Understanding Security APIs - CrySyS Lab

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Secure Computing Base (NGSCB), previously called ‘Palladium’ – a whole set of technologies to be integrated into the next generation of PCs, including a tamperresistant cryptographic coprocessor, and a special security kernel for Microsoft operating systems. NGSCB proponents hope that they will experience the same success controlling PC media as that of media read by consumer electronics. But the more complex APIs presented by DRM software on PCs will be hard to get right, whether or not they are supported by back-end tamper-resistant hardware. It will not be a surprise if the first generation of DRM hardware for PCs is only resistant to casual attack. 4.7 Military Applications There is unfortunately little information in the public domain about military applications of Security APIs (and there are no guarantees that the military knowhow that has been published is not misleading, unintentionally or otherwise). Nuclear command and control appears to have employed hardware enforcing simple Security APIs that perform access control on arming of weapons. In particular, these APIs implemented dual control policies – the arming must be authorised by multiple topranking officials – that were permeated right through the command infrastructure down to the devices themselves. There would then be no weak-spot where a single person could seize control of an array of weapons. This application area certainly seems to have catalysed the development of tamper-resistance, which is described further in section 6.1. There is plenty of speculation about nuclear command and control on the internet [44]. Battlefield radios certainly use cryptography to secure communications, and there is indication that some military COMSEC equipment loads keys from a physical token – a “crypto ignition key”. Such devices could be considered to have simple Security APIs that ensure that keys can only be loaded and never extracted. A simple policy such as this could however substantially mitigate the consequences of loss or capture of the equipment. 4.8 Specialist Applications Bills of Lading – Securing high-value business transactions such as sale or transfer of goods in transit across the Atlantic, is a hard problem. When the goods cannot be handed over in synchrony with the sale, there are a number of potential frauds, such as selling the same goods twice. It may be months after a sale when an oil tanker’s course finally becomes unique in differentiating between two probable destinations, and these months can be used to launder the profit from a double sale and disappear. Trading authorities have adopted a measure of computer security to uphold simple 40
policies on transactions (e.g. the same goods cannot be sold twice). A natural way to implement such a policy is with an HSM. Key-Loading Sites – Applications which deploy thousands of HSMs into a public environment, such as pay-TV smartcards and prepayment electricity meters all require an infrastructure to initialise them before delivery. Generic manufacturing processes are often followed by a key-loading phase, which may happen at an entirely different facility from that where the manufacture took place. These key-loading facilities can hold master keys which are used to derive the keys for a particular device, or valuable signing keys used to certify the authenticity of a device. The same API technology which protects the devices during deployment is thus used to secure the loading process from potentially untrustworthy staff. 41
Page 1 and 2: Understanding Security APIs Michael
Page 3: Dedication To Philip Barnes, who co
Page 6 and 7: Understanding Security APIs Michael
Page 8 and 9: 4.3 Certification Authorities . . .
Page 10 and 11: 7.3.1 VSM Compatibles - XOR to Null
Page 12 and 13: Chapter 1 Introduction In today’s
Page 14 and 15: Whatever you intend to get out of t
Page 16 and 17: The aspects of the research relatin
Page 18 and 19: it spawned the development of contr
Page 20 and 21: 2.4 Key Dates Year Events 1960 Deve
Page 22 and 23: ciphertext into a four digit number
Page 24 and 25: service engineer). In order for the
Page 26 and 27: 3.3 Development of the Attack Toolk
Page 28 and 29: This key binding attack effectively
Page 30 and 31: Chapter 4 Applications of Security
Page 32 and 33: Higher-level goals maybe to achieve
Page 34 and 35: VISA. It also permits end-to-end co
Page 36 and 37: There are three sorts of threat to
Page 38 and 39: control - and would typically be is
Page 42 and 43: Chapter 5 The Security API Industry
Page 44 and 45: • Individuals, Customers, Clients
Page 46 and 47: 5.2.2 1990 to 2000 Year Events 1991
Page 48 and 49: 5.3 Summary of HSM Manufacturers 5.
Page 50 and 51: pose crypto platform market, and si
Page 52 and 53: 5.3.8 Baltimore http://www.baltimor
Page 54 and 55: The Trusted Computing Group will li
Page 56 and 57: available, but should be carefully
Page 58 and 59: Chapter 6 Hardware Security Modules
Page 60 and 61: an increasing concern as the device
Page 62 and 63: • Potting is nowadays one of the
Page 64 and 65: • Light Sensors can be coupled wi
Page 66 and 67: 6.2.1 Tamper-Evidence Hardware Secu
Page 68 and 69: 6.3 HSM Summary This section introd
Page 70 and 71: 6.3.3 nCipher nForce API nCore API
Page 72 and 73: 6.3.5 nCipher netHSM API nCore API
Page 74 and 75: 6.3.7 Thales RG7000 API Proprietary
Page 76 and 77: 6.3.9 Chrysalis-ITS Luna CA3 API PK
Page 78 and 79: Chapter 7 Analysis of Security APIs
Page 80 and 81: First Command: Key Part Import User
Page 82 and 83: achieve the same functionality as o
Page 84 and 85: Figure 7.5 shows a common key manag
Page 86 and 87: 7.2 The Attacker’s Toolkit This s
Page 88 and 89: early HSMs actually used this techn
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PIN numbers are often stored in enc
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operating systems. Naively implemen
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The supervisor key switch is turned
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7.3.4 4758 CCA - Key Import Attack
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7.3.6 4758 CCA - 3DES Key Binding A
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Bank Home Bank Home Bank Home Test
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the number of operations the HSM wo
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Implementation Overview The DES cra
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7.3.8 4758 CCA - Weak Key Timing At
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which is a many-to-one mapping betw
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Digits Possibilities A AAAA(1) AB A
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No # Poss. pins Decimalisation tabl
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tables in a generic way will be har
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Security Officer 1 -> HSM : SM?IK 8
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in. Consider the example below, whi
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Indeed it now seems that many conve
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• Search Tools - such as PROLOG -
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\% these are the commands provided
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--------------------------SPASS-STA
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Problem Specification The API is sp
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UI Decisions Figure 7.23: The MIMse
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Figure 7.25: The MIMsearch ‘Watch
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2. If the Security API prevents cer
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it can be enabled and disabled, the
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• When the host machine sends dat
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8.2.5 Legacy Issues • Isolate you
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The Visa Security Module had a seri
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Class I Passive tokens, which prese
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Smartcards Figure 8.2: Chrysalis Lu
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link to the authorisation process f
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To minimise the risk of breach, eac
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When no privileged operations are r
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8.4.3 How Many Security Officers ar
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Chapter 9 The Future of Security AP
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e unable to assure themselves that
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9.4 The Bottom Line Whilst it is ex
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10.1 Roles and Responsibilities Sec
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Chapter 11 Glossary 4753 IBM Crypto
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PKCS#11 Public Key Cryptography Sta
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[14] J. Clulow, “On the Security
Page 170:
[53] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/
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