Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam - CIA FOIA

C01268717
license plates, to create the impression of a high-level US convoy. The
ploy worked, and the guards waved the convoy through to the parking
area reserved for Air America. Ambassador Martin was there to bid farewell
to the ex-President, and Polgar also boarded the old C-1l8 to brief
the pilot on the formalities to expect .in Taipei. With the aircraft disappearing
into the evening sky, Polgar radioed the Station to flashllits
estimated arrival time. To Headquarters, he wrote, "Wish to aavrse-you
that by direction of highest authority Station has successfully evacuated
former President Nguyen Van Thieu, former Prime Minister Tran Thien
Khiem and ten others, with wheels up at 2120 hours local, 25 April."
Returning to Saigon, the Ambassador and COS sought to present a business-as-usual
air by dropping in at the party at the Polish Mission.ISO
Thieu's departure may have facilitated the subsequent transfer of
power from Tran Van Huong to General Minh, but the next day brought
only intensified anxiety over other aspects of the Saigon and US positions
with respect to Hanoi. For one thing, the North Vietnamese chose 26
April to renew both psychological and military pressure, with strident
media attacks and stepped-up military activity around Saigon that forced
the closing of Bien Hoa Air Base. In addition, the evacuation problem
remained unsolved. The Thais had already expressed their reluctance to
harbor large number of Vietnamese refugees, and now Manila reported
that Ambassador William H. Sullivan had just promised President Marcos
to allow no politically sensitive Vietnamese, that is, KIPs, into the
Philippines. And theI Iechoed Polgar's own
fears when he blamed Saigon's paralysis for a perceived decline in the
prospects for negotiations.In
But the Station persistea1n its uphill struggle to get a Saigon govcrnment
capable of avoiding military occupation by negotiating a political
surrender. The Station discussed with General Minh the candidates
for office Colonel Toth had listed for the COS. These included the
woman activist, Ngo Ba Thanh, whom Generals Quang and Binh had
exactly a month earlier contemplated arresting; Minh said she would get
a senior position. But he would have no Catholic priests in key positions,
especially the "irresponsible liar" Father Chan Tinh proposed by
the Communists.nO, .
While Polgar struggled to help prevent a Communist assault of
Saigon, his reservations about full-scale evacuation preparations encouraged
something of a business-as-usual spirit at the working level. As one