Understanding Security APIs - CrySyS Lab

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• Individuals, Customers, Clients Individuals (and small companies such as merchants) may interact with Security APIs embedded in equipment they use as part of their interaction with other businesses of which they are customers. For an individual this may come in the form of a smartcard for electronic banking; for a merchant it might be the capture device for credit cards. They will likely be shielded from most of the interaction with the API, but will probably be aware of some of the overriding principles from the API’s policy which affect how they must interact with it. For example the user of the smartcard may know that a PIN has to be presented to unlock access for certain commands, but they wouldn’t know the specific function of these commands. • Government Agencies such as NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) have a role producing cryptographic standards. NIST produces the FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) series and involved with the internationally recognised suite of ‘Common Criteria’ standards. The more clandestine government agencies once kept themselves to themselves, but now the NSA in particular has involvement in the commercial security community, and maintains an interest in standards and evaluation. The NSA recently released code for the collaborative Secure Linux project [54], which has a special security module (a module of code) which is privileged and enforces a set of policies on how the applications can access the rest of the operating system. • Validation Labs are a newer arrival to the Security API world – increasing demand for conformance to government quality specifications from commercial industry has led to the establishment of these private organisations, which check commercial products against government standards. Previously, when the military was the sole customer for cryptography, validation was performed by the military, for the military. The availability of third-party evaluation labs has led to an interesting shift in the way validation is done. Companies now stipulate that they will only consider validated products, but the manufacturer actually commissions the evaluation of the product. The validation labs then make bids for evaluation, and (presumably) the contract is won by the lowest bidder. 44
5.2 Corporate Timeline 5.2.1 1970 to 1990 Year Events 1972 NBS (precursor to NIST) requests standardised crypto algorithm 1974 IBM submits Lucifer algorithm to NBS 1974 IBM launches 3600 series finance system – ATM, Teller, PIN software 1976 DES released by NBS 1976 Diffie and Hellman invent public key crypto 1977 IBM 3845 DES encryption unit launched 1977 IBM extends its 3614 ATMs to use PIN derivation 1978 RSA invented 1979 IBM 3848 DES encryption unit released, which is faster than the 3845 and supports 3DES 1979 IBM product development site in Charlotte opened 1979 Mykotronx founded in California, working for the NSA 1979 Eracom founded in Australia, producing IBM channel connected HSMs 1981 IBM 4700 series finance system – ATM, teller, PIN software 1984 Rainbow Technologies founded in California, ‘Sentinel’ anti-piracy product highly profitable 1984 Eracom expands into Germany 1985 VISA Security Module introduced 1985 Eracom produces PC crypto card 1987 IBM µABYSS mesh introduced 1987 Rainbow floats 1989 IBM Transaction Security System (TSS) products introduced, including CCA, 4755 high-speed crypto card, 4573 channel-attached crypto unit 1989 VSM clones appearing on market 45
Page 1 and 2: Understanding Security APIs Michael
Page 3: Dedication To Philip Barnes, who co
Page 6 and 7: Understanding Security APIs Michael
Page 8 and 9: 4.3 Certification Authorities . . .
Page 10 and 11: 7.3.1 VSM Compatibles - XOR to Null
Page 12 and 13: Chapter 1 Introduction In today’s
Page 14 and 15: Whatever you intend to get out of t
Page 16 and 17: The aspects of the research relatin
Page 18 and 19: it spawned the development of contr
Page 20 and 21: 2.4 Key Dates Year Events 1960 Deve
Page 22 and 23: ciphertext into a four digit number
Page 24 and 25: service engineer). In order for the
Page 26 and 27: 3.3 Development of the Attack Toolk
Page 28 and 29: This key binding attack effectively
Page 30 and 31: Chapter 4 Applications of Security
Page 32 and 33: Higher-level goals maybe to achieve
Page 34 and 35: VISA. It also permits end-to-end co
Page 36 and 37: There are three sorts of threat to
Page 38 and 39: control - and would typically be is
Page 40 and 41: Secure Computing Base (NGSCB), prev
Page 42 and 43: Chapter 5 The Security API Industry
Page 46 and 47: 5.2.2 1990 to 2000 Year Events 1991
Page 48 and 49: 5.3 Summary of HSM Manufacturers 5.
Page 50 and 51: pose crypto platform market, and si
Page 52 and 53: 5.3.8 Baltimore http://www.baltimor
Page 54 and 55: The Trusted Computing Group will li
Page 56 and 57: available, but should be carefully
Page 58 and 59: Chapter 6 Hardware Security Modules
Page 60 and 61: an increasing concern as the device
Page 62 and 63: • Potting is nowadays one of the
Page 64 and 65: • Light Sensors can be coupled wi
Page 66 and 67: 6.2.1 Tamper-Evidence Hardware Secu
Page 68 and 69: 6.3 HSM Summary This section introd
Page 70 and 71: 6.3.3 nCipher nForce API nCore API
Page 72 and 73: 6.3.5 nCipher netHSM API nCore API
Page 74 and 75: 6.3.7 Thales RG7000 API Proprietary
Page 76 and 77: 6.3.9 Chrysalis-ITS Luna CA3 API PK
Page 78 and 79: Chapter 7 Analysis of Security APIs
Page 80 and 81: First Command: Key Part Import User
Page 82 and 83: achieve the same functionality as o
Page 84 and 85: Figure 7.5 shows a common key manag
Page 86 and 87: 7.2 The Attacker’s Toolkit This s
Page 88 and 89: early HSMs actually used this techn
Page 90 and 91: PIN numbers are often stored in enc
Page 92 and 93: operating systems. Naively implemen
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The supervisor key switch is turned
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7.3.4 4758 CCA - Key Import Attack
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7.3.6 4758 CCA - 3DES Key Binding A
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Bank Home Bank Home Bank Home Test
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the number of operations the HSM wo
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Implementation Overview The DES cra
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7.3.8 4758 CCA - Weak Key Timing At
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which is a many-to-one mapping betw
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Digits Possibilities A AAAA(1) AB A
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No # Poss. pins Decimalisation tabl
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tables in a generic way will be har
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Security Officer 1 -> HSM : SM?IK 8
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in. Consider the example below, whi
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Indeed it now seems that many conve
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• Search Tools - such as PROLOG -
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\% these are the commands provided
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--------------------------SPASS-STA
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Problem Specification The API is sp
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UI Decisions Figure 7.23: The MIMse
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Figure 7.25: The MIMsearch ‘Watch
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2. If the Security API prevents cer
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it can be enabled and disabled, the
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• When the host machine sends dat
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8.2.5 Legacy Issues • Isolate you
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The Visa Security Module had a seri
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Class I Passive tokens, which prese
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Smartcards Figure 8.2: Chrysalis Lu
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link to the authorisation process f
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To minimise the risk of breach, eac
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When no privileged operations are r
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8.4.3 How Many Security Officers ar
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Chapter 9 The Future of Security AP
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e unable to assure themselves that
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9.4 The Bottom Line Whilst it is ex
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10.1 Roles and Responsibilities Sec
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Chapter 11 Glossary 4753 IBM Crypto
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PKCS#11 Public Key Cryptography Sta
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[14] J. Clulow, “On the Security
Page 170:
[53] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/
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