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TRAGIC RECOGNITION: ACTION AND IDENTITY IN ANTIGONE ...

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6. This ambivalence is registered in Aristotle’s definition of anagnôrisis, which he says is a<br />

“change from ignorance to knowledge, and thus to either love or hate, in the personages marked<br />

for good or evil fortune” (Poet. 1452a29–32). It is also nicely reflected in Jocasta’s next-to-last<br />

words to Oedipus, “May you never know who you are!” (Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1068). Our tendency<br />

to regard recognition as an unequivocal good makes it impossible to grasp this exclamation as an<br />

expression of concern and goodwill, as it seems to be.<br />

7. For analogous uses of “ontological” see Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation: The<br />

Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000);<br />

and the discussion of “ontopolitical interpretation” in Connolly, “Nothing is Fundamental,”<br />

chap. 1 in The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).<br />

8. In Aristotle’s terms, tragedy is an “imitation of an action”: Poet. 1450a16.<br />

9. Cf. J. Peter Euben, The Tragedy of Political Theory: The Road Not Taken (Princeton:<br />

Princeton University Press, 1990), 56.<br />

10. Both Axel Honneth (The Fragmented World of the Social [Albany: SUNY Press, 1995], 250)<br />

and Taylor (“The Politics of Recognition,” 26) say that misrecognition can “cripple” its victims.<br />

For the unmediated connection between identity and agency, see Avishai Margalit and Moshe<br />

Halbertal, “Liberalism and the Right to Culture,” Social Research 61, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 491–510;<br />

498); for the mediated connection, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory<br />

of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), chap. 5 (though I believe Kymlicka is pushed<br />

further toward Margalit’s and Halbertal’s position than he acknowledges in his effort to justify<br />

not only a right to culture in general but a right to “one’s own” culture: since what the latter idea<br />

adds is the notion of cultures as plural and to at least some degree mutually exclusive, it demands<br />

a shift in focus away from the choices culture contains (which it might well share with others)<br />

and toward the options it excludes (which are what marks it off as unique).<br />

11. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University<br />

Press, 1982).<br />

12. Of course, not only the Poetics is implicated here: the Nicomachean Ethics (especially the<br />

discussion of virtue, misfortune, and eudaimonia in book 1, ch. 10); the Metaphysics (esp. book<br />

9); and the Politics are also all important, as are (for me) Arendt’s uses of some of these<br />

Aristotelian texts in her account of action in The Human Condition, I intend to expand the<br />

discussion of these other texts in a future version of this paper.<br />

13. Parenthetical citations to the Antigone refer to line numbers, and unless otherwise noted,<br />

quotations from the play follow Elizabeth Wyckoff’s translation, in the first edition (only) of<br />

David Grene and Richard Lattimore, eds., The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. II, Sophocles<br />

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).<br />

34

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