Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam - CIA FOIA

C01268717
Waiting for Polgar, when he got to his cable traffic, was a Shackley
message dealing with the 28 April WSAG meeting. It acknowledged Polgar's
report of Minh's inauguration, but otherwise pointedly ignored the
event and the Station's speculation about cabinet organization and negotiating
procedure. Dealing exclusively with the evacuation issue, Shackley
acknowledged Martin's relatively optimistic. estimate of two to, three
weeks while Minh negotiated with the Communists. He also pointed out
Hanoi's clear capability to take the airport under fire whenever it chose.
Uncertain about Communist intentions, Washington had authorized Gen.
Homer Smith, the Defense Attache, to decide when to suspend C-130
flights under artillery or rocket fire; Regarding the Station's Vietnamese,
Shackley advised that the WSAG endorsed CIA use of Nam Phong and
Taipei as it wished; he was at the moment trying to obtain C-130 transports
for the Station's use.llD
Martin was ill-the subsequent diagnosis was bronchial pneumonia-but
Polgar thought his presence at the Embassy essential and called
In insist that he come in. The Ambassador did so, about 0600 hours, but
until his medication took effect he lacked the strength even to make himself
heard on the telephone. Polgar had to relay his instructions to the
Defense Attache people at the airport and his reporting to Admiral Gayler
and the Secretary of State. In these early morning hours, Polgar's reports
staff was busy keeping Headquarters informed of the destruction at Tan
Son Nhut. No one, however, had yet proposed the so-called Phase Four
evacuation procedure that prescribed an emergency helicopter lift to
replace the C-130 shuttle.nO
About 0800 hours, Martin received a formal request from President
Minh for the departure within 24 hours of all Defense Attache personnel.
The Ambassador promised to comply and asked Minh to ensure their
orderly and safe departure. Polgar took Minh's request as confirmation
that the Embassy would continue to function. But whether the airport
would .coutinue to function was now in dispute between General Smith
at Tan Son Nhut and Ambassador Martin at the Embassy. Martin refused
to accept Smith's judgment that the runways were now unusable, and
insisted, against staff advice, on driving to the airport for a personal
inspection, What he saw there convinced him that a helicopter lift was in
fact now indispensable, and about an hour later, or around 1100 hours,
Admiral Gayler at ClNCPAC in Honolulu ordered Martin's recommendation
put into effect. 33D
'\ I
"Polgar interview, 29-30 July 1993,0
-nu.. Hutler, 11w Fall ofSaigon, p, 420,0
,.S.oetoet­
210