Understanding Security APIs - CrySyS Lab

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Whatever you intend to get out of this thesis, the author’s intention is for you to understand Security APIs, so you are strongly encouraged to explore, and see the field from as many different perspectives as possible. 1.2 Schedule of Work The material in this thesis is a subset of research performed by the author between October 2000 and October 2003 in the Security Group at the Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge. Much of the material has been published in the following papers: • M. Bond,“Attacks on Cryptoprocessor Transaction Sets”, CHES Workshop 2001, Paris, Springer LNCS 2162, pp. 220–234 • M. Bond, R. Anderson, “API-Level Attacks on Embedded Systems”, IEEE Computer, Oct 2001, Vol 34 No. 10, pp. 67–75 All the attacks except the ’XOR to Null Key Attack’ were discovered by the author. Anderson co-authored the text. • R. Clayton, M. Bond, “Experience Using a Low-Cost FPGA Design to Crack DES Keys”, CHES Workshop 2002, San Francisco, Springer LNCS 2523, pp. 579–592 The attack described in the paper was the author’s work. Clayton built the majority of the hardware DES cracker that served to accelerate attack, and co-authored the text. • R. Anderson, M. Bond, “Protocol Analysis, Composability and Computation”, Computer Systems: Papers for Roger Needham, Jan 2003 The author discovered the decimalisation table attack described; Anderson was the primary author of the text. • M. Bond, P. Zielinski, “Decimalisation Table Attacks for PIN Cracking”, Computer Laboratory Technical Report no. 560, Feb 2003 The author discovered the decimalisation table attack; Zielinski optimised the attack to be adaptive, and co-authored the text. 14
In addition the work has been presented by invitation at seminars and conferences: • “Attacks on Cryptoprocessor Transactions Sets” Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, UK COSIC , Katholieke Universitat Leuven, Belgium CHES Workshop, Paris, France • “A Low-cost Hardware Birthday Attack on DES” Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, UK • “First Steps in Cryptoprocessor API Analysis” “Specification and Verification of Secure Cryptographic Protocols” Workshop, Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany • “The Benefits and Pitfalls of Cryptographic Hardware” Information Security Forum 2002, London, UK • “The Hazards of Security API Design” BCS Advanced Programming Seminar, London, UK • “Experience Using a Low-Cost FPGA to Crack DES Keys” CHES Workshop 2002, San Francisco, USA • “The Hazards of Security API Design : Special Edition” Security PIC, IBM TJ Watson Research Labs, NY, USA • “Hardware Security Modules : Benefits and Pitfalls” EEMA Information Security Solutions Europe conference, France • “Model Checking Cryptoprocessors : Why I like the British Museum” Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, UK • “Differential Protocol Analysis and API-Level Attacks” Invited Talk, Security and Protection of Information 2003 Brno, Czech Republic • “Security APIs – Digital Battlefields” Information Security Group, University of Bristol, UK 15
Page 1 and 2: Understanding Security APIs Michael
Page 3: Dedication To Philip Barnes, who co
Page 6 and 7: Understanding Security APIs Michael
Page 8 and 9: 4.3 Certification Authorities . . .
Page 10 and 11: 7.3.1 VSM Compatibles - XOR to Null
Page 12 and 13: Chapter 1 Introduction In today’s
Page 16 and 17: The aspects of the research relatin
Page 18 and 19: it spawned the development of contr
Page 20 and 21: 2.4 Key Dates Year Events 1960 Deve
Page 22 and 23: ciphertext into a four digit number
Page 24 and 25: service engineer). In order for the
Page 26 and 27: 3.3 Development of the Attack Toolk
Page 28 and 29: This key binding attack effectively
Page 30 and 31: Chapter 4 Applications of Security
Page 32 and 33: Higher-level goals maybe to achieve
Page 34 and 35: VISA. It also permits end-to-end co
Page 36 and 37: There are three sorts of threat to
Page 38 and 39: control - and would typically be is
Page 40 and 41: Secure Computing Base (NGSCB), prev
Page 42 and 43: Chapter 5 The Security API Industry
Page 44 and 45: • Individuals, Customers, Clients
Page 46 and 47: 5.2.2 1990 to 2000 Year Events 1991
Page 48 and 49: 5.3 Summary of HSM Manufacturers 5.
Page 50 and 51: pose crypto platform market, and si
Page 52 and 53: 5.3.8 Baltimore http://www.baltimor
Page 54 and 55: The Trusted Computing Group will li
Page 56 and 57: available, but should be carefully
Page 58 and 59: Chapter 6 Hardware Security Modules
Page 60 and 61: an increasing concern as the device
Page 62 and 63: • Potting is nowadays one of the
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• Light Sensors can be coupled wi
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6.2.1 Tamper-Evidence Hardware Secu
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6.3 HSM Summary This section introd
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6.3.3 nCipher nForce API nCore API
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6.3.5 nCipher netHSM API nCore API
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6.3.7 Thales RG7000 API Proprietary
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6.3.9 Chrysalis-ITS Luna CA3 API PK
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Chapter 7 Analysis of Security APIs
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First Command: Key Part Import User
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achieve the same functionality as o
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Figure 7.5 shows a common key manag
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7.2 The Attacker’s Toolkit This s
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early HSMs actually used this techn
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PIN numbers are often stored in enc
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operating systems. Naively implemen
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The supervisor key switch is turned
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7.3.4 4758 CCA - Key Import Attack
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7.3.6 4758 CCA - 3DES Key Binding A
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Bank Home Bank Home Bank Home Test
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the number of operations the HSM wo
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Implementation Overview The DES cra
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7.3.8 4758 CCA - Weak Key Timing At
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which is a many-to-one mapping betw
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Digits Possibilities A AAAA(1) AB A
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No # Poss. pins Decimalisation tabl
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tables in a generic way will be har
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Security Officer 1 -> HSM : SM?IK 8
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in. Consider the example below, whi
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Indeed it now seems that many conve
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• Search Tools - such as PROLOG -
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\% these are the commands provided
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--------------------------SPASS-STA
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Problem Specification The API is sp
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UI Decisions Figure 7.23: The MIMse
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Figure 7.25: The MIMsearch ‘Watch
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2. If the Security API prevents cer
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it can be enabled and disabled, the
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• When the host machine sends dat
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8.2.5 Legacy Issues • Isolate you
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The Visa Security Module had a seri
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Class I Passive tokens, which prese
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Smartcards Figure 8.2: Chrysalis Lu
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link to the authorisation process f
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To minimise the risk of breach, eac
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When no privileged operations are r
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8.4.3 How Many Security Officers ar
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Chapter 9 The Future of Security AP
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e unable to assure themselves that
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9.4 The Bottom Line Whilst it is ex
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10.1 Roles and Responsibilities Sec
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Chapter 11 Glossary 4753 IBM Crypto
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PKCS#11 Public Key Cryptography Sta
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[14] J. Clulow, “On the Security
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[53] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/
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