Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam - CIA FOIA

C01268717
Chapter 1
Involuntary PassivityD
The generals who overthrew Ngo Dinh Diem lost no time in making
it known to CIA that they had meant what they said, as coup planning
evolved, about seeking US guidance in the formation of a successor
regime. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge moved equally promptly to
ensure that no such guidance would be given, and his moratorium on US
Mission contacts with the new leadership lasted until January. Even then,
he sharply restricted the range of subjects on which the Station could
advise the Vietnamese.n
The day after the'aiath of the Ngo brothers, Bui Diem, a Dai Viet
politician well known to the Station, reaffirmed that the generals would
count heavily on American advice in deciding how to ensure the constitutionality
of their new regime. On 4 November 1963, Gen. Tran Van "Little
Minh,"1 I bemoaned the
generals' inca aeit to meet the challenge of running the country and
berated for being unable to say what the US Government
wanted.'
At the same time, "Little Minh" exposed the potential for friction
with the Americans when he described "Big Minh's" five-minute tantrum
over an Embassy request for the release of labor leader Tran Quoc
Buu, who,[ .. Ihad enjoyed close ties to
both the Em5assy ancfNgOUinllNhu. Minh had exploded in rage at what
he interpreted as US distrust of him, and rejected advice from his Prime
Minister, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, to let the Americans have what they wanted.
Headquarters reacted to the incident by asking the Station to get "Big
Minh" to look at the international ramifications of his jailing a respected
labor leader. 2D
'elA Critic Mcssa e no, 25 3 Noveillber 1963j ISAIG2196, 4 Novembcr
1%3 'fran Van Minh was often-called Little Minh to dis­
Iiuguish hUll rom t lc p rica y Imposing and professionally more senior Duong Van Minh.D
'SAIG 2196;1 5 November 1963,1 1