Beneficiaries are actors too.pdf - Southern Institute of Peace ...

Sustainable peace and
development at community
level: Beneficiaries are
actors too
A selection of papers presented at the International
Symposium on Community-driven Peace-building and
Development, Harare Zimbabwe, 20-21 October 2011.
Edited by
Samuel Maruta
sipd

Sustainable peace and development at
community level: Beneficiaries are actors too
A selection of papers presented at the International
Symposium on Community-driven Peace-building and
Development, Harare Zimbabwe, 20-21 October 2011.
Edited by
Samuel Maruta
sipd
January, 2012

Sustainable peace and development at community
level: Beneficiaries are actors too.
Editor
Samuel Maruta
Material in this book can be freely copied or downloaded for practical
field, educational, academic, research or policy work without the prior
written permission of the publisher (except for commercial purposes)
as long as due credits are given.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this book are not necessarily
those of the Southern Institute of Peace-building and Development, its
management, staff, editorial advisors and board, but those of the
authors who are also primarily responsible for the accuracy of the
material presented.
While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the
material presented, the book is distributed without warranty, either
express or implied. Neither the editor nor the publisher will be held
liable for any damages caused or alleged to be caused directly or
indirectly by this book.
Published by
Southern Institute of Peace-building and Development
Harare, Zimbabwe
E-mail: sipd@sipd-zw.org
Website: www.sipd-zw.org
Copyright
© 2012 Southern Institute of Peace-building and Development
ISBN 978-0-7974-4932-9

About the publisher
The Southern Institute of Peace-building and Development (SIPD)
is a research and capacity building organisation in the area of
peace-building for grassroots, post-conflict and displaced
communities. The organisation has a vision of a society where
justice, peace and security prevail for everyone everywhere
regardless of any form of classification. Taking a strength-based
and development approach to peace-building, its mission is to
enhance the capacity for peace, healing and reconciliation in
grassroots, post-conflict and displaced communities in
Zimbabwe and southern Africa through education, training,
advocacy and economic empowerment. Its current work includes
carrying out conflict resolution, healing and reconciliation work
in grassroots, post-conflict and displaced communities in
Zimbabwe; organising and hosting the International Symposium
on Community-driven Peace-building and Development once
every year; and publishing the Southern Peace Review journal
twice a year and Occasional papers as and when suitable
manuscripts are received. The organisation is based in Harare,
Zimbabwe.
Editorial Advisors
Mediel Hove, University of Zimbabwe, Harare Zimbabwe
Belingtone Mariki, Institute of Adult Education, Dar es Salaam
Tanzania
Professor Ntombizakhe Mpofu, Inkanyezi Development Trust,
Bulawayo Zimbabwe
Layout & design
Pro-Lingua Communications
Cover photograph
George Dzambwa

Contents
Introduction: The primacy of community in development and
peace by Samuel Maruta, Southern Institute of Peacebuilding
and Development, Zimbabwe
1. Women's access to microfinance and poverty
alleviation in Zimbabwe: Case study of Chinhoyi town by
Syden Mishi and Forget Kapingura, University of Fort
Hare, South Africa
2. Natural resources management: Whose burden and
whose benefits? A case study of Maitengwe hunting
concession in Bulilima District of Matabeleland South
Province by Mhlupheki Dube, Tjinyunyi Babili Trust,
Zimbabwe
3. The Zimbabwean traditional chieftaincy and its role in
conflict transformation at micro level by Monica
Matavire, Bindura University of Science Education,
Zimbabwe
4. The Role of Indigenous Knowledge in sustainable
development: The potential benefits and challenges by
Kudakwashe D. K. Tapfumaneyi and Gift Rupande,
Zimbabwe Open University, Zimbabwe
5. Science education for sustainable livelihoods:
Community development through society-responsive
science curriculum reforms by Crispen Bhukuvhani,
Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe; Enna
Gudhlanga and Chipo Chirimuuta, Zimbabwe Open
University, Zimbabwe
6. Re-examining the role of NGOs in conflict resolution:
Friends or foes by Kudakwashe D. K. Tapfumaneyi and Gift
Rupande, Zimbabwe Open University, Zimbabwe
7. Zimbabwe's economic empowerment initiatives: A
critical review by Ronald Chipaike, Bindura University of
Science Education, Zimbabwe
8. Community-driven conflict resolution: The abunzi
mediators in Rwanda by Martha Mutisi, African Centre for
the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), South
Africa
Conclusion
1
6
27
43
60
81
98
117
138
160

Introduction:
The primacy of community in
development and peace
Samuel Maruta, Southern Institute of peace-building and
Development, Zimbabwe
Community is ubiquitous. Human beings organize themselves
and thrive in communities, from the family unit through the
neighbourhood and village or suburb to the global community of
peoples and nations. Animals live and operate in communities
too; so do plants and other species, be it under water,
underground, on it or in the air. It is only in and through
community that living organisms are able to preserve and
perpetuate their kind; that individual members of those groups of
organisms are able to be, to survive, to live and to express
themselves. Community is vital for the preservation and
perpetuation of life on earth as we know it today.
Writing about the importance of community for human beings,
psychiatrist M. Scott Peck says 'There can be no vulnerability
without risk; there can be no community without vulnerability;
there can be no peace, and ultimately no life, without community'
(Wikipedia). It is through community that an individual finds and
fulfils him/herself, yet there are risks to take and a price to pay to
achieve those goals. Thus through these few words, Peck points
to the paradox of the role and place of community to human
existence; the genetic configuration of community is such that it
is at once the cocoon that houses and nourishes life, development
and peace on the one hand and the potential for conflict with its
attendant violence and destruction on the other. Because it is
both incubator and nurturer of life for all people regardless of any
form of classification and the storehouse of conflict flashpoints, it
is to the Southern Institute of Peace-building and Development
(SIPD) the ideal primary target or subject of study and a
fascinating place of work in conflict, peace and development. For
this reason, among others, SIPD made a deliberate choice to focus
1

its work on community, with special emphasis on grassroots,
post-conflict and displaced communities.
But what is community? In Wikipedia, community is broadly
defined as 'organisms inhabiting a common environment and
interacting with one another'. The concept is further subdivided
into at least two distinct types of community: community of place
and community of interest or identity. 'A community of place or
place-based community is a community of people who are bound
together because of where they reside, work, visit or otherwise
spend a continuous portion of their time. Such a community can
be a neighbourhood, town, coffeehouse, workplace, gathering
place, public space or any other geographically specific place that
a number of people share, have in common or visit frequently'
(Wikipedia). On the other hand, 'a community of interest is a
gathering of people assembled around a topic of common interest.
Its members take part in the community to exchange information,
to obtain answers to personal questions or problems, to improve
their understanding of a subject, to share common passions or to
play. In contrast to a spatial community, a community of interest
is defined not by space, but by some common bond (e.g. feeling of
attachment) or entity (e.g. farming, church group) (Wikipedia).
SIPD incorporates both types of community into its work because
both are critical factors in issues of conflict, peace and
development. In both cases members are influenced by and
influence the dynamics of conflict, peace and development for
themselves, their fellow members, their community and its
environment.
It is in the context of the foregoing that the International
Symposium of Community-driven Peace-building and
Development as a project of the SIPD was designed and that the
event of October 2011 was held. The Symposium project was
designed as a forum for all people with interest in peace and
development at the community level, people with interest in
promoting the vibrancy of community as incubator of a quality of
life of its people and the interface of its people with the national
and international levels. These people include practitioners,
researchers, academics, policy makers, community leaders and
2

community activists. Its vision is to be a preferred marketplace of
ideas on these issues for these categories of people in Zimbabwe,
the sub-region and the global south. Held under the theme
“Sustainable peace and development at the community level –
Beneficiaries are actors too” the 2011 event was a major step in
this direction. This book is a compilation of some of the papers
presented at that event. A brief overview of the papers follows.
In Women's access to microfinance and poverty alleviation in
Zimbabwe – Case study of Chinhoyi town, Mishi and Kapingura
assess the impact of women's access to finance for poverty
alleviation in Chinhoyi, the capital city of Mashonaland West
Province of Zimbabwe. The study finds out that a number of
women are benefiting from their small businesses; however they
lack finance to fund these businesses due to lack of collateral
security. As a result they are having to make-do with alternative
coping strategies. In the paper Natural resources management:
Whose burden and whose benefits, Dube sought to examine some
of the natural resource utilisation models that have been tried in
Zimbabwe, interrogating reasons for their limited success and
proffering possible solutions. The study found out that because
protected areas and conservancies did not involve host
communities in environmental management and natural
resources utilisation, the latter turned to poaching both
terrestrial and aquatic animals and vandalising infrastructure
with impunity.
In The Zimbabwean traditional chieftaincy and its role in conflict
transformation at the micro level, Matavire sought to investigate
the kinds of cultural conflicts that chiefs are frequently called
upon to help resolve and the methods which these chiefs use to
reach their verdicts. The study found out that some people do not
respect decisions made by chiefs for they think the institution is
archaic and out of touch; and that sentences are often influenced
by such extraneous factors as the chief's personality or the
political affiliation of the offender. In The Role of Indigenous
knowledge in Sustainable Development – Practices and
Challenges, Tapfumaneyi & Rupande explore the potential role of
indigenous knowledge (IK) in enhancing sustainable development
3

in Africa. The paper highlights the importance of IK as the engine
of sustainable development, arguing that its exclusion from the
development agenda has led to the slow pace of development in
Africa.
In Science Education for Sustainable Livelihoods – Community
Development through Society-Responsive Science Curriculum
Reforms, Bhukuvhani et al explore and ask questions on societyresponsiveness
of science education curricular for community
development and sustainable livelihoods of citizens with a view to
stimulating debate on the subject. In Re-examining the Role of
NGOs in Conflict Resolution: Friends or Foes, Tapfumaneyi and
Rupande explore the nature and functions of NGOs in conflict
resolution, arguing that certain activities of NGOs have
perpetuated conflict in some instances, especially as the NGOs
are sometimes viewed as impartial due to their links with western
nations through funding.
In Zimbabwe's economic empowerment initiatives – A critical
review, Chipaike argues that Zimbabwe's empowerment
initiatives to date create wealth for a few and leave out the most
deserving people which creates conditions for future economic
and political instability. Rather, these initiatives should channel
funds to the informal sector where most of the economically
vulnerable groups have found economic refuge. And in
Community-Driven Conflict Resolution – The Abunzi Mediators
In Rwanda, Mutisi examines a Rwandan traditional dispute
resolution and justice system known as abunzi, showing how it
empowers local communities with the capacity to resolve their
disputes without going through the intricacies of the modern
justice system. The paper also advocates for diminished state
interference in the affairs and processes of the abunzi for genuine
empowerment of the local communities.
While genuine attempts were made to group and sequence the
papers in a logical and coherent manner, claims cannot be made
to complete success given the diversity of the subjects discussed
by the different authors. At the same time the reader is not
expected to read the book sequentially from beginning to end but
4

pick and choose as fits their situation. Therefore whichever
approach the reader uses, it is hoped that she/he will find the
organisation and flow of the book useful enough for her/his
purpose.
References
Wikipedia. Community.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community (accessed January
2012)
Wikipedia. Community of interest.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_of_interest (accessed
January 2012)
Wikipedia. Community of place.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_of_place (accessed
January 2012)
5

1
Women's access to microfinance and
poverty alleviation in Zimbabwe: Case
study of Chinhoyi town
Syden Mishi, University of Fort Hare, South Africa
Forget Kapingura, University of Fort Hare, South Africa
Abstract
The study assesses the impact of women's access to finance for
poverty alleviation in Chinhoyi, the capital city of Mashonaland
West Province of Zimbabwe under an impact assessment model
categorised in three broad parameters. The paper first documents
the current liquidity crisis within the Zimbabwean economy due
to the multiple-currency regime in place and the extent to which
microfinance institutions can provide relief to women engaged in
small and medium scale enterprises. Microfinance becomes so
crucial in funding social entrepreneurship initiatives in the face of
dwindling social value addition by government and the private
sector. The study recognises that a number of women are
benefiting from their small businesses; however they are
struggling with finance to fund their businesses due to lack of
collateral security and other unofficial screening criteria.
Microfinance institutions are one of the sources which can be of
help. However, the paper noted that the available microfinance
institutions are lending for consumption purposes and charge
exorbitant interest rates which make it difficult for the women in
business to borrow. We recommended that: (i) NGO or
government backed microfinance institutions can provide better
services at reasonable rates than the current institutions in place;
(ii) close monitoring is needed on the funding practices by MFIs to
avoid bias towards consumption funding.
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the support from The Department of Economics and
School of Business and Enterprise at University of Fort Hare. We wish to
acknowledge the support of the following: Mrs. P. Makhetha-Kosi (Acting HOD),
Prof. R.D Thakhathi (Dean of Faculty), and Mr. P Smit (Acting Director of the
School). The usual disclaimer applies.
6

Introduction
Women have a central role in family upbringing and upkeep in our
African community setups. In the African perspective, Xhosas say
“wathint'abafazi wathint'imbogodo...” literary translating to
“mistreat women, and you will have no food in the house”. This
shows how, in African culture, women are regarded as pivotal in
sustaining family livelihood. In the same context, supporting
women in business will mean giving a livelihood to the families;
but women have been disadvantaged (mistreated) in terms of
access to credit and other financial services.
Commercial banks and other formalised forms of finance require
documentation which most of the times excludes women.
Ironically, established companies are even struggling to borrow
from banks given the current illiquidity within the Zimbabwean
financial system. The lacklustre economic conditions has seen
private sector funding of community projects dwindling (as they
focus on their survival) and the government and Non
Governmental Organisations' (NGOs) support narrowed as their
budgets became skimpy. The real value creation in such instance
is in jeopardy. The situation calls for social entrepreneurs who, it
can be argued, address social needs economically. The challenge
is that the social enterprises more often lack adequate capital,
have limited access to conventional funding schemes and lack
collateral security among many other woes. Micro financing
institutions can draw funding from government, private sector,
and/or their members and channel these to low income
borrowers (mostly women) who often do not qualify for
conventional funding. Women are actively involved in the
formation of social enterprises with their only hope of source of
finance for business being microfinance.
It can be argued that microfinance helps empower women from
poor households to make a significant contribution towards their
households and economy at large. Microfinance services are
considered a key development tool, particularly for women who
are the target of most microfinance programs (Guérin, 2006). Of
interest, Pitt and Khandker (1998) noted that the return on
investment from finance awarded to women seems to better reach
7

all household members, especially improving children's health
and schooling. On another note, International Labour
Organisation (ILO, 2007) showed that positive environmental
impact is also achievable as microfinance programmes support
green jobs and renewable energy systems. This indicates that
microfinance credit has a potential to help in the sustainable
development of the Zimbabwean economy.
However, microfinance is not easily accessed by women (social)
entrepreneurs. This negatively impacts their output and thus
reduces their contribution to economic growth, further derailing
economic emancipation, regardless of their unwavering efforts to
obtain funding. According to Nicholls (2006), social
entrepreneurship is any venture that creates social value as its
prime strategic objective and which addresses this mission in a
creative and innovative fashion. There is great reason to
hypothesise economic contribution of such activities and
therefore their role in poverty alleviation, fostering sustainable
livelihoods and ensuring economic empowerment, especially in
Zimbabwe. There is a need to closely analyse the impact of limited
access to microfinance by women on their entrepreneurial
activities. This translates to also assessing the impact micro
financing structures have in addressing the gap left out by
conventional financing institutions.
The primary purpose of this study is to determine how
challenging women entrepreneurs' access to microcredit is, so
that viable programming to enhance or encourage women access
to finance can be best constructed. The study sought to carry out
a desk review of literature and a field research (in Chinhoyi town)
on both the supply and demand for microfinance by women,
factors inhibiting access to finance by women, and strategies
implemented by women to circumvent the limited access to
finance. Based on the findings, the paper provides
recommendations regarding future support to microfinance
institutions/structures reaching this group, which can result in
significant and sustainable women access to financial services,
thereby leading to poverty alleviation, fostering sustainable
livelihoods and ensuring economic empowerment.
8

The paper is organised as follows: Section I is the Introduction;
Section II looks at the overview of microfinance activities in
Zimbabwe and review of relevant literature; Section III looks at the
theoretical framework and Methodology; Section IV focuses on
Research findings and Section V conclusions and
recommendations.
Overview of microfinance activities in Zimbabwe and review of
relevant literature
There are a number of studies which have been carried out to
establish the extent to which access to microfinance by women
can help in poverty alleviation, women's empowerment and
sustainable development of the society and the country's
economy at large. Amongst the available studies are Ebdon
(1995), Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996), Rogaly (1996), Buckley
(1996), DFID (1998), Rosenberg (1998) , Rahman (1999) and
Mayoux (1999), (2000), to just name a few.
Leach and Sitaram (2002) suggested points supporting why
women should be provided with loans to fund their businesses.
Among others, firstly, it is argued that women are
disproportionately represented amongst the poorest in society
and are in need of help as compared to men. Secondly, women are
discriminated against in the formal labour market so end up
looking for other sources of income within the informal sector.
However, with the move towards gender equality the world over,
this seems not to be a serious issue. Thirdly, it is also argued that
women-headed households are on the increase as a result of
economic recession, changing labour needs, increasing
urbanisation, and the break-up of extended family structures.
Women have therefore become the breadwinners in some
families.
Women-headed households being more vulnerable than male
headed ones is advanced as the fourth reason. It is argued that
such households are more vulnerable in times of crisis as they
have fewer resources to draw from. Lastly, Mayoux (1999)
suggests that repayment rates on loans and contributions to
9

family well-being are often higher among women than among
men. Thus, implying there would be no basis to screen women
borrowers along the lines of risk of repayment. A study by Mayoux
(2001) indicates some basic views on the link between
microfinance and women's empowerment. The view that stresses
the positive relationship between microfinance credit and
women's empowerment is central to this study due to the vast
empirical evidence available, thus the ensuing discussion shall
concentrate more on this. Advocates of the positive link between
microfinance credit and women's empowerment suggest that
there are three paradigms underlying this view. These include the
financial self-sustainability paradigm, the poverty alleviation
paradigm and the feminist empowerment paradigm.
Under the financial self-sustainability paradigm, dominant with
most donor agencies and models of micro-finance promoted in
publications by USAID, World Bank, UNDP, CGAP and the Microcredit
Summit Campaign, the programme design focuses on the
provision of financially self-sustainable services to large numbers
of poor people and small entrepreneurs. The concept also focuses
on setting the right interest rate to cover costs, separating
microfinance programmes from other interventions to enable
separate accounting and expanding the programme so as to
capture economies of scale. In short this paradigm asserts that
increasing women's access to microfinance services will empower
individuals as well as improve their well-being through social and
political empowerment.
The poverty alleviation paradigm aims at poverty alleviation
amongst the poorest, increasing well-being and community
development. Under this notion, poverty alleviation and women's
empowerment are seen as synonymous. It is argued that
increasing women's access to micro-finance will advance women
in addressing gender inequalities. The feminist empowerment
programme paradigm is believed to underlie most gender policies
of many NGOs as well as many consultative programmes
(Johnson, 1997). The principle underlying this paradigm is
gender equality and women's human rights. It is argued that
micro-finance is promoted as an entry point in the context of a
10

wider strategy for women's economic and socio-political
empowerment.
Lewis (2004) presented an account of the impact of microcredit on
poverty and empowerment, asserting that businesswomen
borrowers are using income from their businesses to improve
their own living conditions and those of their families. Profits are
spent on food and clothes, housing, or school fees for children.
For women, the impact of being able to support their families and
to contribute to the economic development of the community is
often particularly powerful in terms of increased respect and
status. In that study, women borrowers were quoted saying, “'For
the first time, I am able to buy my daughter whatever she needs';
'you see, before I took the [loan] I stayed on the road begging. But
now I am independent and I'm running my own life'; 'I used to be
nobody, but now, when a decision is being made in the family,
they say, "Go call Mary! We can't decide without her!" Now they
respect me'. …” These are testimonies on the positive effect on
women that empowerment microfinance can present.
In Zimbabwe it is argued that microfinance has the noble
objectives of financial and social inclusion of the disadvantaged
segments of our society and attendant poverty alleviation (RBZ,
July 2011). However, regarding the microfinance sector, the
Zimbabwe monetary authorities note with concern continued
reports of ruthless lending activities and abusive collection
practices by some microfinance providers. These practices
further exclude the “poor”, albeit supposedly their target group.
According to The Southern Africa Microfinance & Enterprise
Capacity Enhancement Facility (SAMCAF, 2011), microfinance
has emerged as a response to the failure of the formal sector to
meet the needs of the SMEs and the 'informal' sector.
Unfortunately, until very recently, the support to the
microfinance sector has been minimal and this has therefore
compounded the problem of lack of access to credit and other
financial services. It is imperative to note at this point that the
Zimbabwe National Microfinance Policy stipulates (among other
roles of microfinance) that:
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“[b]y plugging the gap left by the mainstream financial
institutions, microfinance providers improve[s] the
standards of living of the poor but economically active as
well as strengthen their social and human capital.”
Considering that about seventy percent of the world's poor are
women, access to microfinance by women becomes vital. There is
need to highlight the dynamics within the sector in order to
understand how and why women borrowers are excluded, and
ultimately in sections that follow how they can be included.
Liquidity in the Zimbabwe financial sector
Access to finance is undoubtedly a nightmare in an illiquid
financial environment. Zimbabwe banking sector liquidity
remains a challenge due to the short-term nature of deposits, the
absence of an active inter-bank market and lender of last resort
facility at the Reserve Bank (RBZ, July 2011). This results in
exclusion of the poor individuals and entrepreneurs as limited
financial resources will be channelled optimistically to “low risk”
borrowers, like established businesses. There is no doubt women
will be excluded, together with their small enterprises.
Microfinance can help in the inclusion of such class of borrowers
and bring their activities to the core of economic development.
Microfinance tends to thrive in developing countries where there
is an increase in poverty and a widening gap between the affluent
and the poor (Klinkhamer, 2009). , Accordingly, in Zimbabwe
microfinance initially increased as a reaction to a steady decline
in the economic fortunes since 1997, as the RBZ (2009)
recognised the usually unfortunate exclusion of vulnerable
members of the community during economic tides. In order to
ensure they are able to sustain themselves in the multicurrency
environment, the Reserve Bank reported that it had deepened its
Rural Banking initiative. This was complemented through an
integrated Micro Finance Development framework under which
SMEs and other self-help groups will be able to access foreign
exchange loans. The question still arises: did the efforts result in
intended outcomes? This is however, a focus of future studies.
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Micro financing market microstructure
The market structure in microfinance varies significantly across
countries, depending on their stage of financial development,
level of economic development, policy environment, and other
factors (ADB, 2000). According to the RBZ, microfinance
institutions (money lenders) form part of the financial market as
non-bank financial institutions along with asset management
companies, insurance companies, pension funds, provident
funds, corporate bodies, the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE)
and the general public. It is also stated that some microfinance
institutions and money lenders among many others which were
operating under the Collective Investments Scheme Act are now
registered (annually) and supervised by the Central Bank. Thus
the RBZ is responsible for the supervision of microfinance and
money lending institutions, acknowledging the relevance of these
and recognizing the need for sanity in this sector. Table II.1 lists
the types and number of financial intermediaries in the financial
sector of Zimbabwe.
Table II.1: Type of financial intermediaries operating in Zimbabwean
financial markets
Category Number
(2006) 30 July
2011
Central Bank 1 1
Discount houses 6 0
Commercial banks 12* 17**
Merchant banks 5 4
Finance houses 3 0
Building societies 4 4
Post Office Savings Bank 1 1
Asset Management Companies 17 16
TOTALS 213 132
Notes:
* This excludes 5 other banks under curatorship.
* *Excludes Barbican Bank which was re-licensed but is not yet operational
and includes Interfin Bank Limited formerly a merchant bank.
Source: SARB Monetary policy statements (various issues)
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As at 30 July 2011 the country's banking sector remained
diversified, albeit with a sharp swinging in the number of Microfinance
institutions & Moneylenders. This may have been
necessitated by growing illiquidity and dreary economic
environment in the past years due to a number of factors. The
financial sector has suffered in recent years from the shortage of
foreign currency and the lack of viability for loans and advances in
a hyperinflationary environment. These challenges culminated in
change of operational design and approach by most MFIs.
Ghalib (2007) argued that regardless of their scale, outreach,
location and the type of clients, all Microfinance program
interventions target one thing in common: human development
that is geared towards both the economic and social upliftment of
the people that they cater for. However on their part, most
microfinance providers in Zimbabwe design their loan products in
a way that excludes the poor and those who might otherwise
require microloans for entrepreneurial purposes. This explains
why most of these institutions are targeting salaried individuals,
mainly civil servants; that is, consumption credit is preferred.
Microcredit schemes, registered and unregistered, are cashing in
on people's need, especially on civil servants, at interest rates that
can only create an unending vicious debt cycle (Banda, 2011). The
design of higher interest rate with a lock-in effect and
consumption credit bias further weaken the chances of women in
small enterprises to access microcredit.
In Zimbabwe, Zambuko is one of the long existing MFI. According
to the UNDP assessment report, the areas that were not well
serviced lie in Mashonaland West and Matebeleland North
provinces which encompass Karoi, Chinhoyi (our area of study),
Nkayi, and Binga respectively. UNDP (1997) reported that
Zambuko Trust was leading and coordinating the formation,
meetings and drafting of a constitution and legal structure for the
Zimbabwe Association of Micro Financing Institutions (ZAMFI).
ZAMFI is a representative body for the microfinance institutions
in Zimbabwe. The drive for the initiative is bi-dimensional. On the
one hand, the Government of Zimbabwe requested that the
microfinance industry organize itself so that government can
14

more efficiently establish communication and liaison with the
industry for policy and other industry issues. On the other hand,
microfinance institutions, particularly locally based ones, feel
they need to bolster their voice and work together to support each
other and promote a more conducive environment for
microfinance.
Microfinance institutions play a fundamental role in funding
social enterprises that are crucial in creating real value
(combination of social and economic values). Due to that, their
sound operation is of great benefit to all, over and above the great
objective of meeting the financial needs of the poor who cannot
access conventional funding schemes.
Theoretical framework and methodology
Our study will benefit from the framework developed by Hulme
(2000) and Estapé‐ Dubreuil and Torreguitart‐ Mirada (2010). The
first section will discuss the main elements to a conceptual
framework put forward by Hulme (2000) whilst the second section
will clarify the approach we used as guided by the work of
Estapé‐ Dubreuil and Torreguitart‐ Mirada (2010).
All impact assessment exercises have a conceptual framework at
their heart and in many smaller scale exercises the framework is
implicit and may be seen as “common sense” (Hulme, 2000). Our
scale of analysis is zeroed to one town of Chinhoyi, which in this
context will be considered a small scale exercise as compared to a
national coverage. The three main elements to a conceptual
framework as suggested by Hulme (2000) are as follows:
a model of the impact chain that the study is to examine: This
involves assessing the difference in the values of key variables
between the outcomes on “agents” (individuals, enterprises,
households, populations, policymakers) which have
experienced an intervention against the values of those
variables that would have occurred had there been no
intervention. This takes the dimension of a control group and
the experiment group; despite being so informative this study
only considered one group (the experiment group). The
15

analysis will also be as much informative if instruments are
well designed.
the specification of the unit(s), or levels, at which impacts are
assessed: Common units of assessment are the household,
the enterprise or the institutional environment within which
agents operate, thus producing a fuller picture of overall
impacts. There are advantages and disadvantages to each unit
of assessment used, however combining individual,
household, enterprise and community units (Household
Economic Portfolio- HEP) will present a comprehensive
coverage of impacts and has an appreciation of linkages
between units. Our study considers the HEP composed of
individuals (the women), their households, enterprise (their
small businesses) and community (in terms of jobs created by
each enterprise).
the specification of the types of impact that are to be assessed.
Microfinance impact assessment can be directed to measure
changes in income, with other popular variables being levels
and patterns of expenditure, consumption and assets. The
study focused on assessing the access to finance by women, in
particular if microfinance is coming to the aid of these
financially excluded family livelihood 'guarantors'.
Secondarily, the study also looked at the contribution of
women-led SMEs to meeting basic family needs like education
and how many jobs are created for the local community.
From this conceptual framework it follows that parameters for
analysis need to be clearly outlined. There are a large number of
parameters and variables that can be taken into account when
considering the potential impacts of microfinance on women and
women entrepreneurship. Our parameters for analysis will be
influenced by the objectives of the study as in Estapé‐ Dubreuil
and Torreguitart‐ Mirada (2010), considering that women are
actors too in an effort to access finance despite the challenges
they face. The different categories of our analytical framework are
as follows:
i. parameters linked to the Microfinance Institutions in
which credit was (can be) obtained and women
entrepreneurs perception on their limited access to
16

finance;
ii. parameters related to efforts by women to get funding for
their entrepreneurial ventures;
iii. indicators of the social and economic impact of the women
enterprises as well as personal context particulars.
We modified the Estapé‐ Dubreuil and Torreguitart‐ Mirada
framework recognising the different set of parameters in our
analysis which include: the supply side (market microstructure);
the perceptions by women (what do they perceive as the
hindrances towards their access to finance); personal attributes
(their educational qualifications and wealth ownership status)
and (as mitigating efforts) the women's efforts in bridging the
gaps. The last set of parameters helped the study forward the
hypothesis that women are actors too. These set of parameters
work in unison to contribute to the central goal of enabling
women to access finance. This is illustrated in the figure below.
Source: Authors’ own sketch
The four parameters lying on the outer ring have been identified
as crucial factors in accessing finance by women borrowers. It is
17

not about bemoaning the limited access to finance by women...
but women are actors too… their perceptions, their efforts to find
alternative sources all contribute to mitigating the challenges at
hand. Furthermore supply side factors are beyond the women's
control, and they are highly significant in determining the access
of credit by this group. In Section II, we have noticed how the
microfinance operators are redesigning their loan products at the
expense of women (majority of the poor and marginalised).
Scope of the study
The study focused on a fairly small sample size to necessitate
meaningful in-depth analysis in light of time and resources
constrains. The sample size enabled the researchers to merge
theory and reality, choosing the provincial capital of
Mashonaland West Province, Chinhoyi town. This area
represents one of the areas under served with regard to
microfinance (UNDP). To select respondents from the population
which has pockets of significant differences, simple random
sampling method was used.
Data Collection
Secondary and primary data was used in order to meet the
objectives of the study. Secondary data was obtained from RBZ
reports and bulletins, internet and past researches. Secondary
data was used because of its availability in a synthesized and
processed form. The data was used mainly to give an insight of the
supply side of microfinance. Data was in some instances over
simplified, biased and/or lacking necessary relevance with
respect to timing and distribution of the target group. Various
sources of data and/or information were used to verify the data.
Primary data was collected making use of questionnaires
distributed by trained personnel. Other primary data collection
instruments like discussions, thinking, reflection and
observations were put into use to augment the conventional tool
(questionnaire). The literature reviewed provided the basis for the
hypotheses and the conceptual framework to analyse the
situation on the ground.
Data Analysis
18

The data collected was first sorted out for meaningful analysis to
take place. Data was checked for completeness as well as internal
consistency, while the responses were checked for relevancy and
flow of logic. Women's access to finance was measured in terms of
loans obtained, the process of obtaining it (the screening
measures) and knowledge about availability of MFIs. Impact of
microfinance on livelihood and its sustainability was measured
by the distribution of profits and number of individuals relying for
a living on profits from the enterprises. The assertion that
beneficiaries are actors too was measured from the success of the
efforts by women to obtain other funding in the face of being
screened out.
Research findings
This section presents the research findings from the
questionnaires which were distributed. It is organized into three
sections. The first section looks at parameters linked to
microfinance, the second one looks at efforts being made by
women to mitigate the liquidity crisis and the last section looks at
the social and economic impact of women's enterprises.
a) Parameters linked to the Microfinance Institutions in which
credit was (could be) obtained and women entrepreneurs
perception on their limited access to finance:
From our survey 77.8% of the women never used microfinance
credit to fund their business initiatives. This maybe as a result of
varied reasons, from lack of knowledge of the existence of
microfinance service providers to mere unwillingness due to
negative perception or bad experience by friends or relatives.
From a list of major MFIs in Zimbabwe, 62.5% of the respondents
do not know or have never approached any one. From those who
know/ have approached one of the major MFIs, 25% know of
others who have obtained loans and 12.5% know/ approached
Zambuko Trust unfortunately all failing to access credit. From
the 62.5% who do not know/ have not approached any of the
major MFI in Zimbabwe, 75% would consider approaching the
institutions for funding. This indicates the willingness among
women entrepreneurs in accessing funding through these
institutions. The major reasons cited for the willingness to
19

approach the MFIs, is that “it will assist in quickly expanding the
business, and 'have no other alternative if I am to fund my
business”. Microfinance clients are either very small businesses
or poor individuals who usually have few assets, non-existent
credit histories, and low income levels. This is a problem because
it means these clients cannot offer any collateral to microfinance
providers against loans. As a result, microfinance institutions
(MFIs) may either raise their interest rates (which are already high
for small loan transactions) or turn down hundreds of applicants.
b) Women entrepreneurs' perceptions on challenges to accessing
finance:
Perceptions shape our actions to some extent. Half of the survey
group perceive that women generally face challenges in accessing
business finance, while 12.5% disagree and 37.5% hold a neutral
perception. On the other hand, 57.4% do not view failure to
provide necessary information as a limiting factor to access to
finance by women, the rest are neutral on this factor. This implies
that, the women in small business are confident that they have all
the required information and are ready to provide. This analysis
may point to implicit screening factors the MFIs may be using.
On the issue of collateral, the respondents are divided. 37.5% do
not perceive collateral to be the limiting factor, while an equal
percentage do perceive so and the remaining 25% are neutral.
Almost the same distribution of respondents goes for the view on
the understanding of financing needs by institutions across
gender. Legal restrictions are perceived by 50% of the
respondents as a hindrance to their access to microfinance. The
legal restriction may involve the type of marriage, where consent
from husband may be required or the requirement for surety.
Educational background is perceived by three quarters of the
respondents as a limiting factor. In our own opinion education
may be an implicit screening factor by MFIs, considering how the
women are ready to provide all necessary information like
business plan and company registration certificates among other
requirements and yet they fail to get the finance. Many micro
entrepreneurs are those who did not proceed highly with
20

academic education and have little formal education which leads
to two issues: a lack of knowledge about the existence of financial
services for the poor (a solution may be financial literacy
campaigns) and little access to microfinance services offered by
MFIs. The respondents also consider the size and nature of the
business, nepotism and low coverage by MFI (concentration in
bigger cities and in deep rural areas leaving out smaller towns) as
other screening factors by MFIs.
c) Parameters related to efforts by women to get funding for their
entrepreneurial ventures:
Regarding efforts which are being made by women to raise finance
for their businesses in Chinhoyi, almost 63% of the respondents
agreed that they have made use of stokvels (rounds) in which they
contribute a certain agreed amount of money together and it
circulates amongst them until everyone in the group has received
her portion and the process repeats again. However, 25% of the
respondents did not agree with the idea and 12.5% were neutral.
All of the respondents indicated that the current businesses
which they were running were financed by savings from the
previous business. This indicates that women in business in
Chinhoyi are aiming higher and have the saving mentality which
is crucial in the society as it makes us to think of the future rather
than consuming all that could have been gathered today. Three
quarters of the respondents indicated that they have received
funds from family members in the diaspora. This is typical of the
current situation in Zimbabwe in general due to the harsh
economic conditions which prevailed in the past few years.
However, 12.5% of the respondents indicated that they have not
used or received start-up capital from relatives outside the
country whilst the other 12.5% were neutral.
The analysis above shows that women in Chinhoyi are not “cry
babies” when it comes to the issues of securing finance to start
and expand their businesses but they are doing a lot to mitigate
the lack of finance. The stokvels initiative allows them to buy more
than what one can with her own monies increasing the chances of
making profits.
21

d) Indicators of the social and economic impact of the women
enterprises as well as personal context particulars:
About 50% of the respondents indicated that their businesses
have been in existence for 12 to 24 months whilst 25% indicated
that their businesses have been in existence for almost a year and
the other 25% indicated that their businesses have been in
existence for 25 to 36 months. All respondents indicated that
employees working for their business range from 1 to less than
50. This is an indication that these are small to medium scale
enterprises.
About 75% of the respondents indicated that about six to ten
family members rely on the profits from the business whilst 25%
indicated about one to five dependents. This emphasizes the
importance of women businesses considering the family set-ups
in which women have become breadwinners in some families as
discussed in the literature review. In addition, 37% and 62.5%
indicated 20 to 50 percent and 50% and above respectively of the
profits from the businesses are allocated to family upkeep, an
indication that these small businesses are going a long-way in
alleviating poverty in our communities. 25% of the respondents
indicated that 10-20% of the profits are channelled to education/
fees whilst 75% goes towards expansion of the business.
The majority of members running the business do not exceed
88%, with the majority being both a manager and owner. About
75% of the respondents showed that they do not own properties
which can be used as collateral security, an indication that access
to finance from the banking sector is not an easy task as it
(collateral security) is a major requirement. Microfinance credit is
therefore one of the major financial mechanisms which can be
used to access finance as it does not require all the paper work
compared to the conventional banking system. The majority of
business owners (87%) have either an Advanced Level or a
certificate from college or less qualification with about 13%
having degrees. The level of education can be one of the reasons
why access to finance is a problem for most women.
22

Conclusions and Recommendations
Summary
The study looked at access to microfinance and poverty
alleviation in Zimbabwe focusing on Chinhoyi. We reviewed many
qualitative and quantitative studies which revealed that access to
financial services has improved the status of women within the
family and the community. Women accessing finance become
more assertive, confident, and more visible and are better able to
negotiate the public sphere.
Based on the literature review we adopted a model of study and,
using questionnaires, we collected data on women's business
activities and access to microfinance in Chinhoyi. The women
reached were particularly proud of their financial contribution to
their children's education not only because it helped them earn
the respect of their husbands but also because it gave them the
opportunity to ensure the best possible education for both their
daughters and their sons. Enabling women to access finance for
their enterprises will help in empowering them, giving them a say.
These results are in consonance with Cheston and Kuhn (2002)
who argued that because women are traditionally responsible for
providing food, clothing, children's allowances (pocket money),
and cooking and cleaning supplies, a woman's earning a little
money to cover household expenses will not necessarily earn her
more respect in the eyes of her husband. If, however, she earns
enough to help cover typically male expenditures like school fees,
rent, furniture, and transport, her decision-making power often
increases greatly. In our survey sizable amounts of profits from
the women-owned enterprises are going towards education and
health of the family.
Although leadership skills, self-confidence, and solidarity play an
important role in changing women's role and status in the
community, women's economic success plays a role in shaping
the community's perception of them as well. We noted that
extending finance to women will go a long way in solidifying their
social status, hence creating a platform for empowering them.
However, women's general education and literacy are important if
they are to reach their full potential and become empowered.
23

Illiteracy creates a situation of dependency on others that can
limit an individual's prospects for empowerment.
Recommendations
Access to finance has been proven to be a challenge in Chinhoyi
town. This study proposes a review of the screening process by the
MFI and money lenders, prioritizing entrepreneurial credit over
consumption credit. Entrepreneurial credit will help in creating
jobs and providing sustainable income to a number of families.
The fortunate thing is that women borrowers (potential
borrowers) are hardworking and willing to go an extra mile in
sustaining their businesses. This is a feature the Zimbabwean
economy can boast of and prioritise lending in order to reap
benefits of the enterprising groups of individuals.
The banks have the potential to tap into the MFI sector through
partnering with already established groups within communities –
providing them with lending funds without them bearing the
associated costs of following each and every borrower. The group
will be jointly liable so that there is no need to follow up on each
individual.
We also recommend that government or NGO initiated
microfinance institutions can also play an important role in
making funds available at reasonable rates thus increasing
access to finance and contributing to poverty alleviation. Also
responsible parties should make women aware of all the funds
available to assist them so that women in need may take
advantage of what is on offer.
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26

2
Natural resources management: Whose
burden and whose benefits? A case
study of Maitengwe hunting concession
in Bulilima District of Matabeleland
South Province
Mhlupheki Dube, Tjinyunyi Babili Trust (TBT), Zimbabwe
Abstract
Sustainable environmental management and utilisation of
natural resources by nations goes beyond enactment of
protection legislation and enforcement thereof. There has to be
support and ownership of the natural resources by host
communities and those peripheral to such natural resources. A
number of implementation models designed to sustainably utilise
natural resources and accrue benefits to community members
have been tried albeit with little success. These models were
primarily designed for the exploitation of flora and fauna in
communal areas with little or no intervention at all designed for
mineral resources. Protected areas and conservancies have also
failed to involve host communities in environmental management
and natural resources utilisation, preferring instead to convince
host communities that they should be satisfied with the aesthetic
value and not commercial value of their natural resources.
Understandably this has had disastrous consequences as
communities inhabiting environs of protected areas and
conservancies have turned out to be menacing neighbours
poaching both terrestrial and aquatic animals and vandalising
infrastructure with impunity. This paper therefore seeks to
examine some of the natural resource utilisation models that
have been tried in Zimbabwe, interrogating reasons of their
failure and proffering possible solutions. The models examined in
the management of flora and fauna are WINDFALL, CAMPFIRE
and protected areas.
27

Abbreviations and acronyms
CBNRM Community Based Natural Resources
Management
WINDFALL Wildlife Industries New Development For All
DNPWLM Department of National Parks and Wild Life
Management
CAMPFIRE Communal Areas Management Programme For
Indigenous Resources
CASS Centre for Applied Social Science
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
IIED International Institute for Environment and
development
RDC Rural District Council
CA Campfire Association
WWF World Wide Fund for nature
GDP Gross Domestic Product
CITES Convention on International Trade for
Endangered species of flora and fauna
LIFE Living In a Finite Environment
Introduction
Zimbabwe is endowed with a wide range of natural resources
which are spread across the different agro-ecological regions of
the country. These include mineral resources, large water bodies,
wildlife and forestry resources. These resources are owned by the
state and governed under relevant legislations such as the Parks
and Wildlife Management Act of 1975 and the Environmental
Management Act of 2002. Under the Parks and wildlife Act land
owners are granted user rights for the wildlife in their properties.
In communal areas local authorities were granted the
“appropriate authority” status which enabled them to be
custodians of all wildlife obtaining in their areas of jurisdiction.
Local authorities therefore have wildlife user rights on behalf of
the communal farmers in their area. In both the private and
28

communal owned land no farmer has ownership over wildlife
because it is a fugitive resource (Madzudzo, 1996).
A number of strategies and interventions have been adopted to try
and promote conservation and sustainable utilization of natural
resources. A majority of these strategies are based on
incentivizing host communities so that they can manage their
natural resources and derive benefits from their environment.
However these strategies have largely been targeting communal
areas with no notable strategy designed to ensure that host
communities of protected areas benefit from natural resources in
these vast government estates. Community Based Natural
Resources Management (CBNRM) has been hailed as a panacea
for sustainable utilization of natural resources in communal
areas with success having been documented in Namibia,
Botswana and Zimbabwe (Jones, 1999). However a closer
scrutiny of CBNRM intervention reveals some glaring gaps which
need to be seriously addressed if the intervention is to be
completely community-driven and community sustained.
Serious instructive questions need to be asked about the whole
concept of natural resources conservation and utilization.
Questions such as how much indigenous knowledge about
natural resource conservation exists in communities? What are
the socio-cultural disruptions that are brought to the community
by the implementation of CBRNM programmes? What is the level
of community resilience against the socio-economic burden of
coexisting side by side with wildlife? Should CBRNM emphasise
community compliance or participation? How much authority
should be devolved from the central authority? If critical attention
is paid to the above questions most of the problems bedevilling
CBRNM programmes may be resolved.
Community -based natural resource management programmes
Project WINDFALL
In 1978 the Department of National Parks and Wildlife
Management (DNPWLM) launched a wildlife conservation project
called WINDFALL (Wildlife Industries New Development for All).
The project was aimed at reducing human-wildlife conflicts and
instilling a conservation mentality among communities
29

(Murindagomo, 1990). Its main approach was to return some
revenue generated from wildlife to the district councils
neighbouring the protected areas. The meat from elephant culling
and some revenue from trophy fees was occasionally paid to rural
communities adjacent to state-managed protected areas, with the
aim of encouraging a positive attitude to wildlife. While the project
did not manage to change people's attitudes towards wildlife, it
highlighted a need to devolve proprietorship over wildlife to enable
those living with wildlife to receive direct and sustained benefits
from it (Frost and Bond, 2007). The project did not succeed
mainly because communities were not involved in decision
making, there were no direct benefits to communities and district
councils failed to remit revenue to the communities affected by
wild life (Murindagomo, 1990).
CAMPFIRE project
After the failure of project WINDFALL, CAMPFIRE (Communal
Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) project
was conceived in 1986 and implemented by DPWLM in
partnership with Centre of Applied Social Science (CASS) at the
University of Zimbabwe and a number of non-governmental
organisations (NGO) such as Zimbabwe Trust (IIED report, 1994).
The CAMPFIRE project was first experimented in districts which
had large numbers of wildlife outside protected areas such as
Sebungwe in Gokwe before being rolled out to all the Districts of
the country. CAMPFIRE was designed specifically to stimulate
long-term development, management and sustainable use of
natural resources in Zimbabwe's communal farming areas (Frost
and Bond, 2007). It aimed to align land use more closely with the
natural opportunities and constraints of these agriculturally
marginal areas. CAMPFIRE was designed to encompass four
major natural resources, that is wildlife, woodlands, water and
grazing land. However wildlife utilisation dominated other forms
due to high profits involved. While CAMPFIRE managed to
record successes in the form of appreciation of the value of wildlife
by rural communities, funding of social infrastructure such as
clinics and schools and drastic reduction in poaching, its major
constraint was the reluctance by local authorities to devolve real
power to the communities and the failure to remit revenue due to
30

the communities in full and in time (IIED report, 1994). Also
political and administrative reasons have slowly moved
CAMPFIRE from its original objectives (Murphree, 1997). Another
reason for the failure of CAMPFIRE project is that it was highly
funded at inception to levels where donor money became the
oxygen for the project implementation; thus when the umbilical
cord was inevitably severed the life of the project took a huge
knock. Another major handicap of CAMPFIRE is that the law
places the appropriate authority for wildlife in the hands of the
Rural District Councils (RDCs), instead of host communities. This
has resulted in CAMPFIRE being driven by the RDCs rather than
host communities and thus most of the major decisions over
CAMPFIRE are made at the RDC level instead of community level.
Also the appropriate authority applies specifically to wildlife, but
not to land. This has made CAMPFIRE to be seen as applying
primarily to safari hunting and problem animal control (PAC).
Photographic and cultural tourism is not generally perceived as
belonging to CAMPFIRE. However in some communal lands, ecotourism
and cultural tourism have a greater economic potential
than safari hunting. Another major problem with CAMPFIRE in
most Districts is that problem animal control (PAC) is perceived as
a primary responsibility of the Safari operator contracted under
CAMPFIRE. However in most cases Safari hunters do not respond
swiftly when called for PAC resulting in extensive damages and
losses of livestock and crops by communities. The reluctance by
Safari hunters is mainly because PAC animals are usually not
trophy animals and hence have no significant value.
Benefits of natural resources management
While natural resources management as a practice is fraught with
a lot of challenges in terms of the appropriate and effective model
of implementation, it however has several benefits that can be
realised by government in general and host communities in
particular. These benefits include but are not limited to:
Financial or economic: Huge economic benefits can be
realized from both consumptive and non-consumptive use
of natural resources. Tourism industries which are largely
anchored on natural resources, contribute significant
31

percentages to the gross domestic products (GDP) of a lot of
countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
Protection of endangered flora and fauna species:
Conservancies, protected areas and hunting concession
areas provide protection to a lot of animal and plant species
which would otherwise get extinct from overutilization.
This includes species that are listed under the Convention
on International Trade of Endangered Species of flora and
fauna (CITES). Examples of such species include both the
white and black rhino, the wild dog (Lycaon pictus) and the
cheetah (Accynonix jubatus).
Increase in biodiversity: Preservation of the ecosystem
ensures that there is growth in the biodiversity and hence
richness of the ecosystem. A well managed ecosystem
supports a wide range of both animal and plant species.
Ecological studies: Properly managed natural resources
provided for scientific exploration into both plant and
animal kingdom. This helps to understand both biological
and ecological issues around the natural resources and
thus contributing to the body of knowledge which is
essential for both their perpetuation and protection.
Critique of community-based natural resource management
programmes
An analysis of the formulation and implementation of CBRNM
raises the following salient points which should be taken into
consideration by future planners so as to produce models that
can endure the test of inclusivity and active participation.
Indigenous conservation knowledge
One of the most common mistakes that are made by designers
and implementers of conservation programmes is the unfounded
assumption that host communities have no prior knowledge of
conservation and natural resource management and hence they
can only be recipients of externally derived knowledge. Nothing
can be further from the truth than this. For the purpose of this
paper the term host communities refers to communities who
share immediate boundaries with wildlife concession areas.
These are communities who pay social and economic costs of
32

living next to wildlife areas. Community members have always
had ways and means of conserving their natural resources. Local
cultures have always contained an ethic of conservation and
sustainable use of natural resources (Jones, 199). This is
highlighted in their rich taboos and totems which acted as
effective and enforceable conservation laws and by-laws. For
example a person of Dube (Zebra) totem is not allowed to eat Zebra
meat and hence will naturally not hunt that animal as he/she will
hold it sacred. Similarly the Ndlovus (Elephant) will not eat nor
hunt an elephant and they hold this animal in sacred esteem.
Also certain animals could only be hunted by individuals of a
certain standing in the community and not everyone. Also the
spirit of communal sharing meant that a successful hunt would
feed several families and postpone hunting until there is a need
again. This therefore means any serious and well meaning
conservation programme needs to acknowledge the existence of
this wealth of indigenous knowledge among community members
and build on their acceptable progressive practice so as to avoid a
complete rejection of externally conceived and externally driven
programmes with high sounding names but very little respect for
community wisdom. The quotation below from Chief Shikabeta of
Luano Valley in Zambia, amplifies calls by local communities that
they have vast reserves of indigenous conservation knowledge.
“The way we looked after animals in the past was different
from today. A person could never kill an animal without
informing the chief. A person who killed an animal would
give the hind legs, rib cage and internal organs to the
chief. No one but the chief could hunt the eland, which
was hunted only once a year. Anyone who killed an eland
committed an offence. Nowadays it is different. Anyone
can kill an eland”. (Lewis and Carter, 1993 as cited in IIED
report, 1994).
Such strict measures ensured that excessive harvesting of slow
multiplying species was minimized and hence reducing pressure
on their populations. Even in forestry some trees were
traditionally viewed as sacred (ukuzila/kuyera). This meant such
trees could not just be felled down without a serious reason. Also
33

some trees were not supposed to be used for firewood for example
umphafa. Of note is that most of the sacred trees were generally of
very rare species which means that the taboos placed on them
were ingenious conservation techniques meant to prevent their
extinction.
The social price of conservation programmes
Implementing a CAMPFIRE programme usually involves
designating a selected area within the communal lands as a
hunting area. This is followed by a plethora of regulations which
may completely prohibit communities from undertaking certain
activities within or adjacent to the hunting area. In some
instances this results in a complete transformation of lifestyles
for the previous human inhabitants of that area resulting in
socio-cultural disruptions which may prove too costly a price to
pay for hosting a CAMPFIRE project. In Makhulela ward of
Bulilima District the San people were moved to make way for
creation of the Maitengwe hunting concession. A San settlement
was set up at the fringes of Makhulela ward and the San were
prohibited from hunting in the designated area (Madzudzo,
1996). A solar powered electric perimeter fence demarcating the
hunting area from human settlement was erected. Without
proper preparation and proper consultation the San were
transformed from nomadic hunters and gatherers to sedentary
farmers. They obviously faced enormous challenges which
included bearing the burden of livestock and crop losses to
wildlife and adjusting to a sedentary agriculture based lifestyle.
They also lacked basic requirements for a life based on
agriculture, such as draught power, farming implements and
inputs (Madzudzo, 1996).
Consequently the San community became terrible and menacing
neighbours to the safari hunting concession of Maitengwe. The
perimeter fence was cut and the solar equipment was stolen and
poaching became rampant. Also the Maitengwe safari hunting
concession became a source of inconvenience to neighbouring
livestock farmers who used the hunting area as a relief grazing
area (ukulagisa) and were now expected to follow new grazing
regimes to avoid interfering with scheduled hunts. Management
34

of ukulagisa became a thorny issue as it was a perennial source of
conflict between surrounding livestock owners and the local
authority.
It is therefore instructive for project designers to thoroughly
analyse the project cycle for sources of possible negative impact to
both the project and the beneficiaries. Also communities need to
be thoroughly prepared to embrace changes that are going to
occur in their lifestyles as a result of the project. This should not
only involve taking host communities through a change
management training exercise but also a full disclosure of the
potential positives and negatives of the project to their lives so
that informed consent for the project is obtained.
Community compliance or community participation?
The cornerstone of community-based development initiatives is
the active involvement of members of a defined community in at
least some aspects of project design and implementation
(Mansuri and Rao, 2004). CBRNM projects are usually conceived
outside host communities and sold to these communities through
ill prepared and ill administered participatory techniques. This is
why these projects have high sounding acronyms such as
WINDFALL, CAMPFIRE and LIFE (Living in a finite environment),
clear products of academic minds outside host communities.
Communities are only brought in to legitimize an already
conceived and funded project with project facilitators shaping
and directing participatory exercises and community “needs” are
often shaped by perceptions of what the project can deliver and
thus outside agendas get expressed as local knowledge (Mansuri
and Rao, 2004). Some ethnic groups such as the Tonga have
been sidelined in much of the decision-making processes of
CBRNM projects, even though they are often the original
inhabitants of these remote areas (Frost and Bond, 2007). Host
communities need to be afforded a chance for real participation
where they are fully informed of the objectives of the project and
they make inputs into the formulation and conceptualization of
the project not just pseudo participation designed to fulfil donor
requirements and a way of leading communities into a finished
product. Giving host communities a voice during project
35

formulation will ensure their total buy in and commitment
towards the success of the project. They will become full
participants in the project and they will willingly police and
enforce agreed rules and regulations. Community compliance will
thus be achieved through community participation and
cooperation not forceful enforcement of by-laws. Trained game
scouts or rangers will then be used to compliment and augment
traditional community enforcement machinery. Community
members need to participate in (for example) quota setting, anti
poaching, anti trespassing and anti vandalism campaigns.
Invariably poachers are members of the community and hence
only fellow community members know them better and how to
deal with them.
Devolution of authority or responsibility?
One of the main constraints of the CAMPFIRE programme is the
unwillingness by district councils to devolve authority to host
communities to manage their own natural resources, preferring
instead to devolve logistical responsibilities of day to day
functions with no real decision making (IIED report, 1994, Jones,
1999). This centralization of authority around district councils
has also resulted in some councils failing to remit in full and on
time revenue realized from natural resource utilisation to the host
communities. This has had a demoralizing and paralyzing effect
to the communities who rightfully feel short-changed by the
appropriate authorities. A top-down approach to the
management of natural resources should be limited as this tends
to make the programme insensitive to the priorities of the
community and predisposed to a militaristic use of uniformed
paramilitary guards with negligent regard for the community
aspirations. However caution needs to be exercised when
devolving authority to the host communities as absolute
devolution may result in the politically powerful and local elites
individualizing a communal project.
Spreading the benefits
Host communities endure social and economic costs of
conserving natural resources within their localities and hence it is
only reasonable that they should enjoy the benefits of suffering.
36

These are the communities that lose crops and livestock to wildlife
every year. These are communities who are vulnerable to
marauding predators. However more often than not host
communities do not receive meaningful benefits from their
natural resources and they are reduced to 'mere beggars
inhabiting a beach of gold'. This brings to the fore two pertinent
questions whose answers might guide future programme
designers and implementers in CBRNM. Whose burden is it and
whose benefits are they? There are three ways through which
benefits from natural resource utilisation can be unveiled to the
host communities. These are as follows.
Employment opportunities. Natural resource utilisation is a
growing industry which is inextricably linked to tourism and
other leisure related industries. This industry employs a huge
number of people and contributes significantly to the gross
domestic product of the country. Host communities therefore
need to be given first preference for jobs occurring within their
CAMPFIRE area. If locals are employed for example as game
scouts or game guards they will value and respect the project
because of its impact in the lives of their contemporaries. However
most programme implementers tend to deliberately ignore this
important factor, preferring instead to employ their kith and kin.
This inevitably alienates the community, affects their enthusiasm
and compromises the acceptance of the project.
Communal infrastructure development. This is an area where
CAMPFIRE projects across several districts have scored
significant success. A number of communal social
infrastructures has either been built or rehabilitated. This
includes structures such as clinics, schools, boreholes and
grinding mills. The major challenge of this blanket approach of
sharing benefits of wildlife across the entire geographical ward of
the host community is that it assumes that costs and burdens of
living close to wildlife are incurred equally by everyone in the
ward, which is not so (Madzudzo, 1996). This causes tension
within the community as some members feel they are carrying the
cross on behalf of others. Also communally owned assets such as
grinding mills always suffer from the phenomenon of “tragedy of
37

the commons'. The concept of communal benefits for individual
needs leaves community members with very little zeal and hence
no proper care is given to these communal assets.
Communal projects undertaken by Bulilima wards from proceeds of
CAMPFIRE
Ward Project
Makhulela Renovated a clinic, bought barbed wire to fence off
community fields from wildlife
Huwana Renovated and bought furniture for malambuka clinic,
refurbished a water pump for the clinic
Ndolwane Bought roofing material for Siyephambili secondary school
Bambadzi Bought roofing material for Bambadzi secondary
Madlambudzi Contributed towards building a community hall
Hingwe Built a class room block for Himago secondary school
Gala Fenced Ntoli primary school. Built shed for the community
grinding mill
Source: Annual report by Bulilima CAMPFIRE manager 2010
Direct payouts. This entails paying dividends to individual
members of host communities from proceeds of natural resources
utilisation. There are two major problems associated with this
method. Firstly payouts are distributed equally across all
members of the host communities regardless of their distance
from the safari hunting area. Secondly the amounts paid out to
individuals are reduced to insignificant levels due to the numbers
of beneficiaries that are involved. (See table below.)
Compensation for relocations
Setting up of hunting concessions may involve relocating some
people to make way for wildlife habitat. The affected people need
to be adequately and properly compensated for the
inconvenience. This is usually clearly indicated in environmental
impact assessment reports which are produced before the project
is kick started. Sadly most of these reports are only produced as a
fulfilment of legislative requirements with not much attention
given to the recommendations made in them. However this
creates long lasting acrimony between the project and the
relocated people who may set out to vandalise and sabotage the
38

existence of the project. An example is of the Tonga community
who were moved from the Zambezi valley in the 1960s to make
way for the creation of the Kariba Dam but are still fighting to get
compensation from the government.
Distribution of CAMPFIRE revenues in 1999 in the three most profitable districts
(in US$)
Organisational
level
Rural District
Council
District
Binga a
Guruve b
Nyaminyami c
1999 income 301,580 489,872 772,731
Retained 103,368 349,114 470,429
Disbursed 198,212 140,758 302,302
% disbursed 65.7 28.7 39.1
Ward
Average 9439 23,460 25,192
Range 3,082–30,826 0–56,160 0–55,918
No. of CAMPFIRE
Wards
Household
21 11 12
Average 10 58 59
Range 3–35 0–160 0–197
No. households
(all wards)
19,669 5303 5720
Notes:
a) The Binga RDC distributes some revenue to each ward, irrespective of
whether they have exploitable wildlife populations or other natural attractions.
b) In Guruve, only 11 out of 21 wards produced CAMPFIRE revenues during the
period 1989–2001, and then not in every year. Payments to wards reflect their
contributions to annual revenue generation.
c) In Nyaminyami, 12 out of 16 wards are involved in CAMPFIRE, with payments
reflecting their contributions to annual revenue generation.
Source: adapted from Frost and Bond, 2007
Protected areas, ivory towers?
While significant strides have been made towards ensuring that
host communities derive benefits from natural resources within
their localities through the CAMPFIRE programme, very little if
any has been done to ensure that communities within the
environs of protected areas benefit from the utilisation of natural
39

esources in these government estates. Protected areas refer to
National Parks, conservancies and sanctuaries that are usually
under the stewardship and protection of government. These
protected areas usually cover vast tracts of land, sharing
boundaries with communal areas. Hwange National Park is the
2
largest in Zimbabwe covering about 14651km inhabiting 105
mammal species, 19 herbivores and 8 large carnivores (Wikipedia
accessed 09/08/2011). This park has an estimated elephant
herd of about 30000. It is one of the major tourist attractions in
the country. There are also a number of conservancies around the
Hwange National Park all of which owe their existence to the
presence of a wide range of wildlife and an expansive range of
forest with huge biodiversity. There are also several communal
areas on the peripheries of this park such as Gwayi, Lupote, Dete,
Lukosi and Kamativi. These communities endure daily raids on
their livestock by predators and annual crop losses to wildlife
especially elephants. Sadly this is their only interface with this
valuable but burdensome resource in their vicinity.
While the park generates a lot of revenue from both consumptive
and non-consumptive use of wildlife, none is channelled towards
host communities who endure the social and economic burden of
living adjacent to a protected area. Locals are expected to just
marvel at the large volume of both national and international
tourists that visit the park with nothing trickling into their
pockets. Theirs should be just an aesthetic appreciation of nature
and visual gratification from the resource with no monetary
benefit despite the huge losses that they incur. Very little effort is
also made to ensure that locals are employed in these vast estates
turning them into ivory towers that are aloof and indifferent to
their immediate neighbours. This is the situation obtaining in
almost all the protected areas and conservancies across the
country.
Recommendations
While some of the recommendations and suggestions are implicit
within the body of this paper, the following points are flagged out
for emphasis.
40

There has to be full and honest disclosure of the
advantages and disadvantages of a CBRNM project
Those that are affected by the setting up of such a project
especially in terms of relocations need to be adequately
compensated to reduce acrimony towards the project
Revenue generated from the CBRNM project needs to be
distributed timeously and in consideration of the level of
costs/losses incurred by each individual/area
Host communities need to be actively involved in decision
making about the project and this entails devolution of
authority (not only responsibility) to the host communities
Project designers need to acknowledge the existence of
indigenous knowledge within host communities and build
on that
Protected areas need to develop programmes/methods
that ensure that host communities benefit from the vast
estates within their environs, instead of just being ivory
towers
CAMPFIRE should be extended to encompass programmes
such as photographic safaris and cultural tourism.
Conclusion
It is indisputable that there is huge economic potential from
wildlife utilisation in both communal lands and protected
government estates. However the real challenge is in
transforming the potential into tangible benefit which can
influence and be influenced by the host communities themselves.
People-sensitive and people-oriented models have to be developed
especially by the management of protected areas so as to bring on
board host communities on the environs of these estates to
benefit from what is essentially THEIR resource in all possible
ways.
References
Frost, P. G. H. and Bond, I. (2007) The CAMPFIRE programme in
Zimbabwe: Payments for wildlife. Ecological economics. 65. 776-
787
Jones, B. T. B. (1999) Community based natural resources
41

management in Botswana and Namibia: An inventory and
preliminary analysis of progress. Discussion paper number 6.
International Institute for Environment and development report.
(1994) Whose eden? An overview of Community approaches to
wildlife management. Russell press. Nottingham.UK
Madzudzo, E. (1996) Producer Communities in a Community
Based Wildlife Management Programme: A case study of
Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho districts. Harare: Centre for
Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe
Mansuri and Rao. (2004) Community-Based and -Driven
Development: A Critical Review World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 3209, February 2004
Murphree, M. W. (1997) Congruent Objectives, Competing
Interests and Strategic Compromise. Concept and Process in the
Evolution of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE Programme. Community
Conservation in Africa Working Paper, Vol. 2. Institute for
Development Policy and Management (IDPM), University of
Manchester, Manchester, U.K.
Murindagomo, F. (1990) 'CAMPFIRE programme' in Kiss, op.cit
Swanson, D. (2004) South Africa Case Study Analysis of National
Strategies for Sustainable Development. Unedited Working
Paper. Ottawa, Canada
www.wwf.panda.org/benefits accessed 26/09/2011
42

3
The Zimbabwean traditional chieftaincy
and its role in conflict transformation at
the micro level
Matavire Monica, Bindura University of Science Education,
Zimbabwe
Abstract
This article describes and presents the story of two traditional
chiefs involved in solving domestic disputes in Chiweshe
communal lands. The study is based on the construction of a
grounded theory, which is supported by gathering data from
observation, and interviews (Robson 2002). The purpose was to
highlight the kinds of cultural conflicts that the chiefs are
frequently confronted with and spell out the methods which these
chiefs used to reach at verdicts that guarantee legitimate
outcomes. The study was based on the premise that although
chiefs are custodians of culture they are not legislators by virtue
of academic qualifications but by traditional and cultural
appointment. The findings that emerged from this research was
that very few people respect decisions made by chiefs for they
consider cultural and traditional legislations to be archaic. The
research also discovered that sentences are influenced by several
determinants such as the chief's personality and political
affiliation of the offender, and that the methods used by chiefs to
resolve conflicts offer only temporary reprieve. Consequently the
results of these conflicts are at times catastrophic, and in most
cases they diffuse to a string of generations to come.
43

Introduction
This article seeks to explore the traditional court system (Dare
raMambo) among the Shona people of Zimbabwe in as far as it
seeks to resolve disputes. The role of African traditional chiefs as
interfamily and intra-family arbitrators, mediators, and judges
date back to pre-colonial period and is as old as conflicts
themselves. In Zimbabwe, the role of traditional chiefs is to
promote and uphold cultural values among their people,
particularly the promotion of traditional family life; to adjudicate
in disputes amongst their people in accordance with law; and to
exercise any other function that may be conferred or imposed on
them by or under an act of parliament (Law Society of Zimbabwe
2011). The paper will highlight the kind of conflicts that the chiefs
are perennially confronted with and spell out the methods that
the chiefs use to reach at verdicts. If there are guidelines, the
extent to which these are adhered to shall be discussed. The
paper also considers the base from which traditional chiefs derive
their sentences considering that chiefs are not legislators by
virtue of academic qualifications but by traditional appointment.
Factors that influence the chiefs' decisions in dealing with
conflicts will be discussed taking cognizance of the fact that the
chief has much discretion in the decision making process. Gombe
(1980) cites that local courts are the foundation of law and ethics
among the Shona. The theory emerging from this research is that
there are instances when sentences imposed by chiefs vary
greatly even though the offences might be similar and committed
under similar circumstances. In exploring this subject, some
disputes are to be discussed to determine the process and
outcomes of the traditional court system.
Conceptual Framework
This research is premised on the African theory of conflict
transformation – dare – that relies heavily on traditional
principles of Unhu. Thus by unhu is meant personhood which is
derived from one's historicity and rootedness in an ongoing
human community (Menkit, 1976). It is the community which
defines the individual as a person. The theory of unhuism is
grounded in the critical upholding of traditional values and beliefs
(Gwaravanda, 2011). Any violation of these ethical values is an
44

offence to the whole community and is punishable. The theory of
unhu seems to incline heavily on the secularized natural law
school that firmly believes that man has a certain conception of
morality, which is intrinsic to him and his nature (Grotius, 1953).
This intrinsic morality avails itself in the form of conscience and is
made of basic principles which make the foundation of proper
human action. According to this school, morality is determined by
society's beliefs; in Zimbabwe, chiefs are the custodians of these
beliefs and values. The Shona traditional chieftainship reconciles
disputants using the concept of unhu as the basis of guiding
principles from which to refer to. The key tenet of these principles
is to bring equilibrium to the 'disequilibrated' relationships
targeting permanent conflict transformation. Conflict involves a
clash, confrontation, a contentious struggle, a collision course
between two or more or a set of two or more antagonistic
characters or forces. Drieberg (1934) observed that African law's
objective is to maintain equilibrium, and the penalties of African
law are directed not against infractions but to the restoration of
this equilibrium.
Methodology
The design selected for this research is the traditional qualitative
intervention design, as well as the construction of a grounded
theory which allows for observation of traditional court sessions
of two traditional chiefs in Chiweshe communal area. Pseudo
names have been used for all people for ethical reasons because
the research is based on true stories. Omer, Meier and Galinsky
(2004) describe intervention research as a 'developmental
research method'; it takes into account issues that are of
importance to the target group and aims to promote an
understanding of these issues. This research methodology is
conducted in a field setting in which researchers and participants
work together to assess interventions. The aim of intervention
research is to create new policies by means of a process of
problem analysis and dissemination (Walliman and Buckler,
2008).
Grounded theory was selected because it is supported by
gathering data from observation. This method recognizes that
45

esearchers come to study with background knowledge that
influences their points of view towards the object of study. This
means that this researcher was careful not to allow her previous
knowledge to influence her findings. The researcher decided on
observation as the primary method of data collection to assure
that her previous knowledge would not bring biases to the
conclusions that she would make. Other methods used
complemented observation for triangulation purposes. The
researcher followed some traditional court proceedings on two
traditional chiefs to understand the process that chiefs use to
reach at a legitimate verdict that fosters conflict transformation.
Frequent visits by the researcher had strength in that she became
part of the process and the chiefs and elders got used to her.
Results
Traditional court procedure
A case is reported to the chief a week before the actual court day.
Simple cases may be resolved at this preliminary stage. Cases
that are complex are given a date of adjudication. The parties
involved are informed of the court day and deliberate absence of
either party is regarded as disrespect for the court and is
punishable by a monetary fine or a goat. The first stage in the
proceedings is to acknowledge the presence of the traditional
chief and his advisors who are mainly kraal heads and senior
members of the community like headsmen. The entry of the chief
is acknowledged by a standing ovation and ululation. This is
similar to the formal court system where authority and presence
of a magistrate is acknowledged by rising upon entry of a
magistrate, lawyer or judge. Showing respect to the chief and his
advisors is tantamount to authenticating and validating their
authority. The parties involved are then brought before the actual
court session as they are introduced to the chief and his court
(dare).
The next step involves making a report of the case to the chief and
the congregation so that the process of justice takes its course.
Any complainant reporting a case to the chief is expected to pay a
court fee of $20.00 or a goat. The complainant reports on the
nature of the crime committed against him\her, the extent of
46

damage inflicted on the offended and his\her nuclear and
extended family members. It is at this stage that those present
note the consistency of the offended's report. Visitors or anyone
present is allowed to take part in the conflict resolution process.
Consultation is based on the assumption that wisdom is not a
monopoly and sharing ideas enriches individual perceptions and
insights on the matter. The traditional court system upholds the
non-contradiction and clarity of expression, which help to ensure
consistency of statements and soundness of arguments. The
principle of unhu from which the court derives its transformation
mechanism upholds principles such as truth telling, self control,
respect for elders, conflict resolution and peace building
(Gwaravanda, 2011). The analysis of the offence is based on moral
determinants such as time, space, reason, non-contradiction and
gravity of the offence among other things.
Below are cases that were presided over by chiefs Chounda and
chief Mazano in Chiweshe in the context of this research.
Case 1 – Witchcraft
A woman (Mrs. Rusenza) reported her son (Choto) to chief Mazano
for accusing her of bewitching and killing his two-year-old son.
Choto alleged that he consulted a traditional healer who
confirmed that his paternal grandmother killed the boy. The chief
invited an expert in mixing traditional concoctions (muteyo) that
would reveal whether Rusenza was guilt if she didn't vomit after
drinking the mixture. Rusenza did not vomit. In passing
judgment on Rusenza 'the witch' the chief banished her from his
chiefdom citing that he wanted to protect his people from
wickedness and witchcraft. The chief indicated that witches who
kill babies are dangerous to the community and therefore should
find somewhere to live where witchcraft is condoned. He said the
punishment for witchcraft must remain stiff so that it saves as a
deterrent to would be witches.
Case 2 – Land dispute
The complainant Huni bought a 5-acre piece of land and a rural
residential stand from Mr. Mudzi. After a year, Mudzi demanded
another payment of US$350.00 top up to make the total cost of
47

the land US$750.00. Mudzi laid the condition that either Huni
pays the money or vacates his stand. The chief's court dealing
with the case resolved that Mudzi was at fault in selling farm land
to Huni because the custodian of all rural land was the chief. The
traditional court agreed that Mudzi pays back half the amount he
had already received from Huni for land was not supposed to be
bought and sold. The court told him that he had sold his
homestead and the farmland was being repossessed by the chief
who would distribute it to needy people. By selling the land Mudzi
had shown that he did not need it. Mudzi reported the same case
to the magistrates' court who told him that the chiefs' decision
would stand because he (Mudzi) did not have title deeds to the
land.
Case 3 – Cattle graze in a crop field
This was reported at chief Chounda's court. Jeremiah demanded
a tonne of maize at harvest as compensation from Washaya after
Washaya's cattle fed on his crops. The chief tasked a local
Agriculture Research Extension (AREX) officer together with the
chief's two selected elders to visit the field and assess the damage
caused by Washaya's cattle. The verdict reached after the
assessment was that Washaya would pay two bags of maize
because the AREX officer alleged that the whole crop without
being grazed would not yield a tonne.
Case 4 – Adultery
Mupona reported to the traditional court at chief Mazano that he
caught Masango with his wife (Mupona's wife) in a compromising
position in his garden. The garden is 200 metres away from
Mupona's homestead. Mupona said he followed his wife to the
garden when he thought she had stayed too long. He brought a
pant to the court which he claimed was Masango's which he had
left behind when he escaped from the garden in panic. Masango
refuted the allegations vehemently and eloquently, pointing out
that Mazano was fabricating. Mupona's wife also denied the
allegations levelled by her husband. The traditional court
dismissed the case as lacking in evidence. Masango threatened to
report the accuser to the same court on allegations of soiling his
name.
48

Outcomes of the reported cases
Rusenza implicated in Case 1 contested the chief's verdict at the
Bindura magistrates' court. The court had a different view on the
case, that is, to stop beliefs in witchcraft by punishing those who
would have labelled others as witches. Resultantly the chief and
Rusenza's son were summoned to answer allegations of violating
Part V1 Chapter V of the Witchcraft Suppression Act which
explains that to “accuse a person of witchcraft means to indicate
that the person is possessed by a spirit or used non-natural
means to cause the death, injury, disease, or inability in any
person'' (Law society of Zimbabwe, 2009). The dilemma in this
issue is that witchcraft is not an area that can be scrutinized; it is
not easy to verify an evil spell because it's a matter of spiritual
belief not of empirical evidence. Unfortunately, before the
magistrate's court day, unknown persons set Rusenza's
homestead on fire. She escaped death by a whisker but lost all her
belongings in the inferno. Through fear, Rusenza withdrew the
case from the magistrates' court. Commenting on the mysterious
fire in an interview with the researcher the chief said Rusenza was
facing the wrath of ancestors as she disobeyed the chief's orders.
He castigated the courts for continuously clinging to the colonial
era restrictions on the practice of witchcraft. When contacted for
comment, Rusenza thought her home was burnt by the chief's
aides as punishment for reporting the chief to court.
A follow up was made to solicit the feelings of Mupona since he
had lost the case. He dismissed the chief's court as “a good for
nothing group who depend on money given to them by corrupt
offenders''. He expressed dissatisfaction on how his case was
handled. He reiterated that it was likely that Masango had paid
some bribe. He even dismissed the idea of reporting his case to
another chief pointing out that they are all the same. “These chiefs
are to be vetted before they are installed to chieftainship because
some of them are criminals themselves”, echoed Mupona in an
interview with the researcher.
Although the cases reported above are unique in nature, the
process of conflict transformation applied is the same. In each
49

case the chief's court sought the truth before passing judgment.
In Shona, truth telling is valued more than anything else and is
used as a yardstick to measure a person's personality (Driberg,
1934). Telling lies to the traditional court is considered as wasting
the court's time as well as a sign of disrespect. Any report or claim
made to the traditional court is supposed to be verified and
supported by eye witnesses. This is why even complicated
spiritual cases have to be verified by traditional healers so that
people are not punished on false allegations. Arguments used in
the court are supposed to be truthful land straightforward. This is
done to rid the court system of unscrupulous individuals who
may falsely accuse others on the basis of hatred. When reporting
a case, it must be in a language that is understood by the people
present and ambiguity should be avoided at all cost.
When passing judgment, the traditional court system employs
the mitigation approach. Mitigation is a process of assessing
sentence after the accused has been found guilty (Thomas, 1988).
If the offended demands some compensation in form of cattle,
grain or cash, the offender may plead for a lower sentence to the
chief and his court. Mitigation factors may influence the court to
reduce the punishment for the crime committed under the
following conditions: i) Assessment of the way the offender
progressed and behaved throughout the process of conflict
transformation; and ii) Assessment of the damage caused to the
victim and future implications of the offence to the victim.
The Shona traditional court system values peace. In convicting
the offender, the offended is also consulted so that a lighter
punishment can be settled. They respect the Shona idiom that
says 'miti inokura pamwe haikoni kukwizirana' literally
translated to mean people who live together will at one time
conflict but that should not permanently damage their
relationship (Bourdillon, 1981). The witnesses to any case are
vetted to ascertain their authenticity. These are exposed to
serious interrogation to check their consistency and establish
whether they are not interested parties in the case.
Factors determining sentences
50

The cases above have revealed that the chief's role is that of a
judge and a mediator. They are mediators because they are called
upon to assist disputants in agreeing with each other. They are
also arbitrators whose roles parallel those of judges. They devote
their time to the resolution of disputes of distributive, marital,
religious and cultural nature. In judicial courts, the sentences
affirm that punishment ought to fit the crime committed but the
findings in this research have demonstrated that sentences by
chiefs are determined by other circumstances.
Punishment as a deterrent
There are instances when chiefs impose stiffer punishment to the
offender to deter possible offenders from committing similar
cases. In an interview with the researcher chief Mazano reiterated
that cases such as rape to minors and bestiality (makunakuna)
will automatically attract a stiffer sentence because the offences
will invite the wrath of ancestral spirits on the community.
Offenders will have to pay in form of cattle so that cleansing
ceremonies are conducted. In cases involving murder, Chief
Chounda pointed out that although these are not common such
cases again attract a stiff punishment first before the person is
handed to the police. The reasons for stiff punishment are that
traditional courts are there to protect weaker people from those
wicked individuals who do not value life. The other reason is that
the victim has to be appeased so that vengeance is not directed at
everyone in the village. The offenders have no choice but to
comply with the demands of the chief and those of the offended
family so that the burial of the victim may take place.
Motive of the offender
The motives of the offender in committing a crime are considered
before a sentence is passed. A bad motive such as rape, raping
infants for rituals, murder, witchcraft, bestiality and adultery
attracts stiff penalties because there are no extenuating
circumstances in these cases. The research has established that
offenders and their extended families prefer payment of stiffer
penalties outlined by traditional courts for fear of incarceration
and possibly death sentences that the courts may impose on the
offenders for the same crimes.
51

The chief's personality
This influences the process of conflict transformation in that
some chiefs are easily moved by people's pleas. One chief may be
influenced by the mitigating plea of the offender, and may reduce
sentence, while the other may be influenced by his tribal
relationships with the offender or the offended (victim). This
research has established that one of the chiefs canvassed for
bribes during the preliminary stages of the case (before the trial
day) so that he would rule in favour of the one who paid the bribe.
The research has discovered that the chief's decisions on the case
may be influenced by the political party of the victim. Offenders
who belong to the same political party as the chief are likely to
receive lenient punishment; whereas those that are from other
political parties may get stiffer penalties. This has been common
on matters involving political violence. The paper has unearthed
that the age of the chief also influences the process of conflict
transformation. A younger chief may fail to adhere to the
principles of Unhu himself. For example' canvassing for bribes is
against the traditional principles of Unhu. Other chiefs have
corrupt tendencies that are driven by selfishness and greed. Such
chiefs want to benefit from the criminals so much that
individual's right to justice is flouted by unusual severity,
especially in cases where the chief would benefit from the
offender.
The chief's personality and predisposition are key factors. This
explains why crimes that are alike in all respects receive different
sentences from different chiefs. This again explains why some
victims may decide to appeal and report their cases to a different
chief after having undergone a trial process under one chief.
Victim-offender Relationship
Myrna (2004) concluded that the relationship between the
offender and the offended exerts influence on sentencing
decisions and determination of compensation and penalty fees.
Those that are closely related receive more lenient treatment
because Shona tradition upholds the existence of peace after
conviction and sentence. After the court session, the feuding
52

parties are encouraged to forgive each other despite the penalties
imposed since they belong to the same community or family.
Emotional responses that a case may elicit at times have
enormous influence on the sentences imposed. The example of
wife beating cited in this research serves as testimony to this.
Husbands who were reported by their wives on charges of wife
beating walked away with warnings because the traditional court
system respects the fabric tying husbands to their wives. Giving
stiffer punishments, it has been noted, would result in hostilities
in the families.
Gender
This research has unearthed that female offenders are given
lighter sentences if their offences are not spiritual cases such as
witchcraft and murder. Male offenders in cases like theft were
slapped with stiffer punishment as compared to their female
counterparts. The explanation given was that females are a
weaker and protected sex of the Shona tradition just like children.
Men on the other hand, were expected to fend for their families
rather than resort to unorthodox means of acquiring things.
Gravity of the offence
In Shona tradition, life is valued more than anything else. Anyone
who takes another person's life is regarded as an outcast. In this
regard, people who commit crimes against humanity like murder,
or any crime that disturbs the existence of fellow community
members are given stiffer punishment. Cases like burning of
someone's granary, house, grass meant for cattle grazing and
incest are examples of some cases that attract stiffer penalties.
The logic behind this is that these crimes are rated as violating the
concept of unhu.
Challenges and limitations of the traditional process of conflict
transformation
The institution of traditional authorities in Zimbabwe is a
recognized institution that operates within set parameters and
guidelines. Despite these guiding principles there are several
limitations and challenges to the traditional process of conflict
transformation. Gwaravanda (2011) noted that the traditional
53

process of reporting a case is too bureaucratic and the process to
assess a case is too winding resulting in long winding court
sessions.
Another challenge is that the concept of unhu on which the
traditional court system is heavily inclined is not standard in
every individual presiding either as a chief or an elder. There are
some chiefs whose unhu (personality) is as bad as criminals
themselves whose integrity and credibility has been eroded by
their bad behaviour. The selection of the chief's advisors on the
basis of eloquence of speech and intelligence is not a convincing
instrument, because being eloquent does not mean one is
knowledgeable about the court procedures.
The other challenge is that the court session may pass a sentence
basing on mistakes which may arise due to failure to understand
a case, false accusation, irrelevant conclusions and/or
generalizations (Gwaravanda, 2011). An example of a person who
loses a case against an adulterous wife due to lack of evidence and
eye witnesses can best explain this limitation. Less experienced
panellists may be confused by the eloquence of the offender in an
attempt to avoid punishment. At times clarity and soundness of
argument are undermined by the less experienced panellists.
The traditional court system has no mechanism to follow up on
those criminals who boycott traditional courts; as a result, many
offenders go freely without being tried. The chief's messengers
who are expected to make a follow up on those who boycott the
traditional court are sometimes ineffective because they lack
mechanisms to enforce their commands. They may fail to locate a
criminal who would have gone to another town because of the
financial expenses that are involved in making such follow ups.
Chief Mazano pointed out that tradition is being eroded by
diffusion of culture. The present generation has since stopped
valuing their culture because they consider it archaic and
backward. Formal courts are more preferable to the younger
generation than traditional courts. This research has uncovered a
rift between the aspect of Unhuism /Ubuntuism that culture
54

purports to advocate and the reality on the ground. There are
some chiefs whose behaviour is at odds with Unhu; for example
canvassing bribery is unacceptable and uncultural therefore
against the principles of Unhu. Another challenge faced by the
traditional court system is to preside over cases in a way that will
not put the chief in trouble with the courts, especially cases to do
with witchcraft which the courts have been trying to suppress.
Finally, the Shona traditional court system excludes women in
decision making because they are regarded as minors who must
be represented by their husbands and fathers in matters affecting
them. In most cases, their opinions are not represented well.
However despite the outlined challenges and limitations, the
traditional court system is still viewed with high esteem and
decisions made by chiefs are highly respected.
Conclusion and recommendations
The implications emerging from the research are that the Shona
traditional chieftainship's role is to promote the Shona traditional
values. The chiefs perform this role using directive as well as
adjudicative methods of conflict transformation. The aspect of
directive justice manifests when chiefs sometimes use coercive
means to get criminals to accept responsibility for their action,
while the adjudication role is displayed when traditional chiefs
presiding over a case determine the outcome of the case; as a
result of this role, chiefs are still held with high esteem in
Zimbabwe.
One aspect that this research applauded about the traditional
chieftainship's role in conflict transformation is that it
accommodates and accepts that conflicts are inevitable parts of
all human association. It acknowledges that conflict disturbs
peace, and that its resolution involves taking corrective measures
aimed at averting disaster and restoring the peace that has been
shattered. The System recognizes that if conflict is suppressed, it
can result in stagnation and erode the bond of group solidarity
because of an accumulation of hostility. The traditional court
system is confronted with the task to administer justice at the
same time reducing criminality. Justice is identified with fairness
55

and implies that offenders should receive the punishment they
deserve. The research has also unearthed that not all disputes
reported to chiefs end in resolution.
Following the discussed findings of this research, this paper
recommends the following:
There must be no gap between formal courts and
traditional courts in the way cases are tried and sentences
are passed so that criminals will not have a lesser evil
choice. Contradictions between the two systems can be
sealed if they work in consultation.
Chiefs should execute their duties without prejudice or
favour if conflicts are to be resolved permanently. This can
be made possible if some mechanism to guide and monitor
their operations is put in place.
In a world that is influenced by cultural dynamism, the
traditional court system should be flexible to borrow and
accommodate some new concepts of dealing with conflicts
from modern theorists rather than solely depending on
unwritten laws which can be subject to abuse.
Upon appointment to chieftainship, chiefs should undergo
some judicial orientation since these are appointed on
hereditary basis and because some chiefs appointed are
too young and therefore unfamiliar with traditional morals
and values.
Finally, the research gathered that, despite the discussed
strengths, the Shona traditional chieftainship is shrouded
in several limitations that haunt its credibility.
References
Aquirre, A. and Baker, D. (1991) Race, racism, and the death
penalty in the United States. Berrien Spring, MI: Vande Vere.
Bourdillon, M. (1981) The Shona peoples: An ethnography of the
contemporary Shona with special reference to their religion.
Gweru: Mambo Press.
David. M. (1999) Christians and chiefs in Zimbabwe: A social
history of the Hwesa people, 1870-1990s. Volume 20.
56

Dawson, M. (2004) @www.eup.ed.ac.uk
Drieberg, J. H. (1934) “The African conception of Law”, Journal of
Comparative Legislation and International Law, Vol XV1
Feltor, (1990) 'Sentencing Persons who kill witches. Legal forum
Vol 2 p37
Gelfand, M. (1981) Ukama. Gweru, Mambo Press.
Gombe, (1980) Tsika DzavaShona. Harare: College press.
Grotius, (1953) De Jure Belli ex Pacis. Cambrigde: University
press.
Gwaravanda, E. T. (2011) Philosophical principles in the Shona
traditional System. In International journal of peace and
development, Vol 2 (5)
Hamutyinei M A, and Planner (1987) Tsumo-shumo: Shona
proverbial lore and wisdom. Gweru: Longman
Hoodford, J. Jr (1969) Adjudication considered as process of
conflict Resolution: A variation on separation of powers. Yale
University Press.
Law Society of Zimbabwe Handbook 2011.
Menkiti, A. in Wright, R. (1986) African Philosophy. London:
University press.
Pound, R (1954) An introduction to the philosophy of law. New
Haven: Yale university press.
Robson, C. (2002) Real world Research: A source for social
nd
scientists and practitioner researchers. 2 Ed, Oxfords Blackwell
Samkange, T and Samkange, T. (1980) Hunhuism/Ubuntuism: A
Zimbabwe indigenous political philosophy. Harare: Graham
Publishers.
Thomas, D. A. (1988) Sentencing: some current questions.
Current legal problems: Cambridge.
Walliman, N and Buckler (2008) Your dissertation in education,
London: Sage.
Attachments...
57

Cases reported to Chief Chounda between March 2010 and August 2010.
Type of
Cases
Rape
Cases
involving
minors.
Land
boundary
cases
Divorce
cases
Non-
payment
of
Lobola to
in laws.
No. of
cases
Chief’s decision Outcomes
2 Offenders to pay
3beasts each.0ne
for the chief, two
for the offended.
10 4 resolved
successfully
6remained
outstanding.
3 Chief refused to
grant them
divorce except in
case of adultery.
8 Calculated the
lobola basing on
number of
children a woman
has ‘given’ her
husband.
58
They all paid for fear of a
stiffer penalty if the matter
were to be reported to
formal courts.
Two offenders refused to
attend the chief’s court
citing irregularities in the
way issues were handled.
Two others refused to
retreat to the boundary
defined by the court.
Another two ignored the
chief’s orders.
A couple went on to divorce
without the chief’s
permission. Others reported
their cases to another chief.
Coercive methods were
used to get the cattle.
Those without had to
borrow from relatives.

Cases reported to Chief Mazano between March 2010 and September 2010.
Type of
Cases
Land
disputes
No. of
cases
Chief’s decision Outcomes
17 Four cases
Resolved amicably
Bestiality 1 Asked to pay four
cattle to the chief
Divorce
cases
Nonpayment
of lobola
Wife
beating
for defiling the
area.
8 One marriage
dissolved; two
disputes resolved
peacefully.
6 He said people
would be forced
to pay lobola
because in
Zimbabwe wives
are not for free;
gave them until
after harvests.
3 Dismissed the
three cases with
warning
Rape 1 The offender was
asked to pay 4
cattle, one to the
chief and three to
the offended
family.
Murder 1 Family members
to pay 6 herds of
cattle to the
bereaved family.
To pay 2 more
cattle to the chief.
59
Six reported their disputes
to another chief. The
remainder did not attend
the courts.
He negotiated for lenience
and finally paid 3.
5 cases were referred to
the formal courts.
One man refused to pay
alleging the wife eloped to
him when she was
pregnant; he wanted to do
DNA test when the child
was born. Another man
asked his wife to go to her
parents and remarry.
Disputes were resolved
successfully.
The offender paid because
rape attracts stiffer
penalty at the formal
court.
The offender was handed
to the police for custodial
sentence, 2 cattle were
paid to the chief 3
cattle were paid to the
offended family.

4
The role of Indigenous Knowledge in
sustainable development: Practices
and challenges
Kudakwashe D. K. Tapfumaneyi, Zimbabwe Open University,
Zimbabwe
Gift Rupande, Zimbabwe Open University, Zimbabwe
Abstract
Despite the technological advances that have come with the
ubiquitous effects of globalisation indigenous knowledge (IK) has
continued to play a central role in the socio-economic and
cultural lives in most resource poor nations in the developing
World. Every society inevitably has a history behind its knowledge
resources – i.e. IK – which guides its development process. African
Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) are holistic in nature and
centuries of close contact with nature have cultivated a good
relationship with the ecosystem, enabling ecological
responsibility and human health maintenance. The paper
explores the potential role of IK in enhancing sustainable
development in Africa. The paper argues that exclusion of IKS
from the development agenda has led to the snail's pace of
development resulting in Africa lagging behind the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). The paper examines why the
development policies and strategies in the West may not be
misguidedly adopted straitjacketed to suit Africa's development
agenda largely because of different operational environments and
the disparity in infrastructure resources. The paper highlights
the importance of IK as the engine of sustainable development in
Africa and also the challenges that currently hinder the full
exploitation of IK citing possible solutions to the challenges.
60

Introduction
Since time immemorial traditional local communities have
continued to rely heavily on IK to conserve the environment and
deal with natural disasters. This has enabled communities to
identify themselves easily with IKS which have enabled them to
live in harmony with their environments for generations. The
systems are vital tools in the day to day living of rural
communities in Africa, they play a key role in environmental
conservation and natural disaster management, and have a great
potential in enhancing sustainable development. The United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) recognises the role of IK
in the conservation of natural resources and management of
natural disasters. Sadly IK has been under utilised and
overlooked in the pursuit of various sustainable development
initiatives and policies in Africa. Such policies have largely failed
because they have overlooked the already existing knowledge, i.e.
IK. The paper compares IK and western science examining the
problematic characteristics of IK which cause challenges in its
use in development. The discussion advocates for the use of IK to
spearhead all development initiatives in sectors such as health,
agriculture and environmental management as a way of achieving
sustainable development.
Definition of key terms
Sustainable development. The term sustainable development is
used to denote development which meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs – development that does not require a continuous
input from outside to sustain itself (Hirji et. al, 2002:315).
Development. Development is the process of improving the
quality of human life through multi-dimensional changes in
structures, attitudes and institutions. The three important
aspects of development include raising people's living levels,
creating conditions conducive to the growth of people's selfesteem
through the establishment of social, political and
economic systems and institutions which promote human dignity
and respect; and increasing people's freedom to choose by
61

enlarging the range of their choice variables. This is aimed at
reducing inequality and eradicating absolute poverty (Todaro,
1996).
Indigenous Knowledge. Indigenous knowledge is knowledge that
is unique to a given culture, community or society. It is contrasted
and differentiated from the knowledge gained at formal
institutions. Indigenous knowledge systems encompass all
aspects of life, such as the management of natural environment.
It forms the basis of survival for the people who own the
knowledge. Indigenous knowledge may be part of an on-going
experiment or maybe even be an established local tradition (Slum,
2006). Indigenous knowledge is a result of many generations and
is cultivated over prolonged years encompassing experiences,
careful observations and trial and error experiments evolving over
centuries (Martin, 1995). Thus over centuries, indigenous people
of various localities would have developed their own specific
knowledge on plant resource use, management and conservation
(Cotton, 1996).
Knowledge. The question of defining knowledge has occupied the
minds of philosophers since time immemorial dating back to the
classical Greek era and culminating into many epistemological
debates (Alavi and Leidner, 2001:109). Knowledge is processed in
the mind of an individual and can be described as internalised
information relating to facts, concepts, ideas and observations.
However, it is essential to note that knowledge building is a social
process that occurs in all local communities. Nonaka (1994)
explicated two dimensions of knowledge:
Explicit knowledge which is articulated, codified,
expressed and communicated in symbolic form and in
natural languages; and Tacit knowledge which
comprises both cognitive (that is an individual's mental
modes) and technical which refers to the concrete knowhow,
crafts, skills elements. Explicit knowledge can
easily be encoded, explained and understood. Tacit
knowledge is highly subjective and personal, making it
difficult to formalise and encode and is susceptible to
62

change. IK, as an example of tacit knowledge, is
generally stored and embedded in people's minds and
passed on through generations by word-of-mouth rather
than in written form and it is very vulnerable to rapid
change (Sithole, 2006).
Practical uses of IK in development
The local African communities have a vast fund of IK on weather
prediction and early warning, time tested coping mechanisms,
food production and storage techniques, and an impressive
plant-based pharmacopoeia for both human and animal health.
For example, in the field of prediction and early warning of
disasters, the Luo community in the Lake Victoria basin has a
large number of climate monitoring indicators that allow them to
tell such things as the right time to start planting in anticipation
of the rains or to preserve and store food in anticipation of a dry
season. These indicators include observation of the behaviour of
animals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, insects, vegetation and
trees, winds, temperatures and celestial bodies. In the area of
animal health, the Maasai, who inhabit both Kenya and
Tanzania, have at least half a dozen different medicinal plants for
treating East Coast Fever alone in cattle. In farming technologies,
the Matengo people, believed to have lived in the steep slopes of
Matengo Highlands since the Iron Age, have developed a
sophisticated system that enables them to grow crops on hillsides
while at the same time controlling soil erosion and improving soil
moisture and fertility.
Many of the IK approaches to environmental conservation include
such technologies and practices such as shifting cultivation,
mixed cropping or intercropping, minimum tillage and agroforestry,
as well as transhumance. These technologies and
practices used to be pervasive and were used with various other
methods of land use and management to promote higher yields
while at the same time conserving the environment. For instance,
mixing or intercropping maize with other crops such as beans
promoted not only efficient labour utilization but also lessened
the risk of total crop failure since chances were that if one of the
crops succumbed to environmental stress others would survive,
63

this also served to promote food security. Mixed cropping or
intercropping stabilised yields, preserved the soil and made it
possible to harvest different crops at the same time. Other
advantages included the reduction in susceptibility of the crops to
pests and diseases and a better use of the environment where the
combination of species grown had different light requirements or
explored different depths of soil. The system also tended to
provide a complete vegetation canopy at different heights and
thus broke up heavy rainfall and protected the soil.
Traditions, customs, beliefs and cultural rights also played an
important role in environmental conservation and biodiversity.
Many of the communities in Africa maintained shrines and this
protected forests which were used as places of worship and other
rituals. In addition, certain trees or animals were considered
sacred or as totems, so they were protected. IKS provided and still
has the potential to provide participatory approaches to
development that are both cost effective and sustainable hence
the need to put IK at the forefront of development initiatives in
Africa.
The importance of IK in sustainable development
IK is important for the survival of many indigenous communities
and the preservation of biodiversity. Warren (1992) notes that IK
provides the basis for grassroots decision-making, much of which
takes place at the community level through indigenous
organisations and associations where problems are identified and
solutions to them are determined. “Solution-seeking behaviour is
based on indigenous creativity leading to experimentation and
innovations as well as the appraisal of knowledge and
technologies introduced from other societies” (Warren, 1992).
Thrupp (1989) also notes that IK empowers local communities,
contributes to development and increases self-sufficiency.
According to Bayalama (1994) indigenous food production and
preservation systems, for example, contribute significantly to
food security. IK, in its various manifestations, also gives cultural
pride and motivation to solve local problems with local ingenuity
and resources. It is a crucial aspect of sustainable development.
64

For centuries local communities have been managing their
environments using IK technologies and knowhow. These have
been proven to be superior in many cases than alien technologies.
IK technologies and know-how rely on locally available skills and
materials and are thus often more cost-effective than exotic
technologies introduced from the outside (San Francisco
Chronicle, 2002). This highlights the importance of IK in
achieving sustainable development strategies.
Models of development that have failed in Africa
New Partnership for Development (NEPAD)
Most development initiatives in Africa have been euro-centric in
nature and focus, for instance the NEPAD strategy, which
attributed the problem of underdevelopment to the malaise
endemic in Africa. It was assumed that Africa would develop by
following the footpaths of the Anglo-Saxon development
experience and system under the neoliberal, Washington
consensus ideology. Contrary to Africa's social values, these
ethnocentric models placed heavy emphasis on free markets,
deregulation and privatisation, and limited the role of the state in
the development process.
NEPAD does not present a sound economic model for
development which is based on economic theory. Development
models and strategies have been taken strait jacketed out of the
university classrooms and handed over to international agencies
including the IMF and the World Bank. NEPAD presented a
strategy to obtain funds or loans from industrialised countries to
finance African development efforts. This strategy has been
implemented during the pre- and post colonial period but has not
solved Africa's problems. This strategy was dubbed
“Industrialisation by Invitation” (IBI). It was developed by Sir
Arthur Lewis and implemented in former British colonies.
It can be argued that NEPAD came out of Western policies for
Africa and institutions that have been set up for Africa as “thinktanks”
for developing African policies and as a result the strategy
was suitable for a colonial Africa with the West being the major
beneficiaries hence its failure to develop Africa to date. Viable
65

development strategies in Africa should be driven by an agrarian
strategy of development which is based on IKS in that sector.
The Lewis Models of Development
Economic development as an academic discipline is of recent
origin. Before then it was believed that developing countries
would follow the footsteps of the developed countries. When
development issues first surfaced in international debates in the
1950s, the then politically independent nations of Africa
attempted to mechanically transform the Anglo-Saxon
development models. In doing so, African countries heavily relied
on Arthur Lewis' two-sector economic growth model to structure
their economies. Furthermore, there was the African leaders'
keen sense of the waste of their peoples' human potential under
colonialism and the ambition to catch up with the industrial
countries by taking advantage of their technology and of the aid
that was expected to flow from them in growing amounts.
Since Lewis' economic growth model was heavily endorsed by the
United Nations (the First Development Decade of the 1960s –
1970s) and various funding agencies, it was accepted as the
general theory of development for Third World nations when the
tide of independence was swelling. Thus, the politically
independent African countries wholeheartedly attempted to
industrialise by instituting massive capital formation
(industrialisation, urbanisation and technological
transformation of the agriculture sector). Arthur Lewis argued
that if the surplus labour available at subsistence wages in the
rural areas were transferred to the urban areas, it could enhance
capitalistic development. For economic growth to be achieved,
Lewis proposed a structural transformation of a subsistence
based agricultural economy into a modern industrial economy
[Lewis, 1955]. Lewis' model assumed that Third World countries
needed to follow the experience of the West in order to develop. In
addition, the model assumed that the foreign investors would
reinvest their profits in the newly independent countries rather
than sending their profits to their mother countries.
Lewis' two-sector model contributed the following problems to
66

Africa's experience with the industrialisation process. (1)
Agriculture and IK, which were the mainstay of Africa's economy,
were given less importance by the two-sector economic model as a
viable means of achieving Africa's industrialisation as well as
sustainable development. It was suggested that the rural
economy should perform a secondary role as an outlet for capital
products (producing food for consumption and to facilitate
production for export currency earning) and be a supplier of
manpower. (2) By emphasising the perpetuation of capitalist
infusion as a major means of Africa's development, Lewis' model
contributed to insufficient agricultural investment, which
resulted in the rising of food imports and the failure of export
earnings to grow fast enough to provide the needed industrial
inputs. (3) In the African countries that tried Lewis' model,
industrialisation was very disappointing both in its inability to
absorb the large numbers of workers it had attracted to urban
areas and in its limited contribution to development outside the
principal urban areas. (4) Finally, Lewis' model of development
mainly concentrated on output and failed to take into account
income distribution, welfare, and human satisfaction.
Deng (1988) has argued that Lewis' development model
desperately failed in Africa because it “sought to apply
development models that were incompatible with African
economic structure, social values, and institutions” [Deng,
1988:32].
Import Substitution (Prebisch-Singer Thesis)
Prebisch and Singer developed the Import Substitution
Industrialisation (ISI) strategy. African countries that
experimented with the ISI strategy, which was very predominant
in the 1960s, were convinced that because of secular decline in
the value of their export of agricultural products to their imports
of manufactured products, their terms of trade were declining.
(That is, export prices declined relative to import prices.)
Nkrumah opted for the ISI Strategy. Other African countries
followed Ghana's lead in the 1960's. Mali and Kenya looked at
industrialisation in terms of cost savings from local production in
place of high cost imports from abroad. Similarly, other African
67

countries seriously questioned why they should have to import
manufactured products based on the raw materials they
exported. As discussed by Todaro (1996), advocates of import
substitution (Inward-looking development policy) believed that
less developed countries (LDCs) should initially substitute
domestic production of previously imported simple consumer
goods (first-stage IS) and then substitute through domestic
production for a wider range of more sophisticated manufactured
items (second-stage IS)—all behind the protection of high tariffs
and quotas on these imports. In the long run, IS advocates cited
the benefits of greater domestic industrial diversification and the
ultimate ability to export previously protected manufactured
goods such as economies of scale, low labour costs, and the
positive externalities of learning by doing therefore causing
domestic prices to become more competitive with world prices.
The Import-substitution industrialisation strategy raised the
learning curve of the African countries that went through it.
Nonetheless, it had the following limitations: (1) being secure
behind protective tariff walls, its products were non-competitive
and very expensive. (2) Import substitution's main beneficiaries
were the owners of foreign direct investments. (3) The imported
capital-good inputs and intermediate products that came under
government subsidies contributed not only to heavy debt burden
but also balance of payments deficits. (4) IS industrialisation
policy negatively affected the exportation of traditional primary
products because the exchange rates of some of the African
countries were artificially overvalued in order to raise the prices of
exports and lower the prices of imports. (5) Import substitution,
which was created in order to stimulate infant industry growth
and self-sustained industrialisation by creating forward and
backward linkages with the rest of the economy, inhibited the
industrialisation process.
Under these economic conditions it seems that to develop a selfreliant
development strategy for Africa would be impossible. It
seems the academicians in the Universities failed to provide viable
strategies for Africa's economic development in the 1950s and
1960s. African countries have tried to form political Pan African
68

unions, to take matters into their own hands, and engage in a self
reliant strategy for development. Despite such efforts not much
has been achieved because colonial rule left the African
economies in a weak and fragile situation. Given these conditions
it would be difficult to build economically viable nation states.
These fragile states began to crumble under balance of payment
crises generated by rising energy prices of the early 1970s and
under weak commodity prices resulting from the recession in
1980/81 in the industrialised countries. In addition development
plans have not been sustainable as they have largely relied on
western funding and imports; for example agriculture is largely
based on hybrid seeds and chemicals which are not
environmentally friendly and destroy ecological life, the health
sector imports western medicines for treating diseases such as
HIV/AIDS and malaria (despite the limited availability of
conventional health centres) at the expense of indigenous
medicines which have been used to provide primary health care
for centuries. The World Bank and IMF developed strategies
including the Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (ESAP)
to improve economic conditions in Africa but ended up making
the conditions worse; this is especially so for countries like
Zimbabwe.
The paradigm shift towards the Indigenous Knowledge for
development discourse
For some post-development writers, IK represents a possible
alternative for progress among the world's rural poor. As Escobar
(1995:98) puts it: “the remaking of development must start by
examining local constructions, to the extent that they are the life
and history of the people, that is, the conditions for and of
change”. Such approaches can be supported by careful
ethnographic work capable of drawing out the complexities of the
interrelationships established between communities and places
(Herbert, 2000). This implies a change that comes from within
communities themselves, having confidence in and deploying IK,
among other things, to bring about economic and social progress.
There is then a sense of the rural poor having a voice about
progress which affects them, and enabling outsiders to listen
seriously to what they have to say, learning from them, and
69

especting their realities and priorities (Chambers, 1983:2001).
There is nonetheless recognition that indigenous agricultural,
health, rituals and cultural systems demonstrate a considerable
knowledge of, and sympathy with, the environment. IK becomes
fundamental to debates about sustainable development because
of the way in which such knowledge has apparently allowed
people to live in harmony with nature for generations. Such a
privileging of IK in development is, therefore, welcome and is
testimony to the potential role that it can play in development and
sustainable development. This represents “a shift from the
preoccupation with the centralised, technically oriented
solutions of the past decades that failed to alter life prospects for a
majority of the peasants and small farmers of the world” (Agrawal,
1995:414).
Without doubt, there is a belief in many quarters of the need to tap
into the stock of IK if appropriate planning and land management
strategies are to be developed in a sustainable way in the
agricultural sectors of Africa (Chokor and Odemerho, 1994; De
Boef, Amanor and Wellard, 1993; Okali, Sumberg and
Farrington, 1994). IK seems to reject western science's claims to
universality and spatial transferability, at the same time its
institutionalisation casts it as an object that can be essentialised,
archived and indeed transferred itself. IK has a pivotal role to play
in sustainable development because of its ubiquitous presence in
a myriad of sectors which include agriculture, health, natural
resource management, food security and education which are the
cornerstones of development and also considering the local
availability of most of the resources that indigenous approaches
require, making them cheap and sustainable.
Much IK research has tended to focus on the contents of IKS per
se, with a particular interest in indigenous soil classification and
management methods in agriculture, as well as on indigenous
technologies, water conservation techniques and indigenous
woodland management. There has been relatively less interest in
knowledge about vegetation for grazing and livestock
management more generally, although there are notable
exceptions. Arguably, this interest has been at the expense of a
70

deeper understanding of the epistemology of IK with the focus of
attention being on the empirical and practical knowledge of the
environment and natural resources, and how they can be used
and managed in ways that provide material support for
communities within which they are deployed. The economic and
socio-cultural context in which such knowledge is used seems to
be of lesser interest. This results in IK becoming disconnected
from its context. Reij, Scoones and Toulmin (1996:26-27) have
suggested that “much effort is expended on designing and
disseminating 'solutions', but too little time is spent on
understanding the problem”.
This can be exemplified by some of the work conducted on the
indigenous knowledge of soils. Much of this work has revolved
around understanding how people classify soils, and, in
particular, the factors used in such classifications. Soil colour
and texture emerge as key common factors in indigenous soil
knowledge. In their study of farmers in Niger, Lamers and Feil
(1995) noted that 'red' soils are seen to be moderately fertile, quite
sandy with some organic content; 'black' soils are more fertile
with a greater organic content; and 'white' soils are very infertile
with little organic material. For Osunade (1994) in Swaziland,
touch is an important process for farmers in deciding soil fertility,
as well as identifying the presence of fauna and flora; for example,
earthworm casts are found on nutrient rich soils, but never on
acidic soils. In Nigeria, farmers are also aware of the link between
soil texture and the differential deposition of river sediments, as
well as the 'feel' of soils and their moisture content (Kundiri,
Jarvis and Bullock, 1997). There is much that is factually very
useful, practical and relevant in these examples, but very much
only within the place in which these 'knowledges' have been
developed. There persists the uneasy feeling that somehow these
knowledges are too place-specific to be of much theoretical use,
or, indeed, of much developmental value beyond these particular
locations. The fact that IK is context tied seems to place questions
upon its broader use in sustainable development.
Western science and indigenous knowledge: binary tensions
Often western science and IK are represented as two different,
71

competing knowledge systems, characterised by a binary divide, a
divide arguably evolving out of the epistemological foundations of
the two knowledge systems. Hence, they may be treated as
discrete entities, separable from each other in space, hindering
dialogue and learning between them (Mohan and Stokke, 2000).
Although this divide may indeed be false, or, at least, not as
marked as might be supposed, the binary notion still persists.
Western science is seen to be open, systematic and objective,
dependent very much on being a detached centre of rationality
and intelligence, whereas IK is seen to be closed, parochial,
unintellectual, primitive and emotional (Agrawal, 1995; Ellen and
Harris, 2000; Herbert, 2000; Howes, 1979; Howes and
Chambers, 1979; Mitchell, 1995; Warren, 1991). Consequently,
whereas western knowledge systems are part of the whole notion
of modernity, IK is regarded as part of a remnant, traditional and
backward way of life, a view which may be reinforced by the
concentration of work on IK on people in low- and middle-income
countries.
The result has been the pursuit of myopic development plans
firmly based on the view that development can only emerge from
the application of western knowledge and that IK has nothing to
offer. As Escobar (1995:13) noted “development has relied
exclusively on one knowledge system, namely, the modern
Western one. The dominance of this knowledge system has
dictated the marginalisation and disqualification of non-Western
knowledge systems”. Ellen and Harris (2000) take this further by
arguing that the term 'indigenous' almost invites an oppositional
'us and them' scenario between the two knowledge systems. It
may well be that there can be no rapprochement, however, as
possible interactions are constrained by the different ways in
which participants have been trained to think and by the rather
different contexts in which they operate. This binary is
perpetuated in some of the empirical literature, perhaps
unintentionally. For example, in a discussion that is broadly
sympathetic to indigenous knowledge, Kundiri, Jarvis and
Bullock (1997:206) nonetheless talk about farmers having “very
subjective methods of identifying and describing the different
soils”. By using the word 'subjective', a non-rigorous connotation
72

of IK is implied. Similarly, Pretty (1994) notes that participatory
methods of data collection are all too often assumed to lack the
rigour and accuracy assumed to be present in more formal
positivist approaches. Science has retained its resilience in
development debates over IK because of its perceived 'substance'
(Leach and Mearns, 1996), something which indigenous
knowledge apparently does not possess. The fact that not all
aspects of IK may be subjected to empirical study makes its
wholesome adoption in development problematic.
Indeed, it can be argued that IK has an advantage over western
science in the context of poor communities in that information is
tested in the context of survival, that is, in the laboratories of
human existence, and hence is not just true or false in some sort
of dispassionate way (as western science might conclude), but is
either more or less effective in providing the means of survival, a
conclusion more meaningful in the context of everyday existence
(Davies, 1994; Kalland, 2000). Hence, IK is very much driven by
the pragmatic, utilitarian and everyday demands of life. It
requires openness on the part of western science to explore and
even recognise the validity of alternative explanations and to
acknowledge the importance of the negotiated character of
knowledge production of IK (Leach and Mearns, 1996; Pottier,
2003).
According to Homann and Rischkovsky (2001), the problem for
the integration of western and IK is that the former searches for
knowledge of universal significance which is not context-related,
whilst the latter is a social product closely linked to a cultural and
environmental context. It is interesting how the view that western
science is in some way objective, detached and decontextualised
from its socio-cultural, political and physical environments is still
pervasive in these debates. Western science is as much socially
constructed as IK, and it is ironic that although the charge is
frequently made that IK is too place- and culturally-specific to be
universal and transferable, and therefore to be of much value in a
broader sense of development, such doubts are rarely expressed
about western science, even though its results in the last 50 years
of development in Africa and elsewhere have hardly been
73

impressive in transforming poor people's lives.
This raises a critical issue for the legitimacy of IK; for if IK is to be
taken seriously, it might potentially jeopardise the hegemony of
current development planning strategies based on western
science and the dominant role of the 'expert'. This may result in
'experts' discouraging scientific research that discredits their
dominant development discourse or they may attempt to
deliberately discredit local knowledges to maintain their
positions. Hoben (1995) acknowledges that local environmental
knowledges in Ethiopia, for example, were discredited because
they were held responsible for producing environmental
degradation. Consequently, all the other elements of the IK base,
such as manuring methods, the use of ash, the use of rotational
leguminous crops, terracing methods, and locally constructed
run-off ponds to collect rainwater were also, wholly undeservedly,
discredited.
Challenges of using IK in development
A key element of IK is that it tends to be deeply embedded within
the society in which it has been developed, and it must therefore
be seen in its economic, political and cultural contexts (Barrera-
Bassols and Zinck, 2003; Bebbington, 1993; Davies, 1994;
Jewitt, 2000; Myers, 2002; Pottier, 2003). This is discomfited and
unusual for development practice as it makes the broader
application of IK difficult between different geographic, cultural
and economic settings. Herein lie some of the thorniest policy
difficulties for IK. This marks a major difference between IK and
western science, in that, whilst IK is indeed deeply embedded in
its context, western scientific knowledge thrives on abstract
formulation and separation from the lives of the investigated
(Agrawal, 1995; Pretty, 1994). Hence, there is a real danger here
that in development discourses, IK can amount to little more than
“ a convenient abstraction, consisting of bite-sized chunks of
information that can be slotted into western paradigms,
fragmented, de-contextualised, a kind of quick fix, if not a
panacea” (Ellen and Harris, 2000:15). But this view misses the
point that it is precisely the local embeddedness of IK that imbues
it with relevance, applicability and even power. Thus in essence IK
74

can be used for the sustainable development of the local
communities in which those knowledges exist. However, there is
therefore, the real danger that IK will lose its agency and efficacy if
it becomes depersonalised and/or objectified and is used in some
sort of top-down manner. There are, therefore, real problems in
applying IK ideas out of context.
It may be argued that the importation of IK from one context to
another carries serious risks of failure, and, indeed, that there is
little merit in trying to develop IK as a generic development
planning tool. Because knowledge is developed by local people
through a real understanding of the environment in a particular
place, knowledge is not easily transferred into other locations,
raising doubts about how applicable IK is out of its immediate
geographical context (Leach and Mearns, 1996; Warren and
Rajesakaran, 1993). If so, this raises serious questions about the
efficacy of IK and how it can really be used in a wider development
context. Indeed, it can be argued that IK should not be packaged,
generalised or 'scientised', because such an approach misses the
point of the special character of local needs, as well as ignoring the
reality of “the socio-economic and historical situation of the local
community in which the technology is applied” (Sikana and
Mwambazi, 1996:108). Similar sentiments are shared by
Eyzaguirre (2001) who argues that a global recognition of IK as a
planning tool may be at a price. That price is the detachment of IK
from its cultural, livelihood and community contexts, the very
things which helped to create IK in the first place, and hence such
a disembodied IK may end up undermining the system itself.
Although there has recently developed the rhetoric of an
'indigenous technical knowledge' which implies a certain
universality of knowledge, overlooking the unique features of
particular knowledge systems and taking knowledge out of its
cultural context (Sillitoe, 1998), there are clearly problems with
what might be seen as a developing institutionalisation of IK.
Indeed, there are real dangers in such institutionalisation in that
the focus of an institutionalised IK may be rather more on
administrative structures and management, rather than on IK.
As with other forms of knowledge, IK has its limitations and these
75

must be recognised if it is to be integrated with the global
knowledge. Certain IK practices become outmoded because of
rapid changes in the environment or the socio-economic and
cultural scene. Not all IK practices are naturally in harmony with
the environment. Thus it is imperative to move away from the
misconception that all IK is good and vital for sustainable
development.
There is historical and contemporary evidence that indigenous
peoples have also committed environmental wrongs through
over-grazing, over-hunting, or over cultivation of the land and it is
misleading to think of IK as always being “good”, “right” or
“sustainable”. In particular, IK relating to cultural artefacts,
totems, rules and taboos, beliefs and prohibitions may require
critical examination. For instance, where perhaps in some distant
past there was need for people to hold that women and children
should not eat chicken or eggs, it is questionable whether that
prohibition is justified today. The same goes for the tradition,
common in many tribes, which specifies which parts of an animal
or chicken, can be eaten by men, women and children
respectively. Many of the taboos, rules and prohibition seem to
have been overtaken by time and are no longer serving a useful
purpose nor rational. However, in critically re-examining those
beliefs it is always useful to bear in mind their purpose, rather
than their grounding. For example, among the communities in
western Kenya every young boy in the village was restrained from
killing frogs by creating the fear that his mother's breasts would
disintegrate if he did so. The logic of this prohibition is faulty, but
its purpose is sound since frogs needed to be protected to avoid
extinction as they were valued by the communities for some forms
of traditional medicine. IK is dynamic and evolves all the time.
However, Thrupp (1989) has noted how sometimes IK that was
once well-adapted and effective for securing a livelihood in a
particular environment becomes inappropriate under conditions
of environmental degradation and when change is particularly
rapid or drastic, the knowledge associated with them may be
rendered unsuitable and possibly damaging in the altered
conditions.
76

Recommendations and Conclusion
It may be argued that the key to achieving development more so
sustainable development in Africa lies in tapping into the rich
aura of IK that exists in Africa. The challenges of IK transfer
maybe overlooked in the short term as communities are
encouraged to tap into locally existing knowledges in various
sectors of agriculture, food security and environmental
management to meet development goals. It would myopic to think
IK has all the answers in meeting the sustainable development
needs of Africa but rather a holistic approach is required that
embraces the best of both worlds that is the incorporation of IK
and western knowledge in intelligible ways that will help Africa
attain sustainable development. It is only through the inclusion of
indigenous knowledges in the African development discourse that
the wreckage and trail of successive sustainable development
failures maybe halted.
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5
Science education for sustainable
livelihoods: Community development
through society-responsive science
curriculum reforms
Crispen Bhukuvhani, Bindura University of Science Education
Enna Gudhlanga, Zimbabwe Open University
Chipo Chirimuuta, Zimbabwe Open University
Abstract
With poverty deepening, environmental degradation worsening,
severe effects of climate change and natural hazards and
disasters, this literature-based paper explores, raises questions
and stimulates debate on society-responsiveness of science
education curricular for community development and
sustainable livelihoods of citizens. Scientific literacy is a
cornerstone of science education reform and twenty first century
citizenry. The ability to make decisions about socio-scientific
issues is a characteristic of scientific literacy. Science education
research, unless it emerges from praxis and is central about a
political commitment to the struggle for liberation and in defence
of human rights, will fall short of helping make sense of the
intended goal of responding to community needs and
development. As a society, we believe that schools should prepare
masses of people to exercise the rights and responsibility of
citizenship. Social responsibility is an established general
education goal, one that science education must no longer avoid
(Kyle, 2006). Science education must not be limited to the
laboratory but, to some critical extent, be an active part of our
social milieu. Science education ought to be linked to issues of
sustainable development. Current science education reform
movements have, either intentionally or unintentionally, not fully
conceptualised the task at hand.
81

Introduction
The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) has led international efforts towards
scientific literacy, particularly, in developing countries, cognizant
of the crucial role of science and technology in national
development. Lately, international emphasis is on education for
sustainable development, with 2005-2014 declared as the United
Nations Decade for Sustainable Development. Like scientific
literacy, sustainable development is laden not only with concepts
but also skills and values such as the development of human
potential, moral, cultural and gender sensitivity, participatory
democracy, collaboration, unity and peace.
Why the advocacy for a Society-Responsive Science Curriculum
Globally, higher education is poised to become more responsive to
societal needs (Narasimharao, 2011). Kyle (2006) also rightly
notes that science education ought to be connected to issues of
sustainable development, a critical ingredient to the realisation of
peace in any given nation. Throughout our global science
education community, the rhetoric of 'science education for all' is
juxtaposed to the reality of 'science education for the privileged.'
Science educators must articulate a vision of and assume agency
for an education in science that creates opportunities for self-and
social-empowerment whereby all learners are able to engage in
participatory action-taking in a democratic society (Kyle, 1991,
1999, 2002). Levelling the playing field for all the learners will
greatly work towards limiting the chances of the creation of a
volatile environment where learners from different social strata
are provided with fertile ground for possible conflict and therefore
threaten the realisation of sustainable social development. A
science/technology curriculum built around the concept of
equity and the dire need to address pertinent societal issues of the
day is a pivotal point for school science (Yager, 1984). Trends
toward viewing science as a discipline concerned with the study of
the interaction and impact of science on society are apparent
(NSTA, 1978).The dominance of technology in society today
reaffirms these philosophical orientations and necessitates that
today's students achieve a level of scientific and technological
82

literacy to help them deal with science-related societal issues for
the improvement of their own lives and the advancement of
society (Lisowski, 1985). Once the learners start gearing
themselves towards addressing the science related social issues,
they are accorded a platform from which to unleash their creative
potentials as well as effectively make use of their hyper energies
and ultimately channel them towards the development of their
lives as well as that of their communities in general. This kind of
development is surely sustainable; it can go on (be maintained)
without possibilities of reaching a dead end as the very local
environment will be making use of locally available scientifically
empowered intellectual resources. Such a society (that is blessed
with an empowered young generation) is best placed to foster
everlasting, uninterruptable development and ultimately peace
within the different social groups. In such scenarios the
communities' energies are all harnessed towards productive
science oriented projects and, resultantly, the propensity towards
aggression and violent behaviour towards each other is reduced.
As Galtung (1996) has argued, individuals, associations or
nations resort to conflict actions that in most cases result in the
reversal of developmental efforts or destruction as a way of
venting out feelings of frustration which normally emanate from
experiences of rank disequilibrium. With a young generation that
would have been given equal opportunities in science-oriented
education, the disequilibrium and frustration that goes with it is
reduced to a void and in place of it development oriented creative
interventions from the sharp minded youth will be realised.
There is widespread agreement that philosophy of science,
especially positivism, is a very poor guide to actual science
(Fuchs, 2000). The natural sciences did not constitute the singleminded
pursuit of the ultimate truths of nature that we imagine it
to be today (Fuller, 2000). Initially the curriculum is laden with an
industrialist sense of what science has to offer humanity, rather
than a study in theory driven disciplines. Science became theory
driven; where theory meant “systematic knowledge abstracted
from the concrete contexts in which science was the normally
pursued” (Fuller, 2000).
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Science educators have failed in their social responsibility to
provide students and the general public with an understanding of
science as it is today …its history …its nature …its powers. In a
way science has been presented to the learners as an entity that is
totally removed from their everyday experiences and only found in
the books. And as the science learners on the African continent,
science became an imported knowledge system that had no roots
what so ever in the everyday experiences of Africa. In a way it had
to be something that is imported into the continent or nation
(roots, stem and leaves) with nothing alike from the local context.
It is this situation that Kyle (2006) bemoans when he notes that it
is regrettable that science courses from elementary school
through undergraduate studies continue to be structured and
taught from the perspective of this uncritical acceptance of logical
positivism. It is however unfortunate that in spite of the years of
schooling, students and adults alike are not aware of the
misleading notion to which they have been exposed. Thus, for
sustainable development and ultimately peace to be realised
through the provision of a science oriented curriculum, local or
indigenous scientific knowledge also has to be incorporated into
the whole project. With a contextualised science curriculum,
which attempts by all means necessary to absorb the local
scientific flavours, chances of missing the goal post in the search
for scores in sustainable development are very slim. This will also
afford the learners to, not just regurgitate what they would have
been taught in the science classroom for purposes of passing
examinations and obtaining paper qualifications, but to interact
with and interrogate the scientific knowledge systems to come up
with intervention strategies in dealing with locally specific social
problems.
It is sad that the old school of science education has led students
into believing that science is one discipline with special qualities –
rationality, objectivity, reliability, validity. This shows that the
road paved as 'Science Education' could equally possess street
signs denoting “One Way” or “Dead End” (Kyle, 2006). Works in
Science and Technology Studies (STS) field point to the difficulty
of seeing those special qualities in the scientists' native habitats
(laboratories) unless one enters already a believer in those
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qualities (Barnes, 1974; Bloor, 1976; Latour & Woolgar,
1979/1986; Knorr-Certina, 1981). Fuchs (2000) drawing upon
Knorr-Certina (1981), Latour & Woolgar (1979, 1986) and others,
notes that the ethnographic evidence regarding how scientists
actually do their research shows that it resembles playful
tinkering, practical reasoning, and mundane sense-making and
manipulation. The goal of science education ought therefore to be
not only learning specific scientific knowledge, but also
developing skills of scientific thinking (Driver, Newton, &
Osborne, 2000; Kuhn, 1993; Zohar & Nemet, 2002), and the skills
of argumentation such as critical reasoning, creative thinking,
and problem-solving play important roles in high-level brainstorming
(Coles & Robinson, 1989). Such critical interrogation of
scientific knowledge at hand, innovative thought and capacity to
apply to practical situations can best be achieved when science
education has been skewed in such a manner that it takes
cognizance of the locally available scientific knowledge within the
social environment as well as life experiences of the learners.
Hence, Kuhn's (1993) assertion that people normally judge and
draw conclusions based on their beliefs or evidence they have
experienced in life. The skills of argumentation, therefore, become
essential knowledge for modern citizens and professionals, and
ought to be taught in school (Driver et al., 2000; Nussbaum,
2002).
It is, however, unfortunate that in Africa, science education has
tended to register a denial of the ever existence of any indigenous
science oriented knowledge and experiences to the point that
what has been experienced has been an importation of the
foreigners concept of what is authentic scientific knowledge. This
attempt to implant the 'renaissance' into Africa is a denial of
Africa's right to choose from her experience terms and concepts
that can be understood and used to interpret, within the context
of scientific discourses, African history and politics. This kind of
anomaly within the knowledge development and knowledge
dissemination processes can be one of the attributes of the
fixation of the African gaze to the North that has resulted in Africa
conceding prominence and leadership to the North. The new
paradigm shift in the designing and implementation of science
85

education in this historical era that is dominated by high levels of
technological developments has to uphold the view that African
historical experiences yield fertile experience from which to
extract key scientific analytical concepts (Ramose, 2008b). It is
sad that the epistemological paradigm of colonial legacy still
continues to dominate the entire construction of knowledge in
African states, including Zimbabwe. The implications are far
reaching since whoever holds the key to the construction of
knowledge also has key to power. Besides, such a scenario points
to the fact that the former masters continue to be the points of
reference with regards the construction or even deconstruction of
scientific knowledge on the entire globe. As has already been
alluded to, the now being a period of incessant advancement in
science and technology, this has a far reaching implication: that
Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular will never claim a
space in the global scientific advancement by virtue of the
people's failure to identify local or indigenous points of reference
from which to leapfrog into the digital highway. It is these points of
reference that should act as a springboard from which the local
communities and later the entire continent can register their
existence as well as their stake in the field of developing scientific
oriented knowledge and, therefore interventions to alleviate
challenges.
Every human society develops, for its own use, different ways of
coping with existence, experience and nature. We need the full
and active participation of highly educated citizenry. In order for
this to occur, we must begin to take action upon conditions that
persist for a significant percentage of the global population (Kyle,
2006). The secret of knowledge pre-eminence is grounded in a
value-based society (Kaw, 2011). According to Kyle (2006) the
following human conditions are most pertinent to science
educators engaged in socially transformative work in schools and
communities:
1. More than 10 million children under the age of five die
each year from preventable causes such as malnutrition,
unsafe water, and the lack of even the most basic health
care.
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2. Nearly 120 million children of primary school age remain
out of school; these children are working children,
children affected by HIV/AIDS, children whose lives are
affected by conflict and disability, children of the poor or
minorities, and rural children.
3. At least one third of the 190 million working children aged
10 to 14 in developing countries have no access to basic
education or health care. Uncounted millions in the same
age group are receiving an education of poor quality.
4. Adult literacy, however measured, is also critically
important. Recent assessments suggest that there has
been modest progress towards the goal of adult literacy,
with slight decline in illiteracy rates throughout the world.
5. While global economic production has tripled since 1980,
the gap between the average incomes of the wealthiest
20% and the poorest 20% has more than doubled and
continues to widen.
6. More than 1.2 billion people in the world lack safe
drinking water and nearly 3 billion do not have access to
adequate sanitation. These two conditions alone pose
serious consequences for development and contribute to
an estimated 25000 people per day dying from diseases
caused by contaminated water or food.
7. HIV and AIDS pose an enormous danger to the
achievement of the world's goals for education. In the
worst affected areas, the demand for education is on the
wane because families and communities are increasingly
poor, dispirited, and devastated. Education is an essential
need both for both combating HIV and AIDS and
responding to the needs of children, families and
communities affected by the pandemic.
These human conditions can be viewed from socio-cultural,
political and economic perspectives, and may be framed in the
context of science-technology-society (STS) issues. When society
fails to care for the environment that sustains it, when its
population increases beyond the capacity of the land and water to
provide adequate food for all, when the disparity between the
haves and have-nots widens into a gulf of social injustice, the
87

esult may be disastrous. The HIV and AIDS challenge is one very
interesting issue where the locally available knowledge systems
that had previously been down trodden (circumcision,
consumption of pure unprocessed traditional food among others)
are now being resuscitated and utilised in mitigating the effects of
the epidemic. Flavin (2002) notes that forging a harmonious
global community will only be possible if it is based on universal
principles of respecting human rights, meeting basic human
needs, and preserving the natural environment as well as the
indigenous scientific knowledge for Africa's posterity. In that
endeavour, governments, international organisations, private
companies, and citizens all have important roles to play.
Science Education and Sustainable Community Development
The major questions this paper sought to address was: In what
ways science education ought to be connected to issues of
sustainable development? Much of the socio-political rhetoric of
st
the 21 century is centred on socio-scientific issues and
sustainable development. The need for citizens who use
knowledge of scientific concepts to participate in social
conversations and make decisions about socio-scientific issues is
epitomized in the science education community's calls for
scientific literacy (American Association for the Advancement of
Science, 1993; Bybee, 1997). Socio-scientific issues are complex
social dilemmas that (a) impact economic, civic and cultural
affairs, (b) lack clear-cut solutions, and (c) have conceptual or
technological ties to science (Sadler, 2004). Some examples of
socio-scientific issues include genetic screening, diet, medical
treatment, and biological and chemical weapons.
Dani (2011) views scientific literacy as entailing decision-making
that leads to sustainable development. Sustainable development
results from practices, processes, activities, or regions that meet
the needs of the present without compromising future
generations' ability to meet their needs (Dani, 2011). For
sustainable decision-making to occur, the principles, values, and
concepts of sustainable development must be integrated into all
aspects of education and learning (Bybee, 2008; United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO],
88

2010). The outcomes of such an education are citizens with the
“attitudes, skills and knowledge to make informed decisions that
would benefit themselves and others, now and in the future, and
[are predisposed] to act upon these decisions” (UNESCO, 2010).
Sustainability and sustainable development naturally fit in the
science curriculum. The essence of sustainable development is
simply to provide for the fundamental needs of humankind
without doing violence to the natural system of life on earth (Dani,
2011). This idea arose in the early 1980s and came out of a
scientific look at the relationship between nature and society.
This is the kind of relation whose destruction can cause untold
suffering and even violent conflicts among human kind that have
the potential to derail all development strides that could have
been realised in most of the global communities. The concept of
sustainable development, therefore, reflects the struggle of the
world population for peace, freedom, better living conditions, and
a healthy environment (NRC, 1999 in Martens, 2006).
Thus, if knowledge is related to power then ideas about
knowledge, expressed in discourse, must be researched to render
visibility on how power is being exercised in knowledge discourse
and in whose interests it is being exercised . Fuller in Rooney
(2011) argues that knowledge societies are not industrial societies
permeated by knowledge, but that knowledge societies are
permeated by industrial values. Those industrial values are
inexorably associated with commercialised technology and
assumptions about the ability of technology to bring about
change.
Curriculum review in many countries has encouraged the
development of courses which aim to develop 'scientific literacy'
(Norris & Phillips, 2003). When students experience an education
in science limited to the guiding interests of instrumental reason,
they are denied a form of knowledge that enables them to develop
and change culture, including the culture of science. It is this
product of science education that would surely lead to
sustainable development as the application of the learnt
knowledge will result in the alteration of the existing state of
89

affairs and ultimately the adoption of completely different
perspectives towards social phenomena in pursuit of challenges
characteristic of human life. It is imperative that students have an
opportunity to experience the hermeneutic and critical sciences
in the context of formal education in science (Kyle, 2006). The goal
of science education should be to facilitate both students and the
public's ability to identify possibilities, seek challenges, use their
imagination and transform communities. Students' experiences
with science ought to be self-involving, socially just and
emancipatory.
According to Greene (1995) in Kyle (2006) the main point of
education (in the context of a lived life) is to enable a human being
to become increasingly mindful with regard to his or her lived
situation and its untapped possibilities. Science education must
be contextualised and must be linked to the life world experiences
of learners. These multiple images of science education ought to
be open to multiple forms of research and knowledge production
and take issues of locality, cultural values and social justice
seriously. Surely, this challenges the science educators in Africa
in general and Zimbabwe in particular to tap into indigenous
scientific knowledge reservoirs and assist young learners to
produce scientific innovations with local roots for the
consumption for their own kith and kin so as to avoid a situation
where Africa consumes what it does not produce while conversely
producing what it does not consume. With the contextualisation
of science education, the continent will quickly move away from
relying on imported scientific solutions or interventions in the
face of challenging social phenomena. Harding (1996) argues
that a transformed science education would be personally
relevant to people living in naturalistic environments; would
acknowledge the political, social, and cultural forces at work in
scientific labour; and would be linked to local contexts and issues
of sustainability.
The notion of locality and the social construction of science,
according to Kyle (2006) can facilitate a far more reflective and
insightful science education. Science education ought to enable
learners to: (a) understand how the natural world works, (b)
90

understand how human systems are interacting with natural
systems, (c) assess the status and trends of crucial natural
systems and (d) promote and follow a long-term sustainable
relationship with the natural world. These are ways in which
science education ought to be connected to issues of sustainable
development.
Science education ought to be much more intrinsically linked to
the goals of human rights, democracy and social justice (Kyle,
2006; Kyle, 1999) as perceived by the people for which the
educational curriculum is designed. This is especially so in key
areas such as agriculture, energy policy and climate change,
global toxic chemicals and the chemical economy, the politics of
population and selected natural resources. It also relates to the
challenge of addressing resource-based conflicts, breaking the
link between resources and repression, as well as democratising
global influences; that is, shifting the course of the global
economy and institutions that underpin it away from destruction
and toward local governance, ecological and social integrity.
These are key themes that ought to be permeating science
classrooms if we wish to prepare future citizens who recognise the
links between environmental, economic, political, and social
concerns and who are able to establish sustainable development
as the central organising principle for societies around the world.
Science education should be fostering engagement with goals of
sustainable development in domains such as health and
environment, economic prosperity, equity, conservation of
nature, stewardship and civic engagement.
Meaningful science education should be an application of science
in daily lives of the targeted communities, being specifically
designed to address the citizens' need to have the knowledge,
skills and disposition to make decisions and solve problems at the
interface of science and society (Bingle & Gaskell 1994, Kolsto
2000) through the use of locally available resources. This requires
the ability to meaningfully engage and critically reflect on science
as it applies to local social issues and public debate. Some
examples of current topical issues are sustainable energy
sources, use of pesticides and fertilisers, managing water
91

esources, increasing green house effect, ozone depletion, logging
forests, increasing soil salinity and cloning to name just a few.
Science could also be used as a resource for making informed
personal decisions on health and lifestyle issues within the
context of the indigenous peoples' frames of reference. Examples
could include childhood immunisation, the use of antibiotics,
hormone replacement therapy, exercise and healthy eating.
Bowers (2001) also notes that unless our approaches to the social
justice attained through educational reform are reframed, science
education will continue to lead to more intractable forms of
consumerism and therefore further impoverishment of our
communities (for a community that only consumes without
producing to replenish what it has exhausted is sure destined to
starvation or insecurity in the long run). Bowers (2001) outlines a
strategy for educational reform that confronts the rapid
degradation of our ecosystems by renewing the face-to-face,
intergenerational traditions that can serve as alternatives to our
hyper-consumerist, technology-driven worldview. Bowers (2001)
explains how current technological and progressive programs of
educational reform operate on deep cultural assumptions that
came out of the Enlightenment and led to the Industrial
Revolution. These beliefs frame our relationship with nature in
adversarial terms, view progress as inevitable, and elevate the
individual over community, expertise over intergenerational
knowledge, and profit over reciprocity. By making eco-justice a
priority of educational reform, we can begin to: democratize
developments in science and technology in ways that eliminate
eco-racism; reverse the global processes that are worsening the
economic and political inequities between the hemispheres;
expose the cultural forces that turn aspects of daily life from
education and entertainment to work and leisure into marketdependent
relationships; uplift knowledge and traditions of intergenerationally
connected communities; and develop a sense of
moral responsibility for the long-term consequences of our
excessive material demands.
Many science educators have been engaged in what is commonly
referred to as the science-technology-society movement. While
92

there have been reports of successes in developing curricular
materials and reconstructing the science curriculum in local
schools, little is reported in the research literature that would
inform the science education community of whether and how
such a curricular orientation: impacts students, teachers, and
community members; contributes to the adult population's
literacy in science; or enables action-taking on critical issues of
importance to our respective societies. This is true, in part,
because science educators have not regarded education as a
primary means of investing in human resources and promoting
development. That is, education has been disassociated from the
contextual realities of life and living. Education must be
transformed from the passive, technical, and apolitical
orientation that is reflective of most students' school-based
experiences to an active, critical, and politicized life-long
endeavour that transcends the boundaries of classrooms and
schools.
The language of science education and sustainable development
It is sad to note that the language of science education is foreign
and distanced from the learner in an African community. When
learners are taught in their language they grasp the concepts of
Science education better than when being taught in a foreign
language. If our Science curriculum incorporates the use of
indigenous languages as the medium of instruction then it would
go a long way in promoting education for sustainable
development. There are some countries that have done very well
by using their indigenous languages. For example, English is not
taught in China and 95% of the people do not speak it or write it,
and yet the Chinese are visibly prosperous (Gudhlanga 2005).
The economic miracle of Japan was not based on widespread
dissemination of English. It was a result of indigenisation of such
technology, and the translation of the processes into terms that
an ordinary Japanese factory worker could understand
(Gudhlanga 2005). Also, some European countries for example
Germany, France, Italy and Denmark, use their own languages
for education and other purposes, but they are highly successful.
In these countries, English is only taught as a subject. Also
Afrikaans was used in apartheid South Africa for more than 40
93

years, and yet it is less than 100 years old. It was only recognised
as a language in 1925, but is now a language of instruction in
several universities. It is also a language of science and
technology (John 1971). Indigenous languages should be allowed
to develop in a similar manner that Afrikaans did. Languages are
dynamic and can develop terminologies as they are required. No
language is more expressive than the other (Gudhlanga 2005).
Our science curriculum would be enriched and it would have
meaningful results if it is taught in indigenous languages; it
would promote sustainable development as has happened in
China, Japan and South Africa.
Conclusions
Science content courses may emphasize the relationship between
sustainability, science, technology, and ecology by giving
examples of sustainable practices, unsustainable practices, and
consequences of both. Content courses may also engage preservice
teachers in analysing community-based cases. We also
call for science education in Zimbabwe and other African
countries to incorporate the use of indigenous languages;
language is a universal human right and hence people of African
descent should not be disadvantaged by being denied information
in their own indigenous languages.
Dani (2011) calls for science teacher education programmes to
incorporate explicit instruction about sustainability and related
constructs in science education courses. One way of addressing
the concept of sustainability in a science methods course consists
of explicit instruction in the context of socio-scientific issues.
Failure to consider the economic, social, and environmental
domains to analyze socio-scientific issues and concomitant
projects, activities, regions, or processes will undoubtedly result
in less sustainable decisions and actions. The debate continues:
Which science is being taught in our schools, colleges and
universities and how relevant is it for our communities? To what
extend do our science education curricular respond to issues of
community sustainable development and address basic human
rights and socio-scientific issues?
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Recommendations
For the achievement of the goals there is need to:
Identify an appropriate philosophy, platform or rationale from
which curriculum goals (aims and objectives) unwaveringly
advance the need for community responsive curriculum.
Select relevant content (theories, laws, formulae, facts, etc)
that will help achieve the intended goal.
Select learning experiences (learning activities), that is,
experiments and projects: scientific investigation, designing of
prototypes, construction, testing, reconstruction and
improvements, presentation of prototypes to communities and
industries for large scale production).
These should be the real activities individuals must be exposed
to acquire relevant skills.
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6
Re-examining the role of NGOs in
conflict resolution: Friends or foes
Kudakwashe D. K. Tapfumaneyi, Zimbabwe Open University
Gift Rupande, Zimbabwe Open University
Abstract
NGOs have been heavily involved in various conflict resolution
initiatives of various forms and types. The conflicts NGOs are
involved in range from minor resource disputes to fully fledged
ethnic wars. The increased involvement of NGOs in various
conflict resolution initiatives in the developing world has put
them under closer scrutiny as to their real reasons for their
involvement in conflict resolution and peace building. The paper
explores the nature and functions of NGOs in conflict
resolution, in providing such services as psycho-social support
thus giving a more comprehensive picture of the spectrum of
NGO activities in relation to resolving conflict and making
peace, especially in Africa. The paper argues that certain
activities of NGOs have inevitably and unintentionally
perpetuated conflict in some instances. The paper highlights
how NGOs are at times viewed as partial mediators in conflict
resolution initiatives and why their links with western nations
through funding and origins make them liable to suspicion of
having biases in resolving conflicts in ways that suit their
western sponsors. The paper proposes ways in which NGOs may
play a meaningful, transparent and impartial role in conflict
resolution and peace building in Africa.
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Introduction
Over the years there has been a great increase in the number of
NGOs in Africa with their scope and nature of activities being
varied and well spread geographically. Because most of the
NGOs are involved in activities relating to development, relief
and advocacy, which are of direct and visible benefit to the
communities in which they operate, NGOs have achieved a high
degree of goodwill. This has enabled most NGOs to be involved in
conflict resolution interventions; their capacity to deal with
conflicts is further boosted by the wide expertise of NGO
employees who are able to work creatively in conflict situations
in order to bring about resolutions. The role of NGOs in conflict
resolution is recognised by the United Nations as well as
international funding agencies like the World Bank who now
bank upon the resources of NGOs for conflict resolution,
particularly in areas like early warning, third party intervention,
reconciliation, and peace building. The UN General Assembly
has recognised the role of NGOs and called upon the UN
Department of Public Information (DPI) to work with NGOs
interested in communicating information about the United
Nations. In continuation of the General Assembly resolution,
the NGOs and Institutional Relations Section was established
within DPI to provide information and other liaison services to
the growing number of NGOs accredited to the United Nations.
In 1968, the UN Economic and Social Council formalised its
consultative relationship with NGOs. However it should be
noted that NGOs have not been given any formal status in the
General Assembly or other powerful bodies like the Security
Council. NGOs have evolved to become key partners in
development assistance and in conflict resolution especially to
less developed countries in collaboration with international
agencies like the UN, the European Union and the World Bank.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former Secretary General of the UN
remarked that NGOs are an indispensable part of the legitimacy
without which no international activity can be meaningful and
attainable. The paper explores some of the causes of conflict in
Africa and the strategic role that NGOs may play in resolving
conflicts. The discussion also highlights the controversial roles
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that NGOs are involved in when trying to resolve conflicts. The
paper also examines the relationship that exists between NGOs
and the communities they serve and concludes by
recommending solutions to solve the challenges that emerge as
a result of NGOs involvement in conflict resolution.
Definition of Key Terms
NGO. A non-governmental organisation (NGO) is any non-profit,
voluntary citizens' group which is organised on a local, national
or international level. NGOs are task-oriented and driven by
people with a common interest. NGOs perform a myriad of
services and humanitarian functions, through bringing citizen
concerns to Governments, advocating, lobbying and monitoring
policies and encouraging political participation through
provision of information. Some are organised around specific
issues, such as human rights, environmental management,
health or conflict management. They provide analysis and
expertise, serve as early warning mechanisms especially in
issues to do with conflicts or food security and help monitor and
implement international agreements. Their relationship with
offices and agencies of the United Nations systems differ
depending on the goals and the mandate of particular
institutions (http://www.ngo.org/ngoinfo/define.html).
Conflict. Conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable part of human
existence. It entails the pursuit of incompatible interests and
goals by different groups. Armed conflict is the result of use of
force and armed violence in the pursuit of incompatible and
particular interests and goals (Juma, 2008).
Conflict Resolution. Conflict resolution refers to a range of
methods for alleviating or eliminating sources of conflict. The
term "conflict resolution" is sometimes used interchangeably
with the term dispute resolution. Conflict resolution is an
important feature of both personal and international relations.
Conflict analysis, negotiation, mediation, conciliation,
facilitation, arbitration and judicial settlement are aspects of
collaboration towards a compromise or consensus decision
usually aimed at resolving conflicts at various levels
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(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflict_resolution).
Peace-building. According to Juma (2008) peace building refers
to the efforts and interventions aimed at overcoming the root
causes of conflict. Peace building is about the attempts to
overcome the structural, relational and cultural contradictions
which lie at the root of conflict in order to underpin the processes
of peacemaking and peacekeeping. In theoretical terms peace
building is a combination of the fields of development studies and
conflict resolution.
Causes of African conflicts
Africa is a vast and varied continent with different countries
having equally different histories and geographic conditions,
different stages of economic development and also different
patterns of internal and international interaction. The sources of
conflict in Africa also reflect this diversity and level of
sophistication. Sources of conflict are at times purely internal,
while some reflect the dynamics of a particular sub region and
some have vital international dimensions. Despite the variations
the sources of conflict in Africa are linked by a number of common
themes and experiences.
Historical legacies such as the portioning of Africa in 1885 at the
Berlin conference resulted in certain states and kingdoms being
arbitrarily divided and by the same manner unrelated areas and
people were arbitrarily joined together. The newly independent
states inherited these poorly designed boundaries created in the
colonial period. The problem was further compounded by the fact
that the framework of colonial laws and institutions which the
new African states inherited had been designed to exploit local
divisions and not to overcome them. The era of serious conflict
over state boundaries in Africa has largely passed, aided by the
1963 decision of the OAU to accept boundaries which African
states inherited from colonial authorities. However the challenge
of forging a genuine national identity from among disparate and
often competing communities has remained.
There has been a growing concern amongst Africans themselves
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to see the causes of conflict as going beyond the results of their
colonial past and to look at themselves as the ones to blame for
the conflicts that bedevil the continent. The nature of political
power in many African states, together with the perceived
consequences of capturing and maintaining power is a key source
of conflict across the continent. The political scenario in which the
winner takes all approach with regards to wealth, resources,
patronage and the prestige and prerogative of office has been a
major source of conflict. Such a scenario has cultivated a culture
of corruption, unequal distribution of resources and very often a
flawed electoral system. Thus where there is limited
accountability, lack of checks and balances, non adherence to the
rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace
leadership, political control becomes important and the stakes
become dangerously high making conflict in most cases
inevitable. For instance the ongoing conflict in the Ivory Coast
was triggered by an electoral dispute which resulted in a civil war.
Pockets of violence as a result of electoral disputes are all too
common in Africa as there is absence of clear means of change of
leadership because of a flawed electoral process. When the state
is the major provider of employment as is often the case in Africa
and political parties are often based on tribal and ethnic lines,
multi ethnic conflicts are more likely to erupt resulting in a violent
politicisation of ethnicity (Juma, 2008).
During the cold war external efforts to bolster or undermine
African governments were a familiar feature of super powers'
constant fight for neo-colonial hegemony. With the end of the cold
war such external intervention has receded but has not
completely disappeared. In the competition for oil, mineral
resources such as diamonds, gold and other resources in Africa,
interests external to Africa continue to play a large and at times
decisive role, both in suppressing conflict and in sustaining it.
The recent uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia are believed to have
been caused by third forces though this remains largely a theory
which is difficult to prove. NGOs are also perceived to be agents of
external forces in some conflict situations, a claim which may not
be wholly dismissed as there are some cases where intelligence
operatives have been proven to be working undercover for some
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NGOs. This has only gone on to add to the suspicion in which
NGOs are viewed; a case in point is the denial of entry to give food
aid in the famine hit Somalia which is in part controlled by the Al
shaabab militia group linked to the Al Qaeda group. This is
testimony to the mistrust that NGOs and other humanitarian
agencies are viewed with in conflict zones, largely because their
independence is questionable especially in light of their funding
base and often perceived euro-centric orientation and ideologies.
Apart from external causes of conflict one of the major causes of
conflicts in Africa are economic motives. Despite the devastation
that armed conflicts bring there are some players who stand to
benefit from them and are therefore responsible for fanning and
fuelling the conflict rather than halting it. The chief culprits in
supporting armed conflicts in Africa are the international arms
merchants and the warring parties themselves. Arms merchants
benefit immensely through the sale of arms to the warring groups
and therefore do not have an interest in seeing the end of the
armed conflict. In Liberia for instance, the control and
exploitation of diamonds, timber and raw materials was one of the
major principal objectives of the warring factions. Control over
those resources financed the various factions and gave them the
means of sustaining the conflict. This is similar to Angola where
protracted difficulties in the peace process owed much to the
importance of control over the exploitation of the country's
lucrative diamond fields. The chance to plunder natural
resources and to siphon the central bank reserves were the major
motives for those who staged a coup to over throw the elected
government in May of 1997 in Sierra Leone.
In addition to the sources of conflict in Africa that have been cited
a number of factors also come into play notably the particular
situations and conditions in various sub regions. In central
Africa, they include the competition for scarce resources such as
land and water in densely populated areas. Several
displacements which occurred as a result of ethnic conflicts and
disturbances have resulted in multi claims for the same piece of
land amongst various families in Rwanda. In most oil rich
countries in Africa conflict has emerged because communities in
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which the oil is located are disgruntled because they believe that
they are not deriving any tangible benefits from the extraction of
the oil or that they bear the brunt of the environmental
degradation that results from the oil extractions. Similar
sentiments are shared by the people of the diamond rich
Chiadzwa area in Zimbabwe who argue that those companies
mining should make efforts to develop the area as well as
ensuring that the local community members benefit through local
employment for those who will be working in the mines. In North
Africa, the tensions between strongly opposing visions of society
and the state are serious sources of actual and potential conflicts
in some States. These can be attributed as the potential causes to
what has now become known as the “Arab Spring” optimised by
the uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya.
The nature of operations and relationship between NGOs and
communities
NGOs are increasingly recognised as an important role-player in
community or people-centred development. They are a large
category of structures responsible for development. NGOs have
often been viewed as important for democracy and resolving
conflicts because of their strong support at grassroots level and
their capacity to develop and empower poor communities. They
are extremely important mechanisms in rural development and
they enjoy the goodwill and acceptance of the community.
Therefore NGOs have become very important players in the field of
social development and upliftment. This is particularly so at
grassroots level. The primary aim of NGOs is to improve the living
conditions of people through development in general. This entails
various aspects of human life, such as literacy, human dignity,
justice and economic ability, essentially the joy of life.
There is an argument that NGOs are today still seen as possible
alternatives to government in addressing the needs of
communities which are not reached by official development
programmes. During the operation 'Murambatsvina'' (operation
remove filth or dirt) in Zimbabwe NGOs played key roles in
providing food and shelter to those whose illegal structures such
as shacks had been destroyed. NGOs such as the Red Cross
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continue to provide food aid in times of droughts and famine or
during food shortages as was the case in Zimbabwe in 2007-2008.
According to Stephenson (2005) in the early 1990s there began to
be recognition of the importance of NGOs. NGOs were found to
have closer ties to on-the-ground realities in developing countries
and, more importantly, to be able to deliver development aid more
cheaply than states as they are more cost-effective in their work
among the poor. That is they usually spend less money on
administration and more on actual help and it is for this and other
reasons they are able to operate on fairly low costs.
A small criticism has emerged questioning the effectiveness of
NGOs in improving the lives of their intended beneficiaries. For
instance, Mendelson and Glenn (2002) scrutinised democracybuilding
NGOs and argued that foreign NGOs may have created
domestic offshoots that were well-funded but weak in grassroots
support; this especially so in Africa where NGOs may operate
detached from the communities they purport to serve. NGOs at
times make ephemeral interventions which operate in fits and
starts and which are not empowering to the communities but are
based on handouts which run out and are not sustainable. In
such situations when the handouts cease the communities go
back to their impoverished conditions. Stiles (2002) has argued
that the growth and sophistication of Bangladesh's NGO sector
may cause some of the organisations to seek a greater presence in
the public arena (by getting involved in politics) and to pursue forprofit
type activities that may have some “unintended and
negative” consequences for the lives of the poor. Similarly, Gauri
and Galef (2005) noted that the adoption of micro-finance
activities by some NGOs seems to have created incentives for
managers of these organisations to maximize the size of their
portfolios by targeting wealthier villages. While this may be
efficient in a strictly economic sense, this can mean that activities
of NGOs might not reach the poorest individuals in communities.
NGOs in both Bangladesh and Uganda do not appear to locate in
the most needy communities (Fruttero and Guari, 2005; Barr and
Fafchamps, 2006). Even in Zimbabwe most NGOs are based in
the capital Harare only. Even though they might operate in some
rural communities they would not have offices in those
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communities putting into question the relationship between such
NGOs and the communities they serve and whether such
organisations really understand the needs of such communities.
NGOs tend to focus on reaching the poorer and more needy
members of the community. They are therefore less prone to
elitism and are able to promote popular participation through
facilitating resource mobilisation. They help to increase diversity
of opportunity in society and they broaden channels through
which resources and benefits can reach groups which otherwise
may be bypassed. The main focus of NGOs' activities in the
communities they serve are aimed at facilitating development
either through offering relief and advocacy services to
communities or mitigating conflict issues. Thus NGOs are good at
communicating with and mobilising the poor and they employ
participatory, bottom-up approaches in project planning,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. They are effective in
assisting the poor to participate in matters affecting them and as
a result gain more control over the quality of their lives. This
ability of the NGOs to promote public participation is due to their
partnership relations with the communities they serve. They also
work well with, and strengthen, ineffective local institutions. Most
NGOs are innovative, flexible and experimental. This implies that
they can transfer technologies developed elsewhere and adapt
them to local conditions, as well as formulate innovative
responses to local needs in ways that suit the communities they
serve.
The strengths of NGOs are that they are able to facilitate a
relatively high degree of community participation; they can
accurately identify the specific needs of a community. In other
words, NGOs can more effectively identify community needs
because they are closer to the community than government
structures. This is because the members of the NGO may live in
the community or even belong to the community which they
serve. This is particularly useful in facilitating conflicts as they
are aware of the background of the conflict thereby making them
more capable of playing mediators and resolving it. Because some
NGOs function at community level, or have been created as a
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esult of a community initiative, they tend to enjoy more
legitimacy in the communities which they serve. This is because
communities might feel that such initiatives are their own, and
effectively address their own needs and interests (De Beer and
Swanepoel, 2005). The projects initiated by NGOs therefore
become the property of the community, and because the
communities see the projects as their own, its members are more
likely to support them. The high degree of community
participation creates a conducive environment in which local
technology can be utilised and adapted to local development
needs. This high degree of participation allows communities to
apply knowledge and technologies which they have developed
themselves to suit their own situation.
Because of their structures, NGOs are not characterised by the
same bureaucratic nature as that of government; rather they are
very flexible and adaptive to local conditions and changes in the
environment. Their running costs are lower because of their
smaller organisational size, which is supported by its voluntary
character. This means that they can respond faster to situations.
Yet NGOs should evaluate the environment where they are
operating to assess which functions government cannot perform
effectively, and serve as an alternative in the provision of such
services. As at times NGOs in Africa waste vast resources by
assisting communities with services already covered adequately
by government or other NGOs. Hence there is duplication of effort
in communities whilst there is neglect of other areas in which they
could possibly serve.
African NGOs should encourage access by grassroots
communities to information materials, communications
methods, and popular participation in decision making whilst
enabling support to grassroots organisations and social groups
that are in a position to work out alternative policies and bring
about change through collectively defined actions which are
culturally acceptable to the communities they serve
( http://www.unsystem.org/ngls/documents/publications.en/v
oices.africa/number6/vfa6.06.htm).
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The controversies surrounding NGOs' involvements in African
conflicts
Gary (1996) argued that international donors are trying to
undermine state governments in Africa from below by increasing
NGO funding and from above by a loss of legitimacy and
sovereignty through World Bank and IMF policies (Gary, 1996).
As this African state is being weakened, Gary believes that it can
sometimes co-opt and control these NGOs to its own purposes as
a consequence of their battling together for the same resources.
As a result, Gary believes, local African NGOs might not be as
independent as claimed.
According to MacFarlane (1998: 245), 'the proliferation of NGOs is
part and parcel of the pluralist conception of the rooting of
democratic governance within a society. To the extent that
citizens aggregate on the basis of common interests into effective
organisations for the promotion of the latter, this limits the power
and flexibility of government. 'In addition to their direct effect on
public policy, NGOs have an important indirect effect in
increasing the awareness of the public at large of the nature and
significance of policy issues before government' (MacFarlane
1998:245). The advantages of NGOs in conflict prevention are
that they 'do not carry the baggage of government status, are
closer to and better informed about developments within the
community, are 'often made up of people of stature within
communities' and promote functional concerns and therefore can
transcend ethnic boundaries. This makes them better positioned
to be impartial mediators in conflicts more capable in resolving a
myriad of conflicts.
In transitional societies, such as those in the former Soviet Union,
NGO potential is conditioned in large part by the relationship
between local NGOs and their international partners, who are
responsible to some extent for setting the agenda, wholly for
obtaining funding, and in large part for evaluating project work.
International NGOs (INGOs) also have a specific role to play, with
certain advantages over local organisations under particular
conditions: 'where local organisations are weak and vulnerable to
government interference…international groups may fill the gap in
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non-governmental activity' (MacFarlane 1998: 246). Further,
INGOs usually have more prestige and better access to
information; can do capacity-building via training, financial
support, provision of equipment, etc.; can operate across lines of
conflict; and can serve an early warning function for international
intergovernmental organisations or for their home governments
(MacFarlane 1998: 246-247). However it is this link with home
governments that has been a point of great consternation because
of the historical baggage of the west's interest in Africa and its
resources. Most African states have always felt that the west is
bent on pursuing a neo colonial agenda largely based on
exploiting Africa's natural resources. The role of NGOs especially
INGOs in conflict resolution is perceived as that of ensuring that
conflicts are resolved in the interest that serve the west best in
allowing the west access to Africa's natural resources. This may
be achieved in a number of ways which may include ensuring that
a puppet government comes into power that will bow to the whims
of the West or the propping up of tyrannical regimes that are
linked to the west. In Zimbabwe a bill was crafted by parliament
which was intended to curb the interference of NGOs in national
politics though the bill is still to become law.
Over the years studies have placed less emphasis on the ideal type
of NGOs and more on the actual role NGOs can play in the
conditions in which they find themselves (Hudock
1999;Mendelson and Glenn 2002). Hudock (1999) points out the
difficulties of cooperation between northern and southern NGOs,
stressing especially the southern perspective that dependence on
northern funding and agendas often prevents local organisations
from carrying out useful projects. She criticizes the tendency of
some scholarship to idealize NGO activists' goals: 'One of the most
fundamental weaknesses of the NGO literature is its suggestion
that NGOs possess a value base that drives them to act on
'altruistic 'motives. This absolutely contradicts one of the key
tenets of organisational analysis; namely, that organisational
survival is every organization's goal and that, to survive, an
organisation must place its own interests before those of others,
especially those which are potential competitors' (Hudock 1999:
20-21). This observation points to a problem present in most
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conflict ridden African states, where 'civic values' cannot be taken
for granted among NGO employees and where competition for
association with western partners and access to hard currency is
stiff, leading to a harsh struggle for survival by any given
organisation. This has led local NGOs and INGOs to be over
dramatic and to sensationalise conflict situations in their reports,
doing so in ways that are partial and which would suit view points
of their funders in order to please their western sponsors and to
enable them to secure more funding.
Another factor conditioning the development of the NGO
community is the widespread lack of resources. These can be
human in nature as well as material and financial. This has led to
a search for outside training, equipment and funding. Such a
search has a variety of consequences. On the one hand, it can
introduce a potentially positive element of competition into the
emerging NGO realm, forcing organisations to attempt to generate
high-quality proposals. However, all too often this initial phase
encourages a certain amount of parroting of supposed western
civic values in order to obtain grant monies, rather than to the
actual internalisation of such values by locals, which is a slow
process depending inter alia on conditions outside the NGO
community. Thus, an overly rapid and uncritical adoption of
western funding organizations' agendas takes place, with little
sense of the need and/or available capacity to reflect on
significant differences between western and African societies and
to modify approaches accordingly. This has affected the
impartiality of NGOs involved in conflicts in Africa and reduced
the trust warring factions would have in them, thus diminishing
their role in conflict resolution and peace building.
Puplampu and Tettey (2000) argue that the increasing
globalisation forces are conditioning the state and NGOs. The
heightened competition between the state and NGOs for
resources, make it so that INGOs are increasingly being
substituted for good local policies (Puplampu & Tettey, 2000).
Local governments are opting out of performing a lot of the
necessary and basic services because their incentives to provide
them are being eroded by the presence of foreign NGOs with
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foreign money who are willing to provide these services. Thus the
dependency syndrome culture is cultivated which is a potential
source of conflict in future. In most African states donor funding
flowed through NGOs soon after independence and this was in
support of basic services such as health and water and
sanitation. Failure in these basic services after NGO funding is
withdrawn usually after the thawing of relations between the
home governments of INGOs and the governments of African
states causes conflicts between the African government and its
restless citizens. Indirectly these actions of NGOs trigger conflicts
in some states though however unintended.
Another aspect of INGO activities that can be manipulated is aid
to displaced persons, such as refugees. Terry (2002) discusses the
paradoxes of the humanitarian refugee situations. The first
paradox is that of protection—that refugee camps are often not
fully de-militarised and thus become targets for violent action.
Humanitarian aid can also be manipulated by factions to bestow
legitimacy on their cause and to control the local population.
Refugee camps can also involuntarily feed into the war economy
by creating a space for other groups to make a profit out of the
displaced persons or through providing services and resources to
the groups providing aid. These groups have little incentive to see
the conflict end because it will dry up their own source of revenue.
Manipulation is a huge problem for several reasons. It can add to
the incentives surrounding the conflict and inadvertently
perpetuate the conflict, and it can also jeopardise the
organisation's central missions through a loss of neutrality. Rieff
(2002) also pointed out the dangers of humanitarian aid and how
numerous large, international aid agencies are succumbing to
the dilemmas of aid and forsaking their neutrality and
independence by lobbying governments and the UN to take action
on human rights issues. This jeopardises these organisations'
free access to all victims because they are no longer seen as
neutral participators, and it also opens them up to be
manipulated by world leaders and governments to serve their own
political purposes. Even more alarming is that some NGOs are
becoming more and more politicised stifling the role they can play
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in resolving conflict and peace building or even hampering their
humanitarian activities as a result.
In Sudan, NGOs with clear political agendas have been
proliferating and that can hinder conflict resolution and entangle
the NGOs in the conflict (Riehl, 2001). NGOs have strong
incentives to get involved politically because the political
situation affects their ability to make headway with conflict
resolution. Although giving aid appears to be a benign and
benevolent activity, this aid can inadvertently perpetuate
patterns of conflict. Anderson (1999) argues that international
humanitarian aid can negatively affect conflict in two main
ways—it can either feed into tensions between groups or it can
weaken existing connections between the groups. An example of
this would be targeting the aid to a particular group of
people—ethnic, religious, or some other group. If this group
receives aid and another group with whom they have tensions
doesn't receive aid, it can serve to reinforce those divisions.
Anderson thus advocates that humanitarian aid needs to be given
in a thoughtful way, including an analysis of the causes of the
conflict and how existing institutions and norms either feed into
the conflict or serve to mitigate it. NGOs need to be careful that
any resulting aid will strengthen local capacities for peace and not
serve to strength existing tensions and divisions.
INGOs are the largest source of controversy when it comes to
NGO involvement in conflict resolution. The other types of NGOs
involved are much more limited in their reach and roles, and thus
they do not have as big a problem with jeopardising their core
missions through political involvement. The most dangerous
thing for NGOs is when they try to engage in both hand-on and
hands-off methods of dealing with conflict resolutions. For
example, trying to combine relief and advocacy can lead to
jeopardising the neutrality that is so vital in relief work. Even
combining policy work and empowerment/transformation
activities can be difficult because then NGOs might be looked on
as taking sides as well. There is definitely a need to re-look and
probe into the proper relationship between NGO advocacy and
NGO relief and services work to establish how a balance can be
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struck to ensure an impartial role in conflict intervention.
The strategic role NGOs can play in conflict resolution
NGOs constitute an essential part of civil society and they have
the potential to play key roles in resolving conflicts and restoring
civil society. NGOs can support and form well knit local
infrastructures or peace constituencies comprising of people from
different sectors of civil society whose aim is to attain sustainable
peace and whose activities are based on long term commitment.
The major Achilles heel of NGOs working in resolving conflicts has
been largely due to their failure to forge relations with indigenous
partners, local leaders and so on. This has diminished their role in
resolving conflict and this has exacerbated suspicion as to their
impartially especially considering their foreign origins and source
of funding. Thus NGOs can only be believed to be acting as
impartial mediators to bring consensus among different
conflicting groups with the help of local peace constituencies.
There are a several roles that NGO's can play in the peace making
process. NGOs should presume their traditional relief and
rehabilitation activities with a long-term perspective. This implies
that initial emergency relief responses should be neatly tied to a
set of activities that leads to the transformation of those conflicts
in a manner that promotes sustained and comprehensive
reconciliation among the warring parties. NGOs should be
cautions against the excessive use of external resources in relief
and rehabilitation activities. Excessive use of external resources
all too often fosters and cultivates dependency syndrome and
passivity. This may also become a new object of contention,
inadvertently fuelling the conflict. NGOs should mobilise local
resources which empower the people and enrol new participants
into their activities, especially women who have often been kept
passive and sidelined in the peace process despite being the major
victims in conflict situations as they are subjected to all forms of
physical and emotional abuse. NGOs should continue to monitor
human rights abuses and undertake the task of providing early
warnings of potentially violent conflicts and should pursue
conflict resolution activities.
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Recommendations
To work effectively in a conflicting situation NGOs should
preserve their own identities and neutrality and should appear to
be impartial. Of crucial importance is the need to forge local
indigenous partnerships in attempting to resolve the conflict.
NGOs should be mindful of their unofficial status and they should
use it to gain more access to conflicting parties, which helps in the
process of negotiation. However, these remain ideals which are
not being practiced; what is required is to create truly indigenous
NGOs which may be supported by regional African bodies that
may be engaged in conflict resolution without the control and
involvement of external western funding.
The long-term commitments may enable NGOs to establish trust
among the people involved in the conflict and NGOs may be able
to attend to the goal of lasting peace. The guiding principles for
NGOs that intend to be engaged in conflict resolution activities
are that: (1) the NGOs must be very familiar with the country,
issues and participants in the conflict; (2) the NGOs should have
indigenous partners; (3) NGO staff must be well grounded in
conflict resolution skills and knowledge; and (4) NGO workers
must understand and accept the personal risk they run in
attempting to intervene directly in the conflict.
Conclusion
The state is often perceived as one of the parties in a large number
of conflicts in Africa. Therefore, it is imperative for NGOs to
preserve their independence without losing trust of the conflicting
parties including the state because loss of trust has often resulted
in NGOs being labelled as instruments of the West. NGOs should
work in co-operation and co-ordination with each other to reduce
duplication in their activities and in the process NGOs should not
lose their individual identities. Coordination and networking of
NGOs is a key factor in lobbying and advocacy at a higher level. In
the end NGOs should not limit their scope of work to mere conflict
resolution, but expand to address the root causes of conflict and
enhance the process of peace building. Only through maintaining
impartiality can NGOs be viewed as friends rather than foes. The
role of NGOs in conflict resolution should be based on their
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presence at the ground level as actors with an abundance of good
will generated through years of development and rehabilitation
work. Apart from creating a friendly atmosphere for negotiations,
where the prospects for such negotiations are not visible at the
level of the conflicting actors, the NGOs can play a key role in
many intractable conflicts. Peace building is now seen as a part of
sustaining agreements reached. Very few organizations if any are
perhaps more equipped than NGOs in undertaking this task.
However, in order to play a more effective role in conflict
management, the NGOs may have to reorient themselves with the
appropriate attitude and skills, which of course should be seen as
an additional element of their development work. So far NGOs
have been playing mixed roles which make them friends on one
extreme end and foes on the other. It is through the
implementation of the recommendations cited that NGOs may
extricate themselves from the controversies that have
surrounded their involvements in conflict resolution.
References
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Barr, A and Fafchamps, M. (2006) A Client-Community
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Development Studies, forthcoming.
De Beer F, Swanepoel, H. (2005) Community development and
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7
Zimbabwe's economic empowerment
initiatives: A critical review
Ronald Chipaike, Bindura University of Science Education,
Zimbabwe
Abstract
Zimbabwe's empowerment efforts began in the 1980s with the
redistribution of land under the willing-buyer-willing-seller
method, which however proved unviable in the long run.
Following on the inability of the willing-buyer-willing-seller
strategy to effectively redistribute land, the government
embarked on a fast track land reform programme in 2000 which
redistributed land to a significant number of locals. Currently,
the government is championing industrial indigenisation which it
claims will benefit most people. This paper argues that the
problem with all of Zimbabwe's empowerment initiatives is that
they create wealth for a few and leave out the most deserving
people. This creates conditions for economic and political
instability. The paper holds that the solution to this problem is to
channel funds to the informal sector and small business
enterprises where most of the economically vulnerable groups
have found economic refuge.
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Introduction
The Zimbabwean land reform programme and the current
industrial indigenisation programme have met with mixed
reactions from both the local constituents and the international
community. Initially, the land reform programme was seen by the
United States of America (USA) and the members of the white
Commonwealth as a flagrant and vindictive violation of property
rights which could only be stopped by the imposition of punitive
measures on the Mugabe regime; however it has become apparent
that land has been taken for good and it seems these countries are
beginning to learn to live with that reality. The industrial
indigenisation drive as well has been criticised for the huge
chunks of stakes that it forces foreign owned corporations to cede
to black Zimbabweans. The programme, though noble has been
criticised for being introduced in an environment in which the
economy is struggling to stabilise as a result of a decade long
recession caused by a host of challenges ranging from blatant
corruption and general economic mismanagement by
government officials to a list of restrictive measures put on the
country by the USA, the United Kingdom, Australia and other
countries who are supposedly opposed to the land reform
programme and the checkered human rights record of the
Mugabe regime since 2000.
The concern is that the law will scare off potential investors who
would want to bring the much needed Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) and force those already operating in Zimbabwe out of
business as a result of the 'injustice' they would have suffered. All
these observations paint a picture of a hastily compiled policy
that is inconsistent with the needs of an economy struggling for
stability in the interim. However all the talk about the advantages
and disadvantages of both the land reform and the industrial
indigenisation drive miss the point that both processes have
yawning loopholes that will contribute to significant political and
economic problems in the near future.
Significant sections of Zimbabwe's communal areas have not
been decongested as a result of the land reform programme as
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was initially envisaged. Yet areas bordering their communal areas
and others far afield have underutilised or unproductive farms
lying idle. With the effects of increasing pressure on the land
pushing them, these landless communities might in the near
future call for a revision of the land allocation process so that they
equally benefit. The government through the ministry responsible
should ensure that the recommendations of the Utete
commission of 2003 and those of other independent experts be
implemented to ensure an equitable land reform that benefits all
deserving people.
The industrial indigenisation drive from the beginning assumed
elitist dimensions. With the crafters of the law seemingly out of
touch with the reality on the ground as far as real empowerment is
concerned, the stage was and is set for an elite driven and elite
benefiting programme. An economic empowerment programme
that ignores the unemployed youths both in the urban and the
rural areas has various misgivings. Similarly, an empowerment
programme that ignores the economic needs of women has
various shortfalls. The youth and women constitute a large
percentage of Zimbabwe's population, and unfortunately they are
the most economically unempowered and most politically
exploited groups. The only way to achieve the goals of economic
empowerment in Zimbabwe is through availing as much
resources to the informal sector as possible because this is where
some of the unemployed youths and women have found economic
refuge. The parcelling out of land to the deserving landless people
in the dry and highly populated areas of the country could also
introduce an element of justice into the land reform programme.
This paper therefore seeks to critically review Zimbabwe's
economic indigenisation drive and recommend the appropriate
ways in which the programme can be used for social and
economic justice.
Land reform as economic empowerment
While the concept of economic empowerment has various
definitions and accompanying theoretical perspectives, the basic
explanation of the phenomenon has to be found in the provision of
economic capacity to targeted sections of the society by either
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Government or private agencies. This could be done either
through the provision of working space (land for farming, or for
embarking on various income generating projects) or the
provision of funding together with training on the prudent use of
such resources for sustainable livelihoods. Any empowerment
initiative must have a target group. The background to
Zimbabwe's economic empowerment history is firmly anchored in
the land reform process that began in the 1980s with the
resettlement of about 71 000 landless households (Utete, 2003).
However with the increasing demands for more land by people
especially in overpopulated communal areas and the subsequent
forceful occupation of both state land and private owned land by
landless peasants, the government embarked on the fast track
th
land reform programme from the 15 of July 2000. Though a
variety of factors are mentioned as having given momentum to the
fast track land reform programme, the basic idea was the
empowerment of previously landless people especially in the
communal areas where pressure on land was and is still high. The
A1 and the A2 models were aimed at the decongestion of
communal areas and the creation of an indigenous group of black
commercial farmers respectively.
The controversies of land reform in Zimbabwe stem from the
programme's divergent results. In its quest to empower the people
of Zimbabwe through land redistribution, the Robert Mugabe led
government in the same process was disempowering the white
community which owned most of the farms targeted for land
reform. The white farmers had mostly benefited from historical
patterns in land allocation which mainly benefited the white
community at the expense of indigenous blacks. After
disempowering the white community in Zimbabwe through land
seizures and related human rights abuses, punitive measures
were implemented by the USA against the government of
Zimbabwe through the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic
Recovery Act (ZIDERA) of 2001 (Hondora, 2009) and a host of
other restrictive measures impacting the government's viability.
The United Kingdom (UK) under Tony Blair and various members
of the white Commonwealth also made sure the Mugabe regime
was punished for the land reform programme. It was the talk of
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lack of respect for property rights that resonated through western
media that attracted the wrath of the West on Zimbabwe. Despite
the fact that the UK government at that time (under Tony Blair)
had reneged on commitments by his predecessors to fund Land
reform in Zimbabwe, the whole western block cast a blind eye on
that very important fact and chose to focus on issues that were at
best results of their failure to honour their pledges to support the
land reform programme.
The common perceptions or misperceptions peddled by the
British and the USA media and other Western broadcasting
stations is that the land reform is a disastrous failure and did not
achieve the desired results of poverty reduction and its
accompanying benefits. Allegations of heavy political cronyism,
which could be partly true, are advanced with emotion and gusto
to the point of a misrepresentation of the true picture obtaining.
Figures are profusely quoted detailing how the “land grab” has
negatively impacted on productivity on the farms and has
reduced total agricultural yields annually. On the contrary,
recent studies by the United Kingdom based Institute of
Development Studies (IDS) and the African Institute of Agrarian
Studies (AIAS) have shown that most beneficiaries of the land
reform programme were ordinary people and the elites
constituted a small proportion of the beneficiaries (Elich, 2011).
The plummet in agricultural productivity in the years
immediately succeeding the fast track land reform though, in a
sense, could be blamed on the latter process, but it is however not
entirely true that it was solely as a result of the land reform that
agriculture suffered. Southern Africa as a region suffered from
perennial droughts from 2001 to 2005 and the region is also
vulnerable to climate change which can also cause uncertain
rainfall patterns. The black large scale and small holder farmers
proved their worth in the closing stages of the decade when
favourable rain patterns were experienced. Agricultural output in
2009 grew by 15% and by 34% in 2010. Smallholder maize
production jumped from 0.57 million tonnes in 2007-2008 to
1.35 million tonnes in 2009-2010. Tobacco production more than
doubled from 2009 (www.ngojobsinafrica.com/). Despite huge
financial and attendant challenges as a result of a critical lack of
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credit facilities, new farmers in Zimbabwe have shown a lot of
potential. Government on its own cannot do enough because of
many other pressing commitments like the need to strengthen
and stabilise the economy after a decade long recession through
industrial development and provision of electricity and other
economic prerequisites. The black African farmers, overall, have
shown huge potential and with the requisite support, they can
match or surpass the ability of the land's erstwhile owners.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the fast track land reform
programme marked the beginning of the first major step towards
the empowerment of indigenous Zimbabweans. Though the
process was fraught with political cronyism and could have been
used for the achievement of immediate political ends by the
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) that
cannot take away the fact that a considerable number of
Zimbabweans benefited from the programme. The table below
shows the number households who officially benefited from the
fast track land reform programme in the country:
P ro vin
ce
Mi d lan
d s
Ma sv i
ngo
Ma nic
ala nd
Ma t.
South
Ma t.
N o rth
Ma sh.
East
Ma sh.
W es t
Ma sh.
Ce ntr
al
M o d e l A1 M o d el A2 N o . o f
hou sehold s/
b e ne ficia rie s
N o .
o f
fa rm s
H e cta re
s
3 0 6 5 1 3
6 7 2
2 1 1 6 8 6
6 1 2
2 4 6 1 9 5
6 4 4
2 2 6 6 8 3
1 4 0
2 5 8 5 4 3
7 9 3
3 8 2 3 0 2
5 1 1
6 7 0 7 9 2
5 1 3
3 5 3 5 1 3
1 9 5
To tal 2 6 5 2 4 2 3 1
0 8 0
N o . o f
fa r ms
H e cta re
s
1 06 1 8 1
9 6 6
1 70 7 5 3
3 0 0
% Ta k e up
ra te s
A 1 A2 A 1 A 2
1 6
1 69
2 2
6 70
2 2 9 9 0 4 8
7 7 3 9 5 7 9
1 38 7 7 5 3 3 1 1
0 19
4 6 3 9 2 4 2
6 5 1 9 1
6 9 7
8 9 2 3 2 7 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
6 5 1 4 2
5 1 9
9 9 0 1 1 9 1 1 2 0 9 4
3 19 2 5 0
9 3 0
5 68 3 6 9
9 9 5
2 41 2 3 0
8 7 4
1 67 2 2 1 9 8
8 1 4
1 6
7 02
2 7
0 52
1 4
7 56
1 2 7
1 92
Source: Utete Commission Report, Provincial profiles, 2003. p 39.
122
1 6 4 6 9 3 4 5
2 0 0 3 9 7 5 0
1 6 8 4 8 9 7 3
7 2 6 0 9 7 6 6

From the table above, '…a total of 2 652 farms, 4 231 080
hectares in extent, were allocated to A1 model while a total of
1672 farms, 2 198 814 hectares in extent were allocated to
model A2…A total of 127 192 households were settled under
model A1 while a total of 7260 beneficiaries were settled under
model A2' (Utete, 2003). Of note in the statistics shown above
is the significant number of beneficiaries under the A1 model
which is the category for small holder farmers in the fast track
land reform programme. This could have had an effect of
decongesting some of the communal areas in the country from
which the beneficiaries moved. However the problem is that
most of the beneficiaries of the land reform maintain dual
ownership of both their communal homes and their new farm
plots. Hence no meaningful decongestion can occur in such a
scenario. Requisite legal provisions should be implemented to
do away with dual ownership of land, cancel out multiple
ownership practices and support the new farmers, especially
those in small scale operations.
The Current Push for Empowerment
The nationalist undercurrents in the land reform programme
have continued to push for the advancement of the economic
empowerment agenda in the current period under the industrial
indigenisation drive. While nationalism seems to be out of touch
with the current wave of globalisation, it is a refuge for countries
suffering from economic injustice as a result of restrictions
imposed by those championing globalisation. Nationalist feelings
mostly hatched during the liberation struggle and the period
preceding it (from the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
going backwards) have continued to contribute significantly to
the government's policy thrust. The current industrial
indigenisation drive is also driven by very deep-seated feelings of
economic nationalism which do not seek to put the economy in
the hands of government but under the control of a local black
bourgeoisie class that will supposedly keep its profits in the
country for the benefit of other sectors. This nationalist element
has gone beyond simply bringing political independence but has
gone further to fulfil Nkrumah's vision of a politically and
economically liberated Africa (Nkrumah, 1965). According to the
current indigenisation guidelines, black Zimbabwean business
people should control a 51 percent stake and foreigners should
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control 49 percent in any business venture established in
Zimbabwe with a minimum capitalization of US$500 000. Of
much interest is the fact that though differing and sometimes
conflicting sentiments are communicated with regards to
indigenisation by coalition partners in the Government of
National Unity (GNU), all seem to have embraced the view that
indigenous business people need to take controlling stakes in the
various economic ventures in the form of partnerships. For
example, while in Cape Town, addressing guests at a dinner
luncheon hosted to discuss Zimbabwe's future, the Prime
Minister of Zimbabwe, Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai, mentioned that,
'Across the political divide, citizenship empowerment is a policy
and we are committed to ensuring the majority of Zimbabweans'
participation in the economy. It's not an expropriation strategy or
a nationalisation policy but it's a voluntary piece of legislation'
(Ruzvidzo, 2011). This might be a reflection of a common
nationalist or semi-nationalist feeling in Zimbabwe's inclusive
government or is an artificial show of a unified approach to policy
when in fact the opposite is true. However the Prime Minister
continued with his defence of the indigenisation drive at the same
forum as follows, 'The government can rightfully claim that the
nation has something to contribute. We have mineral resources
which we can exploit for a win-win benefit' (Ruzvidzo, 2011). The
government of Zimbabwe is hence seeking to make sure that in
the face of the debilitating phenomenon of the New Scramble for
Africa's resources (Weinstein, 2008), foreign corporations cannot
just exploit the country's vast resources for their own benefit
without benefits to local communities.
Commenting on the current industrial indigenisation thrust in
Zimbabwe, the country's Deputy Prime Minister Professor Arthur
Mutambara claimed that:
There is nothing new about Zimbabwe's indigenisation
programme. China has such laws and so are many other
countries. What we just need to do is explain our laws
better. Investors must understand that it is in their
interest for Zimbabweans to be empowered and they must
view this as an opportunity and not a problem. When
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Zimbabweans are empowered it means their (foreign
investors) investments are secure because if people are
economically disenfranchised it is no good for business in
the long term…The asset underground has value. Gone
are the days when investors could get claims for free.
Zimbabweans are no longer satisfied with surviving on
taxes and royalties but they want equity. (Ruzvidzo, 2011)
The need for an indigenous or local component in the country's
economy is therefore an imperative aspect of the current and even
of the succeeding regimes. Any derogation from this policy thrust
might give rise to political instability in the country in the present
or at any time in the future. Zimbabwe is a peculiar case in terms
of empowerment programmes implemented by the government.
Though negative effects will be experienced in the short term, if
properly handled, the empowerment of previously disempowered
and unempowered people can ensure both political and economic
stability in the future. The current indigenisation drive, which is
an endogenous approach to economic development, also has an
advantage to the country because it seems to be politically
supported by all or most of the parties in the Inclusive
Government. Further, when election time finally comes, no single
party can claim that it pushed the indigenisation drive on its own.
This has the potential of levelling out the political play field in a
way that reduces the risk of violent political clashes.
Challenges of economic empowerment in Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe's economic empowerment initiatives, driven by a
desire to indigenise a significant portion of the local economy, do
not only have benefits in their fold but they also have potentially
politically and economically destabilising manifestations. While
in the interim, the political leadership of the GNU has been at
pains to present uniform views on indigenisation as a common
front, various inconsistent and conflicting views have cropped up
from various party functionaries, commentaries in the media and
from the technocrats who know the technical aspects of such
initiatives and the respective legislations. As already mentioned
the fear is that in the present, the legislation might result in
capital flight and introduce hesitancy in the planning and
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implementation of investment programmes by those willing to do
so. Inconsistent and conflicting statements pertaining to the
industrial indigenisation programme literally leave the potential
investors in the wilderness. However despite all these fears, which
in the long run can be overcome by a well strategised offensive to
explain the programme to the potential investors, the real fear is
that the land reform programme did not benefit some of those in
real need of land and the current industrial indigenisation drive
will not benefit the most deserving sections of Zimbabwean
society.
Land reform
The guiding legislation in the fast track land reform programme
was the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 and Constitutional
Amendment Number 16 of 2000 which both gave Government the
power to compulsorily acquire land for the purpose of
redistribution, with the latter putting the responsibility for
compensating white farmers for land acquired by government on
the British government. During the fast track land reform
programme, the following categories of land were targeted for
acquisition:
Derelict and under-utilised land
Land under multiple ownership
Foreign owned land
Land contiguous to communal areas.
While the criteria for the compulsory acquisition of land outlined
above was the most convenient given the circumstances, it is
bullet point number four that disadvantaged most communities
who live far away from commercial farming areas from getting the
land during that phase. Whether the land was derelict and
underutilised, or it was under multiple ownership or it was
foreign owned, it is the communal areas surrounding those
commercial farming sites that mostly benefited at the expense of
those communities far removed from them. The case of Buhera
district in Manicaland Province is the most telling. For a district
stretching from the borders of Mashonaland East in Chikomba
District to Birchenough Bridge, and without a single farm in its
126

vicinity, a special arrangement was required for the people in that
area so that they could equally benefit from the programme. The
whole district, with an approximate population of 284 910 in
2003 ( www.icrizimbabwe.org),
only had 200 households which
benefited from the Fast Track Land Reform programme in
Chikomba district of Mashonaland East (Utete, 2003). As a result
of this unfortunate situation, no significant decongestion was
witnessed in the District. Presently, the situation in drier parts of
the district (Buhera South) is getting even more critical. Coupled
with the perennial droughts that ravage the area, population
pressure on the land is increasing with resultant negative
consequences on the environment. The increasing numbers of
households as a result of the youth bulge and early marriages has
dictated that people divide the small portions of land that they
have so as to accommodate the new households. This however is
only a short term and a stop gap measure that can only hold in the
interim. As the population continues to grow, even more pressure
will be put on the land and ultimately conflicts might arise as a
result of competition for the little pieces of land available as well
as other resources.
The problem of land shortage is not only found in the southern
part of the district but in the north as well. Since the district is 100
percent communal, people had hoped that the government would
come up with a special plan to accommodate them in the
programme. From all the seven districts of Manicaland province,
a total 13 000 households benefited from the fast track
programme (Utete, 2003). As already mentioned, Buhera had the
least number of beneficiaries; a mere 200 families. In
Mashonaland East province, the same unfortunate situation
seems to have characterised the fortunes of Mutoko, Mudzi and
Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe (UMP). These areas did not also have
any commercial farms and hence had only negligible numbers of
beneficiaries, with a combined figure of 9000 applicants on the
waiting list (Utete, 2003). As a result, there was no significant
decongestion in these areas.
These areas are certainly not the only places in need of land after
the completion of the land reform programme, they are just a tip of
127

the ice-berg. Disadvantaged areas might need special allocations
in other provinces or districts to ensure an equitable land reform
effort. Poverty levels cannot be expected to decline in such a
situation, and in any case, there actually could be huge income
gaps precipitated by these inequitable land ownership patterns.
These can also be sources of conflicts since classes with different
interests will start emerging. Increasing pressure on land is
already forcing most of the economically active age groups from
such communal areas to flock to the already strained urban areas
hoping for better fortunes. However, as things are not always rosy
in the urban areas because of the economic havoc of the past
decade, most of these desperate men and women turn to crime or
informal sector activities. Urban crime rates increase as well as
the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS.
The industrial indigenisation drive
As already alluded to, the industrial indigenisation drive, just like
the land reform programme, has also been received with varying
feelings by different sections of both the local and the
international community. The programme, which has an
aspiration of a 51 percent indigenous shareholding in most
business ventures in the country, has also provoked much
controversy as much as it has created interest. While to countries
of the global north that own and control most of the global capital
the move might be an act of expropriation and is reminiscent of
the land reform programme, the political leadership in Zimbabwe
believes this is the only way of empowering the indigenous people.
However ideological and other acute political differences have led
to conflicting views and sentiments both in terms of approach to
and implementation of the programme. And while the move to
indigenise the economy is noble, it can only be commendable as
far as it creates conditions for social and economic justice and
does not end up as another elitist boob. An industrial
indigenisation drive that ignores the needs of the vulnerable
groups in society such as the youth, women and minorities might
be self defeating in the long run.
Indigenisation - The Move to economic development in
Zimbabwe?
128

The legal basis of the current economic indigenisation agenda is
found in the various Acts and statutory instruments. These
include the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act of
2007 and Statutory Instrument 21 0f 2010, among others. The
most important provision in the legislation dealing with the
current economic empowerment drive is set out in the Ministry of
Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment's news
release in the Africa Report:
The programme's investment aspiration is 51%
indigenous shareholding but is not an investment prerequisite
for existing companies; rather, indigenous
shareholding will be attained in phases. The government
will not impose indigenous partners on foreign companies
or businesses hence the indigenisation process does not
entail expropriation or nationalisation of companies or
businesses, rather these are commercial transactions
(New African).
From an honest perspective, merely looking at the above
sentiments reveals the noble intentions of a government
intending to fully thrust its people in the economic driving seat
through means appreciated by all partners. The fact that the
government concedes that the indigenisation of the economy
cannot be achieved overnight is also a reflection of the
consideration put by the responsible authorities on the need to
stagger the programme for the benefit of the still fragile economy.
However this commitment is not matched by the activities
currently taking place on the ground since hurried deadlines for
the submission of indigenisation have been published by the
responsible ministry in the papers, provoking much debate and
brewing doubts as to the sincerity of the government to establish
the programme as a major driver to economic development in
Zimbabwe. Consequently the government has been criticised for
lacking a clear guiding framework on the implementation of the
indigenisation guidelines in the wake of hastily instituted
deadlines for the full implementation of the programme (Zengeni,
2011). This might be a reflection of a serious lack of political unity
that destroys the requisite environment for policy discussion and
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eventual agreement on the implementation of agreed policies. In
the current political set up in Zimbabwe policies could be used for
cheap political scores that will count most in the envisaged and
not so remote general elections. Though echoes of agreement do
sometimes come out from the corridors of the various political
offices, there still remains a visible disagreement between the
parties in the inclusive government on the issue of indigenisation.
Political unity is however very crucial when dealing with issues of
such magnitude, issues which have an impact on the immediate
and future economic fortunes of the country.
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Prime
Minister Tsvangirai has cautioned that, 'New rules demanding
that at least 51% of mining operations should be indigenously
owned have to be carefully managed, lest they frighten away
tentative investors' (The Africa Report, 2011). Further, in a sign
of a widening gap in the perceptions of both the MDC-T and the
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF),
instead of giving full support to the indigenisation programme
currently being implemented, the MDC-T unveiled its own
economic development and empowerment plan (Maodza, 2011).
This signals lack of the desired political support that the
indigenisation programme desperately desires in this era of the
inclusive government. There is also a risk that if MDC-T gets into
power, the current indigenisation programme may be terminated
midway and replaced by the above stated programme. The fear of
investor flight mentioned above is also shared by a cross section
of the business community who feel that the programme should
not be more political in outlook but should be more technocratic
and investor friendly. To ZANU PF any attempt to derail or delay
the programme using whatever means might not be acceptable
because that would mean continuation of colonialism through
invisible hands. However in trying to drive the point home that
neo-colonialism will not be tolerated, ZANU PF has also added to
the confusion bedevilling the current indigenisation process by
way of threats that companies originating from countries that
have imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe face the risk of
expropriation. Whether these are empty threats or real threats,
the overall effect is that the potential investor is left pondering on
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whether to invest or not. Simply put, the indigenisation policy in
Zimbabwe lacks firm political backing and, plagued with
conflicting sentiments from the coalition partners, the
programme might not 'sell' in the international community.
Who benefits?
It is common knowledge that whatever policy the government
comes up with should be intended to benefit the generality of the
people in that particular country. Likewise, the intended
beneficiaries of the indigenisation drive in Zimbabwe are 'the
people'. The policy might be shrouded in controversy and might
also be a victim of conflicting agendas of the inclusive government
partners but the real aim is to alleviate poverty and raise the
standard of living among ordinary Zimbabweans. According to
the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and
Empowerment, 'the programme guarantees participation of
locals which also safeguards foreign investment' (The African
Report, 2011). It was also envisaged that the policy has a broad
based approach and intends to benefit even the grassroots. On a
general level and without looking too deep beyond the stated
interests, the objectives appear very noble indeed.
It is however worth noting that some of the envisaged targets are
rather too simplistic and somehow qualify for political election
talk. In Zimbabwe at the present moment, the talk of industrial
indigenisation is mostly heard in the circles of the well to do,
either in terms of educational or economic capability. It is again
mostly the urban dwellers who seem to be privy to the
particularities of the indigenisation drive. To most rural dwellers
it is gibberish that comes from the boulevards of Harare,
Bulawayo, Gweru and other towns. It is the kind of talk that
almost often accompanies election periods but without tangible
benefits to the rural folk. This is where elitism starts. Elitism is
not only a process characterised by domination and control of
national processes by political or other elites; rather, it is also a
process that categorises people into various classes defined by
economic and social status, area of habitation, race and other like
characteristics. For those poor classes whom Frantz Fanon would
call the 'Wretched of the Earth' (Fanon, 1982), if they are lucky,
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they are simply recipients of policies from above, but in the worst
cases (which unfortunately they usually find themselves in) they
are not informed and they do not know what would be taking
place. It is therefore prudent that the government embarks on a
programme specifically targeted at informing the people in the
remotest parts of the country like Binga, Kanyemba and other
places of this indigenisation programme and explain to them how
they might benefit from it, otherwise it might just be one elitist
arrangement meant to benefit the well placed.
When the government alludes to the notion that the grassroots
will benefit from the programme, it is not enough to stop there.
The notion of having policies that benefit the grass roots has been
in common parlance for a considerable period in Africa. However
the issue lacks conceptual clarity and the defining characteristic
of such statements is their vagueness. For example, the mention
by the Ministry of Youth of the indigenisation programme
prospectively benefiting the grass roots does not give a clear
picture of how this is intended to be achieved when other policies
that came riding on the same gospel failed to help the same
people. Probably the answer to the woes of the grassroots this
time around will be found in the envisaged but not widely
publicised Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). By definition sovereign
wealth funds are:
'Pools of money derived from a country's reserves, which
are set aside for investment purposes that will benefit the
country's economy and citizens. The funding for a
sovereign wealth fund comes from central bank reserves
that accumulate as a result of budget and trade surpluses
and even from revenue generated from the exports of
natural resources' ( www.investopedia.com).
Assuming that the various indigenisation deals that are going to
be struck become profitable, funds will be set aside for the
development of the backward communities in the country. This
might give a respite to the 'grass roots' in the long term. It is
however also worth pointing out that the SWF talk is still head at
meetings of a very technical nature and indications are that the
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envisaged fund is an idea still in its gestation stages and it might
be too early to talk about its implementation. In a show of the
fund's infancy (either as an idea or actual programme), the
ministries of finance and economic planning did not include it in
their recent policy reviews. The expectation is that in the current
dispensation, policies should be crafted and implemented from
the same table and anything to suggest the opposite will be a sign
of discord in the government. However whatever set up the
government comes up with should also benefit the grass roots,
not merely in talk but in reality.
Besides benefiting the grassroots, it is highly imperative that the
indigenisation drive also benefit small communities in the
country which are by definition Zimbabwean. The coloured
community, for example, has not been too enthusiastic about the
empowerment projects in the country, from the land reform to the
current industrial indigenisation drive. This indifference is
caused either by a lack of a sense of belonging by the community
itself or by the lack of political will on the part of government to
integrate the community and provide it with a share of the
national economic cake. Though the Indian community as well
seems reluctant to partake in national programmes because of
the above mentioned or other reasons, they have at least shown
signs of enthusiasm. The government should however ensure the
communities' effective integration into national empowerment
programmes to ensure that every Zimbabwean benefits. The
danger is that if such communities are continuously neglected
the nation building project in the country would eventually fail to
achieve goals of social justice and equality among the people.
The real fear
The real fear that hangs on the minds of many a critical thinker is
that those who benefited most from the land reform programme
are the same people who are destined to benefit again from the
current phase of empowerment. There have been unproven
revelations that mostly senior officials in government
departments amassed more than one farm in the prime farming
areas of the country during the fast track land reform programme.
Assuming these allegations are true, it is highly imperative that
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the government embarks on a nationwide land audit to ensure the
equitable distribution of land.
Multiple farm ownership increases the rate of inefficiency and
reduces production. It actually defeats the purpose of land reform
since land is transferred from a white bourgeoisie class to a black
bourgeoisie class that is not different from the white class in
terms of multiple property ownership and the attendant
exploitation of other classes. From the elitist inclinations of the
current empowerment programme, those who benefited from the
land reform programme will certainly benefit again from the
former since they already have the capital or the connections to
get into partnerships with foreigners in the various business
ventures earmarked for indigenisation. The convergence of such
streams of wealth on the same group of people creates a
comprador class that is super wealthy and is more in tandem with
the interests of Western capital than with social justice. The
country could be heading into this unfortunate situation if
corrective measures are not implemented in the current
empowerment phase. The danger is however that the scenario
might bring both political and economic instability in the form of
class conflicts, with the super wealthy bourgeoisie class using all
its influence and power to protect its class interests. This class
will almost often try to be in power or put its proxies in power to
ensure the security of its wealth. However the poorer masses,
both landless and unempowered in any form, might challenge the
status quo in violent ways that can prove disastrous to both
society and the economy (probably a fourth Chimurenga). The call
for economic and social justice should hence start with a revisit of
the land reform programme and end by ensuring that even the
lowest person benefits from the current economic indigenisation
process.
The governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), Gideon
Gono has warned that:
'This law must not be used to multiply pockets of
inefficiency in as far as utilisation of national resources
and opportunities of the country is concerned…For
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example, where an individual has benefited from the
historic Land Reform Programme, and was allocated
farm(s) which they are not making full use of, those people
in our view, should not be allowed to go and multiply that
failure into other sectors such as mining, manufacturing
and many others…' (Muronzi, 2011).
Gono's observation is as telling as it is accurate. Non performers
should not be included in the current empowerment drive
together with those who substantially benefited from the land
reform programme. Instead new blood should be injected into the
economic system to ensure efficiency and economic justice. It
should be broad based, touching the grass roots people, the
youths, women, the elderly and the vulnerable, including special
needs groups such as the disabled.
An empowerment policy that ignores the needs of the above
mentioned groups cannot be described as such. However the
handicap in the current indigenisation process is that it is vague
in its pronouncements on benefits to the grassroots. There is no
clearly laid out plan for the inclusion of vulnerable groups in
society. There is a real fear that this policy might end up as
another electioneering mechanism which ends up only benefiting
those who are vocal in its gestation and implementation.
Communities in mining areas might also end up benefiting more
than those who are located in non mining areas.
Conclusions and recommendations
Zimbabwe is a country that has taken several strides towards
citizen empowerment. However most of the empowerment policies
have either been marred with controversy or they have not
benefited a substantial number of the intended beneficiaries. The
land reform programme and the current industrial indigenisation
programme are the hallmark of economic empowerment in
Zimbabwe. While the land reform programme has been
completed, industrial indigenisation is preparing for takeoff. The
land reform however could not cater for other desperately
deserving communal dwellers as the example of Buhera
indicated. This is despite the fact that there are cases of multiple
135

farm ownership in the country. The industrial indigenisation
agenda also has the objective of economically empowering
Zimbabweans; however, the policy is vague as far as the
participation of the grass roots is concerned. The risk is that the
policy might only benefit the politically connected and those
already in business.
The real fear of the economic empowerment drive in Zimbabwe is
that those who benefited most from the land reform programme
are the ones who will also benefit from the industrial
indigenisation drive. This creates a megalomaniac class that will
certainly protect its interests through hook and crook to the
detriment of other classes in society. This introduces conditions
for political and economic instability. It is therefore prudent that
the government should ensure that all empowerment
programmes create conditions for economic and social justice.
This can be done through the following ways:
Immediate institution of an impartial land audit that would
release more land to those who did not benefit from the
land reform programme. The auditors should either be a
private firm or a hybrid team of government and private
agencies.
Redistribution of unproductive land to deserving people,
especially the unemployed youths and women.
Governmental support for informal sector activities-this is
a real form of empowerment.
Government should put in place mechanisms that allow
those who did not benefit from other empowerment
programmes to benefit from the current indigenisation
drive.
Broad based citizen empowerment should be based on the
equality of the country's peoples in terms of access to
economic opportunities. Minority populations should not
be ignored.
Policies should be futuristic in perspective and should
have the political support of every party in the Inclusive
Government.
The indigenisation policy should aim at balancing the need
136

for citizenship empowerment and the need to create lasting
beneficial relationships with investors. Clarity is needed in
policies.
The Ministry of Youth Development should ensure that the
Youth Development Fund is transparently and widely
distributed in order to benefit youths in all the provinces of
the country.
References
Elich, Gregory. (2001) 'Challenging Western Distortions about
Zimbabwe's Land reform', global research, February 21,
2011> www.globalresearch.ca,
accessed 20 May, 2011.
Fanon, F. (1982) The wretched of the earth, Penguin, Middlesex.
Hondora. (2009) Tawanda. 'Economic sanctions undermine
Zimbabwe's economy', newzimbabwe.com, Thursday, November
12, 2009.
Maodza, Takunda. (2011) 'MDC-T slams empowerment', The
Herald (online), October 17, 2011.
Masawi, Tirivaviri. (2011) The new scramble' The Southern Times
(online), 27 May 2011.
Muronzi, Chris. (2011) 'Indigenisation must not multiply
failures', The Zimbabwe Independent, August 5 to 11, 2011.
Nkrumah, K. (1965) Neo-colonialism: The last stage of
imperialism, International Publishers, New York.
Ruzvidzo, Victoria. (2011) 'Government committed to
indigenisation: PM', The Herald (online), May 5, 2011.
The Africa Report, August-September 2011 edition.
Utete Land Review Commission Report, 2003
Weinstein, L. (2011) 'The New Scramble for Africa' The
International Socialist Review, Issue 60, July-August
2008,

8
Community-driven conflict resolution:
The abunzi mediators in Rwanda
Dr. Martha Mutisi, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution
of Disputes (ACCORD), South Africa.
Abstract
This paper examines a Rwandan traditional dispute resolution
and justice systems known as abunzi, paying special attention to
its role in community-driven peace-building. The abunzi or local
level mediation is part of the Rwandan justice and conflict
resolution system, engrained in the rubric of restorative justice
as it helps Rwandan people to address their conflicts without
resorting to litigation and other retributive approaches. The
paper highlights in detail how the reincarnation of the abunzi
following the genocide in Rwanda has helped the state to
decentralize justice and empower local community with the
capacity to resolve their disputes without the challenges
associated with modern justice systems. In addition, the paper
demonstrates that the abunzi system, by bringing together
community members in a forum of dialogue and resolution, has
become part of the repertoire of social healing processes and
rituals in Rwanda. Despite these benefits, the paper is wary of
too much state oversight in the abunzi processes, and cautions of
the possibility of abunzi becoming just another state-mandated
mediation whose ultimate result could be a dramaturgical
representation of reconciliation and community building. For
true community ownership of justice, the paper advocates
diminished state interference in the affairs and processes of the
abunzi.
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Introduction
As Rwanda continues with its post-conflict reconstruction and
quest for sustainable peace, the country has to grapple with the
reality that conflict is an inevitable and permanent feature of
social reality. As such, the Rwandan government passed the
Organic Law (No. 31/2006) which recognizes the role of abunzi or
local mediators in conflict resolution. The abunzi is a community
based organ comprising of local mediators who are chosen on the
basis of their integrity to intervene in local disputes. The abunzi
system was popularised in the post-2000 era by the Rwandan
government as a way of decentralising justice, making it
affordable and accessible. Before seeking justice in local courts,
mediation by abunzi is obligatory for local level disputes, criminal
cases and civil cases whose property value is below 3 million
Rwandese francs (equivalent to US$2 500).
The relevance of traditional methods and institutions of conflict
resolution is now slowly gaining an audience among policy
makers and practitioners of conflict resolution. This reality has
spurned this paper's focus on the traditional institution known as
the abunzi in Rwanda. For the purpose of this paper, traditional
institutions of conflict resolution are defined as those that “have
been practiced for an extended period and have evolved within
African societies rather than being the product of external
importation” (Zartman, 2000:7). These institutions are rooted in
the culture and history of African societies, and are ingrained in
the socio-political and economic environment of communities.
Such institutions have developed independently in the context of
pre-modern societal structures and have been practised in that
context over a considerable period of time. This paper analyses
how the abunzi mediators are part of the Rwandan local
governance and conflict resolution system, and further conceives
this institution as a restorative mechanism that helps Rwandese
people to address their conflicts without resorting to litigation and
other retributive approaches.
Post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building in Rwanda
In 1994, Rwanda experienced a genocide which killed
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approximately 800,000 Rwandans and left many scars in
Rwandan society, including displacement as many Rwandans
were forced to live as refugees in neighbouring countries and
outside the African continent. Seventeen years after the
1994genocide, Rwanda can be considered as having embarked
on a largely grandiose post-conflict reconstruction and healing
process. The efforts towards healing and reconciliation are
ongoing and they are largely geared toward rebuilding trust
among the Rwandans. The abunzi mediators epitomize the
Rwandan government's efforts towards institutionalizing conflict
resolution and justice at the local level. The abunzi exist in the
context of other local initiatives for conflict resolution and
transitional justice including the gacaca courts, which have been
hailed as having paved way for accountability by trying
approximately 1.5 million cases of genocide. With the conclusion
of gacaca court hearings in 2010, the Rwandan government has
had to institutionalize traditional methods of conflict resolution
in its legal system to ensure that communities remain
empowered to address their problems before resorting to the
formal court system. This has been made possible through the
promotion of various endogenous systems including the abunzi,
a mechanism for mediation. Unlike the gacaca courts which were
specifically mandated to try cases of genocide which were
committed from October 1990 to 31 December 1994, abunzi
mediators deal with smaller local disputes between neighbours
and fellow community members.
Anatomy of the abunzi
The abunzi is an indigenous system which existed in Rwanda
before colonialism. Their objective is to unite two parties who
have a disagreement. The abunzi can be paralleled with similar
traditional dispute resolution systems in other parts of Africa,
including the kogtla in Botswana, the Bashingantahe in Burundi
and the dare in Zimbabwe. All these institutions essentially exist
within a particular cultural context for dealing with disputes.
The abunzi (which literally means 'bringing two people together
to talk') are not necessarily the first or the last institution to
attempt to resolve a dispute between parties. In some cases,
parties go to the abunzi when resolution at the family level,
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through the inama y'umuryango or the village level, namely the
umudugudu (the institution of governance and conflict
resolution at that level) has failed to adequately resolve the
dispute. However, of the institutions that resolve disputes
locally, the abunzi is the only one whose formal, statutory
mandate is dispute resolution through mediation. Mandated by
the Constitution and the Organic Law (No. 31/2006) on
Mediation Committees, the abunzi is defined as “an organ meant
for providing a framework of obligatory mediation prior to
submission of a case before the first degree courts hearing cases
referred to in articles 8 and 9 of this organic law.” In essence, the
provisions of the Organic Law are such that the formal courts act
as an appellate court and will not consider a dispute unless the
abunzi has first considered and ruled on the dispute, especially if
the dispute's property value is below 3 million Rwandese francs.
The abunzi mediators exit mainly at cell level, although the
mediation appellate is found at the sector level. Article 2 of the
Organic Law (2010) spells out two types of abunzi Mediation
Committees, namely Mediation Committee whose jurisdiction is
at the cell level and the abunzi Appeal Mediation Committee
whose jurisdiction is the Sector level. Formally situated under
the Ministry of Justice (MINIJUST) with the Ministry of Local
Government (MINALOC) providing administrative oversight, the
abunzi comprises of 12 volunteers (plus three substitutes), all of
whom must be residents of the cell. Every two years each village
elects fifteen new abunzi who will constitute a committee. The
Organic Law (2006, 2008 and 2010) spells out that abunzi
members must not hold any other government administrative
position in the community at the time they serve as mediators.
The Abunzi committee is headed by a 'Bureau' comprising the
President, Vice-President and Secretary. The Presidents and
Vice-Presidents are elected by the Abunzi Committees and the
Secretary of the Abunzi is also the Secretary of the Cell. In
addition, the Rwandan constitution underscores that any
institution of governance, including the abunzi must comprise at
least 30 percent women. Abunzi members, just like their
counterparts, the inyangamugayo in the gacaca courts are
expected to be “persons of integrity who are acknowledged for
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their mediation skills.” The cell council elects the abunzi whose
members serve a two-year term, which is renewable. The system
of re-election is designed to give all members of the community an
opportunity to serve on the abunzi as well as prevent
complacence, bias and corruption. When it comes to the process
of mediation, three abunzi mediators hear and resolve the
dispute. As such, at the beginning of the first session, each party
is requested to choose one mediator from the twelve available at
the cell level. The third mediator is mutually chosen by the two
selected abunzi, and hence the panel is thus established.
Before assuming their responsibilities, each abunzi mediator
must take an oath of office in front of the population and the cell
coordinator, which includes swearing to “observe the
Constitution and other laws” and to “consciously fulfil my duties
of representing the Rwandan people without any discrimination
whatsoever, and “promote respect for the freedoms and
fundamental rights of the human being and safeguard the
interests of the Rwandan people.” In the oath, the mediator
acknowledges that for failure to honour the oath, “may I face the
rigors of the law.” The Organic Law mandates that the abunzi
makes decisions consistent with the law: “To settle the conflict
submitted to them, the Mediators shall seek first to conciliate the
two parties. In case of non-conciliation, they take decision in all
honesty and in accordance with the laws and place's custom,
provided it is not contrary to the written law.” As with the gacaca
courts, the abunzi function according to codified laws and
established procedures; although their decisions are still often
inspired by custom. The abunzi encourage disputing parties to
reach a mutually satisfying agreement, but they will issue a
binding decision if need be.
More than 30 000 abunzi mediators operate in Rwanda at the cell
level. The abunzi have a broad jurisdiction which ranges from
civil disputes to criminal cases. The abunzi mediate over civil
disputes related to land and other immovable assets whose value
does not exceed three million Rwandan francs and defamation.
The abunzi also settle cases involving immovable property and
assets such as cattle whose value does not exceed one million
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Rwandan francs. Other cases that abunzi mediators are
mandated to deal with include civil cases such as those involving
breach of contract where the value of the matter at issue does not
exceed one million Rwandan francs. In addition, the abunzi also
mediate upon family cases, including paternity, matrimonial
inheritance and succession issues when the matter at issue does
not exceed three million Rwandan francs. The abunzi also deal
with business and labour cases, including breach of commercial
and labour contracts as well as insurance and commercial
contractual obligations in which case the maximum amount is
100,000 Rwandan francs. In this latter area, the abunzi system is
similar to the informal justice system in Burundi called the
Bashingantahe, which is used mostly for property disputes,
which form up to 70 percent of legal cases in Burundi.
The abunzi also has jurisdiction over some criminal cases,
including some land-related matters such as boundary disputes,
cases of damage to crops and theft where the value does not
exceed three million Rwandan francs. Cases of larceny and
extortion committed between members of same family, killing or
wounding without intent are also presented to the abunzi as long
as the matter at issue should not exceed three million Rwandan
francs. However, in terms of geographical jurisdiction, the abunzi
can only mediate on disputes that involve persons from their
sector. Currently, the Organic Law prevents cross-sector
mediation. In essence, the court does not provide for the abunzi
to mediate in cases involving persons from their sector and a
person from another sector. As soon as an outsider is involved,
the case is referred to a formal court.
Theoretical perspective for comprehending the abunzi
Decentralisation thesis
Simply defined, decentralisation is the transfer of public
authority, resources, and personnel from the national level to
sub-national jurisdictions (Ndengwa, 2002). Decentralisation is
often discussed alongside devolution, which also refers to the
transfer of political power from central government to the local
authorities and communities (Kauzya, 2007). Decentralisation as
a concept and practice is informed by the dependency theory as
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well as centre-periphery thesis which argues that too much power
in the centre is detrimental to the development of the periphery.
However, the nature and strategies of decentralization are often
guided by the history and socio-political needs of that particular
country. In Rwanda, decentralization was informed by the need to
“provide a structural arrangement for the government and people
of Rwanda to fight poverty at close-range, and to enhance their
reconciliation via empowerment of local populations” (MINALOC
Decentralisation Policy, May 2000). Through the National
Decentralisation Policy, the government of Rwanda has been
engaged in decentralization efforts that seek to bring development
to the grassroots communities by enabling their participation in
critical processes.
The abunzi are part of the Rwandan government's repertoire of
initiatives designed to make justice available to citizens at every
level. In 2003, the Constitution of Rwanda adopted a broader
nationwide project of decentralization, hence the setting up of the
Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC). The objective of
decentralization was to allow citizens to “participate in the
planning and management of their development process”
(Ministry of Local Government, 2008). Decentralization is a
central theme in Rwanda's broader development goals and it is
flaunted by several government departments including MINALO,
Ministry of Finance (MINICOFIN) and Ministry of Justice
(MINIJUST). In fact, Rwanda's Vision 2020 strategic plan is
themed, “Community Driven Development” in pursuit of the
decentralization theme. Furthermore, the government of Rwanda
advances the decentralization of justice thesis based on the
assumption that this will enhance good governance in Rwanda
through the emphasis on local autonomy, collective action, and
bottom-up decision making. In the quest for decentralization and
dispersion of government's administrative functions to the local
level, the government of Rwanda created 30 administrative
districts which were sub-divided into 416 sectors, which were
further sub-divided into 2 148 cells. These structures are meant
to enhance service delivery as well as facilitate the involvement of
communities in development and decision making, and
ultimately improve governance.
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Lederach (1997) also discusses the importance of grassroots
actors in peace-building, a theme that is reminiscent of the
decentralization thesis. Lederach underscores that peacebuilding
should have space for diverse actors, from the state to
civil society and local community members, and advocates
grassroots peace0building instead of state-centric peacebuilding.
Lederach emphasizes the role of grassroots actors and
members of local communities in peace-building, arguing that
they not only experience the day-to-day impact of conflict, but are
also best positioned to resolve that conflict because they are
aware of their environment and the needs of the community.
Using this line of thinking, one could conceive of the abunzi as
grassroots actors in peace-building as they actively play
prominent roles in resolving conflicts at the local level.
The abunzi are not the only institution of local justice that has
been mandated by the Rwandan government to decentralize
justice. In fact, the abunzi system exists amidst a myriad of other
decentralization initiatives of justice including the gacaca,
ingando, nyumba kumi, umudugudu as well as other fairly
modern systems of justice. The government's major initiative to
decentralise the justice system and to provide advice and support
at the community level, is existent through the establishment of
Access to Justice Office (MAJ) in every district throughout the
country. Interestingly, although the local institution of abunzi
can be explained by the decentralization thesis, it is inevitable to
recognize that although the government of Rwanda has
decentralized administrative and governance structures at the
local level, it has not fully devolved power. Critics posit that the
decentralization of the law is just a means by the Rwandan
government to extend its authoritarian control to the grassroots
locales, hence the concept of 'lawfare' (Chakravarty, 2009;
Thomson and Nagy, 2010). Through decentralized structures,
government is able to keep vigilance over everyday activities,
looking for signs of dissent.
Insight into abunzi justice
Abunzi: Opportunities for sustainable conflict resolution and
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justice
In the post-genocide era, the government of Rwanda has sought to
reform the justice system and institutionalise local institutions of
conflict resolution. The abunzi system is in accordance with one
of the goals of the Rwanda Ministry of Justice (MINIJUST), which
is to promote transparency, accountability, mediation, unity and
reinforcing reconciliation mechanisms as well as maintenance of
law and order. Since the abunzi are lay mediators who live in the
community, they are therefore accessible to the people and
understand the conflict dynamics better. As such, the abunzi are
well perceived by the Rwandan population. According to the
2010 Citizen Report Cards (CRC) survey conducted by the
Rwanda Governance Advisory Council (RGAC), the abunzi
Mediation committees came as the first appreciated dispute
resolution instrument in comparison with other mechanisms.
Citizens felt that the abunzi process allows for easy access to
justice. The survey by RGAC reveals that 81.6 % respondents
were satisfied with the service delivery of the Mediation
Committees in resolving their disputes, compared to the 63.4 %
satisfaction rate with formal courts and 18.4% satisfaction with
the Access Justice Bureaus.
Land disputes are the most common cases that are brought
before the abunzi, which clearly reflects how land is important to
Rwandan people, as close to 90% of Rwandans depend on
agriculture for livelihood. Land disputes in Rwanda are
compounded by the political changes that occurred after the 1994
genocide, especially in the light of past Tutsi refugees coming
back to Rwanda following the RPF victory. Conflicts between
returnees and old inhabitants of land are common, and the
conflict can be ethnicised since returnees are usually Tutsis while
old inhabitants are usually Hutus. However, government has
instituted a policy that obligates land sharing with returnees,
although this does not necessarily prevent conflict outbreaks over
land. The overwhelming cases of land disputes that are presented
to the abunzi often involve women's claims to land, which are
often complicated by intricate issues such as poverty, patriarchy,
polygamy, inheritance, divorce and unofficial marriages. In
addition, the introduction of new laws protecting women's right to
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land seem to have increased the number of land conflicts among
families. A study on local resolution of land disputes by RCN
Justice and Democratie revealed that the abunzi mediators have
played a prominent role in resolving land disputes thereby
relieving the over-burdened court system. Speaking after a
training session of the abunzi in January 2011, a representative
from the Ministry of Justice said this about the advantages of
using the abunzi approach to justice: “The mediation committee
is a strong pillar of conflict resolution which will deal with social
conflicts regarding land, gender violence and abuse of child rights
in rural community. Use the skills acquired to help the others
engage into productive ventures other than wasting time in legal
battles” (AllAfrica.com, 24 January 2011).
In addition, the abunzi system in Rwanda has the capacity to
overcome a state-centric perspective in conflict resolution and
justice delivery. The abunzi approach encourages positive-sum
thinking and ultimately peaceful solutions. This means the cases
are resolved in a shorter period as there is limited room for the
conflict to become intractable. Even in cases where the mediator
decisions are appealed by disputants, in most cases the formal
courts follow the recommendations of the abunzi since they are
considered to be credible. Ultimately, this reduces costs
associated with the formal justice system. Even though the
prevention from formal courts is often framed as beneficial and
less costly, Nader (2008) cautions that alternative forms of
dispute resolution are actually marginalizing to the poor,
especially if they are mandatory. Doughty (2011) asserts that in
Rwanda, the abunzi system has ultimately excluded poor, rural
and uneducated peasants from accessing the formal justice
system, while the urban elites are the only ones privileged enough
to make use of this system.
However, considering the pressure on the Rwandan modern
courts, it is perhaps not far-fetched to conclude that the
institution of abunzi, although not perfect, at least allows people
to access justice timely. If the modern courts were operating alone
without the assistance of these decentralized legal forums, it is
highly likely that many Rwandans would have been completely
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marginalized and disenfranchised from the formal justice system.
In Rwanda, despite its strong presence and control on the
citizenry, the state realizes that it is apparently not the only actor
in socio-political processes, but that it can make use of a number
of 'political orders' to provide governance and regulate processes
of conflict management. Like the gacaca courts, abunzi
mediation appears to have contributed to the decongestion of the
formal courts as most civil suits and crimes that fall under three
(3) million francs will be resolved at the local level. First, some
disputes are too trivial for formal courts' attention, hence the
abunzi are mandated to deal with such disputes. Statistical
reports on the Ministry of Justice website indicate that before the
Abunzi system, 80% of civil cases pending before courts involved
less than one (1) million Rwandan francs. However, following the
establishment of abunzi in 2006, approximately 70% of all civil
cases now fall under the competence of the abunzi. The MINJUST
also conducted a survey in 2005 to ascertain abunzi
effectiveness, and the results concluded that 73% of cases tried
by abunzi were not later referred to the formal court system. In
addition, should a case that was once before the abunzi be
brought to the formal court as an appeal, the abunzi can submit
their investigations, discussions and decisions as official
documents for the case.
Through the use of mediation, the abunzi system is designed to
enable restoration of relationship and ultimately facilitate a sense
of community. Both the process and outcome of the abunzi
mediation are expected to reflect conciliation and restoration
rather than retribution. In fact, Organic Law prevents abunzi
mediators from handing punitive sentences. This approach has
been credited for promoting reconciliation among disputants. A
2010 study by RCN Justice and Democratie concludes that the
majority of cases heard by the abunzi are concluded through a
compromise arrangement, although the majority of disputants in
abunzi cases hardly go further into reconciliation.
Another value of traditional institutions of governance and
conflict resolution is their potential to contribute to Africa's
democratisation process. Just like many state mandated
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institutions in Rwanda, the abunzi are opening spaces for
ordinary citizens to participate in public processes such as justice
delivery and governance reform. For example, the abunzi system
is instructed by the Rwandan constitution to ensure that at least
30 percent of the mediators are women. One oft-cited challenge of
endogenous methods of conflict resolution is the limited
participation of women in the discourses and decisions
happening at the traditional level. Women's participation in
traditional power structures remains limited with many women
being confined to the roles of subtle advisers or petitioners.
However, the abunzi institution has presented opportunities
where women can re-emphasise their relevance in community
processes. The quest for consensus and restoration by the abunzi
system has enabled women's active participation and subsequent
ability to challenge notions of vertical hierarchy that are often
found in some traditional institutions.
Abunzi: Challenges to justice
Limited Capacity
Although the abunzi is mandated by the Organic Law (2006, 2008
and 2010), there is procedural dissonance which is caused by
lack of knowledge about the law and dispute resolution methods
by abunzi members. Knowledge of the substantive law, mediation
aptitude, skills in evaluating evidence and respect of procedures
are important attributes of any mediator. However, many abunzi
mediators are elected into their positions not on the basis of these
attributes but mainly because they are 'persons of integrity,' and
are willing to offer their services to the state and their community.
While the Organic Law clearly spells out how the abunzi are to be
constituted and the nature of the cases they should resolve, the
law nonetheless does not clearly indicate how they should
mediate. In addition, the abunzi mediators need to be
knowledgeable in other laws apart from the Organic Law. Such
relevant laws to their task include the land law and family law and
inheritance law since these are the most emergent cases for the
abunzi. With few exceptions, these abunzi committees and
individuals have limited access to copies of applicable laws. The
few copies of the law that are available for some abunzi are dry
documents written in 'legalese' instead of the accessible,
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summarized and simplified versions of the law.
The abunzi institution also suffers from the lack of adequate and
effective institutional support. Although some organisations offer
the abunzi support in terms of training and skills development,
this support is often scarce and inadequate. The limited skills
significantly reduce the effectiveness of their efforts hence the
numerous cases of appeals that has affected areas such as the
Nyarugenge sector. While appeals can signify the fairness of the
process, too many of such appeals can also be attributed to the
incompetence of the mediators as perceived by parties to the
dispute. In fact, according to a study conducted by RCN Justice
and Democratie (2010), 55% of the abunzi decisions which are
annulled by the primary courts are due to errors in assessing
facts, while 26% relate to procedural errors and 19% are due to
the misapplication of substantive laws. As such, in efforts to
counter the challenge of lack of awareness of the law, the
Rwandan government organizes various forms of trainings and
information exchanges for the abunzi. In addition,
nongovernmental organisations such as the RCN Justice and
Democratie and Access to Justice Centre (AJC) offer mediation
skills training as well as training on substantive law to the abunzi.
Organisations outside Rwanda such as the Pepperdine's Straus
Institute for Dispute Resolution and Nootbaar Institute on Law,
Religion, and Ethics have been training the abunzi in laws on
domestic violence and inheritance.
Inadequate institutional support
Although the abunzi mediators document their decisions and
minutes of meetings, these are largely handwritten as the
government has not provided digital gadgets for capturing data
such as computers. This is quite a paradox as Rwanda is
presently known as a knowledge economy and fast becoming the
technology hub for Africa. The Rwanda state launched an e-
Government project which aims to provide internet access to all
levels of government except the abunzi and gacaca. However, the
digitalisation of abunzi decisions and processes is a form of
electronic-governance which would lead to greater transparency,
less corruption and a more accessible justice system. In addition,
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abunzi mediators lack access to legal and mediation training.
Most of the training in mediation and substantive law for the
abunzi is often voluntarily conducted by organizations such as
RCN Justice and Democratie, Access to Justice Centres, the
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) as well as
the Ministry of Justice. However, the ratio of attorney-abunzi at
AJC is 1:1 000 which is hardly adequate or effective. Support
from government is equally stunted. A study conducted by the
USAID to assess local resolution of land disputes in the
Kabushinge and Nyamugali cells concludes that the abunzi do
not receive support on basic necessities such as cellular phones,
airtime and even transportation costs. The same issue was
revealed during the interviews conducted by the author in
Gacuriro wherein the abunzi mediators verified that they use
their own personal funds to travel to meetings and hearings.
Unlike their counterparts in the gacaca courts, the
inyangamugayo who received support with costs such as
transportation, stationery, cellular phone airtime and school fees
for their children, the abunzi mediator is essentially a volunteer
to the core. However, recently, the government, through the
Ministry of Justice has begun to pay health insurance for the
abunzi members which is pegged at 5 000 francs a year. In
addition, the ministry provides one bicycle at every cell to be used
by abunzi mediators in the dispensation of their duties. Abunzi
mediators could also benefit from interacting and networking
with others from other villages and districts so that they can
discuss best practices and enhance their mediation skills and
decisions.
The challenge of legalized and state mandated mediation
Although the abunzi existed in pre-colonial Rwanda, the abunzi
institution in its current form is a somewhat adulterated version
in the sense that it is top-down mediation. Abunzi like its
counterpart, the gacaca courts, is what Hobsbawn and Ranger
(1983) would describe as a 'reinvention of tradition for particular
uses in the present'. Thomson and Nagy (2010) posit that the
general assumption about community-led conflict resolution
process is that citizens are willing participants when the reality
however is that such processes are controlled by the government.
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In Rwanda for example, citizens could be compelled to participate
in abunzi due to their social situation of poverty, limited
education, powerlessness as well as lack of credible alternatives
for justice. In addition, the abunzi mediation is mandated by the
law. However, legalized mediation is not peculiar to Rwanda only;
other countries including the United States of America also
practise legalized mediation, which is often classified as a form of
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). However, state mandated
mediation distorts the entire manner in which proper mediation
is supposed to be experienced by actors. The government of
Rwanda has made it explicit in its laws on the abunzi that it
expects a mediation process from the abunzi members. In other
words, the culture of mediation is communicated by the law.
Crimes and disputes of a particular nature are by law required to
go to the abunzi for hearing before the primary courts can
deliberate on the issue. Although the state-backed legal
institutions of dispute resolution have filled a void in the justice
arena, it is also arguable that the government of Rwanda is
preoccupied with the creation of decentralized legal forums where
people can access justice. However, the mandatory nature of such
institutions makes the resultant reconciliation questionable.
Citizens are obligated to use the mediation approach, while they
are reminded of the punishment that will follow from the formal
courts should the mediation efforts fail. The abunzi system is an
apt demonstration of the tangled relationships between law,
power and justice and how these cumulatively impact on the lives
of ordinary Rwandans brought into contact with the state.
Given the foregoing, the abunzi are an illustrative demonstration
of the dual impact of state-initiated systems of restorative justice.
The abunzi system demonstrates a level of ambivalence when it
comes to pursuance of the restorative and retributive approaches
to justice. This is because the abunzi is a traditional system of
conflict resolution which was just transplanted into the formal
legal system, and is still expected to exhibit a conciliatory
approach. Although the Organic Law states that the abunzi are
supposed to use restorative approaches instead of the retributive
approach, the reality is such that this institution can also exhibit
adversarial tendencies. Participants in mediation process are
152

often explicitly told about the danger of non-compliance with the
abunzi process and outcomes, including payment of fines as well
as incarceration. When the state is involved in issuing incentives
and disincentives with regards to one's participation in local legal
forums, the process becomes coercive in essence. People end up
participating in the mediation process not because they are
convinced it works or that they subscribe to its tenets but because
they are obliged to. The combination of state-backed threats and
cultural mysticism and justification for the process makes the
abunzi an institution that is replete with compulsion, hence the
term “voluntary-yet-mandatory control” by Doughty (2011).
Because of these overt and covert threats in the abunzi process,
there is a danger of people sacrificing their individual rights in
order to uphold community rights and collective interests.
Gahamanyi (2003) is skeptical of cultural practices that are often
taunted as being beneficial to the community, and instead
cautions that these can be disempowering to individuals.
Although the threat of punishment by abunzi system is less overt
than the threat in gacaca courts, the imposition of mediation
undermines elements of choice, freedom and individual will to
decide on a course of action to take. In addition, the fact that some
people do not take cases that would have been dealt with by the
abunzi to the primary court might not reflect satisfaction with the
mediation outcome, but might just reflect fatigue or lack of
wherewithal to confront the much clogged formal court system.
In some instances of observing the abunzi institution, there seem
to be problems in distinguishing between the mediation and
arbitration processes both in comprehension and in action.
Depending on the nature of the case, the abunzi can choose to
mediate or arbitrate. In fact, some members of the Rwandan
community refer to the abunzi as arbitrators; for example an RCN
Justice and Democratie report of 2007 referred to abunzi as
'arbitrators” and the same case was found in many other online
reports. In some complex cases, abunzi mediators end up
applying the adversarial process. For example, in instances
where disputing parties cannot be reconciled, the abunzi will
adopt a decision applying the laws of the state. This is a typical
combination of sanctions and incentives in conflict resolution.
153

Although the use of carrot and stick strategies is common in
adversarial approaches, in Rwanda this has been used by abunzi
to deter delays in handling cases.
Social legal forums and sustainable peace
The abunzi just like the gacaca are elaborate processes by
communities trying to own the justice and conflict resolution
space. While the symbolism of community ownership in the
abunzi processes is undoubted, what cannot be ascertained is
how far such processes have gone in facilitating actual social
cohesion, healing and reconciliation among conflict parties and
disparate groups. It is even more difficult to ascertain these
issues by directly asking Rwandans at the grassroots levels and
in civil society because of the limited social and political space in
post-genocide Rwanda. The level of political freedom in Rwanda is
quite low; indeed the country has been consistently ranked as
'not free' by Freedom House every year since its annual survey
was launched in 2002. Zorbas (2010) asserts that certain
“silences” are being imposed on the Rwandan population when it
comes to the reconciliation and unity project. Such 'silences',
Zorbas argues, are evidenced by the lack of debate on Rwanda's
conflicted “histories.” The government has a lot of control on what
is said within Rwanda, and the fear of being labelled a 'divisionist'
may prevent people from sharing their true thoughts about their
experiences of cohesion and inter-ethnic interaction. However,
what can be directly observed is how people religiously
participate in these forums as called for by the government, a
situation that Erving Goffman would label, 'dramaturgical
representation.” Indeed, critics argue that their participation is
out of fear of the repercussions of non-participation. These
concerns have led to some scholarly labelling the current
situation in Rwanda as 'pretending peace' (Buckely-Zistel, 2010).
Buckley-Zistel's conclusion is that there is still ethnic
antagonism among Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, only that the
government does not allow its expression because any such
exhibition of differences would be labelled 'genocide ideology.'
Although abunzi is a state-backed legal initiative, the
nomenclature of Abanyarwanda often strategically accompanies
this process. Some critics say it is a move by the Rwandan
154

government to protect the process from being criticised for not
meeting international legal and human rights standards.
Conclusion
This analysis concludes that the abunzi have filled a void left by
the formal court system by ensuring that local people have access
to prompt and universal justice. Like the gacaca courts, abunzi
brought justice to the grassroots level and enables community
members to participate in the dispensation of justice both
symbolically and practically. Although abunzi functions and
jurisdiction are spelt out by law, the institution, process and
rituals associated with abunzi is uniquely 'Rwandan' and has
existed long before colonialism. Abunzi processes emphasise on
mediation and conciliation, although the failure for disputants to
cooperate with the mediators can be followed by adversarial
processes and applications of punitive laws of the land. However,
in its current form, the abunzi risks being one of those statemandated
programs that addresses disputes at the superficial
'make-believe' level without effectively restoring broken
relationships and trust. It would be interesting to analyse the
long-term impact of the abunzi system on social relations and on
ownership of the outcomes of the abunzi process. On the one
hand, the abunzi can be perceived as a system that guarantees
access to justice and which does not necessarily have to be purely
mediation. On the other hand, the same system can be
interpreted as a highly politicized institution of justice which
curtails citizens' right to choose their vehicles of justice.
The mixture of the adversarial approach and the conciliatory
approach, coupled with the combination of culture and western
justice are some of the inherent contractions within the abunzi.
These contradictions also affect how it is perceived by parties and
outcomes of abunzi processes. Not wanting to paint a dark picture
of the contemporary traditional justice forums in Rwanda, it is
important to acknowledge the potential of the abunzi system if it
is delivered well. Despite being a state-backed mediation process,
the abunzi system has become embedded in daily life in Rwanda
and has the capacity to promote social rebuilding, bonding and
negotiation of community. Ultimately, the synergy between the
155

abunzi and the formal system beckons of the possibilities that lie
ahead when traditional institutions of conflict resolution are
institutionalized, acknowledged by law yet de-politicised and left
to operate independently.
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Conclusion
All through the papers, the primacy of community comes
through, with special emphasis on viewing grassroots and other
vulnerable communities as key actors in their own empowerment
for development and peace-building. For true and sustainable
empowerment can only come from within, albeit with external
support, material or otherwise. This issue comes out clearly in
all the articles contained in this book.
For example, in Women's access to microfinance and poverty
alleviation in Zimbabwe – Case study of Chinhoyi town, Mishi and
Kapingura found that women in Chinhoyi are not having to wait
for banks and micro-finance institutions to bail them out. In the
paper Natural resources management: Whose burden and whose
benefits, Dube found out that communities bordering
conservancies are demanding to participate in the management
of the natural resources. In The Zimbabwean traditional
chieftaincy and its role in conflict transformation at the micro
level, Matavire shows that many of the chiefs' subjects are
demanding change in how chiefs conduct themselves. In The
Role of Indigenous knowledge in Sustainable Development –
Practices and Challenges, Tapfumaneyi & Rupande argue why
development practitioners should reckon with the knowledge
existing in their beneficiary communities. In Science Education
for Sustainable Livelihoods – Community Development through
Society-Responsive Science Curriculum Reforms, Bhukuvhani et
al argue for the recognition of indigenous scientific knowledge. In
Re-examining the Role of NGOs in Conflict Resolution: Friends or
Foes, Tapfumaneyi and Rupande argue for the need for foreign
NGOs to work with local NGOs in order to be acceptable to the
local communities. In Zimbabwe's economic empowerment
initiatives – A critical review, Chipaike argues for the participation
of the marginalized segments of society in national economic
empowerment initiatives. And in Community-Driven Conflict
Resolution – The Abunzi Mediators In Rwanda, Mutisi shows how
the local communities in Rwanda are capacitated to resolve their
disputes locally.
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That beneficiaries are indeed actors too in sustainable peace and
development at the community level is not wishful thinking;
rather it is reality that genuinely concerned actors cannot ignore.
161

About the editor
Samuel Maruta is the founder and current director of the
Southern Institute of Peace-building and Development (SIPD) and
the editor of the Southern Peace Review, an academic-cumpractitioner
journal dedicated to promoting the peace-building
work of citizens of the global south, published by the SIPD.
Previously, he once served as the associate editor of the Journal of
Peace-building and Development, jointly published by the South
North Centre for Peace-building and Development in Harare
Zimbabwe and the Centre for Global Peace in Washington DC
USA. Before that he was the publisher and editor of The Third
Sector, an industry magazine for the civil society sector in
Zimbabwe. Mr. Maruta holds, inter alia, a B.Ed degree from the
University of Zimbabwe, an MA degree in English from Iowa State
University (USA), a post-graduate certificate in Peace and
Reconciliation Studies from Coventry University (UK), a certificate in
Transforming Civil Conflicts from NETUNI (European Network
University) in the Netherlands, and a certificate in Conflict
Analysis from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). He is
also a member of the editorial team of the African Journal of
History and Culture (AJHC) published by Academic Journals
based in Lagos, Nigeria.

SIPD Publications to date
Community development in Zimbabwe: Role and
situation of community-based organisations,
Occasional paper series, August 2010
All culpable together: Civil society and the fast-track
land reform programme in Zimbabwe, Occasional
paper series, July 2010
Hands-on community peace-building, democracy
and development in Zimbabwe, November 2008.
Southern Peace Review Vol1.1, September 2008