Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam - CIA FOIA

C01268717
he asked Polgar to send them on the C-130 transport dedicated to the
Kissinger party. Having sharply inquired as to their number, Polgar consented.
[ Ihad the same sense of being
on his own, but found a different solution when he took his relatives to
the informal Defense Attache center for evacuation on one of the supply
aircraft returning to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. 170
Late in the evening of 19 April, Polgar summarized the North Vietnamese
troop movements that threatened Saigon: Hanoi could readily
reinforce, while ARVN reserves were nonexistent or already committed.
But Thieu was heartened, a Vietnamese military contact had told the Station,
by a report that the US Congress was about to approve $350 million
in military aid. As a result, the President was preparing a defiant speech
sure to irritate the domestic opposition and provoke the North Vietnamese
into intensified military pressure. But if Thieu was defiant, Ambassador
Martin had finally come to see his departure as indispensable. Just
what he would do, and when, Polgar did not know, but the COS understood
that Martin and Kissinger had just exchanged several messages on
the subject. And the Ambassador had just made an urgent request to see
President Thieu. 180
Acting on his assurance to Kissinger, Martin had also instructed
Polgar to contact Colonel Toth. At this point, the COS was simply to ask
Toth to clarify his allusion to a Communist demand for an American
statement regarding the future of an American Embassy in Saigon. But
Polgar noted to Shackley that the PRG spokesman at that day's Tan Son
Nhut press briefing had restated a willingness to begin negotiations,
which tended to confirm that Toth had indeed talked to them and accurately
conveyed to Polgar what they said. There was one hitch, a new
PRG precondition that Ambassador Martin be recalled for allegedly having
functioned as a military adviser. In the context of these developments,
and in particular that of Thien's proposed departure, Polgar assured
Shackley that neither he nor anyone else in the Station was "engaged in
political action to bring about a change of government in Saigon. All of
our senior officers understand fully the need to avoid any semblance of a
repetition of the events of 1963, and none of them aspires to be Lou
[Conciu's] successor."'9D
"Saigon 89202; Schofield interview, 3 September 1992;1 linterview, 24 August 1992.
Neither Martin nor Polgar opposed the informal DAOairlift or any ofthc other de facto evacuation
schemes thaI emerged after the fall of the Highlands. Their objection seems rather to have involved
any US policy declaration that in their view would implicitly abandon the Saigon government.D
"Saigon 89215, 19April 1975.1 I
"Saigon 89215. The message to which Polgar was presumably responding has not been found.D
So&et
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