ÉTIENNE GILSON AND THE ACTUS ESSENDI

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Dewan: Gilson and the actus essendi an efficient cause, it must have an act of being which is distinct from its essence. Thomas thinks so. He says in the ST: ... It belongs to the notion of the caused, that it be in some measure a composite, because at the very least its esse is other than the “what it is,” as will be made clear later. 35 One should at least note that Gilson is here parting company with Thomas. 36 Indeed, just what Gilson thinks he is saying with the word “superadded” in the above is not clear to me. What is it for existence to “come to essences from outside” and yet not be distinct from those essences? Gilson first takes the case of Avicenna. For brevity, we leave that aside. He goes on to say: ... For reasons of his own, Thomas did not like to call existence an accident of essence. (128) No, indeed, he did not. And the “reasons of his own” have everything to do with the very notion of esse. It has a kinship with essence that Avicenna, as Thomas sees it, has missed. 37 In fact, the sort of mistake he sees Avicenna making is one which would incline someone to say that “God has no essence”! Perhaps Gilson should be paying more attention to that issue right here. Still, let us consider what Gilson’s own problem is. He says: 35 ST 1.3.7.ad 1: ... Est autem de ratione causati, quod sit aliquo modo compositum, quia ad minus esse eius est aliud quam quod quid est, ut infra patebit. The Ottawa editor sends us to ST 1.50.2; the ad 2 must be meant. The text says that, even though the angel is not composed out of form and matter, there is still act and potency, inasmuch as the form is potential with respect to the distinct act of being. - Still, it is not a text on all caused things being composed of quiddity and act of being. It is a text helping us to understand the situation in the case of seemingly simple substance. 36 I think Thomas adequately proves the distinction in such a text as SCG 2.52 (ed. Pera, #1278): ... The substance of each thing belongs to it just by virtue of itself and not through another: hence, to be actually illuminated is not of the [very] substance of air, because it belongs to it through another. But for any created thing, its esse belongs to it through another: otherwise it would not be caused. Therefore, of no created thing is its esse its substance. [... Substantia uniuscuiusque est ei per se et non per aliud: unde esse lucidum actu non est de substantia aeris, quia est ei per aliud. Sed cuilibet rei creatae suum esse est ei per aliud: alias non esset causatum. Nullius igitur substantiae creatae suum esse est sua substantia.] Notice that the argument bears generally on all caused things as such. - I have discussed the problem of proving the composition in my paper “St. Thomas, Joseph Owens, and the Real Distinction between Being and Essence,” The Modern Schoolman 41 (1984), pp. 145-156. See also my paper “St. Thomas and the Distinction between Form and Esse in Caused Things,” Gregorianum 80 (1999), pp. 353-370. 37 CM 4.2 (#556 and 558). 83
84 Études maritainiennes/Maritain Studies ... Still, like Avicenna, he [Thomas] considered it as “other than” essence, so that as soon as existence had been conceived as a distinct metaphysical element, it was necessarily to be described as that which in a substance is both distinct from, and united with, essence. The way of remotion therefore leads to the notion of a God Whose essence is his very act of existing; but it does so only if it sets out from a world of concrete substances endowed with individual acts of existing. And this does not seem philosophically demonstrable from the notion of substance alone. It can be demonstrated that no essence is the cause of its own existence, from which it follows that whatever has an essence, and exists, must exist in virtue of an external cause; but no one has ever been able to demonstrate the conclusion that, in a caused substance, existence is a distinct element, other than essence, and its act. (128, my italics) As I see it, Gilson’s problem here is that he does not have esse as a proper target to start with. He starts with substance or essence, and is willing to look on as these are caused by something external. However, their “existence” is not thus seen as a distinct target of metaphysical attention. I think he should start with esse, as Thomas does, for example, in his In DE HEBDOMADIBUS. Esse is a target of metaphysical attention, no matter what else is, and it is seen as intrinsically involving simplicity. As soon as a thing is recognized as composite, one has esse as really distinct from the composite as a whole. 38 It need not, at first, be distinguished from essence. Both terms, “essence” and “act of being,” seem to refer to principles or elements of a being. It is only when the thing is seen as caused, and thus as dependent on a higher and more noble essence, that one must conceive of a distinction, within the caused thing, between its essence and its act of being. The act of being is a perfection, pertaining to the being as a being, which surpasses the causal power of the essence of the caused thing. 39 - It is true that if one does not recognize esse as a target of metaphysical attention right from the start, one will never propose the Thomistic doctrine. Still, that does not mean one must fully know the nature of esse right from the start. There is another feature of Gilson’s above remarks which does not seem right. He says, concerning the real distinction: ... this does not seem philosophically demonstrable from the notion of substance alone. It can be demonstrated that no essence is the cause of its own existence, from which it follows that whatever has an essence, and exists, must exist in virtue of an external cause ... It is quite true that the real distinction between a substance or essence and its act of being cannot be demonstrated from the notion of substance alone. If it could, “substance” could never be properly predicated of God. 40 If one is speaking of 38 Expositio libri Boetii DE EBDOMADIBUS, Leonine ed., t. 50, Rome\Paris: Commissio Leonina\Cerf, 1992 [henceforth “DH”], lectio 2 [lines 204-214][Calcaterra #32]. 39 Quaestiones de quolibet 12.4.1 [6], in Leonine ed., t. 25-2, Rome\Paris: Commissio Leonina\Cerf, 1996, pp. 403-404. This late text of Thomas brings out best the role of hierarchy of causal natures in the distinction between a caused nature and its esse. 40 For the use of “substantia” (meaning “essence”) concerning God, cf. ST 1.11.4.ad 3.
Page 1 and 2: ÉTIENNE GILSON AND THE ACTUS ESSEN
Page 3 and 4: 72 Études maritainiennes/Maritain
Page 13: 82 Études maritainiennes/Maritain
Page 27: 96 Études maritainiennes/Maritain

ÉTIENNE GILSON AND THE ACTUS ESSENDI

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?