A Digest of Case Law on the Human Rights of Women - Asia Pacific ...

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos v Commission on Elections and Cirilo Roy Montejo (Philippines)
she amended the time <strong>of</strong> residency in her application from seven months to “since
childhood”. She claimed that the entry <strong>of</strong> the word “seven” in her original Certificate
<strong>of</strong> Candidacy was the result <strong>of</strong> an “honest misinterpretation”, which she now sought
to rectify. She further stated that she had always maintained Tacloban (in the district
<strong>of</strong> Leyte) as her domicile or residence.
COMELEC, after considering the petition <strong>of</strong> Cirilo Roy Montejo to have the
candidacy <strong>of</strong> Imelda Romualdez-Marcos rejected, found the claim meritorious and
refused the petitioner’s original application for candidacy and her amended version.
COMELEC rejected the petitioner’s application for candidacy on the basis that her
conduct revealed that she did not intend to make Tacloban her domicile, that she had
registered as a voter in different places, and on several occasions had declared that
she was a resident <strong>of</strong> Manila. COMELEC stated that although she spent her school
days in Tacloban she had abandoned residency when she chose to stay and reside in
other places.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court requesting
a declaration that she had been a resident, for election purposes, <strong>of</strong> the First District
<strong>of</strong> Leyte for a period <strong>of</strong> one year at the time she applied to contest the 1995 elections.
She argued that the meaning <strong>of</strong> residency in the Constitution, which designated the
requirements for candidacy for election purposes, was that <strong>of</strong> domicile. She argued
that she had domicile in Leyte because that was her place <strong>of</strong> original domicile and she
had not acted to replace that domicile with another. She also argued that her marriage
and changes <strong>of</strong> residency alongside her husband when he changed residency did not
result in a change in her place <strong>of</strong> domicile. In support <strong>of</strong> that argument she claimed
that section 69 <strong>of</strong> the Family Code 1988, which gives a husband and wife the right
to jointly fix the family domicile, illustrates the intent <strong>of</strong> the Philippines Parliament
to recognise the rights <strong>of</strong> women. She claimed therefore that since she had domicile
in Leyte she automatically fulfilled the requirements for a one-year residency for
election purposes.
The respondents argued the meaning <strong>of</strong> residency in Article 110 <strong>of</strong> the Civil Code
1950 was the meaning that should be applied to the constitutional requirement for
a one-year residency prior to qualifying for candidacy for the elections. Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, they argued, had changed her residency to that <strong>of</strong> herhusband
upon her marriage and at the same time automatically gained her husband’s
domicile. After returning to Leyte she had resided there for only seven months and
she therefore did not satisfy the one year requirement for candidacy.
Decision
The majority <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court (eight judges in favour, four against) held that
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was a resident <strong>of</strong> the First District <strong>of</strong> Leyte for election
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