Mehmed Ali PaĊ a and Sultan Mahmud II: the genesis of a conflict

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Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24 brill.nl/thr
Mehmed Ali Paşa and Sultan Mahmud II:
the genesis of a confl ict
Butrus Abu-Manneh
Department of Middle Eastern History, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel,
Haifa 31905, Israel
butrus@research.haifa.ac.il
Abstract
Th e war that Mehmed Ali Paşa of Egypt waged against his suzerain, Sultan Mahmud II in 1831
is often presented as motivated by the Paşa’s intention to annex Syria. Th is paper argues that it
was a war for self defence and for achieving tenure in Egypt for himself and hereditary rights for
his descendents. Sultan Mahmud forced the restoration of centralization into the Ottoman
system, which entailed the destruction of the ayan and derebeys and the subjugation of their
domains to direct government from Istanbul. In order to avoid a similar fate, Mehmed Ali established
a modern army which would serve him in due course to achieve his other goal. In this
endeavour he enjoyed full cooperation of the Turco-Egyptian elite to whom the survival of the
socio-political order which he established in Egypt, was of paramount interest. When Mehmet
Ali felt that the sultan was planning to attack Egypt he attacked fi rst. His victorious army was
one week away from Istanbul when he ordered it to halt its march following Russian intervention.
Only after the death of Sultan Mahmud, did the Porte grant him tenure in Egypt and
hereditary rights for his descendents, an off er confi rmed by the Protocol of London in July
1840.
Keywords
Ayan and Derebeys , centralization, despotism, Turco-Egyptian elite, security of tenure/ Istiklal,
sultanate renewal, Gülhane Rescript
Th e confl ict between Mehmed Ali Paşa of Egypt and Sultan Mahmud II has
recently been the subject of discussion among several historians. 1 Th e question
1 Aksan, Virginia H., Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged (London: Pearson-
Longman, 2007), chapters 8 and 9; Fahmy, Khalid, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army,
and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Kutluoğlu,
Muhammed H., Th e Egyptian Question (1831–1841) (Istanbul: Eren, 1998); Marsot, Afaf Lutfi
al-Sayyid, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984);
Çetin, Atilla, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa’nın Mısır Valiliği Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre (Istanbul:
n.p., 1998).
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI 10.1163/187754610X495003

2 B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24
is what justifi es another paper on this theme? I believe that there is place for
further discussion, because a fresh look at the subject will require its reinterpretation
from a diff erent angle. In other words, while some historians
attribute the policies of Mehmed Ali and his objectives to his wish to expand
and to annex new territories or to achieve ‘independence’, this paper will try
to understand his confl ict with the sultan against the background of developments
that took place in the Ottoman empire during the reign of Sultan
Mahmud II (1808–39). It will try to show that Mehmed Ali was a loyal servant
of the Ottoman state and that his “revolt” was an act of self-defence and
directed primarily against the sultan, his advisers and his policies, rather than
against the state. It will try to show, moreover, that his ultimate objective was
to guarantee security of tenure for himself and hereditary rights in the government
of Egypt for his descendants after him and nothing else.
Sultan Mahmud II: centralization and despotic rule
Sultan Mahmud was raised to the sultanate in 1808 by Mustafa Bayrakdar
(also called Alemdar), the ayan of the city of Rusçuk (Ruse) in north-west
Bulgaria, who occupied Istanbul in July 1808 with the aim of restoring the
deposed sultan, Selim III, to the throne. But the incumbent sultan, Mustafa
IV, ordered the execution of Selim and of his own brother Mahmud. While
Selim met his death, Mahmud was saved. As the new sultan, he appointed
Bayrakdar to the grand vezirate. Th is was the fi rst time that a provincial magnate
used force to bring about a change in the sultanate and had himself
appointed as grand vezir , and it would not be repeated. 2
Th e eighteenth century witnessed the rise of local dignitaries in the provinces
of the Ottoman empire, known as ayan and derebey s who carved up for
themselves districts in which they enjoyed a virtual autonomy. Th ey raised
their own militias while ultimately preserving loyalty to the sultan. In October
1808, Grand Vezir Bayrakdar convened an assembly in Istanbul attended by a
number of these dignitaries to discuss the relation between them and the state
2 Th ere are several secondary sources on the events of 1807–08 in Istanbul, see Shaw, Stanford
J. and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 1–6; on Mustafa Paşa Bayrakdar see the article by
H. Bowen in Th e Encyclopaedia of Islam , 2 nd . edn., H.A.R. Gibb et al . (eds.) (Leiden, 1960–2006)
[hereafter EI 2 ] , vol. VII, p. 719; Uzunçarşılı, İ.H., Meşhur Rumeli Ayanlarından Tirsinikli İsmail,
Yılık Oğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1942).

B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24 3
and among themselves. 3 Th e decisions of the meeting provided them with
guarantees of their possessions and respect for their established rights.
Implicitly however, it meant the recognition by the state of a decentralized
system of government. 4 Each one of the dignitaries who attended the meeting
arrived in Istanbul accompanied by several thousand of his own troops.
Th ough these troops encamped outside the city walls, this was actually a demonstration
of power on their part and a challenge both to the Janissaries and
to the established Ottoman socio-political order in Istanbul.
It is not the place here to discuss this unique event, but the whole episode
indicates that the power in the land was shifting from the hands of the sultanate
and the upper classes in Istanbul to the hands of the provincial magnates.
Increasingly, the sultan began to realize that he would be unable to rule in an
eff ective manner as long as the ayan and derebey s were safely seated in their
domains.
In light of this, the confl icting forces in Istanbul, the Janissaries on the one
hand and the upper classes of the higher ulema and bureaucrats on the other,
seem to have suspended the perennial hostility between themselves, closed
their ranks, and stood united behind the palace. As of 1812 a drive began for
the “removal and destruction” (izale ve istisalları) of the ayan and derebey s
the restoration of a centralized system of government. For over two decades
this policy was applied relentlessly. Th e suppression of the local rulers by forces
loyal to the sultan “was often ruthless and indiscriminate” or, to quote Ahmed
3 Th e subject of the ayan and derebey s has recently attracted scholarly attention, see for
instance Özkaya, Yücel, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Ayanlık (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu,
1994); Nagata, Yuzo, Muhsin-zade Mehmet Paşa ve Ayanlık Müessesesi (Tokyo: Institute for the
Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1976); Nagata, Yuzo, “Th e role of the ayan s
in regional development during the pre-Tanzimat period in Turkey: a case study of the
Karaosmanoğlu family”, in Idem, Studies on the Social and Economic History of the Ottoman
Empire (İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1995), pp. 119–33; McGowan, Bruce, “Th e age of the ayans
1699–1812”, in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1914 , Halil İnalcık
and Donald Quataert (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 637–79;
Sadaat, Deena R., “Rumeli Ayanları: the eighteenth century”, Journal of Modern History , 44
(1972) 346–63.
4 On this assembly see Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet , 2 nd . ed. (Istanbul: Matbaa-yı Osmaniye,
1309), vol. IX , pp. 3–7 and 278–83 ; Akyıldız, Ali and M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Negotiating the
power of the sultan: the Ottoman Sened-i İttifak, 1808”, in Th e Modern Middle East: a Source
Book for History, Camron Michael Amin, Benjamin C. Fortna and Elizabeth B. Frierson (eds.)
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 22–3; see also Lewis, B., “Dustur”, in EI 2 , II,
pp. 640–1; Aksan, Ottoman Wars , pp. 261–5; İnalcık, H., “Th e nature of traditional society:
Turkey”, in Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, R.E.Ward and D.A. Rustow (eds.)
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 52–3.
5 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet , X, p. 87.
5
and

4 B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24
Cevdet Paşa, “to crush the notables and noteworthy men of a province…was
similar to leaving a garden bare of [its] fl owers”. 6 Indeed, the authority of the
sultan was fi nally restored, but at the expense of much suff ering and bloodshed
and often of the prosperity of many regions. Of these local rulers, the
suppression of Tepedelenli Ali Paşa (known also as Ali Paşa of Ioannina) in
north-western Greece was the most diffi cult. It took the sultan’s army almost
two years to force his surrender (1820–22). In the end he was put to death
despite his old age. 7 Indeed it is diffi cult to understand the confl ict between
Mehmed Ali Paşa and Sultan Mahmud II without comprehending deeply
enough the repercussions of the destruction of the ayan and derebey s and the
impact it left on the paşa , as we shall see.
Th e destruction of the ayan and derebey s was followed by the destruction of
the Janissaries. Formerly, there seem to have existed, though perhaps occasionally,
a degree of understanding between these two socio-political forces especially
in their objection to the nizam-ı cedid , as the event of Edirne of 1806
had shown. 8 But by the mid 1820s the Janissaries stood alone and Sultan
Mahmud II and the upper classes in Istanbul succeeded in eliminating them.
But, following these events the sultan’s hands were freed and he turned despotic
and tried to undermine the power of the upper classes in the city but was
forced to compromise on this issue, as we shall see below.
Mehmed Ali and the Sublime Porte
Perhaps the most important result of the French occupation of Egypt between
1798 and 1801 was the crushing of the power of the Mamluks and ultimately
the restoration of Egypt to the direct control of the Porte. But the governors
appointed by the Porte following the evacuation of the French were unable to
establish a stable government in the country. Finally, an offi cer named Mehmed
Ali, who then commanded the Albanian contingent, managed to restore law
6 For the fi rst quotation see Levy, Avigdor, “Mahmud II”, in EI 2 , VII, p. 58; for the second,
see Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet , X, p. 116. For the contribution of the ayan families to the
prosperity of their domains see, for example, the article of Yuzo Nagata, “Th e role of the ayan s”,
119–33.
7 On the destruction of Tepedelenli Ali Paşa see Mustafa Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat , 2 nd . ed.
(Istanbul: Uhuvvet Matbaası, 1327), vol. IV, pp. 72–4; Aksan, Ottoman Wars, pp. 285–8;
Bowen, H., “Ali Pasha Tepedelenli”, in EI 2 , I, pp. 398–9; Baysun, Cavid, “Ali Paşa Tepedelenli”,
İslam Ansiklopedisi, İslâm Âlemî Coğrafya, Etnoğrafya ve Biyografya Lügatî , Adnan Adıvar et al.
(eds.) (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940–1988) [hereafter İA. ] vol. I, pp. 343–8.
8 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet, 1 st . ed. (Istanbul: Matbaa-yı Amire, 1288), vol. VIII, p. 95.

B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24 5
and order in Cairo, and Egyptian ulema and notables applied to the sultan to
appoint him as a governor general of the province. 9
Mehmed Ali descended from a family, most probably of Turkish origin, that
had emigrated from south-east Anatolia and settled in Kavala in southern
Macedonia some time earlier. 10 His father, İbrahim Ağa, was a derbend ağası
(i.e. a police chief or a warden of a mountain pass). On his mother’s side he
was related to Hüseyin Ağa, the ayan of Kavala. 11 He worked for a while in the
service of Hüseyin Ağa, but in 1801 he left to serve as second in command of
the contingent recruited from southern Macedonia as part of the Ottoman
force sent to seize control of Egypt from the French.
It is not the place here to describe his ascent to the position of governor
general of Egypt or to review his achievements there. Our main concern is the
relation between him and his suzerain, Sultan Mahmud II. From the time of
his appointment in Egypt in 1805 and for over two decades Mehmed Ali
showed complete loyalty and behaved in full subordination to the sultan. He
paid the annual tribute in time; upon the orders of the sultan he waged war
against the Wahhabis in Arabia which lasted for seven years (1811–18), and
which ended in the occupation of their country and the destruction of their
capital, Dariyya, by his forces. Upon the orders of the sultan again, Mehmed
Ali sent his forces to the Morea (1824) to assist in suppressing the Greek revolt
there. But despite these costly campaigns in the service of the state, which no
other Ottoman governor was capable of undertaking, Mehmed Ali was treated
as an ordinary vali (governor general). According to the custom of those days,
the nomination of Ottoman vali s was subject to yearly renewal. Every year
after the feast of Ramadan, on the 5 th of Şevval, the list of nominations of the
vali s for the ensuing year ( tevcihat ) was declared. Th ose whose names appeared
on the list had already paid in advance to the treasury the annual tax of the
provinces to which they were assigned. Mehmed Ali like the other vali s, was
9 On the rise of Mehmed Ali see Toledano, Ehud, “Muhammad Ali”, in EI 2 , VII, pp. 423–
31; Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali , pp. 31 ff . and 38 ff .
10 For the fact that he was a Turk see Gerardin, Saint-Marc, “Mehmet-Ali, aperçu general sur
l’Egypte, par Clot-Bey”, Revue des Deux Mondes 23/3 (1840), pp. 907, 910; İhsanoğlu,
Ekmeleddin, Mısır’da Türkler ve Kültürel Mirasları (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2006), p. 67. Th e author
states that the only language that Mehmed Ali knew was [Ottoman] Turkish and it served as the
language of his administration in Egypt.
11 Sicill-i Osmani (Istanbul: Matbaa-yı Amire, n.d.), vol. IV, p. 292; Lefebvre, Armand,
“Mahmoud et Mehemet-Ali”, Revue des Deux Mondes , 18/2 (1839), 474–516. On p. 495 he
writes that his father “Ibrahim-Aga commandait la garde chargée de la sureté des routes”; Marsot,
Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali , p. 25, writes that the father was “Yol Ağası” (road police
chief).

6 B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24
subjected as well to this system and his appointment was renewed every year,
until this practice was terminated in 1838. 12 It is obvious that such a system
did not provide him with security of tenure and indeed he constantly felt
vulnerable and unsafe due to the policy of centralization which Sultan
Mahmud was enforcing, and to the hostility that existed between him and
Hüsrev Paşa, one of the closest advisors of the sultan and a most powerful
statesman at the Porte. Th is hostility went back to 1801–3 when Hüsrev was
governor general of Egypt and Mehmed Ali was an offi cer who was involved
in forcing him out of his position and out of the country. 13
Th us, due to such feelings of vulnerability, he wrote to his offi cial agent in
Istanbul, the kapu kehya , on the eve of his campaign to Arabia, to check at the
Porte the possibility of granting Egypt the status of an eyalet-i mümtaze
(a privileged province) similar to that of Algiers, which meant virtually granting
him autonomous status. 14 If this was not possible he demanded to be
appointed as governor general of the province of Sidon (in addition to Egypt),
which he regarded strategically as a defence line for Egypt. 15 Only in this way,
he deemed, could he safeguard his position in Egypt while the bulk of his
army was in Arabia. But, as expected, the sultan rejected these demands. On
the contrary, attempts seem to have been made to remove him from Egypt or
to get rid of him altogether. 16
Th e formation of the Turco-Egyptian elite
In face of such threats and aware of the policy of centralization of the sultan,
Mehmed Ali drew strength from several sources. One of these sources was the
Turkish speaking immigrants into Egypt. Indeed, following the power vacuum
12 For the annual renewal of the paşa ’s appointment see Sami, Amin (ed.), Taqweem al-Nil
(Cairo: Dar al-Kutub, 1928), vol. II, pp. 214, 226, 234, 239, 246, 252, 265, 284, 308, 318,
324, 336, 348; on the “ tevcihat ” see Pakalın, M.Z., Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü ,
3 vols. (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1993) , vol. III, pp. 480–2.
13
Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali , pp. 38 ff .; Aksan, Ottoman Wars , p. 307; on
Hüsrev see İnalcık, Halil, “Hüsrev Paşa Mehmed”, in İA. , V, pp. 609–15.
14 Rustum, Asad J., A Calendar of State Papers from the Royal Archives of Egypt Relating to the
Aff airs of Syria, 4 vols. (Beirut: Th e American Press, 1940–43), vol. I, p. 2, doc. 8, 27 Shawwal,
1225 [25.11.1810]; cf. Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali , p. 198 and n. 2, p. 279.
15
Rustum, Calendar of State Papers , I, p. 10, doc. 26, 5 Shawwal, 1228 [31.10.1813] and
p.13, doc. 39, 15 Safar, 1230 [27.1.1815].
16 Rustum, Asad J., Th e Royal Archives of Egypt and the Origins of the Egyptian Expedition to
Syria 1831–184 (Beirut: Th e American Press, 1936), pp. 47–50; Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of
Muhammad Ali , pp. 64–5 and 72 ff .

B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24 7
resulting from the elimination of the Mamluks, these immigrants were much
needed by Mehmed Ali and became the basis of his administration.
Th e fi rst to arrive were his relatives and friends from his native Kavala and
nearby Drama in Macedonia. In the course of the following decade or so he
purchased several hundred Mamluks who formed a military contingent loyal
to him. 17 In addition, once his rule in Egypt became stable, many Turks and
Turkish speaking Ottomans, “in hundreds and sometimes in thousands”, 18
from Anatolia and other provinces headed to Egypt seeking employment 19 or
refuge. Th ey were attracted either by the wealth of this province and the high
salaries off ered by Mehmed Ali or the desire to escape the suppressive policies
of the sultan. It is diffi cult to ascertain which of these two reasons motivated
them more. Certainly, the wealth of the country was an alluring factor. But
there is evidence that some of them belonged to the second category, as we
learn from a letter of Rauf Paşa, the then grand vezir written to Mehmed Ali
asking him to send back Mehmed Bey, the son of Avnalı Hasan Paşa, who had
escaped to Egypt and joined the army of Ibrahim, and adding “lest it would
be said that those who were being suppressed by the state fi nd refuge with
20 you”. Th us, a new ruling class numbering thousands was formed under
Mehmed Ali from among which came the higher civil bureaucracy and the
offi cers’ corps of his army. 21 Apart from his household and relatives, these were
the main benefi ciaries of the regime and naturally had a strong interest in its
17 On buying Mamluks and training them as offi cers, see Zaki, Abd al-Rahman, al-Jayish al-
Misri fi ‘Ahd Muhammad Ali Pasha al-Kabir (Cairo: Matba’at Hijazi, 1358/1939), p. 36; Idem.
A’lam al-Jayish wal’Bahriyya fi Misr athna` al-Qarn al-Tasi’ Ashar (Cairo: n.p., 1366/1947);
Tusun, ‘Umar, Safha min Tarikh Misr fi ‘Ahd Muhammad Ali al-Jaish al-Misri al-Barri wal’Bahri
(Cairo: Matba’at Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyyah, 1359/1940), p. 35.
18 İhsanoğlu, Mısır’da Türkler ve Kültürel Mirasları , pp. 3–21, see p. 7.
19
Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men , pp. 250–1; and Fahmy, Khalid, “Th e era of Muhammad Ali
Paşa, 1805–1848”, in Cambridge History of Egypt, M. W. Daly (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), vol. II, p. 178.
20 See a letter from Rauf Paşa to Mehmed Ali in which he refers to the escape of discontented
Turks to Egypt, in Rustum, Calendar of State Papers, I, p. 16, doc. 46, 25 Sha‘ban, 1231
[21.7.1816] and a letter from Necib Efendi, the kapu kehya in ibid. I, p. 119, doc. 298, 25,
Jumada I, 1246 [11.11.1830] which refers to Ottoman soldiers fi nding refuge in Egypt. Both
letters are given in translation .
21 İhsanoğlu, Mısır’da Türkler ve Kültürel Mirasları , pp. 6–8; İnal, M.K., in his biography of
Grand Vezir Yusuf Kamil Paşa who immigrated to Egypt in 1833 and became an offi cial in the
service of Mehmed Ali, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940),
vol. II, p. 197. John Bowring writing in 1839 reported that “with the exception of situations
fi lled by Christians, the Turks have nearly a monopoly of all high offi cial functions in Egypt”,
Report on Egypt (London: Trıade Exploratıon Ltd., 1998), pp. 6–7; see also Shalabi, Hilmi A.,
al-Muwazzafun fi Misr fi ‘Asr Muhammad Ali (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-Misriyyah al ‘Ammah
lil-Kitab, 1989), pp. 31–2, 62–3, 86–7.

8 B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24
survival. In other words, in his confl ict with the sultan, Mehmed Ali could
depend on a strong core of Turco-Egyptian elite, many of whom were resentful
of the sultan’s policies or worried about their position and wealth gained under
Mehmed Ali.
Th e establishment of the Egyptian army
But his primary source of strength was the new army. As said before, Mehmed
Ali initially commanded a small contingent recruited from southern
Macedonia. Shortly afterwards he became the commander of the Albanian
contingent. But this armed force that had served him in Arabia was mercenary
and irregular. At a certain stage he decided to establish a standing army.
Consequently, he employed French offi cers and entrusted them with the training
of his own Mamluks and Turks from among the new elite in Egypt. After
training they served as offi cers in the new army. Indeed, all the offi cers of the
new Egyptian army came from among the ranks of these immigrants to which,
later on, Circassians were added as well. As for soldiers, Mehmed Ali tried to
conscript Sudanese from the newly conquered Sudan, but this experiment
failed. Finally, upon the advice of Drovetti, the French consul general, Mehmed
Ali opted to conscript the Egyptian fellah s, a measure undertaken about one
year after the destruction of Tepedelenli Ali Paşa. His destruction, as well as
that of other ayan , “had aroused the fear and worries of Mehmed Ali and
22 strengthened his resolve for istiklal ”, wrote a Turkish historian of the confl
ict. Indeed, with the sultan’s vigorous drive for centralization, nothing could
have stopped him from treating the paşa of Egypt similarly. Th us, the establishment
of an Egyptian regular army and a navy, absolutely loyal to him
which had a vested interest in defending the regime, was the best means for
Mehmed Ali and for the new Turco-Egyptian elite in Egypt to ensure their
security and the survival of the regime. It was this approach of establishing his
rule upon local foundations instituted and sustained by him that made
Mehmed Ali diff erent from the other ayan and diffi cult to crush.
Th e beginnings of the open confl ict with the sultan
By the late 1820s Mehmed Ali felt strong enough to defy the sultan. During
these years the tension between him and Sultan Mahmud steadily increased.
22 Ali Fuad, “Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa”, Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası , 16–17
(1928), p. 66.

B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24 9
Firstly, when the sultan, after the destruction of the Janissaries in 1826, came
to establish his new army, the Asakir-i Mansure-yi Muhamediyye , he was willing
to entrust its instruction and training to Muslim offi cers only. Th us, he
asked Mehmed Ali to provide him with offi cers from the Egyptian army to
help in training the new army of the state. But the paşa declined to comply,
using various pretexts. 23 Secondly, after the Battle of Navarino off the shores
of the Morea in the autumn of 1827, in which a joint fl eet of England, Russia
and France destroyed the Ottoman and Egyptian fl eets, Mehmed Ali decided
to withdraw his troops from the Morea without waiting for the approval of the
sultan as he should have done. 24 Th irdly, in 1828 Mehmed Ali declined to
comply with the sultan’s demand to send 12,000 Egyptian troops to assist in
the war which Russia was waging against the Ottoman empire and which
ended with a humiliating defeat for the Ottoman army. Instead he off ered to
donate money for the war eff ort. 25
Th ese excuses, especially the last one, put Mehmed Ali in the category of
disobedience to the sultan and, as Mahmud did with other ayan , he could
have forced his dismissal. But Mehmed Ali was more powerful than the other
ayan , so Mahmud apparently bided his time and started planning for a confrontation
with the paşa .
Rustum, in his A Calendar of State Papers , gives the translation into Arabic
of a document issued by the Sublime Porte concerning the reorganization of
the timar s in the Asiatic provinces. 26 Ahmed Lütfi also provides a summary of
this document under the title “Nizam-ı Abnayi Sipahiyyan”. Although it is
undated, Ahmed Lütfi places it in the year 1243/1828. 27 It gives instructions
to conduct a survey of the timar s in central and eastern Anatolia and in the
provinces of Aleppo, Damascus and Baghdad and to redistribute them, and
then to combine the zeamet s in the provinces of Maraş, the sancak of Ayntab,
and of Aleppo and Damascus and put them under one command. It is not
clear how far those instructions were carried out, but there is certain evidence
23 Rustum, Calendar of State Papers, I, pp. 85–8, doc. 205, 12 Muharram 1242 [16.8.1826];
Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lütfi (Istanbul: Matbaa-yi Amire, 1290), vol. I, p. 196; Fahmy, All the
Pasha’s Men, pp. 53–4.
24 Mustafa Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat, IV, p. 88; Kutluoğlu, Th e Egyptian Question , pp.48–9.
25 Ali Fuad, “Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa”, p. 66; a section added by Abdurrahman Şeref to
vol. VIII of L ütfi Tarihi (Dersaadet: Sabah Matbaası, 1328), pp. 192–394, see p. 385; Mustafa
Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat , IV, p. 88; Rustum, Calendar of State Papers, I, pp. 106 and 109, docs.
257, 263, 265 and 266, dated 18 Rabi, I, 1244 [28.9.1828], 1 Jumada I, 1244 [9.12.1828],
3 Rajab, 1244 [9.1.1829], 5 Rajab, 1244 [11.1.1829] respectively.
26 Rustum, Calendar of State Papers, I, pp. 74–84, doc. 203, undated.
27 Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lütfi , I, pp. 258–9 ; also, Aksan, Ottoman Wars , p. 334; Kutluoğlu,
Th e Egyptian Question , p. 51.

10 B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24
that such reorganization took place in the sancak of Nablus in central Palestine
about 1828. According to a local historian, Ihsan al-Nimr, a governor of this
sancak , Mustafa Ağa Topçubaşı “from the inhabitants of Istanbul” began in
1827 to register the timar s and reorganize the alay [cavalry regiment] with
local help. Th en, added al-Nimr, “in 1243 an offi cer arrived from Istanbul to
reorganize it anew and appointed a miralay [colonel] by the name of Abu-Bakr
Bey from Istanbul” to command it. 28 Being aware of the methods of Sultan
Mahmud in his struggle against the ayan and derebey s in which he directed the
governor general of a province to deploy the local forces in addition to his own
contingents, against his neighbour, it is possible that the sultan was preparing
the grounds for a future assault on Egypt.
In this context it is perhaps not irrelevant to add that, in the summer of
1831, a force was dispatched to Scutari (Ishkodra) in Albania, which attacked
and suppressed Buşatlı Mustafa, the ayan of that district and an ally of Mehmed
29 Ali. Secondly, at the same time, Laz Ali Rıza Paşa, the governor general of
Aleppo, was ordered to launch an attack on Baghdad and bring down Daud
Paşa, the semi-autonomous Mamluk ruler who had ruled the Province since
1817, and to suppress the Mamluk household that had controlled the province
of Baghdad since 1749. Th e city fell into the hands of Ali Rıza, and Daud
Paşa was deported to Bursa. 30 Soon afterwards, the Mamluks who had
remained in Baghdad were massacred by Ali Rıza. In this way the Iraqi provinces
were brought under the direct rule of the Sublime Porte.
Th irdly, at the same time, that is in the summer of 1831, the sultan dispatched
Benderli Selim Paşa as governor general of Damascus. Selim Paşa was
of military background and grand vezir between 1824 and 1828, under whose
direction and command the destruction of the Janissaries had taken place in
31 1826. Th e appointing of such a capable functionary who apparently was a
confi dent of the sultan, to Damascus must in itself have aroused the
28 al-Nimr, Ihsan, Tarikh Jabal Nablus wa’l Balqa‘ , vol. I, 2 nd ed. (Nablus: n.p., 1395/1975),
pp. 304–5, and vol. II (Nablus: Matba’at al-Nasr, 1380/1961), pp. 210–12. It should be noted
that the leader of the revolt against Ibrahim in the mountainous region of Palestine, namely
Qasim al-Ahmad and his son Muhammad, were granted timar s in 1242/1827, vol. 1 p . 304.
29 Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lütfi , III, p. 180.
30
Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lütfi , III, pp. 115–39; al-Azzawi, Abbas, Tarikh al-’Iraq bain-a
Ihtilalain, 8 vols. (Baghdad: Matba’at Baghdad, 1373/1954 ), vol. VI, pp. 301–31.
31 On Benderli Selim Paşa see ; Sicill-i Osmani, III, p. 61 ff .; Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lutfi , III,
pp. 202–10; Gövsa, İbrahim A., Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul: Yedigün Neşriyatı,
[1933]), p. 350; Ahmad Rif’at ibn Ismail, Ward-ul Hada’ik (Freiburg: D. Robischon, 1970),
pp. 24–6; Schelcher, Linda S., Families in Politics (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1985), pp. 40–3;
Aksan, Ottoman Wars , p. 315 ff .

B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24 11
apprehension of Mehmed Ali. More than that, “It was related” stated Mustafa
Nuri that “he [i.e. Selim Paşa] was charged with a secret mission to stir up an
incident in Egypt that would give a pretext for infl icting punishment upon
Mehmed Ali”. He added that the matter became known to the latter through
his informants in Istanbul. 32 Referring to this appointment, Asad Rustum, the
historian of the Egyptian campaign to Syria, stated that the ex-Janissary ağa s
in Damascus were afraid that Selim Paşa was sent to suppress them as he had
with the Janissary corps in Istanbul fi ve years earlier. 33 Even Abdullah Paşa the
governor general of Acre, he added, was also afraid of Selim Paşa and instigated
the ağa s against him. 34 However, Selim Paşa entered Damascus in
advance of the bulk of the troops assigned to his command. Incautiously, he
imposed an unpopular tax on the merchants, which provided a pretext for the
revolt against him which was led by ağa s who controlled the popular quarters
of the city. He was besieged in the citadel until he surrendered. Th e notables
of the city tried to protect him but the insurgents killed him along with several
of his aides. A number of Ottoman historians suspected that Mehmed Ali was
behind this event. 35 Following that, according to Ahmet Rasim, it was decided
“to form a large army to punish the paşa ”. 36
Mahmud II and the upper classes in Istanbul
But to wage a war against the paşa of Egypt, the sultan needed not only a large
army but also a united internal front behind him, especially the full backing
of the upper classes in Istanbul, as had been the case with the destruction of
the other ayan or of the Janissaries a few years earlier. Apparently, the sultan
expected such backing from them. Mehmed Ali was a stranger to the establishment
in Istanbul. Like many ayan , he had built his own power base independently
of the sultan, and had lately disobeyed him on several occasions.
But at this stage the internal front was not united. Many ulema and bureaucrats
were apparently reluctant to give the sultan their full support in this matter,
32 Mustafa Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat, IV, p. 88: “ Mısır’da bir hadise ihdası ile, Mehmed Ali
Paşa’nın tenkili esbabına çalışmak üzere memuriyet-i hafi ye verilmiş imiş” .
33 Rustum, Asad, Bashır bayn-a al-Sultan wal’ Aziz 1804–1841 , 2 vols. 2 nd ed. (Beirut:
Manshurat al-Jami‘ah al-Lubnaniyyah, 1966), vol. I, p. 22.
34
Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lütfi , III, pp. 204, 207–8.
35 Mustafa Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat, IV, p. 88; Ali Fuad, “Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa”,
p. 66.
36 Ahmet Rasim, Resimli ve Haritalı Osmanlı Tarihi , 4 vols. (Istanbul: İkbal Kütüphanesi,
1328–1335), vol. IV, p. 1879.

12 B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24
especially in the fi rst phase of the confl ict (i.e. until 1833), not because they
sympathized with the paşa of Egypt but for other reasons. 37
Following the elimination of the Janissaries, they had gained much political
power because no socio-political force existed at that stage in Istanbul to counterbalance
their power. Consequently, Mahmud was unhappy with this situation.
Rulers feel more in control when they balance the socio-political forces
in the state against each other. On the other hand, once freed from the Janissary
shackles, he assumed a more despotic posture. But by the time of our discussion,
many members of those classes were motivated by high Islamic ideals
disseminated by the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi and Naqshbandi-Khalidi orders
in which they found a renewed moral strength. As such they called for the
supremacy of the shari‘a in the state and that high and low should abide by its
rules. But the sultan was apparently not ready to be bound in state matters by
any constraints. Consequently his next step was to try to intimidate and
weaken the upper classes. He fi rst dismissed the emissaries of Sheykh Khalid
from Istanbul, 38 and followed this step up by the exile of their most devoted
adherents from among the elite in the city. Indeed, in the course of the few
years that followed the destruction of the Janissaries very many were banished
from Istanbul and sent into exile including many ulema .
37 Mehmed Ali was apparently of the belief that “Istanbul was divided upon itself”, one side
supporting the sultan and the other standing by him, and wrote to Ibrahim informing him of
that. See Rustum, Calendar of State Papers, II, p. 118, doc. 1879, 26 Rab’i II [22.9.1832].
38
Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lütfi , I, pp. 285–7; Levy, Avigdor, “Th e Ottoman ulema and the mili-
tary reforms of Sultan Mahmud II”, Asian and African Studies , 7 (1971), pp. 26 ff .
39 Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lütfi , I, p. 187, II, pp. 142, 144, 151, 163–5.
40 Barnes, John R., An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire (Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 1987), pp. 73–4.
41 Takvim-i Vekayi, no. 7, 13 Receb, 1247 [18.12.1831], pp. 2–3; see also Hamilton, W.J.,
Researches in Asia Minor, Pontus and Armenia, vol. 1 (London: John Murray, 1842), p. 351 for a
church that the Armenians in Tokat had recently built “in the centre of the town”.
39
Moreover, he
deprived many leading men, ulema and bureaucrats, of their independent economic
base, namely the evkaf , which provided them with considerable income.
Indeed “the major evkaf of all the chief dignitaries of the state had been taken
away from them…on Mahmud II’s orders”. 40 Such measures contradicted ageold
traditions and norms and was partly aimed at undermining the power of
these classes.
In addition, the sultan gave permission for “the reparation and restoration”
of 29 Greek and 35 Armenian churches and a number of synagogues in
Istanbul and other Ottoman lands because “they fell into ruins” which means
41 that their restoration fi tted into shari‘a norms. Supposing that was the case,

B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24 13
the fact that the permission was issued by the sultan and not by the kadı in the
place, as the normal practice required, was a sign that the sultan bypassed the
legal system for unclear reasons and perhaps it was a sign of distrust of the
ulema on his part. Moreover, since the early 1830s we fi nd Sultan Mahmud
presenting the şeyhülislam and many other state dignitaries with his portrait
ornamented with diamonds in complete disregard of Islamic principles. 42 In
addition, according to the traveller Horatio Southgate, in 1836 the sultan had
his portrait solemnly displayed in various barracks and government offi ces,
noting that “Th is innovation of the Sultan had given serious off ence to the
more rigid Musulmans”. 43
All these acts caused much resentment in Istanbul and provided fertile
grounds for the propaganda of Mehmed Ali against the sultan and his policies.
By pecuniary means, wrote Mustafa Nuri, a well-informed and reliable historian,
Mehmed Ali succeeded in engaging numerous informants from among
the palace staff ( enderun-ı hümayun) and from among state functionaries who
kept him informed of what was going on in the palace and at the Porte. 44 But
money alone is not a suffi cient incentive, and the dissatisfaction with Mahmud’s
policies and despotic rule should be taken into consideration in the fi rst place.
Th is dissatisfaction seems to have divided the upper classes in Istanbul, segments
of which may have shared with Mehmed Ali their distrust of the sultan
and fear of his intentions. Moreover, the fact that Sultan Mahmud was not
popular in Anatolia opened the way for the paşa to gain many adherents there,
as we shall refer to later.
Th e objectives of the campaign into Syria and Anatolia
In 1831 Mehmed Ali turned 62 years old. After 26 years in Egypt and despite
the numerous services he had rendered to the sultan, he was still treated by
42 See Takvim-i Vekayi , nos. 27, 29, 32 and 33, dated 27 Zilhicce, 1247 [25.5.1832], 14
Muharrem, 1248 [13.6.1832], 13 Safer, 1248 [12.7.1832] and 24 Safer, 1248 [23.7.1832]
respectively. See also Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lütfi , IV, p. 65 (the portrait was presented to the
şeyhülislam ) and V, pp. 50–2, entry for year 1252/1836–37.
43 Southgate, Horatio, Narrative of a Tour through Armenia, Kurdistan, and Mesopotamia ,
2 vols. (London: Tilt and Bogue, 1840), vol. I, pp. 73–5; Levy, “Th e Ottoman ulema and the
military reforms”, pp. 30 ff .; Göçek, Fatma Müge, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 42.
44 Mustafa Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat, IV, p. 88; see the additions of Abdurrahman Şeref in
Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lütfi , VIII, p. 384. On Mustafa Nuri see Ali Fuad, “Mansurizade Mustafa
Paşa ve Netayic-ül Vukuat , Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası , 1/1 (1929), 40–8.

14 B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24
him as an ordinary vali whose nomination was renewed annually and could be
terminated at the sultan’s wish. And there were no signs that the sultan would
budge from this attitude towards him. On the contrary, as we have seen above,
Mahmud was preparing the grounds to move against him sooner or later, as he
did with the other ayan and in accordance with his policy of centralization.
Th is deep feeling of insecurity lay behind Mehmed Ali’s invasion of Syria and
Anatolia in 1831–33. In the given circumstances, the best means to achieve
security of tenure was by obtaining it by force. For him it was a matter of life
and death, as Asad Rustum, who studied the campaign, stated in his conclusion:
“In his struggle with Sultan Mahmud II, Mehmed Ali fought for his
wealth, for his position and prestige and very probably for his life”. 45 Moreover,
we may assume that the fate of the Turco-Egyptian elite depended on the fate
of Mehmed Ali. Th e status and prosperity they had gained in Egypt and indeed
their future depended on the paşa ’s success in obtaining security of tenure in
the government of Egypt and hereditary rights for his descendants. Because of
this they stood fi rmly by him in this struggle, as long as Sultan Mahmud was
on the throne and his policies were implemented.
In October 1831 Mehmed Ali’s army commanded by his son, Ibrahim,
marched into Syria. It is not our purpose in this paper to describe this campaign
or the government of Ibrahim in Syria, but our concern is primarily the
confl ict with the sultan. Had the aim of Mehmed Ali been just to annex Syria,
his army had completed its occupation by the autumn of 1832. But Ibrahim
did not halt his advance. On the contrary, he moved on without delay and
crossed the Beylan pass, entered Anatolia, occupied Adana and moved on to
Konya in the middle of a harsh winter (late November, 1832). Th is drive into
Anatolia suggests additional objectives for the war.
Historians of nineteenth-century Egypt study Mehmed Ali from an Egyptian
perspective and overlook the sultan’s policy of centralization and its repercussions
for the paşa ’s fate. Th ey project Mehmed Ali as a state builder who, after
establishing modern institutions, and making Egypt into a strong regional
power, sought to guarantee its future. Th us, they tend to look at his campaign
into Syria from this perspective, i.e. that Syria was necessary for the security
and prosperity of Egypt. “Muhammad Ali sought independence” wrote
Marsot, herself an historian of Egyptian origin. “Egypt’s resources [she continued]
…were suffi cient…to fi nance an army and a navy, to invest capital in
agriculture and industry, in brief to turn it into a state”. 46 Th e Syrian provinces
45 Rustum, Th e Royal Archives of Egypt , p. 50.
46 Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali , p. 196, see also, p. 262; see also Anderson, M.S.,
Th e Eastern Question (London: Macmillan, St. Martin Press, 1966), p.105 where he argues

B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24 15
were needed because they served as “a buff er between him and the sultan”, and
especially because of the economic benefi ts that Egypt could derive from
possessing them. 47 In other words she suggests that the future of Egypt was at
the top of the agenda of Mehmed Ali. On the other hand, the central theme
of Asad Rustum is Mehmed Ali, not Egypt. He agrees with Marsot on the
necessity of Syria for the paşa . It was needed for its wealth in raw materials and
because it was essential “for the safety of Egypt”, as he quotes a saying attributed
to Mehmed Ali. 48 However, even if the claim of a buff er zone looks plausible
and more statesmanlike than the economic one, it should still be
emphasized that Mehmed Ali did not make war on the sultan in order to
annex Syria, because if possessing Syria was the objective behind the campaign,
why then did his forces not stop at the Taurus Mountains which form
a natural barrier between Syria and Anatolia? Th e fact that his forces penetrated
into Anatolia with the intention of reaching Istanbul suggests that
Mehmed Ali had had, up to that stage, undeclared objectives.
Before going further, however, it is perhaps necessary to verify Mehmed Ali’s
“intention of declaring independence”, as he informed the European consuls
in 1838. 49 When Ibrahim, following Russian intervention, received instructions
from his father to halt his march towards Istanbul (early February, 1833),
he wrote back to him saying that in the coming negotiations he should ask for
“istiklal”, a term usually understood by modern historians as full independence.
50 To my mind there is a misunderstanding of this term in the context
of the fi rst half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, in the connotation of the
twentieth century, “istiklal” could be understood as absolute independence
and sovereignty, but what did it mean in the Ottoman political discourse in
the nineteenth century? It should be emphasized, however, that Mehmed Ali
raised the question of “independence” for himself and his descendants in
Egypt, which did not necessarily mean secession from the Ottoman empire.
Indeed, it is doubtful whether he intended to sever his ties with Istanbul
altogether.
that “Mohammed Ali had failed…to build an ‘Arab Empire’ in the Near East”, a gross misunderstanding
by such an eminent scholar.
47 Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali , pp. 220 and 197 respectively.
48 Rustum, Th e Royal Archives of Egypt , pp. 60–1 and 78.
49 Dodwell, Henry, Th e Founder of Modern Egypt: a Study of Muhammad ‘Ali (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1931, rep. 1967), p. 171; Kutluoğlu, Th e Egyptian Question ,
pp. 125–6.
50 Rustum, Th e Royal Archives of Egypt , p. 57; Kutluoğlu, Th e Egyptian Question , p. 92, and
the translation of the document on p. 200.

16 B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24
To my mind the meaning of “istiklal” in Ottoman/Arab terminology of the
nineteenth century was “self rule” within the Ottoman framework. For
instance, one of the demands of the “nationalist” placards in Beirut in 1880
was “ istiklal in common with our Lebanese brethren”. 51 As is known, the
mutasarrıfl ık of Mount Lebanon enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy only.
Th e Arabic-English Lexicon of Wehr gives “autonomous” as one of the meanings
of “mustaqill”. But when it came to secession from the empire, the term
“istiklal kamil” (complete independence) was used. 52 Similarly, when Arab
nationalists in the fi rst half of the twentieth century demanded independence
from the mandatory states, they used the term “istiklal tamm”, i.e. independence
defi ned by the adjective “complete”. 53 In other words, the term “istiklal”
in the Ottoman political discourse in the nineteenth century should be understood
as “self rule” which implies also hereditary rights. Th at was what Mehmed
Ali actually demanded, and in the end that was what he was granted.
Indeed, Mehmed Ali was fi rst of all a Muslim and a Turk who believed in
the absolute necessity of the continued existence of the Ottoman empire for
the defence of the Muslim lands. Th e idea of seceding from it, I venture to say,
was repugnant to him. Besides, he had to take into consideration the Turco-
Egyptian elite. Th ey were newcomers to Egypt and had their roots in Anatolia
and Rumeli and strong family ties there and loyalty to the Ottoman state. Th e
fact that many of them suff ered as a result of the policy of centralization does
not mean that they were ready to abandon the Ottoman empire altogether.
More than that, Mehmed Ali was aware that a completely independent Egypt
would fall an easy prey to the European powers. In this context J.G. Wilkinson,
the noted British Egyptologist who lived in Egypt between the years 1821 and
1833 and who kept visiting afterwards, had the following to say about this
matter: “Mehmed Ali is aware that the moment he declares his independence,
he lays Egypt open to the attacks of any European nation … His wish is to
render his possessions hereditary but still subject to the Porte”. 54 Th us, it is my
contention that the idea of secession from the Ottoman empire contradicted
51 A photocopy of the placard in Zeine, Zeine N., Th e Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut:
Khayats, 1966), Appendix 1, p. 173, “ Istiqlal nashtarik-u bihi ma’ ikhwanin-a al-Lubnaniyyin”.
52 See “Istiklal”, in EI 2 , IV, p. 260 citing Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lütfi , II, p. 15 who gives the
Ottoman version of the Protocol of London of 1830 concerning the independence of Greece,
see the fi rst item.
53 See the decision of the General Syrian Congress of 8.3.1920 that says “we have not revolted
against the Government of the Turks except to seek full independence [istiqla tamm]” , al-Manar ,
21 (1920), p. 441.
54 Wilkinson, John Gardner, Th ree Letters on the Policy of England Towards the Porte and
Mohammed Ali (London: John Murray, 1840), p. 8.

55
56
57
B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24 17
his world view and his political prudence, and it was not his objective. Indeed,
one would agree with the judgment of Kutluoğlu that “it is by no means certain
that Mehmed Ali Paşa believed the obtainment of formal independence
to be either desirable or practical”. It was “rather an attempt to leave to his
descendants a secure inheritance”. 55 Similarly, one would agree with Fahmy in
his conclusion: “Rather than seeing Mehmet Ali as striving to achieve independence
on behalf of the Egyptian nation…this book has argued that
Mehmed Ali was seeking the establishment of a secure personal rule for himself
and his household in Egypt”. 56 And I would add, security for the Turco-
Egyptian elite as well.
Th e unrevealed objective: the “sultanate renewal”
In other words, the war launched by Mehmed Ali was not against the Ottoman
state but against the sultan and his advisors whose policies were in his eyes
disastrous for the Ottoman empire and put him and all that he had achieved
in Egypt in constant danger of being eliminated, as he told Consul General
Campbell in May 1838 (see note 43 above). In this sense two quotations made
by Rustum verify this judgment. He attributed the fi rst to Wahid Efendi, a
confi dential scribe at Ibrahim’s headquarters in Konya, who admitted to
Mehmed Reşid Paşa, the grand vezir who fell captive into Egyptian hands in
the battle of Konya, that the Egyptians were fi ghting in self-defence. Ibrahim
Paşa, on the other hand, reassured the grand vezir that “his sole aim and that
of his father’s was to put an end to the sultan’s folly, injustice, and disregard of
the interest of the nation”, 57 (meaning perhaps the Muslim community). Th ese
two quotations summarize the objectives of the campaign. Th e fi rst was, as
mentioned, to secure the position of Mehmed Ali in Egypt. Th e second, however,
was not solely a personal objective but pertains to the Ottoman empire
as a whole and indicates that the campaign had had another objective which
was not revealed publicly except after the battle of Konya (December, 1832).
When Ibrahim moved into Anatolia, Ottoman historians of the period
observed that he did not encounter hostility from the local population.
On the contrary, according to a report of the mutasarrıf of Kayseri, “all cities
and towns from Konya to Kayseri had rendered their submission to
Kutluoğlu, Th e Egyptian Question , p. 190.
Fahmy, All the Paşa’s Men, p. 311.
Rustum, Th e Royal Archives of Egypt , p. 42 and also pp. 34–5.

18 B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24
Ibrahim Paşa”. 58 Th ose historians attributed this to the propaganda of Mehmed
Ali. Th ey remarked that he had worked for many years to gain the sympathy
and adherence of ulema and notables from Istanbul and the Anatolian provinces.
When they went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, 59 they were well treated by
the Egyptian authorities in the holy cities and then were invited on their way
back to pass through Cairo where they were graciously received by the paşa ,
and “were bestowed with gifts and travel expenses ( harcırah )”. Mehmed Ali,
added Mustafa Nuri, used to raise the question of the condition of the state
with them and to claim that all that he wanted was “to serve religion and
state”, or to rescue the state “from deceit and from Russian domination”. 60 In
this way, they continued, he succeeded in bringing to his side “many high
offi cials ( erkan-ı devlet ), ulema and eşraf of the memleket ”
58 Kutluoğlu, Th e Egyptian Question , pp. 78 ff . and doc. 8, p. 217.
59 Mustafa Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat , IV, p. 95; Ali Fuad, “Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa”,
p. 67 refers to the “Anatolian cities” only.
60 Mustafa Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat , IV, p. 95.
61 Ali Fuad, “Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa”, p. 67.
62 Mustafa Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat , IV, p. 95.
63 As Tahir Efendi the defterdar of Ağa Hüseyin Paşa told Mustafa Nuri, see Netayic ül-Vukuat,
IV, p. 96.
64 Rustum, Calendar of State Papers, II, p. 184, doc. 2289, 8 Rajab, 1248 [1.12.1831]; see also
al-Bitar , Abd al-Razzaq, Hilyat-ul Bashar fi Tarikh al-Qarn al-Th alith ‘Ashar (Damascus: Majma’
al-Lughah al-Arabiyyah, 1961). In his biography of Ibrahim Pasha he wrote that he assembled
the notables and suggested the deposition of the sultan and the elevation of his elder son
Abdülmecid to the sultanate, see vol. I, pp. 22–4.
65 Mustafa Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat , IV, p. 95; Ali Fuad, “Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa”,
pp. 67 and 85.
61
(meaning Anatolia).
Mustafa Nuri added “also from Istanbul and other places”. 62 In addition to
these eff orts, what turned public opinion in his favour was the victory of
Ibrahim Paşa. 63
Already, on the fi rst of December 1832, 20 days before the battle of Konya,
Mehmed Ali wrote to Ibrahim, “to obtain the required fatwa s from the muftis
of Damascus and Aleppo…in regard to the deposition of the sultan and the
raising of his elder son, Abdülmecid, in his place, and to have those fatwa s
proclaimed in Anatolia and Istanbul”. 64 But after that battle at which the last
army that the sultan could muster and which was led by the grand vezir himself
was defeated, Mehmed Ali seems to have felt more emboldened than ever
and instructed Ibrahim to work on that objective without delay. Th us we fi nd
Ibrahim Paşa sending letters to certain vali s in Anatolia inviting them to a
meeting in Istanbul to discuss, among other things “the reform of the condi-
65 tion of the state [ ıslah-ı mizac-ı devlet ]”. Th e above-mentioned eff orts of

B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24 19
Mehmed Ali to gain adherents in Anatolia had borne fruit by then and many
66
ulema and şerif s “fell for [the idea of] sultanate renewal [ tecdid-i saltanat ]”.
A few days after the battle of Konya, Mehmed Ali wrote to “one of the
notables” informing him of its results and referring to “the readiness of the
population of Anatolia…to agree with the Egyptian idea of deposing Sultan
Mahmud II”. 67
On the 26 th of December, fi ve days after that battle, Ibrahim wrote to his
father informing him that he was collecting the fetva s needed to prepare public
opinion for the deposition of the sultan, and that the grand vezir expressed
his readiness to accompany him on his march to Istanbul to achieve that aim. 68
On that same day, Mehmed Reşid wrote to Mehmed Ali and suggested convening
a general meeting of the ulema of Rumeli, Albania, Bosnia, and Anatolia
to examine the acts of the sultan “and if these acts were found to violate the
sharı‘a they (i.e. those assembled) would [declare] the deposition of the sultan
and the raising of his son in his place” and added that there should be extreme
caution in such moves for the safety of the young prince, Abdülmecid who
was nine years old and his younger brother, Abdülaziz, lest Mahmud in a fi t of
rage infl ict harm on them. 69 In response Mehmed Ali wrote to Ibrahim warning
him about the grand vezir who was known to be crafty and a very shrewd
person and suggested to him that he send him to Cairo to discuss the matter
with him, that is with Mehmed Ali. 70 However, despite his distrust of the
grand vezir , Mehmed Ali sent him a gift and a 150,000 kuruş for his expenses,
and begged him to accept them. 71
However, at the same time as this correspondence, Ibrahim continued his
advance towards the northwest of Anatolia. On the 5 th of January 1833,
Mehmed Ali wrote to him expressing his approval of his plan to proceed by
way of Eskişehir towards Üsküdar or Bursa, and added “the circumstances
were opportune to proclaim the fetva s concerning the deposition of the sultan…and
that the purpose of this movement is…to save the Muslims from
oppression and achieve their wellbeing and repose”. 72
All this correspondence shows that Mehmed Ali was serious about this project.
Th e question is, to what end was the change in the sultanate intended?
66 Ali Fuad, “Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa”, p. 85.
67 Rustum, Calendar of State Papers, II, p. 206, doc. 2406, 2 Sha’ban, 1248 [25.12.1832].
68 Ibid. II, p. 208, doc. 2414, 3 Sha’ban, 1248[ 26.12.1832].
69 Ibid. II, pp. 208–9, doc. 2419, 3–4 Sha’ban, 1248 [16–17.12.1832].
70 Ibid. II, p. 222, doc. 2481, 17 Sha’ban,1248 [9.1.1833] and pp. 223–4, doc. 2487, 18
Sha’ban, 1248 [10.1.1833].
71 Ibid. II, p. 242, doc. 2583, 9 Ramadan, 1248 [30.1.1833].
72 Ibid. II, p. 217, doc. 2460, 13 Sha’ban, 1248[5.2.1233].

20 B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24
Nowhere did Mehmed Ali reveal his ultimate purpose. As mentioned before,
Ibrahim told the grand vezir that their aim was “to put an end to the sultan’s
folly, injustice, and disregard of the interests of the nation”, 73 without specifying
his intentions, which leaves us in the dark. However, it is highly probable
that Mehmed Ali was totally against the policy of centralization imposed by
the sultan. If so, was he planning to bring a reversal of this policy in favour of
decentralization? It is diffi cult to give a satisfactory answer. In the sources
available to us there is no reference whatsoever to such an alternative policy.
But the question should remain open.
Th e failure of the aim of “sultanate renewal”
But on the 17 th of January, 12 days after the letter in which Mehmed Ali
approved the itinerary of Ibrahim’s advance, he wrote again to Ibrahim telling
him that he had been told by the French consul at Alexandria that a Russian
general, Muravieff , would soon be arriving in Egypt, presumably with the
intention of mediating, or so he supposed. Consequently, he ordered Ibrahim
to halt his advance until his talks with the Russian general. 74 Parallel to the
mission of Muravieff to Mehmed Ali, a Russian colonel reached Ibrahim’s
camp to warn him against marching on any further. About the same time
Halil Rıfat Paşa, the Tophane müşiri [Marshal of the Artillery], arrived at Cairo
bringing the sultan’s pardon to Mehmed Ali. 75 It must have been a shattering
moment for him to write to his son to halt his advance at whatever point he
had reached and not to proceed any further. Ibrahim’s camp was then in
Kütahya, about a week’s march from Istanbul.
Having remained without an organized force to defend Istanbul and to
secure him on the throne, Sultan Mahmud had no alternative but to ask for
Russian help and as is known a Russian fl eet dropped anchor in the Bosphorus.
With this, the whole idea of deposing Sultan Mahmud fell. If Ibrahim had
hoped to repeat the precedence of Mustafa Bayrakdar in 1808, his dream was
also shattered.
However, this was not the only measure that the sultan had undertaken to
secure his position in Istanbul. I have remarked above that the upper classes in
73 Rustum, Th e Royal Archives, p. 42.
74 Rustum, Calendar of State Papers , II, doc. 2525, p. 231, 26 Sha’ban, 1248 [18.1.1833].
75 On the dispatch of Halil Rıfat to Egypt see Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lütfi , IV, pp. 26, and
28–9; Rustum, Calendar of State Papers , II, p. 244, docs. 2594 and 2595, both dated 12 Ramazan,
1248 [2.2.1833].

B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24 21
Istanbul were not united behind him in this confl ict, and many resented his
arbitrary and despotic acts and his violation, in their view, of shari‘a precepts.
Mehmed Ali’s threat forced him to undertake several measures to modify his
acts and to appease the upper classes. Firstly, Mahmud attempted to reconcile
with the Sunni-Orthodox trend. Th us, he bestowed higher ranks on scores of
ulema and bureaucrats. 76 Above all, he appointed Mekki-zade Mustafa Asım
Efendi to the post of şeyhülislam . 77 Mustafa Asım was a descendant of an upper
class family in Istanbul. His father, Mekki Efendi, and his father-in-law
Samani-zade Ömer Hulusi Efendi, had both served in the same capacity during
the reign of Selim III, 78 as had his father-in-law in the early years of
Mahmud II’s reign. 79 Both of them belonged to the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi
order, and Mustafa Asım himself was a strong believer in Sheykh Khalid and
a leading Naqshbandi-Khalidi adherent in Istanbul. 80 His appointment could
guarantee the support of the higher ulema to the sultan. About the same time,
Mahmud dismissed Ahmed Hulusi Paşa from the post of kaymakam (who
substituted for the grand vezir during his absence from Istanbul). Like Hüsrev,
Ahmed Hulusi was an arch-enemy of Mehmed Ali and a very close and infl uential
adviser to the sultan. 81 Moreover, he appointed ulema , one of whom was
a known Khalidi follower, to tutor his two sons Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz, 82
which very probably aff ected their socio-religious outlook when they became
sultans. In addition to these measures he allowed the return of many exiles, a
measure that had already begun at the start of the confl ict, 83 and performed
other acts with the intention of safeguarding the internal front behind him in
this confl ict and prevent dissidence.
However, parallel to his policy of reconciling the upper and conservative
classes, Mahmud took intensive measures in reforming the apparatus of
76 See Takvim-i Vekayi , nos. 42 dated 20 Cemaziyelevvel, 1248 [15.10.1832], and 50 dated
“selh” (the end of) Şaban, 1248 [21.1.1833]
77 On Mustafa Asım Efendi see İlmiye Salnamesi (Istanbul: Matbaa-yı Amire, 1334), p. 580;
Rıfat Efendi, Devhat-ul Meşayih (n.p: n.pp., n.d.), pp. 124 ff ., on his appointment see Takvim-i
Vekayi , no. 51, dated 20 Şevval, 1248 [12.3.1833].
78 On Mekki Efendi, see Rıfat Efendi, Devhat-ul Meşayih , pp. 111–12.
79 On his father-in-law Samani-zade, see Rıfat Efendi, Devhat-ul Meşayih , pp. 117–19.
80 On his being a Khalidi see Sahib, As’ad (ed.), Bughyat al-Wajid fi Maktubat Mawlana
Khalid (Damascus: Matba’at al-Taraqqi, 1334/1915–6), pp. 105 ff . and 252 ff .
81 On him see Sicill-i Osmani , II, pp. 281–2; on his dismissal see Takvim-i Vekayi , no. 53,
dated 11 Şevval 1248 [3.3.1833], pp. 1–2.
82 On the tutoring of his sons see my book, Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the
19 th Century (Istanbul: Isis, 2001), p. 80, see also p. 55.
83 On permitting the return of exiles see Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i Lütfi , III, pp. 166, 174;
Takvim-i Vekayi, no. 2, dated 7 Cemaziyelahir, 1247 [13.11.1831], p. 2.

22 B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24
government in the fi elds of civil administration, education and the military.
Indeed, the confl ict with Mehmed Ali served as a catalyst for modernization
at the level of the central government.
Moreover, it is believed that there is a direct connection between the campaign
of Mehmed Ali and the promulgation of the Gülhane Rescript after the
death of Sultan Mahmud. In my view the Rescript was not due to the Ottoman
statesmen’s desire to placate the European powers in order to gain their backing
in the confl ict against the paşa . In fact, there was not much need for that.
Th e European powers, controlled at that period by aristocratic and conservative
governments, were against change and for preserving legitimacy. But the
Gülhane Rescript was necessary to pacify the Muslim and Turkish subjects of
the sultan who had been angered by the policies of Mahmud and alienated by
his despotic government, especially by the brutal methods used in the suppression
of the ayan and derebey s, in addition to his violation of shari‘a precepts.
As is known, the Rescript pledged the supremacy of the shari‘a and laws in the
state and the end of arbitrary and despotic government. Above all it promised
security of life, honour and property for all the subjects. Copies of the Rescript
were dispatched to all the provinces including Egypt and Syria, translated
where necessary, and publicly read. It was received with much satisfaction and
widely hailed. 84 In Syria, in the words of Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, “it turned public
opinion in favour of the sultanate and against the Egyptians. Th e people of
Aleppo and Damascus changed all of a sudden against them”. 85
Not only did the Syrians change their attitude towards the sultan, but more
important still, so too did many of the offi cer corps of Mehmed Ali’s army, the
great majority of whom were of Turkish origin. As is known, 11 days after the
death of Mahmud and the rise of Sultan Abdülmecid, an emissary was dispatched
to Cairo conveying to Mehmed Ali the new sultan’s “pardon and
forgiveness” and his promise to grant him the hereditary government of
86 Egypt, an off er which was confi rmed by the Protocol of London in July
1840. Th is conciliatory off er, coupled with the pledges of the Gülhane
Rescript, were enough to make many offi cers of the Egyptian army reconsider
their attitude towards Istanbul. Th ey were fi ghting Sultan Mahmud and his
policies not the Ottoman state. Th e new sultan pledged to rule in justice and
equity. Above all he promised to grant Mehmed Ali hereditary government in
84 See my book Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire , p. 94.
85 Ahmed Cevdet, Tezakir (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1953), vol. I, pp. 7–8.
86 Takvim-i Vekayi, no. 181, dated 28 Rebiyülahır, 1255 [11.7.1839]; Ahmed Lütfi , Tarih-i
Lütfi , VI, pp. 40–1; Dodwell, Th e Founder of Modern Egypt , pp. 176–7.

B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24 23
Egypt, which implicitly meant security for their status and prosperity in Egypt.
Consequently there was no longer any need to be hostile towards the Porte.
When the Porte started to send secret agents to talk to those offi cers they
found many of them, including some of Ibrahim’s top aides, apparently ready
to receive them and talk to them. When these contacts became known
to Ibrahim, he regarded them as committing treason and his reaction was
violent. As I have shown elsewhere, in November 1840 he put fi ve colonels to
death “because they have committed treason”, 87 the nature of which remains
unknown. Moreover, according to Mustafa Nuri, a colonel named Sadık Bey
defected to the sultan’s side along with the staff of his regiment. 88 Even Şerif
Paşa, a son-in-law of Mehmed Ali and for eight years the governor general of
Syria, secretly received an emissary of the Porte. And when the matter became
known to Ibrahim he arrested him and took him under escort to Cairo. 89
Following these new circumstances, the Egyptian army lost its will to fi ght and
when the British, Austrian and Ottoman forces tried to land in Beirut and
Acre in October 1840 they met with little resistance. Following that Mehmed
Ali recognized that it was time to settle. Th e Sublime Porte had already off ered
him the post of hereditary ruler of Egypt under the suzerainty of the sultan.
But he had, it seems, no faith in the promises of the Porte. It was only after
this off er was actually guaranteed by the European powers in the Protocol of
London of 15 th July 1840 that he was ready to accept it. He then gave orders
to Ibrahim to evacuate Syria. Arabia was also evacuated at the same time. After
the ferman of inheritance of 10 th June 1841, Mehmed Ali, by then over 70
years old, fi nally achieved what he had worked for since he became the governor
general of Egypt.
Conclusion
Mehmed Ali waged war against his suzerain, Sultan Mahmud II, not for the
sake of expansion or for achieving full independence and separating Egypt
from the Ottoman empire. He was certainly a wiser statesman than such
claims suggest. It is my contention that he opened hostilities fi rst of all in
87 On putting fi ve colonels to death see [Abdullah Naufal], Mudhakkirat Tarikhiyya , Qustantin
al-Basha al-Mukhallisi (ed.) (Harisa: Matba’at al-Qiddis Bulus, n.d.), p. 223.
88 Mustafa Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat , IV, p. 96.
89 On Şerif Pasha, see [Abdullah Naufal], Mudhakkirat Tarikhiyya, pp. 220–1; Rustum, Asad
and Subhi Abu-Shaqra (eds.), Muntakhabat min al-Jawab ‘ala Iqtirah al-Ahbab (Beirut: n.p.,
1955), pp. 147–50.

24 B. Abu-Manneh / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 1–24
self-defence. In fact he was the last of the ayan and Sultan Mahmud, as we
have seen, was preparing to get rid of him as he did with the others of this class
in Anatolia and Rumeli. Secondly, Mehmed Ali waged war to secure hereditary
rule in Egypt, to guarantee the future of his family and the survival of his
achievements and reforms in the country. In these two objectives he was
backed by the Turco-Egyptian elite who obviously had a basic interest in the
survival of the socio-political order he had created in Egypt.
Mehmed Ali was planning, it seems, to reach Istanbul and bring down the
sultan and raise his heir, Abdülmecid, in his place. We have seen that he built
up considerable support for this cause in Anatolia. Deposing a sultan had
taken place many times before and Sultan Mahmud II had many enemies in
Istanbul and Anatolia who would have greeted such a move with applause. As
for him he would have felt safer if there were a change in the sultanate. Whether
he had other objectives in mind such as the establishment of the Ottoman
empire on a decentralized system is a matter for further research. Indeed,
except France, the European powers stood by Sultan Mahmud and his policy
of centralization. Apparently, this attitude of the powers coupled with a change
of heart among leading members of the elite in Istanbul in favour of the sultan,
ensured the latter’s survival. Th e fact that Sultan Mahmud remained in
control in Istanbul helped to sustain his policy of centralization and gave him
the opportunity to back it up with further measures.
Indeed, we cannot fail to see that the challenges that Mehmed Ali posed for
Istanbul forced the intensifi cation of the measures of modernization at the
level of the central organs of the state. Th ese measures initiated by Sultan
Mahmud and continued by his successors, opened the way in the coming
decades for thousands of young men, predominantly of Turkish origin, to
enter the service of the state in the ranks of the bureaucracy or the military.
Th e result of this development was the consolidation of the centralized system
of government run by the bureaucracy and sustained by a relatively strong
army which characterized the Ottoman empire in the last few generations of
its existence. Finally, though Mehmed Ali failed in his second objective he
succeeded in the fi rst. He obtained recognition of the Porte and of the Powers
for his autonomous status and hereditary rule in Egypt for which he had
worked since becoming governor general of this province.