 11 th July 1926 

171

Mussolini decided to solve the Albanian question without Ahmet Zog. He realized that 

negotiations with the Albanians on the political agreement referring to the Paris declaration 

would proceed but avoiding Zog. Faced with a situation of open intimidation and pressure, the 

Albanian president, to prevent any eventual and imminent risk to Albania, chose the path of 

information and awareness of international diplomacy. He informed the representatives of 

Great Britain, France and Yugoslavia 465 considering the Italian ultimatum and the requirement 

to sign an agreement according to Rome claims as a threat not only to Albania, but to all the 

Balkans. Another argument of Zog was that in any case in which Italy would have critical 

views towards Albania or wanted to take some steps against; it should first present its 

complaint to the League of Nations 466 without taking any other action in relation to the 

question. 

The reaction of France to Zogu‟s request was immediate. For the old rival of the Balkans, this 

was a new opportunity to challenge the Italian power in the eastern Adriatic. Yugoslavia as 

well acted through its representative in London warning HMG that Mussolini‟s behaviour and 

the signing of such an agreement would have had black consequences for the independence of 

Albania as Italy could at any time enter with an army and occupy it under any pretext without 

violating the content of the agreement. 467 

To the pressure of Mussolini Zogu reacted logically and directly ordering the suspension of 

the mission of the Italian officers called for the organization of the Albanian army. 

Correspondingly, he sensitized the national opinion causing the creation of an anti-Italian 

climate throughout the country and replacing it with sympathy for the British influence. In 

these circumstances, he allowed the British military ships to navigate freely in Albanian 

territorial waters of the Adriatic, and also make manoeuvres 468 . In reality, Great Britain 

supported Italian expansion tendencies not only in Albania but in all of the Balkans, but 

465 

Ibid., doc. 376, pp. 279-282, The Head of Government and Foreign Minister. Mussolini, to the Ambassador in 

London, Della Torretta, Rome 18 th July 1926 

466 

Ibid., doc. 381, pp. 288-289, The Head of Government and Foreign Minister. Mussolini, to the Ambassador in 

London, Della Torretta, Rome, 27 th July, 1926 

467 

See Cici A., Marrëdhëniet italo-shqiptare…, p. 100 

468 th 

IDD, 7 series, vol. IV, 1922-1935, doc. 381, pp. 288-289, The Head of Government and Foreign Minister. 

Mussolini, to the Ambassador in London, Della Torretta, Rome, 27 th July, 1926 

172


always in a peaceful manner and to the point where British hegemony in the region was not 

violated and the policy of its allies was not compromised 469 . 

The Albanian president, happy with his diplomatic results in the European arena, thought that 

that was the best moment to strengthen relations with Yugoslavia. After signing with it three 

important agreements: the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the Consular and the 

Extradition Conventions, he proposed to Yugoslavia that Albania became member of the 

Little Entente convinced that in this way its position would be better balanced, especially after 

concluding the agreement with Italy. As it was expected, Yugoslavia refused categorically 

and explicitly the proposal under the pretext that the end of the coalition was to protect the 

interests of Central European countries and no members outside of this geographic area could 

be accepted. Recognizing Zogu‟s character and personality, it neither gave any financial 

support to Albania. Financial crisis in the country was getting stronger. 

In this situation, at the end of August, Zogu called the Italian minister to talk about the 

political agreement between the two countries. Hence, the dialogue on this issue restarted and 

it would pass some time and through many secret bargains 470 and on November 27, 1926 on 

the eve of the Albanian national holiday, at 20 hrs, the pact of friendship and security between 

Italy and Albania was signed by Baron Aloisi and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hysen 

Vrioni. This was the First Tirana Pact. On December 9, the pact was ratified by the Albanian 

parliament. Members who were at hand in the compilation of the document took considerable 

bribes. For the government of Mussolini the First Tirana Pact was the first effect of 

strengthening the Italian presence in the Adriatic, on the other hand it contributed to a more 

solid political position of Zog at home. The wording of the pact was among other things so 

"generic and flexible" that would have allowed Zog to use it to bring up Italy to quell any 

uprisings against his rule and to obtain support for irredentist claims in Kosovo, now firmly in 

the hands of Yugoslavia. 

The deal consisted of 5 items but the most important were the article one and two, which 

469 Ibid., doc. 383, pp. 290-292, The Ambassador in London, Della Torretta, to the Head of Government and 

Foreign Minister. Mussolini, London, 2 August 1926; doc. 444, pp. 344, Talks between the Head of Government 

and Foreign Minister, Mussolini, and the British Foreign State Secretary, Chamberlain, Livorno, 31 st September 

1926 

470 For much more see Pastorelli P., Italia e Albania..., from p. 334 

173

state: "Any action to disturb the status quo in Albania was contrary to their mutual interest." 

In February 1927 the Pact of Tirana was first registered with the League of Nations. The pact 

of friendship between Italy and Albania, however, did not go unnoticed. If in London asked 

for an explanation, the reaction was quite different in Belgrade and Paris. 

174


EPILOGUE OF A REGIME 

November 22, 1927, Second Tirana Pact between Albania and Italy 

The continuing tension with France and Yugoslavia led Mussolini to strengthen the agreement 

with Albania. So, after several months of negotiations, was signed on the Second Pact of 

Tirana, on 22 November 1927, a real treaty of alliance, which put Zogu safe form new 

attempts by insurgent preparations in Yugoslavia. Just to offset the treaty of friendship, 

alliance and arbitration between France and Yugoslavia, on the 11 November 1922, Italian - 

Albanian negotiations came in fact to conclude the Second Tirana Pact. The opening of a 

crisis whose origins were Yugoslavia‟s sights on Albania, which eventually increased the 

Italo-French conflict in the Balkans, had the effect of pushing another step forward the 

collaborative relations between Rome and Tirana. 

September 1, 1928: Zog Proclaims himself King, with Italian support 

Ahmet Zogolli proclaims himself Zog I, King of the Albanians, creating an Albanian 

monarchy. Yugoslavia sees Zog‟s title as a claim on all areas populated by Albanians. 

April 6, 1939: British Prime Minister says UK has “no direct interests” in Albania 

Addressing the House of Commons, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain says that the UK 

has “no direct interests” in Albania” 471 . The next day, Italy will invade Albania. 

471 Kola P., The Myth of Greater Albania, p. 22 

175

April 7, 1939: Italy invades Albania 

Italy occupies Albania, with 50,000 soldiers, 173 ships, and 600 bombers, facing some 

Albanian civilian volunteers and regular soldiers. The ruling family escapes to Greece and 

then the UK, though King Zog I does not abdicate. 3,000 guerillas seek refugee in the 

mountains and political resistance begins. Under Italian control, the Constituent Assembly 

soon proclaims the union of Albania with Italy and invites Italian King Emmanuel III to rule 

Albania. 

176

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182

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