Islamic Republic of Iran: Computer Crimes Law

Myroslava Gongadze (widow of Georgiy Gongadze) 14
autonomy to determine which ideas they
share, when they share them and with
whom they share them. This sense of
security is fundamental to the functioning
of developing and established democracies.
The HR Committee has held that
interceptions of private communications
by Governments must be provided for by
law, be in accordance with the provisions,
aims and objectives of the Covenant and be
reasonable in the particular circumstances
of the case. 46 It would therefore be unlawful
to employ surveillance and interception
techniques to infringe on individual’s
freedom of expression rights as guaranteed
by Article 19 of the ICCPR.
This concern is even more acute as ARTICLE
19 is aware that the Iranian Government
systematically monitors and intercepts
the communications of people within its
jurisdiction, in violation of Article 17 of
the ICCPR and Article 19 of the ICCPR.
For Iran this is necessary to enforce broad
content-based restrictions on expression
(see Chapters 4 and 5). To fully comply
with its obligations under the ICCPR, Iran
must clarify the particulars of Article 2 and
specify the limited circumstances in which
public authorities can lawfully intercept
communications with safeguards to prevent
abuse.
Article 2 provides for minimum custodial
sentences and fines. Minimum sentences
do not provide the sentencing judge
with the discretion to modify sentences
to proportionately reflect the nature of
the offense, the harms caused and any
mitigating factors.
Article 3 of the Cyber Crime Law, under the
heading of “Computer Espionage”, broadly
criminalises access to and the sharing of
“confidential” governmental information.
Three degrees of the offense share the
common principal act of “illegal access to
confidential data, transmitted or saved, on
computer and telecommunication systems.”
Subparagraphs (a) provides principal
liability for anyone who accesses or obtains
confidential data, or spying on confidential
content being transmitted. Subparagraphs
(b) and (c) provide liability for individuals
who make confidential data available
to unauthorised individuals or foreign
governments, organisations, companies or
groups.
Like previous articles, Article 3 of the Cyber
Crime Law does not possess the qualities of
accessibility or certainty to be considered
“prescribed by law” under Article 19(3)
of the ICCPR. It again fails to define
what the Computer Crimes Law means by
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