24.04.2013 Views

Why Saying “I'm Sorry” Isn't Good Enough: The Ethics of Corporate ...

Why Saying “I'm Sorry” Isn't Good Enough: The Ethics of Corporate ...

Why Saying “I'm Sorry” Isn't Good Enough: The Ethics of Corporate ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

<strong>Ethics</strong> <strong>Corporate</strong> Apologies<br />

by name some <strong>of</strong> the worrisome and suspect practices widely believed to be rampant in<br />

the mortgage industry as a whole. Or he could have admitted to some specific errors in<br />

business judgment on the part <strong>of</strong> Citigroup’s leadership. Courts generally do not hold<br />

executives and boards <strong>of</strong> directors legally responsible for business judgment mistakes.<br />

Instead, Prince regrets his failure to foresee that which was allegedly unprecedented and,<br />

therefore, likely unforeseeable. In other words, his apology is not an apology at all<br />

because no one needs to take responsibility for the failure to be omniscient.<br />

Prince clearly understands that his audience is expecting an apology. He argues, in effect,<br />

that neither he nor any other bank can legitimately be held accountable by the audience<br />

because everyone held the same false belief that mortgage-backed securities were safe:<br />

“Everyone, including our risk managers, other banks, and CDO structurers, all believed<br />

that these …securities held virtually no risk. It is hard for me to fault the traders who<br />

made the decisions to retain these positions on Citi’s books” (quoted in Dash, 2010, 1).<br />

Former Citigroup board member Robert Rubin provided an analogous minimization. As<br />

the Times put it, Citigroup board member Rubin “also showed some contrition but<br />

stopped short <strong>of</strong> accepting responsibility for the banks’ woes [by citing] at least nine<br />

different causes for the financial crisis, which formed a toxic cocktail that, he claims,<br />

‘almost all <strong>of</strong> us’ missed” (quoted in Dash et al, 2010, 1). Like his fellow bankers, Rubin<br />

was conspicuously vague when it came to admitting what he and the banks did (or failed<br />

to do) to contribute to the crisis. vii <strong>The</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> any detailed discussion as to what these<br />

financial firms did wrong and why these actions were problematic makes it difficult for<br />

the audience to believe that these executives grasped the magnitude <strong>of</strong> their firms’<br />

wrongdoing. Such perceived cluelessness – or dishonesty – can lead audience members<br />

18

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!