Understanding Security APIs - CrySyS Lab

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pose crypto platform market, and since late 2002 have entered into the (already saturated) financial security market alongside Thales and the others. nCipher’s enduring informal trade mark is a blue LED on their modules which flashes error codes in morse! 5.3.4 HP Atalla http://www.atalla.com Hewlett-Packard now owns the US based HSM manufacturer ‘Atalla’, who retain a significant share of the US financial security market. They are the US equivalent of Racal SPS – one of the manufacturers that has been there from the beginning. Their financial security product range consists of Network <strong>Security</strong> Processors (NSPs), but they have other product lines, including custom programmable modules. Atalla has since 2001 been developing and marketing new key block formats which go some way to addressing the key binding flaws first publicly identified the same year, in the author’s paper “Attacks on Cryptoprocessor Transaction Sets”. Atalla runs a series of web seminars linked from their website, which are a useful (if sales-oriented) source of information about the financial security climate. Atalla’s new proprietary key storage data formats are also being influential in the development of a new ANSI X.98 standard for PIN processing. 5.3.5 Chrysalis-ITS Chrysalis-ITS http://www.chrysalis-its.com Rainbow http://www.rainbow.com SafeNet http://safenet-inc.com Chrysalis is a younger HSM vendor based in Toronto, Canada. They have been floundering since the bursting of the dot com bubble: they were bought in 2002 by Rainbow Technologies, which is now in the process of merging with SafeNet Inc. During their early years, they were very closely involved with the design of the PKCS#11, which is in fact modelled on their underlying ‘Luna API’. They produce small PCMCIA form factor cryptographic tokens which use the PKCS#11 interface for access to the keys. There are a range of tokens available, with essentially the same potential functionality, but customised for particular end user applications; their main business is supporting certification authorities. Their small form factor ‘Luna’ tokens have quite low performance, so they also market separate accelerator devices which temporarily take custody of the key material from the tokens. 50
5.3.6 Prism Payment Technologies http://www.prism.co.za Prism Payment Technologies is a South African HSM manufacturer that has swallowed up a large portion of the SA crypto market. They have two major roots. The first was the company ‘Linkdata’, which started out building electronic funds transfer switches for routing PIN processing transactions. After a management buyout, the name ‘Prism’ was created. They moved from there to focus substantially on the prepayment electricity market, where they developed the TSM200 (see section 6.3.6 and section 7.3.11 for a fuller description including an attack on the API). They were very successful in the SA prepayment electricity meter market, and also made POS devices using the TSM200. In late 2000 Prism acquired ‘Nanoteq’ from Comparex holdings. Nanoteq was another SA HSM manufacturer that started out as a local builder and supplier of communications security equipment for the SA military. South Africa was able to support a number of different manufacturers during apartheid because of import and export restrictions, and the concern that imported devices may have trapdoors. Nanoteq was founded in the 80s, and later expanded into the commercial market with POS devices, smartcards and a low-performance HSM called the SM500. In 1998 Comparex acquired Nanoteq, a small HSM manufacturer called CAT, and part of Mosaic Software. Their product ranges were merged, and Mosaic software wrote a financial API for use with CAT’s HSMs. It was this product range that Prism acquired, rebranding it the ‘Incognito’ series. The Incognito series includes the older TSM credit dispensing HSMs, and several flavours of custom-programmable general purpose HSMs, which support authenticated code loading, and performance similar to the IBM 4758. 5.3.7 Eracom http://www.eracom-tech.com Eracom is an Australian HSM manufacturer, founded in 1979. It has produced general purpose cryptographic equipment such as a DES accelerator for block-level disk encryption in 1985, and since 1991 has been producing programmable HSMs. They have a strong secondary base of operations in Germany, and supply to various continental European nations from there. Their HSM ranges are called ‘ProtectHost’ and ‘ProtectServer’, implementing Eracom’s proprietary ‘ProtectToolkit’ API. 51
Page 1 and 2: Understanding Security APIs Michael
Page 3: Dedication To Philip Barnes, who co
Page 6 and 7: Understanding Security APIs Michael
Page 8 and 9: 4.3 Certification Authorities . . .
Page 10 and 11: 7.3.1 VSM Compatibles - XOR to Null
Page 12 and 13: Chapter 1 Introduction In today’s
Page 14 and 15: Whatever you intend to get out of t
Page 16 and 17: The aspects of the research relatin
Page 18 and 19: it spawned the development of contr
Page 20 and 21: 2.4 Key Dates Year Events 1960 Deve
Page 22 and 23: ciphertext into a four digit number
Page 24 and 25: service engineer). In order for the
Page 26 and 27: 3.3 Development of the Attack Toolk
Page 28 and 29: This key binding attack effectively
Page 30 and 31: Chapter 4 Applications of Security
Page 32 and 33: Higher-level goals maybe to achieve
Page 34 and 35: VISA. It also permits end-to-end co
Page 36 and 37: There are three sorts of threat to
Page 38 and 39: control - and would typically be is
Page 40 and 41: Secure Computing Base (NGSCB), prev
Page 42 and 43: Chapter 5 The Security API Industry
Page 44 and 45: • Individuals, Customers, Clients
Page 46 and 47: 5.2.2 1990 to 2000 Year Events 1991
Page 48 and 49: 5.3 Summary of HSM Manufacturers 5.
Page 52 and 53: 5.3.8 Baltimore http://www.baltimor
Page 54 and 55: The Trusted Computing Group will li
Page 56 and 57: available, but should be carefully
Page 58 and 59: Chapter 6 Hardware Security Modules
Page 60 and 61: an increasing concern as the device
Page 62 and 63: • Potting is nowadays one of the
Page 64 and 65: • Light Sensors can be coupled wi
Page 66 and 67: 6.2.1 Tamper-Evidence Hardware Secu
Page 68 and 69: 6.3 HSM Summary This section introd
Page 70 and 71: 6.3.3 nCipher nForce API nCore API
Page 72 and 73: 6.3.5 nCipher netHSM API nCore API
Page 74 and 75: 6.3.7 Thales RG7000 API Proprietary
Page 76 and 77: 6.3.9 Chrysalis-ITS Luna CA3 API PK
Page 78 and 79: Chapter 7 Analysis of Security APIs
Page 80 and 81: First Command: Key Part Import User
Page 82 and 83: achieve the same functionality as o
Page 84 and 85: Figure 7.5 shows a common key manag
Page 86 and 87: 7.2 The Attacker’s Toolkit This s
Page 88 and 89: early HSMs actually used this techn
Page 90 and 91: PIN numbers are often stored in enc
Page 92 and 93: operating systems. Naively implemen
Page 94 and 95: The supervisor key switch is turned
Page 96 and 97: 7.3.4 4758 CCA - Key Import Attack
Page 98 and 99: 7.3.6 4758 CCA - 3DES Key Binding A
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Bank Home Bank Home Bank Home Test
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the number of operations the HSM wo
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Implementation Overview The DES cra
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7.3.8 4758 CCA - Weak Key Timing At
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which is a many-to-one mapping betw
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Digits Possibilities A AAAA(1) AB A
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No # Poss. pins Decimalisation tabl
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tables in a generic way will be har
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Security Officer 1 -> HSM : SM?IK 8
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in. Consider the example below, whi
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Indeed it now seems that many conve
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• Search Tools - such as PROLOG -
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\% these are the commands provided
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--------------------------SPASS-STA
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Problem Specification The API is sp
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UI Decisions Figure 7.23: The MIMse
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Figure 7.25: The MIMsearch ‘Watch
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2. If the Security API prevents cer
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it can be enabled and disabled, the
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• When the host machine sends dat
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8.2.5 Legacy Issues • Isolate you
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The Visa Security Module had a seri
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Class I Passive tokens, which prese
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Smartcards Figure 8.2: Chrysalis Lu
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link to the authorisation process f
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To minimise the risk of breach, eac
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When no privileged operations are r
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8.4.3 How Many Security Officers ar
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Chapter 9 The Future of Security AP
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e unable to assure themselves that
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9.4 The Bottom Line Whilst it is ex
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10.1 Roles and Responsibilities Sec
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Chapter 11 Glossary 4753 IBM Crypto
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PKCS#11 Public Key Cryptography Sta
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[14] J. Clulow, “On the Security
Page 170:
[53] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/
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