Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam - CIA FOIA

C01268717
government would have to be willing to "stop the war in concrete terms,"
and the US Embassy would have to restrict itself to "normal, traditional"
diplomatic activity. The Hungarians thought only a few days remained to
set up such talks, but that the North was genuinely not interested in
humiliating the United States. Toth thought it silly, on the other hand, to
talk about US military aid to Saigon; "The North Vietnamese will certainly
not wait until the new materiel arrives and the South Vietnamese
divisions are reformed." 12D
Toth specified that by humiliation he meant something like the
ignominious helicopter evacuation of the US Mission in Phnom Penh,
which had just taken place. In his opinion, the North saw a large-scale
reprise of that event in Saigon as provoking US action against the best
interests of all concerned, and wanted to avoid it. Polgar asked about the
Hungarian interest in all of this, and Toth asserted there was none, that
Hungary just wanted to see the end of unnecessary bloodshed. Also, "As
a country which has lost many wars, it [has] a certain sympathy for the
losing side." The South had now lost, and the only question was whether
the political consequences took effect "under civilized circumstances,"
like those facilitated by the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1918, or
only after destruction of the capital city, as in Berlin in 1945.'3D
Although they still differed, apparently, on the question of Thieu's
continued tenure, Martin and Polgar shared an intense commitment to
the pursuit of negotiations. The Ambassador seized on Polgar's talk with
Colonel Toth, telling Kissinger, still on 19 April, that Toth reflected
"Hanoi's desiderata much more accurately than the 'intentions' you've
been getting recently from Hanoi's exhortations to its cadre." Having thus
dismissed the reporting from] Iand elsewhere, Martin said that,
unless instructed to the contrary by the next day, he would instruct Polgar
to explore the matter further. The Ambassador went on to summarize
a discussion with visiting US military commanders of helicopter lift
capabilities. He had determined that a "one-cycle lift" could remove
J,600 people, in addition to the Marine security force; two cycles would
allow 3,200. In any case, although he accepted a worst case estimate of
ten days until the end, Martin expected another three weeks in which to
continue the evacuation."D
Martin showed Polgar his cable, with its startlingly bitter complaint:
"As it now stands, it seems everyone has completed the CYA operation in
Washington. The Intelligence Community has drawn the absolutely worst
Il/iJid.n
"Ibid. mh ended the meeting by suggesting that in view of Saigon's uncertain future. it might be
useful to set up a radio link between his delegation and the US Embassy.D
"Polgar interview, 29-30 July 1993nDavid Butler. The Fall ofSaigon (London: Sphere Books.
19X6).PI'. 304-3051l- """l_
Srhet
/185