Islamic Republic of Iran: Computer Crimes Law

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“illegal access.” The definition provided
for “confidential data” is particularly
problematic. Note 1 makes a provisional
suggestion that it is information that when
disclosed damages the security or interests
of the country. Note 2 acknowledges that
this definition is insufficient and confers on
the Ministry of Intelligence, in collaboration
with other ministries and the military,
the power to define, identify, classify and
protect “confidential data.” ARTICLE 19
has not been able to gain access to this
guidance. This delegation of legislative
authority to the executive concentrates
power in that arm of government and
allows it to penalise conduct based on its
own prerogatives. We note that the HR
Committee’s General Comment No.34
explicitly provides that a law must not
confer unfettered discretion for limiting
freedom of expression on those charged with
executing the law. 47 Significant clarification
of this provision is required before it can
be considered “prescribed by law” under
Article 19(3) ICCPR.
A restriction on free expression must pursue
a protective aim as contained in Article
19(3) of the ICCPR. Article 19(3)(b) permits
restrictions on freedom of expression
that safeguard national security or public
order. Article 3 is illegitimate as it claims
to protect two values that are much more
generic: “security” and “interests of the
country.” Even national security interests
may only justify restrictions on expression in
certain narrow circumstances. Johannesburg
Principle 2 states that restrictions
sought to be justified on this basis are
illegitimate unless their genuine purpose
and demonstrable effect is to protect the
country’s existence or its territorial integrity
against the use or threat of force, or its
capacity to respond to the use or threat of
force. Article 3’s reliance on the broader
“security” or “interests of the country”
indicates that the provision may be targeted
to insulate the government from criticism.
Such a pre-textual reliance on “national
security” interests to suppress legitimate
speech would directly contravene Article 19
of the ICCPR.
Further, restrictions under Article 19 of the
ICCPR must be necessary and proportionate.
However, Article 3 of the Cyber Crime Law
does not provide the least restrictive means
available to safeguard national security.
The provision fails to demonstrate a direct
and immediate connection between the
expression and the harm sought to be
prevented. Johannesburg Principle 15(1)
states that individuals must not be punished
for conduct unless actual or likely harm to