2006/Vol. 5 No.1 - Hamline Law - Hamline University
2006/Vol. 5 No.1 - Hamline Law - Hamline University
2006/Vol. 5 No.1 - Hamline Law - Hamline University
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THE<br />
JOURNAL<br />
OF<br />
AMERICAN<br />
ARBITRATION<br />
<strong>2006</strong>/<strong>Vol</strong>. 5 <strong>No.1</strong>
Article<br />
Arbitration: The Basics<br />
Joseph L. Daly ∗<br />
I. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................3<br />
II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ARBITRATION ................................3<br />
A. Historical Precedents and the Development of Modern<br />
Arbitration................................................................................3<br />
B. Enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act...................................7<br />
III. OBJECTIVES OF ARBITRATION ...................................................10<br />
IV. HOW ARBITRATION BEGINS ......................................................12<br />
A. The Agreement to Arbitrate......................................................12<br />
B. The Arbitration Clause ............................................................14<br />
V. INITIATING THE ARBITRATION ...................................................19<br />
A. Arbitration Agency or Ad Hoc Proceeding...............................20<br />
B. Notifying the Arbitration Agency of Request for Arbitration.....28<br />
C. Choosing the Arbitrator...........................................................29<br />
D. Notification Requirements........................................................31<br />
E. Scheduling...............................................................................32<br />
F. Arbitrator Disclosure Requirements.........................................33<br />
∗ Professor of <strong>Law</strong>, <strong>Hamline</strong> <strong>University</strong> School of <strong>Law</strong>; Arbitrator for the<br />
American Arbitration Association (Labor, Commercial & International) and for the<br />
US Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (Labor). © Joseph L. Daly (<strong>2006</strong>).<br />
The author thanks <strong>Hamline</strong> <strong>Law</strong> students Michael Maza, Katie Thoennes, and Katy<br />
Bowen for their valuable research assistance.<br />
The Journal of American Arbitration © <strong>2006</strong> by Thomas Carbonneau and JurisNet, LLC
2 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
G. Tendency to Delay ...................................................................35<br />
H. Time Required .........................................................................36<br />
VI. PRE-ARBITRATION MATTERS ....................................................36<br />
A. Discovery ................................................................................36<br />
B. Subpoena Power of Persons and Materials..............................37<br />
C. Pre-Hearing Issues..................................................................40<br />
VII. THE HEARING ..........................................................................45<br />
A. The Place ................................................................................45<br />
B. Marking Exhibits and Other Preliminary Matters ....................47<br />
C. The Evidence...........................................................................48<br />
D. Theory of the Case...................................................................49<br />
E. Opening Statement...................................................................50<br />
F. Burden of Proof .......................................................................50<br />
G. Swearing the Witnesses............................................................52<br />
H. Out of Sequence Witnesses.......................................................52<br />
I. Direct Examination..................................................................52<br />
J. Use of Visuals ..........................................................................53<br />
K. Cross Examination ..................................................................53<br />
L. Redirect Examination ..............................................................54<br />
M. Re-Cross Examination.............................................................55<br />
N. Hyper-Aggressive Advocates....................................................55<br />
O. Closing Arguments versus Post-Hearing Briefs........................56<br />
VIII. THE DECISION..........................................................................57<br />
A. Use of the Contract, the <strong>Law</strong>, and Public Policy ......................57<br />
B. The Requirement of a Reasoned Decision ................................58<br />
C. Procedural Requirements for a Decision..................................60<br />
D. Sending the Decision to Reporting Bodies................................60<br />
E. Ability to Appeal an Arbitration Decision ................................61<br />
IX. PROBLEMS WITH ARBITRATION .................................................64<br />
A. Adhesive Nature of the Contract ..............................................64<br />
B. The Problem of Neutrality........................................................65<br />
C. Limited Discovery for Even Complex Cases.............................68<br />
D. Process Too Complicated, Too Slow, Too Expensive .................69<br />
E. Non-<strong>Law</strong>yer Oriented..............................................................71<br />
F. Arbitrability of Statutory Rights ...............................................72<br />
G. Lack of Transparency...............................................................74<br />
H. Arbitrator’s Lack of Power and Control...................................75<br />
I. Punitive Damages are Unusual Even when the Facts Warrant .75<br />
J. No Better Result Than Litigation..............................................76<br />
K. No Review or Appeal ...............................................................76
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 3<br />
L. Is the Process of Arbitration to Achieve a Final Decision or to<br />
Seek Truth and Find Justice ....................................................78<br />
X. CONCLUSION............................................................................78<br />
I. INTRODUCTION<br />
This is a description of the process of arbitration in the United<br />
States. It will focus on the basics of arbitration: its history; its objectives;<br />
its scheduling; how the process begins; pre-arbitration matters; the<br />
hearing; the award; and the problems with arbitration. The goal of this<br />
article is simple and straightforward: to explain the basics of the<br />
arbitration process used in the United States.<br />
II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ARBITRATION<br />
A. Historical Precedents and the Development of Modern<br />
Arbitration<br />
Arbitration is not a recent phenomenon; in fact, arbitration as a<br />
method for resolving disputes has a long and complex history. King<br />
Solomon’s decision to “split the baby” is the first recorded arbitration<br />
decision. 1 Thankfully, Solomon’s award to cut the baby in half was not<br />
executed. Once the loving mother offered to give up the child so the<br />
baby would live, Solomon wisely awarded the child to her. 2 The use of<br />
arbitration rapidly expanded in the formal law of the Romans, in early<br />
Judeo-Christian communities, in Islamic law, and in the settlement of<br />
1. 1 Kings 3:16-28. King Solomon is known for the judgment he passed when<br />
two women came before him both claiming to be the mother of the same child. Id.<br />
After each woman pleaded with him to giver her the child:<br />
And the king said, Bring me a sword. And they brought a sword before the king.<br />
And the king said, Divide the living child in two, and give half to the one, and half<br />
to the other. Then spake the woman whose the living child was unto the king, for<br />
her bowels yearned upon her son, and she said, O my lord, give her the living child,<br />
and in no wise slay it. But the other said, Let it be neither mine nor thine, but divide<br />
it. Then the king answered and said, Give her the living child, and in no wise slay<br />
it: she is the mother thereof. And all Israel heard of the judgment which the king<br />
had judged; and they feared the king: for they saw that the wisdom of God was in<br />
him, to do judgment.<br />
Id. at 3:24-28.<br />
2. Id.
4 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
commercial disputes of the Middle Ages. 3<br />
In early America, the use of arbitration to resolve disputes predates<br />
the United States government and, thus, the establishment of the federal<br />
3. DENNIS NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 2-3 (West<br />
Publishing Co. 1979); see Randy Linda Sturman, House of Judgment: Alternative<br />
Dispute Resolution in the Orthodox Jewish Community, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 417,<br />
418 (2000). For thousands of years, Jewish communities have made use of an<br />
alternative dispute resolution process known as the Bet Din, meaning “house of<br />
judgment.” Id. The Bet Din involves resolution of a dispute by a single rabbi or a<br />
panel of three rabbis. Id. Unlike arbitration, the parties have to agree to the<br />
process, since there is generally no contractual clause involved. Id. The parties<br />
agree to arbitrate for various reasons, such as “social pressure or religious<br />
convictions.” Id. The purpose of the Bet Din is the resolution of disputes by peers<br />
or other members of the Jewish community who have similar cultural beliefs and<br />
values. Id.<br />
For a discussion of arbitration in the Middle Ages, see Michael Clanchy,<br />
<strong>Law</strong> and Love in the Middle Ages, in DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENTS: LAW AND<br />
HUMAN RELATIONS IN THE WEST 52 (John Bossy ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1983).<br />
The approach used by Louis IX in the Middle Ages to settle disputes is described by<br />
the following romanticized passage:<br />
The atmosphere is relaxed: the king sits at the foot of his bed, or in summer with<br />
his back against an oak in the Bois de Vincennes, or on a carpet in the Jardin de<br />
Paris without any head covering other than a cap of white peacock’s feathers.<br />
Litigants come forward without formality and the king himself asks them, ‘Why<br />
don’t you take what our people offer you?’ When they reply that the offers are too<br />
little, the king does everything he can to ‘put them on a right and sensible<br />
course.’. . . [T]he method of adjudication is one of ‘delivering’ the litigants from<br />
their toils through discussion and bargaining.<br />
Id.<br />
For a discussion of arbitration in Islamic law, see Sarvenaz Bahar,<br />
Khomeinism, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and International <strong>Law</strong>: The Relevance of<br />
Islamic Political Ideology, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 145, 167 (Winter 1992) (stating that<br />
arbitration “found a place in the verses of the Qur’an as a respected Muslim<br />
tradition: O you who believe! Obey Allah, and the Apostle and those in authority<br />
among you; if you differ, bring it before Allah and the Apostle, if you believe in<br />
Allah and in the last day. (Qur’an 4:59)”); Charles N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe,<br />
International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase, 97 AM. J. INT’L<br />
L. 643, 643 (July 2003).<br />
Shortly after the founding of Islam, the Treaty of Medina of 622 A.D. (a<br />
security pact among the city’s Muslims, non-Muslim Arabs, and Jews) called for<br />
arbitration of any disputes by the Prophet Muhammad. Indeed, the Prophet himself<br />
resorted to arbitration in his conflict with the tribe of Banu Qurayza. Muslim rulers<br />
subsequently followed his example, notably in the disastrous arbitration between<br />
Muawiyah (the governor of Syria) and the Caliph Ali (the Prophet’s son-in-law) in<br />
659 A.D. . . . [which] made permanent Islam’s enduring split into the Shiite and<br />
Sunni branches. Id.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 5<br />
court system by the U.S. Constitution. Native American tribes used a<br />
hybrid form of arbitration/mediation (Arb-Med) as a tool for dispute<br />
resolution. 4 Additionally, religious communities in the colonial period<br />
developed many creative dispute resolution mechanisms such as “gospel<br />
order,” “brotherly fashion,” and “arbitration” for resolving conflicts. 5<br />
The first U.S. President, George Washington, mandated arbitration rather<br />
than litigation if his will was challenged. 6 Arbitration has been used in<br />
4. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 2-3; see, e.g., Matt Arbaugh, Making Peace the Old<br />
Fashioned Way: Infusing Traditional Tribal Practices in Modern ADR, 2 PEPP.<br />
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 303, 303 (2002). The traditional method used by many Native<br />
Americans to resolve disputes is known as peacemaking. Id. The focus of the<br />
peacemaking process is on saving relationships and finding a solution that is<br />
acceptable to all. Id. The goal is to solve the problem causing the dispute rather<br />
than on awarding remedial measures or punishing the parties. Id. at 309. See, e.g.,<br />
Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33<br />
TULSA L.J. 1, 4 (1997). Certain Native American Tribal Courts have incorporated<br />
traditional mediation into modern legal institutions. Id. The Navajo Peacemaker<br />
Court, for example, implements a process—<br />
[D]irected by a mediator, who acts to guide and encourage the parties to resolve<br />
their dispute. The process relies on parties’ participation and their commitment to<br />
reaching a solution, rather than on the imposition of a judgment by an impersonal<br />
decisionmaker in order to reach a successful conclusion.<br />
Id.<br />
5. Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the<br />
Search for Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 46-47 n.58 (2002). In<br />
Puritan communities, arbitration was the first step in a multistage process to resolve<br />
disputes. Id. If arbitration failed, the parties then relied on elders, the minister, or<br />
others in the community to help them come to a resolution. Id. The Quakers had a<br />
similar process called a “gospel order.” Id. This process required parties to come to<br />
an agreement in a “brotherly fashion.” Id. If this method failed the parties would<br />
submit the dispute to arbitration by disinterested members of the community. Id.<br />
Punishment for failure to accept the ruling of the arbitrators resulted in<br />
excommunication. Id.<br />
6. James R. Deye & Lesly L. Britton, Arbitration By the American Arbitration<br />
Association, 70 N.D. L. REV. 281, 289 n.52 (1994) (citing MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE<br />
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION at 187-88 (Rev. ed. 1991)). The portion of George<br />
Washington’s will providing for arbitration reads:<br />
“But having endeavored to be plain and explicit in all the [d]evises—even at the<br />
expense of prolixity, perhaps tautology, I hope, and trust, that no disputes will arise<br />
concerning them; but if contrary to expectation the case should be otherwise from<br />
the want of legal expression, or the usual technical terms, or because too much or<br />
too little has been said on any of the devises to be consonant with law, my will and<br />
direction expressly is, that all disputes (if unhappily any should arise) shall be<br />
decided by three impartial and intelligent men, known for their probity and good<br />
understanding; two to be chosen by the disputants, each having the choice of one,
6 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
commercial disputes for hundreds of years. 7 Management and unions<br />
have used contractual arbitration to resolve labor disputes for decades. 8<br />
Arbitration gained considerable popularity in the United States in<br />
the 1920s when Wall Street pressed Congress to endorse arbitration as an<br />
alternative dispute resolution mechanism to resolve equities disputes. 9<br />
During the “Roaring 20s,” there were long delays in trying cases in the<br />
court systems of the state of New York. 10 Equities traders and buyers<br />
needed quicker dispute resolution. The traders convincingly argued that<br />
speed in the resolution of conflict facilitates business. A free market<br />
trading system prefers efficiency, economy, speed, and fairness in the<br />
resolution of conflict. 11 “The business of business is business,” not<br />
lawsuits. 12<br />
and the third by those two—which three men thus chosen shall, unfettered by <strong>Law</strong>,<br />
or legal constructions, declare their sense of the [t]estator’s intention; and such<br />
decision is, to all intents and purposes, to be as binding on the [p]arties as if it had<br />
been given in the Supreme Court of the United States.”<br />
Id. (quoting George Washington’s will).<br />
7. Lee Korland, What an Arbitrator Should Investigate and Disclose:<br />
Proposing a New Test for Evident Partiality Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 53<br />
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815, 817 (2003) (noting that arbitration was used in several<br />
of the original U.S. colonies even prior to the American Revolution).<br />
8. Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights,<br />
30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 30 (1998) (“For decades, private arbitration has<br />
been the vehicle of choice for unions, and it has worked well in this context.<br />
Although unions are free to withdraw from arbitration, it is virtually unheard of for<br />
a union to do so.”).<br />
9. See Sarah Rudolf Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against<br />
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and<br />
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 465 (1996) (“Businessmen grew to favor<br />
arbitration not only because it offered them autonomy from governmental<br />
regulation, but also because it allowed for a faster and more reliable means of<br />
dispute resolution.”).<br />
10. See id. During this period, there was an increase in governmental regulation<br />
as the nation’s agricultural economy transformed into an urban industrial economy.<br />
Id. There was a subsequent increase in litigation because of the regulation, resulting<br />
in “extreme congestion and delay [in the court system] accompanied by high costs,<br />
inflexible procedures, and obsolete law.” Id.<br />
11. See American Arbitration Ass’n, Executive Summary, Dispute-Wise sm<br />
Business Management: Improving Economic and Non-Economic Outcomes in<br />
Managing Business Conflicts 5 (2003), available at http://www.adr.org/dw/ES.pdf<br />
(last visited Dec. 8, 2005).<br />
12. The quote, “the business of business is business” is usually attributed to<br />
Milton Friedman as a result of his seminal article on business ethics. Milton<br />
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 7<br />
B. Enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act<br />
Despite historical and statutory acceptance, arbitration faced<br />
opposition in the courts because it seemingly usurped judicial authority.<br />
English courts were loath to accept arbitration agreements, 13 and this<br />
reluctance then carried to American courts. 14 Congress, in response to<br />
Wall Street’s urging, 15 enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 16 in<br />
1925 to combat this judicial hostility. 17<br />
The FAA makes arbitration agreements enforceable like any other<br />
contract. 18 Section 2 of the Act provides:<br />
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract<br />
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by<br />
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or<br />
transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save<br />
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation<br />
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.<br />
13. See Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J. EX. 308, 313 (H.L. 1856) (Campbell, L.J); James<br />
P. Buchele & Larry R. Rute, The Changing Face of Arbitration: What Once Was<br />
Old Is New Again, 72-AUG J. KAN. B.A. 36, 37 (2003). Judicial hostility towards<br />
arbitration dates back to the English common law of the 17th and 18th centuries.<br />
Id. Judges, fearing that their salaries would be reduced if arbitration grew<br />
widespread, developed the “ouster doctrine” which held that agreements to arbitrate<br />
were revocable until an award was issued. Id.<br />
14. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND<br />
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 49 (rev. 3d ed. 2003); see also Buchele & Rute, supra<br />
note 13, at 37. The hostility of the English courts toward arbitration was carried<br />
into the American colonies, and arbitration agreements were usually unenforceable<br />
until the FAA was enacted. Id.; see also Cole, supra note 9, at 462-66.<br />
15. See Cole, supra note 9, at 465-66 (noting passage of New York arbitration<br />
statute in 1920 with support from a coalition of lawyers and businessmen, and<br />
introduction of the FAA in the U.S. House of Representatives by Congressman<br />
Mills of New York).<br />
16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, §§ 201-208, §§ 301-307 (2000). Chapter one, §§ 1-16,<br />
deals with domestic arbitration. Chapters two and three, §§ 201-208 and §§ 301-<br />
307, respectively, cover arbitration proceedings in an international context.<br />
17. See Roger J. Perlstadt, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to<br />
Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1983, 1983 (2002) (quoting Gilmer v.<br />
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (“Congress enacted the<br />
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) ‘to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to<br />
arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been<br />
adopted by American courts.’”)).<br />
18. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (stating that the<br />
FAA was designed to put arbitration agreements on “the same footing as other<br />
contracts”).
8 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
of any contract. 19<br />
The United States Supreme Court extended the application of the<br />
FAA, making the provisions applicable to arbitration agreements<br />
executed pursuant to state law. 20 The Court asserted that any state that<br />
attempts to invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable<br />
only to arbitration provisions will be met with opposition by the FAA. 21<br />
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson, the Court recognized<br />
that, “States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under<br />
general contract law principles.” 22 But “[w]hat States may not do is<br />
decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price,<br />
service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.” 23<br />
Despite the enactment of the FAA with its strong policy favoring<br />
arbitration, some federal and state courts still refused to enforce<br />
arbitration agreements. 24 But, in 1974, the judicial hostility toward<br />
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (emphasis added); see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.<br />
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1994). The Court adopted a broad interpretation of<br />
the phrase “involving commerce.” Id. The Court noted that “a broad interpretation<br />
of this language is consistent with the Act’s basic purpose, to put arbitration<br />
provisions on ‘the same footing’ as a contract’s other terms.” Id. at 275 (quoting<br />
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 511).<br />
20. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (“In creating a<br />
substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to<br />
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration<br />
agreements.”).<br />
21. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).<br />
22. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281; see also Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686-87<br />
(holding that “the text of § 2 declares that state law may be applied ‘if that law arose<br />
to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of<br />
contracts generally.’ . . . Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,<br />
duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements<br />
without contravening § 2.”).<br />
23. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281; Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688 (quoting Scherk,<br />
417 U.S. at 511 (1974) (stating that “[b]y enacting § 2, . . . Congress precluded<br />
States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead<br />
that such provisions be placed ‘upon the same footing as other contracts.’”)).<br />
24. Stephen J. Ware, Basic Principles of Arbitration <strong>Law</strong>: Successful<br />
Challenges to Arbitration Agreements, in ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL<br />
SERVICES DISPUTES 1999, at 797, 802 (PLI Corporate <strong>Law</strong> Practice, Course<br />
Handbook Series No. B0-00C2, 1999); see, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438<br />
(1953) (“[T]he intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better<br />
carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration.”); Rueda v. Union<br />
Pac. RR. Co., 175 P.2d 778, 782 (Or. 1946) (stating that, with respect to agreements<br />
to arbitrate future disputes, “the ancient common-law hostility to agreements<br />
‘ousting the courts of jurisdiction’ becomes manifest, and it is often held that one
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 9<br />
arbitration turned to support when the Supreme Court held that an<br />
arbitral forum would be just as fair as a courtroom for parties to an<br />
international agreement who had agreed to arbitrate a securities fraud<br />
claim pursuant to U.S. law. 25 Since the decision in Scherk v. Alberto-<br />
Culver Co., the Supreme Court has “taken an active interest in promoting<br />
party recourse to arbitration and in protecting the autonomy and<br />
operation of the arbitral process,” 26 relying on the “liberal federal policy<br />
favoring arbitration agreements.” 27 Today, public policy in the United<br />
States favors arbitration as a valid and legal means of resolving<br />
disputes. 28 And, because of the judiciary’s stringent support of<br />
arbitration as a means to resolve all types of disputes, “[t]here is virtually<br />
no subject-matter inarbitrability defense to the enforcement of arbitral<br />
agreements and awards under U.S. law.” 29<br />
The use of arbitration to settle disputes is now widespread and is a<br />
standard feature in business, consumer, and employment contracts.<br />
International and national businesses view it as an essential tool to<br />
control the costs of resolving a dispute and preserve current and future<br />
business relationships. 30 Between 1998 and 1999, the American<br />
Arbitration Association (AAA) saw a fifty percent increase in arbitration<br />
filings, bringing the number of mediations and arbitrations conducted by<br />
the AAA in that year to 140,188. 31 By September 2005, the total number<br />
may bring an action in court without complying with the agreed arbitral<br />
procedure”); Vitaphone Corp. v. Elec. Research Prod., Inc., 166 A. 255, 261 (Del.<br />
Ch. 1933) (“Courts here and elsewhere are opposed to being ousted of jurisdiction<br />
by the agreement of parties to an arbitration.”).<br />
25. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20 (holding that “any dispute arising out of their<br />
international commercial transaction is to be respected and enforced by the federal<br />
courts”).<br />
26. CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 243.<br />
27. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24<br />
(1983).<br />
28. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)<br />
(quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24) (“[T]he Court has also long recognized<br />
and enforced a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.’”); JLM<br />
Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen, 387 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Hartford<br />
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 246 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir.<br />
2001)) (“The FAA expresses ‘a strong federal policy favoring arbitration.’”); Masco<br />
Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 627 (6th Cir. 2004); Register v. White,<br />
599 S.E.2d 549, 556 (N.C. 2004); IMPACT Constr. Group, L.L.C. v. Superior<br />
Concrete Constructors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 901, 906-07 (Ind. 2004).<br />
29. CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 245.<br />
30. Korland, supra note 7, at 818.<br />
31. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, 1999 AMERICAN ARBITRATION
10 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
of cases administered in the history of the AAA exceeded 2,000,000. 32<br />
Because arbitration has become so widely accepted and used by<br />
clients, it is important for the legal profession and the business<br />
community to understand the arbitration process, its positives, and its<br />
negatives.<br />
III. OBJECTIVES OF ARBITRATION<br />
United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger provided<br />
impetus to the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement in 1984<br />
at an American Bar Association meeting when he asserted that “[o]ur<br />
[legal] system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for<br />
a truly civilized people.” 33 A report by the U.S. House of<br />
Representatives recognized that compared to litigation,<br />
The advantages of arbitration are many: it is usually cheaper and<br />
faster than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and<br />
evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less<br />
disruptive of ongoing and future business dealings among the<br />
parties; it is often more flexible in regard to scheduling of times<br />
and places of hearings and discovery devices. 34<br />
The mantra of arbitration is: quick, efficient, economical, and fair<br />
resolution of disputes. “Quick” because an arbitration hearing can be<br />
scheduled for any convenient time including weekends and nights. 35<br />
Ideally, the hearing is set and heard soon after the arbitrator has been<br />
appointed. 36 “Efficient” because the Rules of Evidence and the Rules of<br />
Civil Procedure which govern a trial are typically not applied. 37 The<br />
ASSOCIATION ANN. REP. (1999), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id =1540<br />
(last visited Dec. 8, 2005).<br />
32. American Arbitration Association, Fast Facts, at http://www.adr.org/FastFa<br />
cts (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).<br />
33. Warren E. Burger Former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court,<br />
quoted in Mid-Year Meeting of American Bar Association, 52 U.S.L.W. 2471, 2471<br />
(Feb. 28, 1984).<br />
34. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (citing<br />
H.R. REP. NO. 97-542, at 13 reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 777).<br />
35. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 307<br />
(Alan Ruben ed., BNA Books 6th ed. 2003).<br />
36. Id.<br />
37. See American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and<br />
Mediation Procedures (Including Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial<br />
Disputes) (Sept. 15, 2005), R-31, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22004
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 11<br />
arbitrator and the parties can design any useful arbitral process which<br />
works for them to deal with the conflict. 38 It is not uncommon for cases<br />
to be arbitrated within a few months from the origin of the conflict, not<br />
years. 39 “Economical” because the prevailing belief is that overall<br />
arbitration costs are usually less than traditional litigation costs. 40<br />
Arbitration, at least in theory, is “without the delays and exorbitant costs<br />
of litigation.” 41 “Fair” because notice and a hearing by a neutral decision<br />
maker, chosen by the parties, satisfies due process. 42 Arbitration<br />
provides a fair process which results in a just decision. This “fairness”<br />
concept is sometimes referred to as “industrial due process.” 43 It is a<br />
process that the parties feel they are due in order to resolve their dispute<br />
because the parties had a hand in shaping the arbitral clause, delineating<br />
which of their disputes would be submitted to arbitration. It is a process<br />
that demonstrates party autonomy in that the parties agree between and<br />
(last visited Oct. 25, 2005) [hereinafter AAA Rules].<br />
38. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 35, at 293-94.<br />
39. Scott S. Morrison, Consider Binding Arbitration to Resolve Your Next<br />
Dispute, 40-MAY RES GESTAE 18, 20 (May1997).<br />
40. See American Arbitration Association, supra note 11, at 7.<br />
41. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425,<br />
433-38 (1988). But see Frank E. Massengale & Karen Kaler Whitfield, Arbitration:<br />
Be Careful What You Wish For, 44 LA. B.J. 120, 121 (Aug. 1996) (citing Advanced<br />
Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 1012 (Cal. 1994) (confirming<br />
arbitration award)). Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. represents an extreme example<br />
in which arbitration was not the efficient procedure it is hailed to be. Id. In this<br />
case, “counsel originally estimated that the entire arbitration process should take six<br />
to eight weeks to complete; however, four and one-half years later, after 355 days of<br />
hearings and 42,000 pages of transcript, the arbitrator entered an award.” Id.<br />
42. Shafii v. British Airways, 872 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); see<br />
also American Arbitration Association, Consumer Due Process Protocol, Principle<br />
1, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).<br />
43. See Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int’l Brotherhood of<br />
Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1445 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that an employer did not<br />
violate industrial due process when it discharged an employee accused of sexual<br />
harassment, when the employer investigated the charges and when the employee<br />
had a chance to respond to the charges, had notice that his conduct could result in<br />
discharge, was informed of the source of the charge, and was informed that he was<br />
entitled to representation); Teamsters, Local Union 657 v. Stanley Structures, Inc.,<br />
735 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the employer “had notice of the<br />
grievances against it and an opportunity to be heard. It thus received industrial due<br />
process”); see also Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 990 (9th Cir.<br />
2001) (holding that the arbitration award “demonstrates that the NBA’s<br />
investigation ‘complied with industrial due process’ and that Sprewell received a<br />
full and fair hearing”).
12 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
among themselves to follow it. The parties thus stipulate that, “[A]ll<br />
disputes arising under a contract—whether statutory or contractual in<br />
character—can be submitted to arbitration.” 44<br />
IV. HOW ARBITRATION BEGINS<br />
A. The Agreement to Arbitrate<br />
Arbitration can be agreed to as a dispute resolution method predispute,<br />
post-dispute, or mandated by a court after a lawsuit has been<br />
filed. 45 With pre-dispute arbitration agreements, the parties agree to<br />
arbitration in advance of any dispute; they set forth in the terms of their<br />
contract a negotiated “arbitration clause.” 46 Pre-dispute arbitration<br />
agreements are the typical means by which parties assent to submit their<br />
44. CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 245.<br />
45. The AAA provides recommended arbitration clause language for both predispute<br />
and post-dispute situations:<br />
Arbitration<br />
The parties can provide for arbitration of future disputes by inserting the following<br />
clause into their contracts (the language in the brackets suggests possible<br />
alternatives or additions).<br />
STD 1. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the<br />
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American<br />
Arbitration Association in accordance with its Commercial [or other] Arbitration<br />
Rules [including the Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection], and<br />
judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court<br />
having jurisdiction thereof.<br />
Arbitration of existing disputes may be accomplished by use of the following.<br />
STD 2. We, the undersigned parties, hereby agree to submit to arbitration<br />
administered by the American Arbitration Association under its Commercial [or<br />
other] Arbitration Rules the following controversy: [describe briefly]. We further<br />
agree that a judgment of any court having jurisdiction may be entered upon the<br />
award.<br />
American Arbitration Association, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses: A<br />
Practical Guide (July 1, 2004), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22020<br />
(last visited Oct. 25, 2005) [hereinafter AAA, Drafting Dispute Resolution<br />
Clauses]; see, e.g., MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.01 (2005) (All civil cases are subject<br />
to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes, except for those actions<br />
enumerated in MINN. STAT. § 484.76 and Rules 111.01 and 310.01 of these rules.).<br />
46. See CARBONNEAU supra note 14, at 16 (“The arbitral clause . . . is a contract<br />
under which the parties agree to submit future disputes to arbitration.”).
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 13<br />
disputes to arbitration. In other circumstances, parties may agree to<br />
arbitrate an existing controversy, i.e., after the conflict has arisen the<br />
parties may then decide arbitration is the best way to handle the conflict<br />
even though they had not agreed before the dispute to arbitrate the<br />
matter. 47 But these post-dispute arbitration agreements are rare. 48 In<br />
cases in which the parties agree to arbitrate after the dispute arises, the<br />
parties should enter into a written “Submission to Arbitration<br />
Agreement,” which is the equivalent of an arbitration clause setting forth<br />
the parties agreement to arbitrate and the general guidelines to be<br />
followed in the arbitration process. 49<br />
There have been recent developments in the court systems that<br />
permit a party, a party’s attorney, or the court on its own initiative, to<br />
divert a case out of the court system into non-binding arbitration even<br />
though neither party initially agreed to arbitration and even if one or both<br />
of the parties do not want non-binding arbitration as a step. 50 “Court<br />
mandated” or “court-annexed” arbitration has developed throughout the<br />
United States as a way to relieve overcrowded court dockets. 51 At least<br />
thirty-five States now have court mandated alternative dispute resolution<br />
programs. 52 For example, Rule 114 of the Minnesota Rules of General<br />
47. Some commentators suggest that certain types of disputes, like employment<br />
disputes should only be submitted to arbitration after the dispute arises. See<br />
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment<br />
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).<br />
48. Ware, supra note 24, at 801 (“In some instances, the parties agree to<br />
arbitrate a dispute that has already arisen. These post-dispute arbitration agreements<br />
are rare and uncontroversial. More commonly, the agreement to arbitrate is formed<br />
prior to any dispute.”)<br />
49. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 6.<br />
50. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.09 (2005). The Minnesota Rules of General<br />
Practice allow a party “to opt for binding or non-binding arbitration.” Id.<br />
According to the Rules, “the parties may construct or select a set of rules to govern<br />
the process.” Id. If the parties choose non-binding arbitration conducted according<br />
to the provisions set forth in Rule 114.09, the arbitrator’s award becomes final and<br />
binding, if neither party files “a request for a trial within 20 days after the award is<br />
filed.” Id.<br />
51. Jane W. Adler et al., Simple Justice: How Litigants Fare in the Pittsburgh<br />
Court Arbitration Program, in JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., MEDIATION AND OTHER<br />
NON-BINDING ADR PROCESSES 221 (Found. Press, Inc. 1996).<br />
52. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-133 (2004) (requiring “arbitration in all<br />
cases which are filed in superior court in which the court finds or the parties agree<br />
that the amount in controversy does not exceed the jurisdictional limit”); CAL. CIV.<br />
PROC. CODE § 1141.11 (2004); MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.01 (2005); D. MINN.<br />
LOCAL CT. R. 16.5(b)(1) (2004); M.D. FLA. LOCAL CT. R. 8.02(a) (2004); N.D.
14 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
Practice allows civil cases to be referred to some form of ADR solely on<br />
the initiative of the judge or only one of the attorneys representing a<br />
party. 53 If the case is referred to arbitration, the decision is non-binding<br />
and either party may reject the award and demand a trial. If after ten<br />
days neither party rejects the award of the arbitrator and demands a trial,<br />
the decision becomes binding. So, a “non-binding arbitration” can<br />
become “binding” if both parties accept the outcome or both wait too<br />
long to demand that the case be returned to court. 54<br />
B. The Arbitration Clause<br />
Arbitration is commonly known as a creature of contract. 55 In a<br />
free-market, free-trade economy, the parties to an arbitration agreement<br />
have wide latitude in drafting their arbitration clause. Because the<br />
arbitration clause affects how the entire arbitration process will proceed,<br />
careful drafting is required. The treatment given an arbitration clause<br />
resembles that of any free-market contract. 56<br />
Parties to a contract make their own law, and it is, of course, true<br />
that, subject to the rules of public policy and public order, the<br />
parties are free to agree upon such terms as they may choose.<br />
Nevertheless, agreements that are intended to have legal<br />
operation . . . create legal rights and duties, and legal rights and<br />
CAL. LOCAL CT. R. 4-2 (2005).<br />
53. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.01 (2005) (“All civil cases are subject to<br />
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes, except for those actions<br />
enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 484.76 and Rules 111.01 and 310.01 of these rules.”).<br />
54. See, e.g., MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.09(e) (2005) (stating that “[i]f no party<br />
has filed a request for a trial within 20 days after the award is filed, the court<br />
administrator shall enter the decision as a judgment . . . [which shall] have the same<br />
force and effect as . . . a judgment in a civil action or proceeding.”).<br />
55. See <strong>Vol</strong>t Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489<br />
U.S. 468, 472 (1989) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,<br />
219 (1985) (“[B]ecause ‘the thrust of the federal law is that arbitration is strictly a<br />
matter of contract,’ the parties to an arbitration agreement should be ‘at liberty to<br />
choose the terms under which they will arbitrate.’”)).<br />
56. See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (quoting<br />
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (“By enacting § 2, . . .<br />
Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect<br />
status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed ‘upon the same footing as<br />
other contracts.’”)); St. John’s Sanitary Dist. v. Town of Schereville, 621 N.E.2d<br />
1160, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing that when interpreting an arbitration<br />
clause, “the court will apply ordinary contract principles”); see also Ziegler v.<br />
Whale Secs. Co., 786 F. Supp. 739, 741 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 15<br />
duties cannot exist in a vacuum, but must have a place within a<br />
legal system. 57<br />
While contracts generally do not have to be in writing to be<br />
enforceable, arbitration clauses must be in writing to be valid. 58 Because<br />
both parties give up their right to go to court, the Federal Arbitration Act<br />
requires that an arbitration clause be in writing. 59 An agreement to<br />
arbitrate must be “openly and freely” entered into by both parties. 60<br />
Parties will not be compelled to arbitrate if they have not voluntarily<br />
contracted to use this mechanism to resolve their disputes. 61 Once the<br />
court has determined that the arbitration agreement is valid and that the<br />
parties contracted for arbitration of their dispute, they will be held to it. 62<br />
57. Angela L. Kimbrough, Arbitration: Demise of the Right to Trial by Jury, in<br />
1 AM. TRIAL LAW. ASS’N ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 397<br />
(2000) (quoting Lord McNair, The General Principals of <strong>Law</strong> Recognized by<br />
Civilized Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 7 (1957)).<br />
58. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (providing that “[a] written provision in any maritime<br />
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by<br />
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, . . . or<br />
an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out<br />
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and<br />
enforceable”) (emphasis added).<br />
59. Id.; see Kilmer v. Flocar, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 66, 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing In<br />
re Arbitration Between Chung & President Enters. Corp., 943 F.2d 225, 229 (2d<br />
Cir. 1991) (noting that, “[g]enerally, the FAA governs all questions before a federal<br />
court regarding the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements if: (1) the<br />
parties have entered into a written arbitration agreement”)). The Kilmer court held<br />
that, because agreement was not in writing, it did not meet requirements of the<br />
FAA. Id.<br />
60. Benyon v. Garden Grove Med. Group, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (Cal. Ct.<br />
App. 1980) (“[I]n order to be enforceable an agreement to arbitrate must have been<br />
openly and fairly entered into by the parties.”); see also United Steel Workers of<br />
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (“[A]rbitration is<br />
a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any<br />
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”).<br />
61. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,<br />
626 (1985); Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 199 (1991) (quoting<br />
Hilton-Davis Chem. Co. v. Local 342, Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 185 N.L.R.B.<br />
241, 242 (1970) (“[T]he commitment to arbitrate is a ‘voluntary surrender of the<br />
right of final decision which Congress . . . reserved to [the] parties.’”)).<br />
62. Hahnemann Univ. v. Dist. 1199C, Nat. Union of Hosp. & Health Care<br />
Employees, 765 F.2d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Warrior & Gulf Navigation<br />
Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83) (“A court should order the reluctant party to submit the<br />
dispute to arbitration ‘unless it may be said with positive assurance that an<br />
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
16 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
The FAA then requires a court to “stay litigation” 63 and “compel<br />
arbitration.” 64<br />
The language of the arbitration clause is vital because it is what<br />
courts examine to determine whether parties have submitted a particular<br />
dispute to arbitration. Arbitration clauses run the gamut from the simple<br />
to the complex to the ridiculous. A simple, standard arbitration clause is<br />
often recommended for any type of dispute. For example, the American<br />
Arbitration Association (AAA) recommends this simple clause for all<br />
commercial contracts:<br />
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract,<br />
or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered<br />
by the American Arbitration Association in accordance with its<br />
Commercial [or other] Arbitration Rules [including the Optional<br />
Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection], and judgment on<br />
the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any<br />
court having jurisdiction thereof. 65<br />
A similar simple clause is recommended even for large international<br />
disputes by agencies such as the London Court of International<br />
Arbitration (LCIA), 66 the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 67<br />
dispute.’”).<br />
63. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000) (providing that “[i]f any suit . . . be brought in any of<br />
the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an<br />
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending,<br />
upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to<br />
arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay<br />
the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the<br />
terms of the agreement”).<br />
64. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (providing that “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure,<br />
neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration<br />
may petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such<br />
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. [U]pon being<br />
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue, the<br />
court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in<br />
accordance with the terms of the agreement”).<br />
65. See sources cited supra note 45.<br />
66. London Court of International Arbitration, Arbitration Rules: Recommended<br />
Clauses (Jan. 1, 1998), available at http://www.lcia.org/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).<br />
Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract, including any<br />
question regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and<br />
finally resolved by arbitration under the LCIA Rules, which Rules are deemed to be<br />
incorporated by reference into this clause. The number of arbitrators shall be<br />
[one/three].
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 17<br />
and the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration<br />
Commission (CIETAC). 68<br />
Parties who want to retain more control over the arbitration<br />
proceeding should include more detail in the arbitration clause. A more<br />
detailed arbitration clause will address: the method of selection and<br />
number of arbitrators; arbitrator qualifications; language used in the<br />
arbitration; governing law to be applied during the arbitration; conditions<br />
precedent to arbitration; preliminary relief; document discovery; duration<br />
of arbitration proceedings; remedies; reasoned opinion accompanying<br />
the award; assessment of attorneys fees; confidentiality; and appeal. 69<br />
Id.<br />
The seat, or legal place, of arbitration shall be [City and/or Country].<br />
The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be [ ].<br />
The governing law of the contract shall be the substantive law of [ ].<br />
67. International Chamber of Commerce, The Standard ICC Arbitration Clause:<br />
Drafting the Arbitration Agreement, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/engli<br />
sh/arbitration/model_clause.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). The ICC recommends<br />
parties to include the following clause in their contracts:<br />
All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall be finally<br />
settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce<br />
by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules.<br />
Id.<br />
68. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, Model<br />
Arbitration Clause, available at http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/model_clause/mo<br />
del_clause.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). CIETAC recommends the following<br />
clause:<br />
Any dispute arising from or in connection with this Contract shall be submitted to<br />
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission for arbitration<br />
which shall be conducted in accordance with the Commission’s arbitration rules in<br />
effect at the time of applying for arbitration. The arbitral award is final and binding<br />
on both parties.<br />
Id.<br />
69. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 508 (1974). In the<br />
Scherk case, the arbitration clause provided that:<br />
The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out of this agreement<br />
or the breach thereof and either party shall request that the matter shall be settled by<br />
arbitration, the matter shall be settled exclusively by arbitration in accordance with<br />
the rules then obtaining of the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France,<br />
by a single arbitrator, if the parties shall agree upon one, or by one arbitrator<br />
appointed by each party and a third arbitrator appointed by the other arbitrators. In
18 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
But arbitration clauses can become “pathological” 70 when the clause<br />
is designed to give one side a disproportionate advantage. In one<br />
notorious case, the employer drafted the arbitration clause so one-sided<br />
that the court refused to uphold the agreement to arbitrate. 71 The Hooters<br />
restaurant chain used the following clause in its employment contract:<br />
Hooters and the employee agree to arbitrate all employment<br />
related disputes and controversies. Each agrees to arbitrate all<br />
disputes arising out of employment including any claim of<br />
discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation or wrongful<br />
discharge whether arising under federal or state law. The<br />
employee and the company agree to resolve any claims pursuant<br />
to the company’s rules and procedures for alternative resolution of<br />
employment related disputes, as promulgated by the company<br />
from time to time. 72<br />
The Hooters court stated that the provisions “when taken as a<br />
whole, however, are so one-sided that their only possible purpose is to<br />
undermine the neutrality of the proceeding.” 73 By entering into an<br />
case of any failure of a party to make an appointment referred to above within four<br />
weeks after notice of the controversy, such appointment shall be made by said<br />
Chamber. All arbitration proceedings shall be held in Paris, France, and each party<br />
agrees to comply in all respects with any award made in any such proceeding and<br />
to the entry of a judgment in any jurisdiction upon any award rendered in such<br />
proceeding. The laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and govern this<br />
agreement, its interpretation and performance.<br />
Id.<br />
70. For an analysis of flawed arbitration clauses, see Benjamin G. Davis,<br />
Pathological Clauses: Frédéric Eisman’s Still Vital Criteria, 7 ARB. INT’L 4 (1991).<br />
71. Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).<br />
72. Id. at 936.<br />
73. Id. at 938. In this case, the arbitration rules were procedurally biased in<br />
favor of Hooters. Id. Employees were required to provide Hooters with notice of<br />
their claims from the outset while Hooters was not required to provide responsive<br />
pleadings or notice of any defenses. Id. Hooters also had complete control over the<br />
arbitration panel. Id. at 938-39. Under the rules, the panel of three arbitrators<br />
would be selected from a list of eligible arbitrators compiled by Hooters. Id. The<br />
rules would have permitted Hooters to choose arbitrators who have existing<br />
financial or familial interests in the restaurant and was free to remove from the list<br />
arbitrators who rule against it. Id. at 939. Hooters was also allowed to expand the<br />
proceeding to include any matter whatsoever that it wished; however, the employee<br />
could not raise any issue which was not included in the Notice of Claim. Id. The<br />
rules granted Hooters numerous rights that it denied to the employee: the right to<br />
move for summary judgment, the right to bring a motion to vacate the arbitral award<br />
in court if the arbitrator exceeded his/her authority, to cancel the arbitration
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 19<br />
arbitration agreement, the parties agreed to submit their dispute to<br />
arbitration—a process in which their disputes should be decided fairly by<br />
a neutral third party. 74 By promulgating such one-sided arbitration rules,<br />
Hooters breached the sense of fundamental fairness in its agreement to<br />
arbitrate. 75 The American Arbitration Association has issued a “Due<br />
Process Protocol” refusing to administer such disputes with these types<br />
of “unfair” arbitration clauses. 76<br />
V. INITIATING THE ARBITRATION<br />
Most arbitration agencies simplify the process by handling most of<br />
the preliminary matters. For example, the American Arbitration<br />
Association will notify the other party of the initiation of the arbitration<br />
proceeding, 77 will assign an arbitrator if the parties cannot agree, 78 will<br />
notify the arbitrator that the arbitrator has been chosen, 79 and will assist<br />
in arranging a time and place for the parties to meet. 80 Simplicity and<br />
ease of use of the process are two of the reasons arbitration is used. 81<br />
But a party can forfeit the right to arbitration if the party fails to take<br />
affirmative steps to initiate arbitration. 82<br />
agreement upon thirty days notice. Id. Perhaps most egregiously, Hooters could<br />
change the rules without notice at any time, even during the arbitration proceeding.<br />
Id.<br />
74. Id. at 940.<br />
75. Id.<br />
76. American Arbitration Association, supra note 42, at Principle 1.<br />
77. AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-4.<br />
78. Id. R-11.<br />
79. Id. R-2<br />
80. Id. R-9, R-10, R-22.<br />
81. JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE<br />
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 36-41 (Kluwer <strong>Law</strong> Int’l 2003).<br />
82. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6201(a) (2004) (stating that, in<br />
disputes involving attorney fees, “the client’s failure to request arbitration within 30<br />
days after receipt of notice from the attorney shall be deemed a waiver of the<br />
client’s right to arbitration under the provisions of this article”); ME. REV. STAT.<br />
ANN. tit. 23, § 52-A (2004) (In contract disputes between a contractor and a<br />
subcontractor, “failure to submit [the claim] to arbitration as provided under this<br />
subsection shall constitute a waiver of the claim”); see also Engalla v. Permanente<br />
Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 909 (Cal. 1997). In Engalla, the defendant, Kaiser,<br />
administered its own arbitration program. Id. The arbitration agreement provided<br />
for three arbitrators and each party was to select one arbitrator of its own choosing<br />
within thirty days of initial service on the respondent. Id. Within an additional<br />
thirty days, the two party-appointed arbitrators were to jointly select a neutral
20 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
A. Arbitration Agency or Ad Hoc Proceeding<br />
When a “claimant” and a “respondent” agree to arbitrate predispute,<br />
post-dispute, or are mandated to participate in a non-binding<br />
arbitration by a court, they must make an important decision whether to<br />
utilize an arbitration agency or whether to rely on their own “ad hoc”<br />
arbitration proceeding. If the parties wish to utilize an agency, such as<br />
the AAA or the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), they should<br />
so specify in their agreement. 83 By utilizing an agency, the parties<br />
consent to conduct the arbitration according to the rules of that agency. 84<br />
arbitrator. Id. Engalla sought to bring a malpractice action against Kaiser for<br />
failure to diagnose his lung cancer in a timely manner. Id. His attorney requested<br />
expedited procedures numerous times, because plaintiff was terminally ill. Id. at<br />
910. Despite these requests, defendant continued to delay in choosing an arbitrator<br />
and arranging for discovery. Id. at 910-11. By the time the neutral arbitrator was<br />
chosen, 144 days had passed since the initial service on respondent. Id. at 912.<br />
Plaintiff died one day later. Id. As a result, his wife’s claim for loss of consortium<br />
merged with the medical malpractice claim. Id. at 914. Maximum damages that<br />
could be awarded were reduced from $500,000 to $250,000. Id. The Supreme<br />
Court of California found that there was substantial evidence indicating that the<br />
defendant had waived its right to arbitration through delay and remanded the issue<br />
to the trial court. Id. at 924.<br />
83. The following are some of the most well-known and widely used arbitration<br />
agencies in the world: the AAA (http://www.adr.org) deals with a wide range of<br />
international and domestic disputes, including construction, automotive, insurance<br />
claims, internet commerce, consumer finance, labor, and mass claims; the ICC<br />
(http://www.iccwbo.org) specializes in the resolution of international business<br />
disputes; the London Court of International Arbitration (http://www.lciaarbitration.com)<br />
works to resolve international and domestic commercial disputes;<br />
the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce<br />
(http://www.sccinstitute.com) is one of the leading international arbitration<br />
institutes in the world; the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration<br />
Commission (CIETAC) (http://www.cietac.org.cn) handles disputes arising from<br />
contractual or non-contractual, economic and trade transactions; the National<br />
Arbitration Forum (NAF) (http://www.arb-forum.com) handles national and<br />
international disputes involving commercial or individual claims; and the Federal<br />
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) (http://www.fmcs.gov) deals<br />
specifically with labor disputes in the United States.<br />
84. Each agency provides rules to be used in the arbitration proceeding. Often<br />
the rules vary depending on the specific dispute. See American Arbitration<br />
Association, Rules and Procedures, at http://www.adr.org/RulesProcedures (last<br />
visited Oct. 25, 2005) (listing the various rules and procedures for different<br />
disputes). The AAA has particular rules regulating arbitration of accident claims,<br />
commercial disputes, labor disputes, international disputes, etc. Id. Agency rules<br />
also vary according to the agency utilized. Compare American Arbitration<br />
Association, International Dispute Resolution Procedures, available at
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 21<br />
In an “ad hoc” arbitration proceeding, no agency is selected and, thus,<br />
the parties set the rules and begin the process on their own. Before<br />
deciding whether to contract for “agency” arbitration or to proceed “ad<br />
hoc,” clients and their counsel should consider both the advantages and<br />
disadvantages of each.<br />
Administering arbitral institutions, like the AAA, the United States<br />
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and the ICC, offer distinct<br />
advantages over ad hoc arbitration. They are easy to access, have time<br />
tested rules, maintain lists of qualified and experienced arbitrators, and<br />
have qualified staff to assist and to answer procedural questions. 85 Their<br />
rules and procedures are likely to produce consistent and predictable<br />
results—and their notable experience more easily allows them to deal<br />
with unusual circumstances. 86 Arbitration agencies contribute<br />
organization and control to the proceedings by providing administrative<br />
assistance to the parties, including maintaining files, investigating<br />
conflicts of interest, collecting fees, scheduling, and providing a site to<br />
hold the arbitration. 87 It is widely perceived that an institutional award<br />
will have greater cache, courts are likely to respect such institutions, and<br />
courts are more likely to give deference to the award of the arbitrator. 88<br />
One key disadvantage to using an agency is the costs and fees<br />
prescribed by the particular administering institution. For example, the<br />
AAA bases its filing fees on the amount in controversy in commercial<br />
arbitration cases. 89 Thus, a party bringing a claim of $160,000 is<br />
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22090 (last visited Oct. 25, 2005) (allowing parties to<br />
choose their own method for appointing a panel of arbitrators), with International<br />
Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration, R-15 (Jan. 1, 1998), available at<br />
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp (last visited Oct. 26,<br />
2005) (providing that each party shall choose an arbitrator with the third arbitrator<br />
appointed by the agency) [hereinafter ICC Rules].<br />
85. James K. Hoenig, The Pros and Cons of Administered Arbitration, 49 DISP.<br />
RESOL. J. 59, 60-61 (June 1994).<br />
86. Matthew Rasmussen, Overextending Immunity: Arbitral Institution Liability<br />
in the United States, England, and France, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1824, 1833<br />
(June 2003).<br />
87. Robert L. Ebe, The Nuts and Bolts of Arbitration, 22-FALL FRANCHISE L.J.<br />
85, 85 (Fall 2002).<br />
88. See LEW ET AL., supra note 81, at 36.<br />
89. American Arbitration Association, Resolving Commercial Financial<br />
Disputes: A Practical Guide (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.as<br />
p?id=22008 (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).<br />
The AAA Guide requires Administrative Fees for Commercial Arbitration<br />
according to the following schedule:
22 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
required to pay a $2,750 “filing fee” plus $1,250 for a “case service fee”<br />
to initiate arbitration proceedings. 90 Also, utilizing an agency can add to<br />
the time it takes to arrange the arbitration because there is an additional<br />
level of communication required between the administrator, the<br />
attorneys, the parties, and the arbitrator(s). 91<br />
Ad hoc arbitration does not rely on an agency, nor its good offices,<br />
nor its established rules and procedures. 92 Ad hoc arbitration allows the<br />
Amount of Claim Initial Filing Fee Case Service Fee<br />
Above $0 to $10,000 $500 $200<br />
Above $10,000 to $75,000 $750 $300<br />
Above $75,000 to $150,000 $1,500 $750<br />
Above $150,000 to $300,000 $2,750 $1,250<br />
Above $300,000 to $500,000 $4,250 $1,750<br />
Above $500,000 to $1,000,000 $6,000 $2,500<br />
Above $1,000,000 to $5,000,000 $8,000 $3,250<br />
Above $5,000,000 to $10,000,000 $10,000 $4,000<br />
Above $10,000,000 * *<br />
Nonmonetary Claims ** $3,250 $1,250<br />
*Contact your local AAA office for fees for claims in excess of $10 million.<br />
**This fee is applicable when a claim or counterclaim is not for a monetary amount.<br />
Where a monetary claim is not known, parties will be required to state a range of<br />
claims or be subject to the highest possible filing fee.<br />
Id.<br />
In addition, Rule 48 of the Arbitration Rules for Commercial Financial<br />
Disputes states:<br />
Members of the National Roster appointed as arbitrators will be compensated based<br />
on the amount of service involved and the number of hearings. Arbitrators shall<br />
charge a rate consistent with the arbitrator’s stated rate of compensation, beginning<br />
with the first day of hearing. If the parties fail to agree to the terms of<br />
compensation, an appropriate rate shall be established with the arbitrator by the<br />
AAA and communicated in writing to the parties.<br />
Any arrangement for the compensation of an arbitrator shall be made through the<br />
AAA and not directly between the parties and the arbitrator.<br />
American Arbitration Association, Arbitration Rules for Commercial Financial<br />
Disputes, R-48, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22008#ArbRules (last<br />
visited Dec. 5, 2005).<br />
90. AAA Practical Guide, supra note 89.<br />
91. Ebe, supra note 87, at 85-86.<br />
92. Joyce J. George, The Advantages of Administered Arbitration When Going<br />
It Alone Just Won’t Do, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 66, 68-69 (Aug.-Oct. 2002). George<br />
suggests that the following questions are left to the parties to answer in ad hoc
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 23<br />
parties to make fundamental decisions relating to the arbitration<br />
proceeding. 93 They can write their own rules, decide their own time<br />
schedule, and make the proceeding as flexible or inflexible as they<br />
choose. Ad hoc arbitration is more informal and more flexible than<br />
institutional arbitration. 94 The flexibility of ad hoc arbitration is a<br />
benefit; the parties do not have to deal with the bureaucracy of an<br />
agency. 95 Flexibility allows parties and their lawyers to use whatever<br />
arbitration rules and procedures they desire. 96 With ad hoc arbitration,<br />
there are no administrative fees. 97 It can be quicker and cheaper when<br />
the parties and their lawyers are in procedural agreement on the process.<br />
But there is a two-edged sword to ad hoc arbitration. The parties are<br />
responsible for all administrative aspects of the arbitration. The parties<br />
must mutually agree on the arbitrators they will use in the proceeding. 98<br />
If one party refuses to agree to an arbitrator, the proceeding cannot begin.<br />
Once a serious dispute has arisen between the parties, the cooperation<br />
needed to coordinate an arbitration can be unrealistic. 99 Because the<br />
rules and procedures are not set, if the parties cannot agree on how to<br />
proceed, they may find themselves in court—something they both had<br />
hoped to avoid by agreeing to arbitrate—just to litigate issues on how the<br />
arbitration:<br />
What is the nature of the dispute to be arbitrated? What is the scope of the<br />
arbitrators’ jurisdiction? How are notices to be given and when is an answer to be<br />
made? What selection process is to be used to name the arbitrators? What if a party<br />
fails to select an arbitrator? Should a default procedure be provided? If so, what<br />
procedure and how is agreement to be obtained between the parties? How can an<br />
arbitrator be removed or disqualified? Where is the arbitration to be held? What is<br />
the applicable law? What, if any, rules are to apply to the arbitration? What<br />
discovery procedures will be permitted? Can the arbitrator award any provisional<br />
remedies? What type of award is required? Is there any method for modifying an<br />
award once made? Is the arbitration to be binding? How and when is the arbitrator<br />
to be paid? Who pays the costs of the hearing facility?<br />
Id.<br />
93. See id. at 68.<br />
94. Rasmussen, supra note 86, at 1833.<br />
95. Ebe, supra note 87, at 86.<br />
96. Tom Arnold, Delay and Cost Booby Traps in Arbitration Practice and How<br />
to Avoid Them, CA13 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 99, 104 (American <strong>Law</strong> Institute—American<br />
Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, Course of Study, Jan. 25, 1996).<br />
97. Rasmussen, supra note 86, at 1833.<br />
98. See George, supra note 92, at 68.<br />
99. Thomas E. Carbonneau, International Commercial Arbitration: The<br />
Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND.<br />
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189, 1207 (2003).
24 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
arbitration will be conducted. 100 The key problem with ad hoc<br />
arbitration is it lacks institutional oversight. Despite having a clear<br />
arbitration clause in the contract, if one side is recalcitrant and refuses to<br />
pick an arbitrator, it is difficult to force the party into the ad hoc<br />
arbitration. Furthermore, the parties lack the power that an arbitrator has<br />
to move the proceeding along. 101 For these reasons, and unless both<br />
parties and their attorneys have considerable experience with arbitration,<br />
it is best to utilize the services of an agency. 102 As mentioned previously,<br />
some of the well known arbitration providers are the American<br />
Arbitration Association (AAA), 103 the International Chamber of<br />
Commerce (ICC), 104 and the United States Federal Mediation and<br />
Conciliation Service (FMCS). 105 Many state agencies also provide<br />
100. See Arnold, supra note 96, at 108. In an ad hoc proceeding if “one party is<br />
recalcitrant and wants to obstruct the arbitration . . . the party desiring the arbitration<br />
must go to court to compel initiation of the arbitration.” Id. See also Hoenig, supra<br />
note 85, at 60. Any “dispute among the parties as to the appropriate venue for the<br />
arbitration would delay appointment of an arbitrator and most likely require a trip to<br />
court.” Id. at 62. If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator or did not specify a<br />
method to decide on an arbitrator, “the usual result is that the court will appoint an<br />
arbitrator.” Id. at 60.<br />
101. Rasmussen, supra note 86, at 1834; see, e.g., American Arbitration<br />
Association, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, Canon<br />
1(F) (March 1, 2004), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21958 (last visited Dec. 5,<br />
2005) [hereinafter AAA Code of Ethics]. The AAA Code of Ethics provides that<br />
“[a]n arbitrator should conduct the arbitration process so as to advance the fair and<br />
efficient resolution of the matters submitted for decision. An arbitrator should make<br />
all reasonable efforts to prevent delaying tactics, harassment of parties or other<br />
participants, or other abuse or disruption of the arbitration process.” Id.<br />
102. Carbonneau, supra note 99, at 1207.<br />
103. See American Arbitration Association, A Brief Overview of the American<br />
Arbitration Association, at http://www.adr.org/Overview (last visited Dec. 5, 2005).<br />
In 2002, the AAA administered 230,255 cases, which were resolved through<br />
mediation, arbitration, or less formal methods of dispute resolution. Id.<br />
104. See International Chamber of Commerce, Facts and Figures on ICC<br />
Arbitration in 2003, at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/right_topics/stat_2003.<br />
asp (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). Five-hundred eighty requests for arbitration were<br />
filed with the International Court of Arbitration. Id. Of these requests, the ICC<br />
rendered awards in 369 cases. Id.<br />
105. See Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Arbitration Statistics<br />
Fiscal Year 2004, at http://fmcs.gov/assets/files/Arbitration/CLOSEDCASESFOR0<br />
4.doc (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). In 2004, the number of panel requests received by<br />
the FMCS exceeded 18,000. Id. In the same year, the agency closed 2,485 of those<br />
requests. Id. This number is remarkable compared to the 260 cases that were<br />
closed by the agency only two years prior. Id.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 25<br />
arbitration services. 106<br />
106. State of Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services, About the Bureau of<br />
Mediation Services, at http://www.bms.state.mn.us (last visited Oct. 26, 2005). The<br />
State of Minnesota passed the Minnesota Labor Relations Act (MLRA) in 1939 to<br />
facilitate the settlement of labor-related disputes. Id. As part of the MLRA, the<br />
BMS was created to perform functions, including arbitration and mediation. Id.<br />
Many other state and local agencies exist for the application of ADR services<br />
including the following (links to these organizations are available on the website of<br />
the Association of Labor Relations Agencies (ALRA), at http://www.alra.org/lablin<br />
ks.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2005)):<br />
Alaska Labor Relations Agency<br />
Arkansas Department of Labor, Mediation and Conciliation Division<br />
California Agricultural Labor Relations Board<br />
California Public Employment Relations Board<br />
California State Mediation and Conciliation Service<br />
Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations<br />
Connecticut State Board of Mediation & Arbitration<br />
Delaware Public Employment Relations Board<br />
District of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board<br />
Florida Employees Relations Commission<br />
Hawaii Labor Relations Board<br />
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board<br />
Illinois Labor Relations Board<br />
Indiana Education Employment Relations Board<br />
Los Angeles City Employee Relations Board<br />
Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission<br />
Maine Labor Relations Board<br />
Maryland Higher Education Labor Relations Board<br />
Massachusetts Board of Conciliation and Arbitration<br />
Massachusetts Joint Labor-Management Committee for Municipal Police and Fire<br />
Michigan Department of Civil Service<br />
Michigan Employment Relations Commission<br />
Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services<br />
Missouri State Board of Mediation<br />
Montana Board of Personnel Appeals<br />
Montana Labor Standards Bureau, Collective Bargaining Unit<br />
Nebraska Commission of Industrial Relations<br />
Nevada Local Government Employee-Management Relations Board<br />
New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board<br />
New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission<br />
New Mexico Public Employee Labor Relations Board<br />
New York City Office of Collective Bargaining<br />
New York State Employment Relations Board<br />
New York State Public Employment Relations Board<br />
North Carolina Employment Mediation Bureau<br />
Ohio State Employment Relations Board<br />
Oklahoma Public Employees Relations Board<br />
Oregon Employment Relations Board<br />
Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation<br />
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
26 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
The AAA, one of the largest private arbitration agencies in the<br />
United States, is frequently used for administering the arbitration<br />
process, providing rules, lists of arbitrators, and facilities for<br />
arbitration. 107 The AAA resolves domestic, international, labor,<br />
insurance and many other types of disputes, 108 utilizing a variety of<br />
alternative dispute mechanisms, such as arbitration, mediation, elections,<br />
and other out-of-court settlement procedures. 109 The AAA provides<br />
education and training for neutrals and arbitrators and works to design<br />
ADR systems for corporations, unions, government agencies, law firms<br />
and the courts. 110 The AAA has thirty-four offices nationwide and two<br />
international offices in New York and Dublin. 111<br />
Less well-known, but growing in recognition, are domestic agencies<br />
like JAMS, The Dispute Resolution Experts 112 and the National<br />
Arbitration Forum (NAF). 113 The decision as to which institution is best<br />
suited for a particular set of parties and their potential disputes requires<br />
due diligence to best represent the client.<br />
Phoenix Employment Relations Board<br />
Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board<br />
Vermont Labor Relations Board<br />
Virgin Islands Department of Labor<br />
Washington State Public Employment Relations Commission<br />
West Virginia Division of Labor<br />
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission<br />
107. Jacob P. Hart & David W. Wolf, Grievance Arbitration—Some Hints on<br />
Arbitrator Selection, Preparation, and Trial, R176 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1401, 1416<br />
(American <strong>Law</strong> Institute—American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education,<br />
Labor & Employment <strong>Law</strong>, 6th ed. 1992).<br />
108. The AAA offers expertise in the following areas: Claims Programs,<br />
Commercial, Construction, Consumer, Domain Name Disputes, Elections,<br />
eCommerce, Employment, Energy, Fact Finding, Federal, Health Care, Insurance,<br />
International, Labor, Large Complex Cases, Mediation, Reinsurance, Safe Harbor,<br />
Securities, Sports-Olympic. American Arbitration Association, Focus Areas, at<br />
http://www.adr.org/Focusareas (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).<br />
109. American Arbitration Association, supra note 103.<br />
110. Id.<br />
111. Id.<br />
112. JAMS is a large private ADR service provider primarily based in California,<br />
but growing nationally at an exponential rate. The word JAMS is no longer an<br />
acronym. JAMS, The Dispute Resolution Experts, at http://www.jamsadr.com/ (last<br />
visited Oct. 19, 2005).<br />
113. Originally founded in 1986 to handle court-ordered ADR settlement of<br />
disputes, the National Arbitration Forum is now available to handle private disputes<br />
as well. National Arbitration Forum, at http://www.arb-forum.com/ (last visited<br />
Nov. 6, 2005).
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 27<br />
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) is another<br />
provider of arbitration services in the United States. The FMCS is as an<br />
independent agency of the United States government. 114 Its mission is to<br />
promote labor-management peace and cooperation. 115 It provides<br />
services to both the public and private sectors. 116 The FMCS has its<br />
headquarters in Washington, D.C. and has two regional offices and more<br />
than seventy field offices throughout the United States. 117<br />
There are also many state agencies that provide arbitration services.<br />
For example, the State of Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services<br />
provides alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including<br />
conciliation, mediation, and arbitration, in an attempt to facilitate a<br />
constructive labor-management environment. 118<br />
The ICC is a world-wide business organization. 119 Its activities<br />
cover a broad spectrum from arbitration and dispute resolution to<br />
fighting corruption and combating commercial crime. 120 The ICC’s<br />
dispute resolution mechanisms are designed specifically to resolve<br />
business disputes of an international character. 121 The ICC International<br />
114. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 171-173 (2004). The FMCS was created as part of<br />
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 to “prevent or minimize interruptions of<br />
the free flow of commerce growing out of labor disputes [and] to assist parties to<br />
labor disputes in industries affecting commerce to settle such disputes through<br />
conciliation and mediation.” 19 U.S.C. § 173. Section 171 provides that “[i]t is the<br />
policy of the United States—that sound and stable industrial peace and the<br />
advancement of the general welfare, health, and safety of the Nation and of the best<br />
interests of employers and employees can most satisfactorily be secured by the<br />
settlement of issues between employers and employees through the processes of<br />
conference and collective bargaining,” which “may be advanced by making<br />
available full and adequate governmental facilities for conciliation, mediation, and<br />
voluntary arbitration.” Id.<br />
115. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Serv., Who We Are, at http://www.fmcs.<br />
gov/internet/categoryList.asp?categoryID=13 (last visited Dec. 5, 2005).<br />
116. Id.<br />
117. Id.<br />
118. State of Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services, supra note 106.<br />
119. International Chamber of Commerce, What is ICC, at http://www.iccwbo.or<br />
g/home/menu_what_is_icc.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2005). The ICC aims “to serve<br />
world business by promoting trade and investment, open markets for goods and<br />
services, and the free flow of capital.” Id.<br />
120. Id.<br />
121. International Chamber of Commerce, Introduction to Arbitration, at<br />
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/introduction.asp (last visited Nov.<br />
6, 2005). In an international setting, arbitration has an added benefit. Id. More<br />
than 130 nations are signatories of the 1958 United Nations Convention on the<br />
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (commonly known as the
28 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
Court of Arbitration [in fact, a private, non-governmental organization],<br />
established in 1923, is the arbitration body of the ICC and ensures the<br />
application of the ICC’s rules. 122 The ICC’s headquarters are in Paris<br />
and it currently has national committees operating in eighty-four<br />
countries throughout the world. 123<br />
Parties in international commercial investment disputes can also<br />
utilize the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes<br />
(ICSID). ICSID is an outgrowth of the World Bank and operates as an<br />
autonomous organization with services that may be invoked by<br />
agreement of the parties who are members of contracting nations under<br />
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States<br />
and Nationals of Other States. 124<br />
B. Notifying the Arbitration Agency of Request for Arbitration<br />
If the parties choose to use an arbitration agency to facilitate<br />
resolution of their dispute, the first step is to notify the agency that the<br />
claimant wants the arbitration to begin. The claimant should send (1) a<br />
New York Convention). Id. The result is that arbitral awards enjoy greater<br />
recognition than judicial decisions. Id.<br />
122. International Chamber of Commerce, Introducing ICC Dispute Resolution<br />
Services, at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/intro_court/introduction.asp (last<br />
visited Nov. 6, 2005); International Chamber of Commerce, supra note 119; see<br />
William K. Slate II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference?,<br />
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 47 (1996):<br />
The ICC Rules contemplate further institutional guidance and supervision over the<br />
arbitration proceedings than do the rules of other institutions. These rules delegate<br />
to the institution certain functions that are typically reserved for the arbitrator. For<br />
instance, whereas other institutional rules provide that it is the arbitrator who<br />
decides the prima facie validity of the arbitration agreement, under the ICC Rules,<br />
it is the institution that has the authority to make this determination.<br />
Additionally, and rather importantly, the ICC reviews the arbitrator’s final award,<br />
prior to its signing, to ensure its enforceability. The ICC Rules require the<br />
arbitrator, before signing the award, to submit it in draft form to the International<br />
Court of Arbitration. The Court may lay down modifications as to the form of the<br />
award and, without affecting the arbitrator’s liberty of decision, draw the<br />
arbitrator’s attention to substantive issues.<br />
Id.<br />
123. International Chamber of Commerce, supra note 119.<br />
124. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, About<br />
ICSID, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm (last visited Oct. 26,<br />
2005). The ICSID was established under the Convention on the Settlement of<br />
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, October 14,<br />
1966. Id.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 29<br />
cover letter to the agency requesting arbitration, (2) a check for the filing<br />
fee, and (3) a copy of the contract highlighting the arbitration clause.<br />
The cover letter to the arbitration agency should provide a basic<br />
description of the claim, as well as the name, address and phone number<br />
of the respondent. 125 Once these materials are received by the agency<br />
from the claimant, the agency will take over. The agency will ensure the<br />
respondent has been notified that arbitration has been requested and will<br />
send copies of the claim and the arbitration clause to the respondent, who<br />
will have an opportunity to respond within a certain time limit. 126<br />
C. Choosing the Arbitrator<br />
After the request for arbitration has been filed with the arbitration<br />
agency and the respondent has had an opportunity to answer, the parties<br />
decide on the arbitrator(s) who will resolve the dispute. The parties are<br />
free to choose the number of arbitrators that will be used. Typically,<br />
agency rules allow for one arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators, with<br />
three arbitrators being the typical number of arbitrators in international<br />
disputes. 127 The trend today in most State and federal arbitrations is to<br />
use a single arbitrator in order to reduce the cost. 128<br />
Whether the parties opt for a single arbitrator or a panel of three<br />
arbitrators, it is important to weigh the relative benefit of each method<br />
against the corresponding cost. It is economical to have one neutral<br />
arbitrator chosen by mutual agreement between the parties. But it can be<br />
advantageous to have three arbitrators to provide various levels and types<br />
of expertise, to allow the arbitrators the ability to divide up tasks, and to<br />
give the arbitrators the opportunity to meet and confer with each other<br />
about the facts and applicable law. 129 A panel of three arbitrators is the<br />
best choice in complex cases. The usual method of picking three<br />
125. See e.g., AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-4; ICC Rules, supra note 84, arts. 4<br />
& 5.<br />
126. See sources cited supra note 125.<br />
127. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Pre-hearing Techniques to Promote Speed and Cost-<br />
Effectiveness—Some Thoughts Concerning Arbitral Process Design, 2 PEPP. DISP.<br />
RESOL. L.J. 53, 59-60 (2002) (“Three-person tribunals, although not a mandatory<br />
characteristic of international arbitration, are part of a standard model. Indeed, under<br />
many formulae, a tribunal of three is the default rule.”).<br />
128. See AAA Rules, supra note 37, R. 15 (providing that, “[i]f the arbitration<br />
agreement does not specify the number of arbitrators, the dispute shall be heard and<br />
determined by one arbitrator, unless the AAA, in its discretion, directs that three<br />
arbitrators be appointed”).<br />
129. Id.
30 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
arbitrators is: the claimant picks one, the respondent picks one, and the<br />
two arbitrators pick the third arbitrator, who will be the chair of the<br />
arbitration panel.<br />
For a three person arbitral tribunal, the selection process permits<br />
each party to select an arbitrator with the third being chosen by the two<br />
party-appointed arbitrators. 130 For example, the AAA recommends the<br />
following clause in the arbitration agreement:<br />
The arbitrator selected by the claimant and the arbitrator selected by<br />
respondent shall, within ten days of their appointment, select a third<br />
neutral arbitrator. In the event that they are unable to do so, the<br />
parties or their attorneys may request the American Arbitration<br />
Association to appoint the third neutral arbitrator. 131<br />
If the parties choose to use a single arbitrator, the agency will send a<br />
list of qualified arbitrators to both parties. Typically, there will be five to<br />
seven names of qualified arbitrators, who the agency has vetted and<br />
deemed qualified to arbitrate the claims. The claimant and respondent<br />
attorneys discuss the names on the list. They may decide to pick one<br />
person from the list, or they may decide to use the “alternative strike”<br />
method. The U.S. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service allows<br />
“[e]ach party alternately strikes a name from the submitted panel until<br />
one remains.” 132 Another method requires the parties to rank their<br />
choices, and the person with the highest rank is appointed arbitrator. 133<br />
130. See AAA, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses, supra note 45; see also ICC<br />
Rules, supra note 84, art. 8 (“[E]ach party shall nominate . . . one arbitrator for<br />
confirmation. If a party fails to nominate an arbitrator, the appointment shall be<br />
made by the Court. The third arbitrator, who will act as chairman of the Arbitral<br />
Tribunal, shall be appointed by the Court.”).<br />
131. AAA, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses, supra note 45.<br />
132. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Policies and Procedures, §<br />
1404.12, Selection by Parties and Appointments of Arbitrators, available at<br />
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=197&itemID=16959 (last<br />
visited Oct. 16, 2005).<br />
133. See id. The FMCS rules allow “[e]ach party advises the OAS of its order of<br />
preference by numbering each name on the panel and submitting the numbered lists<br />
in writing to the OAS. The name that has the lowest combined number will be<br />
appointed.” Id.; see also AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-11. The AAA commercial<br />
arbitration rules provide that:<br />
If the parties are unable to agree upon an arbitrator, each party to the dispute shall<br />
have 15 days from the transmittal date in which to strike names objected to, number<br />
the remaining names in order of preference, and return the list to the AAA. . . .<br />
From among the persons who have been approved on both lists, and in accordance<br />
with the designated order of mutual preference, the AAA shall invite the
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 31<br />
If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator from the first list, either can<br />
request the agency to send another list of arbitrators. The AAA rules<br />
provide that the agency may make the appointment if the first list does<br />
not prompt the appointment of an arbitrator. 134 Most arbitration agencies<br />
will permit two lists to be used. If the parties cannot agree to an<br />
arbitrator after the second list is sent, the agency will appoint an<br />
arbitrator. 135<br />
However the parties set up the method of choosing the arbitrator, it<br />
is important to note that, in arbitration, “[t]he arbitrator is the decisive<br />
element. . . . his or her ability, expertness, fairness and impartiality are at<br />
the base of the arbitration process.” 136 The arbitrator decides the<br />
outcome of the case; thus, it is important for parties to take the time to<br />
decide if one or three arbitrators will be best for their potential dispute.<br />
D. Notification Requirements<br />
Once the parties have decided on the arbitrator(s), the arbitration<br />
agency notifies the arbitrator that he or she has been chosen. The<br />
American Arbitration Association sends a written confirmation letter<br />
acceptance of an arbitrator to serve.<br />
Id.<br />
134. AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-11. If the parties cannot decide on an<br />
arbitrator from the first list, “the AAA shall have the power to make the<br />
appointment from among other members of the National Roster without the<br />
submission of additional lists.” Id.<br />
135. The rules for appointing arbitrators vary according to the agency utilized.<br />
See ICC Rules, supra note 84, art. 8. According to the ICC rules:<br />
Where the parties have agreed that the dispute shall be settled by a sole arbitrator,<br />
they may, by agreement, nominate the sole arbitrator for confirmation. If the parties<br />
fail to nominate a sole arbitrator . . . the sole arbitrator shall be appointed by the<br />
Court.<br />
Id. See also Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, supra note 132,<br />
§ 1404.11. The FMCS rules state that:<br />
If the parties do not agree on an arbitrator from the first panel, the OAS will furnish<br />
a second and third panel to the parties upon joint request and payment of an<br />
additional fee. Requests for a second or third panel should be accompanied by a<br />
brief explanation as to why the previous panel(s) was inadequate. If parties are<br />
unable to agree on a selection after having received three panels, the OAS will<br />
make a direct appointment upon joint request.<br />
Id.<br />
136. GABRIEL WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 24-1 (Larry<br />
Edmonson ed., Thomson West 2003).
32 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
notifying the arbitrator he/she has been chosen. The AAA Arbitration<br />
Rules for Resolving Commercial Financial Disputes state:<br />
Notice of the appointment of any arbitrator, whether appointed<br />
unilaterally by a party, mutually by the parties or by the AAA,<br />
shall be sent to the arbitrator by the AAA, together with a copy of<br />
these rules, and the signed acceptance of the arbitrator shall be<br />
filed with the AAA prior to the opening of the first hearing. 137<br />
It is usual for one or both of the attorneys to send confirming letters<br />
to the arbitrator informing the arbitrator that he/she has been chosen as<br />
the arbitrator in the matter. Under the Federal Mediation and<br />
Conciliation Service rules, the parties are responsible for notifying the<br />
Office of Arbitration Services (OAS) “of their selection of an arbitrator<br />
or of the decision not to proceed with arbitration. Upon notification of<br />
the selection of an arbitrator, the OAS will make a formal appointment of<br />
the arbitrator.” 138<br />
The party seeking to begin the arbitration process is required to<br />
notify the respondent. Fundamental fairness requires that the respondent<br />
be notified of the claims being brought against them. 139 If the parties<br />
utilize an agency, notice of the claim is sent by the agency to the<br />
respondent. 140 The respondent has an opportunity to respond and/or<br />
counterclaim. 141<br />
E. Scheduling<br />
Under the FMCS rules, “[t]he arbitrator, upon notification of<br />
appointment, is expected to communicate with the parties within<br />
[fourteen] days to arrange for preliminary matters, such as the date and<br />
place of hearing.” 142 The arbitrator will provide potential hearing dates<br />
for which the arbitrator is available. The usual way for the arbitrator to<br />
contact the advocates for the claimant and the respondent is to send a<br />
letter jointly addressed to both informing them of a series of dates the<br />
arbitrator is available. The arbitrator will ask the parties to contact each<br />
137. American Arbitration Association, supra note 89.<br />
138. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, supra note 132, § 1404.12.<br />
139. Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost—How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity<br />
for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.<br />
RTS. 1, 18 (1994).<br />
140. AAA Rules, supra note 37.<br />
141. See id.<br />
142. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, supra note 132, § 1404.12.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 33<br />
other and choose a mutually convenient date. A typical letter from the<br />
arbitrator is jointly addressed to the claimant’s attorney and the<br />
respondent’s attorney saying: “Below are dates the arbitrator is available<br />
for the arbitration hearing. Kindly contact each other immediately,<br />
choose a mutually convenient date, time, and place. Let the arbitrator<br />
know right away. Please know the arbitrator has these dates out in other<br />
matters, so the sooner you choose the better.” Because the typical<br />
arbitrator is busy, it is important for the advocates to contact the arbitrator<br />
as soon as possible with a mutually convenient date for the arbitration, so<br />
the arbitrator can block the time on his or her calendar. If the parties are<br />
having difficulty arranging a time, the arbitrator will have a conference<br />
call with both advocates. At the conference call, the parties and the<br />
arbitrator coordinate their calendars and choose a mutually convenient<br />
date for the arbitration. The sooner the date, the more likely the<br />
arbitration process is able to fulfill the “quick” objective of arbitration.<br />
Some agencies leave it to the arbitrator to arrange a mutually<br />
convenient time. Others agencies arrange for the arbitration date by<br />
talking with the advocates for the claimant, the respondent, and the<br />
arbitrator. 143 Once a time is blocked on the arbitrator’s calendar the<br />
parties are responsible for a cancellation fee if the matter is settled prior<br />
to the hearing.<br />
F. Arbitrator Disclosure Requirements<br />
Arbitrators as neutrals must disclose all actual and potential<br />
conflicts of interest reasonably known. 144 After disclosure, the neutral<br />
143. See AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-22 (“The arbitrator shall set the date,<br />
time, and place for each hearing. The parties shall respond to requests for hearing<br />
dates in a timely manner, be cooperative in scheduling the earliest practicable date,<br />
and adhere to the established hearing schedule.”); ICC Rules, art. 21 (stating that<br />
“[w]hen a hearing is to be held, the Arbitral Tribunal, giving reasonable notice, shall<br />
summon the parties to appear before it on the day and at the place fixed by it”).<br />
144. See AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-16. Any person appointed or to be<br />
appointed as an arbitrator shall disclose to the AAA any circumstance likely to give<br />
rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence. Id.<br />
CANON II. AN ARBITRATOR SHOULD DISCLOSE ANY INTEREST<br />
OR RELATIONSHIP LIKELY TO AFFECT IMPARTIALITY OR<br />
WHICH MIGHT CREATE AN APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY.<br />
A. Persons who are requested to serve as arbitrators should, before<br />
accepting, disclose:<br />
(1) any known direct or indirect financial or personal interest in the
34 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
outcome of the arbitration;<br />
(2) any known existing or past financial, business, professional or personal<br />
relationships which might reasonably affect impartiality or lack of<br />
independence in the eyes of any of the parties. For example, prospective<br />
arbitrators should disclose any such relationships which they personally<br />
have with any party or its lawyer, with any co-arbitrator, or with any<br />
individual whom they have been told will be a witness. They should also<br />
disclose any such relationships involving their families or household<br />
members or their current employers, partners, or professional or business<br />
associates that can be ascertained by reasonable efforts;<br />
(3) the nature and extent of any prior knowledge they may have of the<br />
dispute; and<br />
(4) any other matters, relationships, or interests which they are obligated to<br />
disclose by the agreement of the parties, the rules or practices of an<br />
institution, or applicable law regulating arbitrator disclosure.<br />
B. Persons who are requested to accept appointment as arbitrators should<br />
make a reasonable effort to inform themselves of any interests or<br />
relationships described in paragraph A.<br />
C. The obligation to disclose interests or relationships described in<br />
paragraph A is a continuing duty which requires a person who accepts<br />
appointment as an arbitrator to disclose, as soon as practicable, at any stage<br />
of the arbitration, any such interests or relationships which may arise, or<br />
which are recalled or discovered.<br />
D. Any doubt as to whether or not disclosure is to be made should be<br />
resolved in favor of disclosure.<br />
E. Disclosure should be made to all parties unless other procedures for<br />
disclosure are provided in the agreement of the parties, applicable rules or<br />
practices of an institution, or by law. Where more than one arbitrator has<br />
been appointed, each should inform the others of all matters disclosed.<br />
F. When parties, with knowledge of a person’s interests and relationships,<br />
nevertheless desire that person to serve as an arbitrator, that person may<br />
properly serve.<br />
G. If an arbitrator is requested by all parties to withdraw, the arbitrator<br />
must do so. If an arbitrator is requested to withdraw by less than all of the<br />
parties because of alleged partiality, the arbitrator should withdraw unless<br />
either of the following circumstances exists:<br />
(1) An agreement of the parties, or arbitration rules agreed to by the<br />
parties, or applicable law establishes procedures for determining challenges<br />
to arbitrators, in which case those procedures should be followed; or<br />
(2) In the absence of applicable procedures, if the arbitrator, after carefully<br />
considering the matter, determines that the reason for the challenge is not
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 35<br />
shall decline to participate unless all parties choose to retain the neutral.<br />
G. Tendency to Delay<br />
There is a tendency on the part of the advocates to delay scheduling<br />
the arbitration hearing. It often is simply a matter of procrastination.<br />
Advocates are busy. Parties delay by failing to cooperate in scheduling,<br />
by refusing to stipulate to uncontested facts, and by failing to respect<br />
time tables and document exchanges. 145 The rules of the Federal<br />
Mediation and Conciliation Services warn that, “[t]he arbitrator may,<br />
unless prohibited by law, proceed in the absence of any party who, after<br />
due notice, fails to be present or to obtain a postponement.” 146<br />
Arbitrators themselves can be guilty of delaying the process.<br />
Although an arbitrator’s role is markedly different from that of a judge,<br />
Changing the name of homosapiens from “judge” to “arbitrator”<br />
does not change his procrastination stripes. When he has a big<br />
complex case he wants to carve out a big unit of time to work on<br />
it. Whether he is called “judge” or “arbitrator,” a steady stream of<br />
smaller, easier projects flow across his desk, pre-empt his time, so<br />
that he never gets that big unit of time he wants for this complex<br />
case. 147<br />
Most arbitrators understand it requires some pressure to push the<br />
advocates into choosing a time which is “sooner rather than later.” A key<br />
objective of arbitration is quick resolution of disputes. The further out<br />
the arbitration is scheduled, the less likely this objective is fulfilled.<br />
Conflicting schedules of the parties can cause the arbitration to be<br />
delayed for a significant period of time; sometimes exceeding the time it<br />
substantial, and that he or she can nevertheless act and decide the case<br />
impartially and fairly.<br />
H. If compliance by a prospective arbitrator with any provision of this<br />
Code would require disclosure of confidential or privileged information,<br />
the prospective arbitrator should either:<br />
(1) Secure the consent to the disclosure from the person who furnished the<br />
information or the holder of the privilege; or<br />
(2) Withdraw.<br />
Id.<br />
145. William Sharpe, The Art of Being a Good Advocate, 50 DISP. RESOL. J. 60,<br />
61 (Jan. 1995).<br />
146. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, supra note 132, § 1404.13.<br />
147. Arnold, supra note 96, at 106.
36 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
would have taken to litigate the case in court. 148 If a dispute cannot be<br />
heard and settled by arbitration much sooner than it would be heard and<br />
decided in court, arbitration looses its efficacy. Delay usurps the promise<br />
of arbitration as “quick, efficient, economical and fair.” 149<br />
H. Time Required<br />
There is a tendency on the part of advocates to underestimate the<br />
amount of time required for the arbitration. 150 It is not unusual for an<br />
advocate to inform the arbitrator that the hearing “will last, at most, one<br />
day.” But experience has shown that more than one day might be<br />
required for even some of the simplest matters. Advocates need to be<br />
aware of the fact that arbitration may require a more significant time<br />
commitment than expected and should avoid understating to the parties<br />
and the arbitrator the time needed to resolve the dispute. Remember, it<br />
takes time for the question and answer method of direct examination and<br />
cross examination to develop the testimony. Be realistic in the estimate<br />
of the entire time for the arbitration by knowing the number of witnesses<br />
and the approximate time it will take for direct examination and cross<br />
examination of each of the witnesses. Many agencies permit expedited<br />
arbitration which limits the time an arbitration can run—typically, one<br />
day.<br />
VI. PRE-ARBITRATION MATTERS<br />
A. Discovery<br />
A primary reason parties choose arbitration is to avoid the expense<br />
and time involved in the discovery necessary to prepare a case if it went<br />
to court. The arbitration process attempts to avoid extensive discovery<br />
that is often involved in a trial. There is very limited discovery in<br />
arbitration. The United State Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit<br />
recognized that “[a]n arbitration hearing is not a court of law . . . . When<br />
contracting parties stipulate that disputes will be submitted to arbitration,<br />
they relinquish the right to certain procedural niceties that are normally<br />
associated with a formal trial . . . . One of these accoutrements is the right<br />
148. Allen Poppleton, The Arbitrator’s Role in Expediting the Large and<br />
Complex Commercial Case, 36-DEC. DISP. RESOL. J. 6 (Dec. 1981).<br />
149. See text accompanying notes 33-44.<br />
150. John Wilkinson, Streamlining Arbitration of the Complex Case, 55 DISP.<br />
RESOL. J. 8, 10 (Oct. 2000).
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 37<br />
to pre-trial discovery.” 151<br />
Civil court trials in the United States often involve extensive<br />
discovery, using interrogatories, depositions, and requests for production<br />
of documents. Arbitration involves some discovery, but it is intended to<br />
be limited because arbitration is a process intended to expedite the<br />
resolution of the dispute. A telephone conference between the arbitrator<br />
and advocates can deal with almost any discovery matter that needs to be<br />
addressed. The AAA describes the discovery process this way:<br />
At the request of any party or at the discretion of the arbitrator,<br />
consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration, the arbitrator<br />
may direct the production of documents and other information,<br />
and the identification of any witnesses to be called. At least five<br />
business days prior to the hearing, the parties shall exchange<br />
copies of all exhibits they intend to submit at the hearing. The<br />
arbitrator is authorized to resolve any disputes concerning the<br />
exchange of information. 152<br />
B. Subpoena Power of Persons and Materials<br />
An arbitrator in the United States is given the power to subpoena a<br />
person or materials, and such subpoenas are enforceable in a court of<br />
law. The Federal Arbitration Act permits an arbitrator to issue a<br />
subpoena requiring a person to testify at the arbitration or a subpoena<br />
duces tecum to bring materials to the arbitration. 153 The Uniform<br />
Arbitration Act (UAA) 154 and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of<br />
151. Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980).<br />
152. AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-21.<br />
153. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2004) (stating that an arbitrator “may summon in writing any<br />
person to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper case to<br />
bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed<br />
material as evidence in the case”).<br />
154. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT (1956), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu<br />
/bll/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/uaa55.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). Prior to the Revised<br />
Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) (2000), the UAA (1956) was adopted by fortynine<br />
of the states in the United States. CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 113.<br />
Several states have repealed adoption of the UAA in favor of the RUAA. REVISED<br />
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 17(a), amended 2000, available at http://www.nccus<br />
l.org/update (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). As of 2004, the RUAA has been adopted<br />
by twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia in some form (also, Oklahoma<br />
has enacted legislation to adopt the RUAA in <strong>2006</strong>). UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED,<br />
ARB., REFS & ANNOS, UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT (1956) REFS & ANNOS, (current<br />
through 2004 Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on
38 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
2000 (RUAA) 155 permit an arbitrator to issue a subpoena for the person<br />
or a subpoena duces tecum for materials. 156 Under the UAA, subpoenas<br />
Uniform State <strong>Law</strong>s).<br />
155. REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, supra note 154. The RUAA is the<br />
result of the work performed by the National Conference of Commissioners on<br />
Uniform State <strong>Law</strong>s (NCCUSL). “[NCCUSL], now 113 years old, provides states<br />
with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity<br />
and stability to critical areas of the law. NCCUSL’s work supports the federal<br />
system and facilitates the movement of individuals and the business of<br />
organizations with rules that are consistent from state to state.” Id. The entire<br />
RUAA is currently adopted by twelve states (Alaska has adopted without repeal of<br />
their RUAA adoption).<br />
156. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 17(a). “An arbitrator may issue a subpoena<br />
for the attendance of a witness and for the production of records and other evidence<br />
at any hearing and may administer oaths. A subpoena must be served in the manner<br />
for service of subpoenas in a civil action and, upon [motion] to the court by a party<br />
to the arbitration proceeding or the arbitrator, enforced in the manner for<br />
enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action. Id.; see American Arbitration<br />
Association, Commercial/Business Forms, available at http://www.adr.org/upload/<br />
LIVESITE/Forms/downlLoadable/subpoena.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2005). The<br />
AAA provides standard forms for the subpoena of a witness:<br />
The Arbitration Tribunals of the<br />
American Arbitration Association<br />
_________________________________________________________<br />
In the Matter of the Arbitration between<br />
Subpoena<br />
_________________________________________________________<br />
FROM THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF<br />
to<br />
GREETING:<br />
WE COMMAND YOU that, all business and excuses being laid aside, you and each<br />
of you appear<br />
and attend before<br />
, arbitrator(s)<br />
acting under the arbitration law of this state, at<br />
___________________________________________________________________<br />
___________<br />
(address)<br />
on the _______________day of_______________ , 20 ___, at<br />
____________o’clock, to testify and<br />
give evidence in a certain arbitration, then and there to be held between the above<br />
entitled parties.<br />
Signed: ______________________________<br />
Signed: ______________________________<br />
Arbitrator(s)<br />
Requested by: _______________________________
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 39<br />
can be issued “for the attendance of witnesses and for the production of<br />
___________________________________________<br />
Name of Representative<br />
___________________________________________<br />
Address Zip Code<br />
___________________________________________<br />
Telephone<br />
Dated:______________________________________<br />
Form G9-11/89<br />
Id.<br />
The AAA also provides standard forms for a subpoena duces tecum:<br />
The Arbitration Tribunals of the<br />
American Arbitration Association<br />
_________________________________________________________<br />
In the Matter of the Arbitration between<br />
Subpoena Duces Tecum<br />
(Documents)<br />
_________________________________________________________<br />
FROM THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF<br />
to<br />
GREETING:<br />
WE COMMAND YOU that, all business and excuses being laid aside, you and each<br />
of you appear and attend before<br />
, arbitrator(s)<br />
acting under the arbitration law of this state, at<br />
___________________________________________________________________<br />
___________<br />
(address)<br />
on the ______________ day of ______________ , 20___ , at ___________o’clock,<br />
to testify and<br />
give evidence in a certain arbitration, then and there to be held between the above<br />
entitled parties, and that you bring with you and produce certain<br />
now in your custody.<br />
Signed: ______________________________<br />
Signed: ______________________________<br />
Arbitrator(s)<br />
Requested by: _______________________________<br />
___________________________________________<br />
Name of Representative<br />
___________________________________________<br />
Address Zip Code<br />
___________________________________________<br />
Telephone<br />
Dated:______________________________________<br />
Form G9-11/89<br />
Id.
40 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
books, records, documents and other evidence.” 157 Under the RUAA,<br />
“An arbitrator may issue a subpoena for the attendance of a witness for<br />
the production of records and other evidence at any hearing and may<br />
administer oaths.” 158<br />
Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, “[a]ll laws compelling a person<br />
under subpoena to testify . . . apply to an arbitration proceeding as if the<br />
controversy were the subject of a civil action in this State.” 159 For<br />
example, the Uniform Arbitration Act of Minnesota provides that a<br />
subpoena may be “enforced, in the manner provided by law for the<br />
service and enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action.” 160 Section 7 of<br />
the Federal Arbitration Act provides for enforcement of subpoenas if the<br />
jurisdiction permits their use:<br />
[I]f any person or persons so summoned to testify shall refuse or<br />
neglect to obey said summons, upon petition the United States<br />
district court for the district in which such arbitrators, or a<br />
majority of them, are sitting may compel the attendance of such<br />
person or persons before said arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish<br />
said person or persons for contempt in the same manner provided<br />
by law for securing the attendance of witnesses or their<br />
punishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the courts of the<br />
United States. 161<br />
C. Pre-Hearing Issues<br />
If there are issues relating to discovery, confidentiality, or difficult<br />
and contentious issues, it may be necessary to hold a pre-hearing<br />
conference. An extra hearing is contrary to the “economy” objective of<br />
arbitration. Arbitration is supposed to be quicker, more efficient, and less<br />
costly than a trial. However, a pre-hearing conference held weeks before<br />
the arbitration may be necessary to deal with difficult preliminary issues,<br />
“to specify the issues to be resolved [or] to stipulate uncontested<br />
facts,” 162 or to deal with myriad of disagreements which can arise prior<br />
157. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, § 17(a) (2000).<br />
158. Id.<br />
159. Id. § 17(f).<br />
160. MINN. STAT. § 572.14 (2004).<br />
161. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2004); see Robert E. Benson, The Power of Arbitrators and<br />
Courts to Order Discovery in Arbitration—Part II, 25-MAR. COLO. LAW 35, 36-37<br />
(Mar. 1996).<br />
162. American Arbitration Association, Patent Arbitration Rules, R-9 (July 1,<br />
2003), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=26401 (last visited Dec. 8, 2005)
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 41<br />
to the arbitration hearing. The American Arbitration Association<br />
recognizes that a preliminary hearing may be necessary,<br />
[T]he arbitrator may, at the preliminary hearing, establish (i) the<br />
extent of and schedule for the production of relevant documents<br />
and other information, (ii) the identification of any witnesses to be<br />
called and (iii) a schedule for further hearings to resolve the<br />
dispute. 163<br />
The Pre-Hearing Conference might be held months, weeks, or days<br />
before the arbitration hearing.<br />
Confidentiality issues can arise during the pre-hearing phase. For<br />
example, in labor arbitration, one of the parties may be seeking private<br />
data protected by Government Data Practices laws. Many data practice<br />
laws in the U.S. give authority to arbitrators to issue subpoenas and hold<br />
hearings prior to an arbitration to determine if special protection needs to<br />
be given to the data. 164<br />
[hereinafter AAA Patent Arbitration Rules]; see also AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-<br />
20.<br />
163. AAA Patent Arbitration Rules, supra note 162, R-9.<br />
164. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 6 (2004). The Minnesota Statute<br />
states:<br />
If a state agency, political subdivision, or statewide system opposes discovery of<br />
government data or release of data pursuant to court order on the grounds that the<br />
data are classified as not public, the party that seeks access to the data may bring<br />
before the appropriate presiding judicial officer, arbitrator, or administrative law<br />
judge an action to compel discovery or an action in the nature of an action to<br />
compel discovery.<br />
The presiding officer shall first decide whether the data are discoverable or<br />
releasable pursuant to the rules of evidence and of criminal, civil, or administrative<br />
procedure appropriate to the action.<br />
If the data are discoverable the presiding officer shall decide whether the benefit to<br />
the party seeking access to the data outweighs any harm to the confidentiality<br />
interests of the agency maintaining the data, or of any person who has provided the<br />
data or who is the subject of the data, or to the privacy interest of an individual<br />
identified in the data. In making the decision, the presiding officer shall consider<br />
whether notice to the subject of the data is warranted and, if warranted, what type<br />
of notice must be given. The presiding officer may fashion and issue any protective<br />
orders necessary to assure proper handling of the data by the parties. If the data are<br />
a videotape of a child victim or alleged victim alleging, explaining, denying, or<br />
describing an act of physical or sexual abuse, the presiding officer shall consider<br />
the provisions of section 611A.90, subdivision 2, paragraph (b).<br />
Id.; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(b)(5) (2004). The California Code provides<br />
that:<br />
A provider of health care, a health care service plan, or a contractor shall disclose
42 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
A pre-hearing conference may be required to deal with<br />
“arbitrability”—whether the dispute is actually subject to arbitration.<br />
Does the arbitrator have authority to determine if the dispute is<br />
arbitrable? Courts are in disagreement concerning the question of who<br />
determines “arbitrability.” Does the arbitrator at a pre-hearing<br />
conference determine the answer or does a court? Some courts have held<br />
that arbitrators are to make determinations relating to arbitrability. 165 In<br />
international law, the concept of kompetenz-kompetenz permits the<br />
arbitrator to determine his or her own competence over this primary<br />
jurisdictional matter. 166 U.S. courts favor assigning the duty to the<br />
courts, but allow the parties to assign determination of jurisdictional<br />
matters to the arbitrator via the arbitration clause itself, 167 whereas<br />
medical information if the disclosure is compelled by . . . an arbitrator or arbitrator<br />
panel, when arbitration is lawfully requested by either party, pursuant to a<br />
subpoena duces tecum issued under Section 1282.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure,<br />
or any other provision authorizing discovery in a proceeding before an arbitrator or<br />
arbitration panel.<br />
Id.<br />
165. See Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp., 197 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Minn. 1972)<br />
(overruled on other grounds). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that:<br />
(1) If the parties evinced a clear intent to arbitrate a controversy arising out of<br />
specific provisions of the contract, the matter is for the arbitrators to determine and<br />
not the court. (2) If the intention of the parties is reasonably debatable as to the<br />
scope of the arbitration clause, the issue of arbitrability is to be initially determined<br />
by the arbitrators subject to the rights of either party [to submit an application<br />
requesting that the court vacate the award].<br />
Id.<br />
166. See LEW ET AL., supra note 81, at 332-34; STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL,<br />
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS 2 (Cambridge Univ.<br />
Press 1987).<br />
167. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Allstate Ins.<br />
Co. v. Stinebaugh, 824 A.2d 87, 94 (Md. 2003) (quoting Gold Coast Mall Inc. v.<br />
Larmar Corp., 468 A.2d 91, 95-97 (Md. 1983)). The Maryland Supreme Court<br />
delegated the responsibility for determining arbitrability differently than the<br />
Minnesota court, stating that:<br />
[I]f an arbitration clause is clear, it is initially for the courts to determine whether<br />
the subject matter of a dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration clause. . . [I]f<br />
an arbitration clause is unclear “as to whether the subject matter of the dispute falls<br />
within the scope of the arbitration agreement,” the question of arbitrability<br />
ordinarily should be left to the arbitrator.<br />
Id. (internal citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court took an all<br />
together different approach, stating that “[t]he question whether parties have<br />
submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question of arbitrability,’ is<br />
‘an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 43<br />
international courts favor allowing the arbitrator to determine<br />
jurisdictional issues. 168<br />
Another important concept which works in tandem with kompetenzkompetenz<br />
is the “separability” doctrine. This doctrine states that the<br />
arbitration clause is enforceable, separate and distinct from the remainder<br />
of the contract, and survives a finding that the contract is void unless the<br />
arbitration clause itself is found to be invalid. 169 In June 2005, the<br />
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cardegna v Buckeye<br />
Check Cashing, Inc. to determine this important question of<br />
“separability” and who has the authority to determine “arbitrability,” the<br />
arbitrator or a judge. 170<br />
The arbitrator’s authority is derived from the contract, which serves<br />
as the basis for the arbitrator’s jurisdiction in arbitration proceedings. 171<br />
In the absence of a valid, binding agreement in writing or a court<br />
mandate to go to arbitration, the arbitrator is without power to hear the<br />
case. 172 Agreements not properly ratified, procured by fraud, or expired<br />
are not valid agreements and, therefore, may deprive the arbitrator of<br />
authority to hear the case. 173 In other words, the case is not “arbitrable.”<br />
In situations where the contract was procured through fraud, however,<br />
the “separability doctrine” permits the arbitration clause to stand alone,<br />
unless the fraud goes also to the making of the arbitration clause itself. 174<br />
provide otherwise.’” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 531 U.S. 79, 79<br />
(2003) (quoting AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643,<br />
649 (1986)).<br />
168. See LEW ET AL., supra note 81, at 330-32.<br />
169. CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 20-21.<br />
170. Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2005), cert.<br />
granted, 125 S. Ct. 2937 (U.S. 2005) (arguing that allowing arbitration clause to<br />
survive otherwise void and illegal contract would be wrong result).<br />
171. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 88. The United States Court of Appeals for the<br />
Seventh Circuit noted that “arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes<br />
from the prior agreement of the parties to submit their grievances to arbitration.”<br />
Int’l Med. Group, Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 312 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir.<br />
2002) (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S.<br />
643, 648 (1986)).<br />
172. Id. at 88-89; see First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943<br />
(1995). Justice Breyer noted that “arbitration is simply a matter of contract between<br />
the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes—but only those disputes—that the<br />
parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.” Id.<br />
173. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.<br />
174. SCHWEBEL, supra note 166, at 2-3. Under the “separability doctrine,” when<br />
“a dispute arises concerning the initial validity or continued existence of the main<br />
contract, the arbitration clause, being independent, continues to be valid and binding
44 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
Another issue relating to arbitrability, which may require<br />
consideration at a pre-hearing conference, involves whether parties are<br />
free to submit statutory claims to arbitration. Statutory claims may be<br />
the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the<br />
FAA. 175 The United States Supreme Court has held that antitrust 176 and<br />
RICO 177 claims are among the statutory claims that parties may agree to<br />
arbitrate. The Court said “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a<br />
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only<br />
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” 178<br />
At the pre-hearing conference, an arbitrator may be tempted to put<br />
on a mediator’s hat. Should an arbitrator attempt to mediate a dispute<br />
during pre-arbitration hearings? Should he/she use med-arb as a<br />
technique? There is much debate on the matter. Most arbitrators avoid<br />
on the parties even if the main contract is void.” Janet A. Rosen, Arbitration Under<br />
Private International <strong>Law</strong>: The Doctrines of Separability and Competence de la<br />
Competence, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 599, 607 (1994). For the arbitration clause to<br />
be struck down, the fraud must go to the making of the arbitration clause itself. See<br />
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967) (stating<br />
that arbitration clauses “are ‘separable’ from the contracts in which they are<br />
embedded, and that where no claim is made that fraud was directed to the<br />
arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause will be held to encompass<br />
arbitration of the claim that the contract itself was induced by fraud”); Republic of<br />
Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 477 (9th Cir. 1991); Sauer-Getriebe<br />
KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1983).<br />
175. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). The Court<br />
in Gilmer stated that “[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of<br />
an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.” Id. at 26. The Court<br />
held that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act were arbitrable.<br />
Id. at 35. See also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 (2002) (holding<br />
that claims brought by employee against employer may be subject to arbitration<br />
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, but such arbitration does not interfere<br />
with the EEOC’s right to bring a claim in court on behalf of the employee);<br />
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 619-20<br />
(1985) (holding that claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act are arbitrable).<br />
176. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 629 (recognizing that “concerns of<br />
international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals,<br />
and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability<br />
in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement [to<br />
arbitrate their antitrust claims]”).<br />
177. Shearson /Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987)<br />
(finding “no basis for concluding that Congress intended to prevent enforcement of<br />
agreements to arbitrate RICO claims,” and thus, a “RICO claim is arbitrable under<br />
the terms of the [Federal] Arbitration Act”).<br />
178. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 534 U.S. at 628.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 45<br />
attempting to mediate the dispute. 179 But some commentators argue that<br />
it is appropriate for the arbitrator to assume the hybrid role of<br />
mediator/arbitrator, 180 especially during the pre-hearing conference. 181<br />
VII. THE HEARING<br />
A. The Place<br />
An arbitration hearing can be scheduled anywhere in the world. 182<br />
Considerations similar to those for “forum non conveniens” govern the<br />
selection of an appropriate place for an arbitration. The Supreme Court<br />
set forth factors used to determine “forum non conveniens,” including:<br />
[T]he relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of<br />
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of<br />
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of<br />
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other<br />
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and<br />
inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability<br />
of a judgment if one is obtained. 183<br />
Arbitration proceedings are not limited, like a trial, to a courtroom.<br />
They can be held in any convenient place. Arbitration proceedings can<br />
be held in a principal place of business, a hotel, a conference center, a<br />
lawyer’s office, or any other place that is convenient for the parties and<br />
the arbitrator. If the parties are working with an arbitration agency, such<br />
as the AAA, ICC, or LCIA, there are facilities provided by the agency.<br />
179. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 10-11 (criticizing the evolution of<br />
arbitration beyond the traditional process, and med-arb specifically).<br />
180. See JOHN W. COOLEY, ARBITRATION ADVOCACY 3 (2d ed. 2003).<br />
181. Id. at 90. For more information on med-arb, see JOHN W. COOLEY,<br />
MEDIATION ADVOCACY § 1.1 (2d ed. 2002). Med-arb (mediation-arbitration) is a<br />
hybrid process in which the parties first mediate their dispute with the assistance of<br />
a third-party neutral. Id. Once mediation is completed, the parties submit any<br />
unresolved issues to arbitration. Id. The same party may conduct both the<br />
mediation and arbitration, or the parties may select a different neutral to conduct the<br />
arbitration. Id. Med-arb is different than traditional mediation because “it gives the<br />
mediator the power to decide the matter for the parties if they are unable to do so<br />
themselves. Med-arb also differs from traditional arbitration because the mediator’s<br />
role extends past that of serving only as a private judge.” Christopher Honeyman &<br />
Ellen A. Waldman, San Diego Moveable East: Competition in Cooperation-<br />
Building, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 173, 185 (2004).<br />
182. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).<br />
183. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
46 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
The site of ad-hoc arbitration will most often be the arbitrator’s office,<br />
the office of one of the parties, or a rented conference room. 184<br />
Given the nature of the arbitration process, additional factors should<br />
be taken into consideration in determining the most convenient location<br />
for an arbitration, including neutrality, formality, and cost. Because the<br />
parties may choose any convenient place, neutrality of the situs of the<br />
arbitration can be at issue. Some advocates prefer that the hearing<br />
always be held in a neutral place. To other advocates, neutrality of place<br />
is not important, as long as the location is convenient to all parties. Cost<br />
is an important consideration, keeping in mind that the purpose of<br />
arbitration is to reduce the time and cost spent on resolving the<br />
dispute. 185 To reduce time and travel expenses, parties can choose a<br />
forum that is close to the parties. If the parties rent a conference room in<br />
a hotel, they will split the cost of the room unless the contract specifies<br />
something different. Formality can be an issue. The environment should<br />
be conducive to a dignified arbitration hearing; there is a danger if the<br />
place is too informal. For example, “arbitrations held in hotel rooms,<br />
offices, union halls, or other places associated with non-judicial business<br />
can increase the likelihood that the proceeding will degenerate from a<br />
true hearing into a free form meeting.” 186<br />
Generally, parties to a dispute are responsible for deciding on a<br />
location that is acceptable to both parties. As an alternative, parties may<br />
choose to have the arbitration administered by an agency, such as the<br />
AAA; in which case, a Case Manager will be assigned to the arbitration<br />
proceedings and will talk with the parties and reach a decision as to the<br />
location, time, and date of the arbitration hearing. 187 Factors the AAA<br />
184. Glen Spencer, Administered vs. Non-administered Arbitration, 54 DISP.<br />
RESOL. J. 42, 46 (Feb. 1999). In ad-hoc arbitration:<br />
[T]he arbitrator’s offices are most commonly used. Sometimes, hotel<br />
conference rooms are rented for the hearing when no other option exists.<br />
From time to time, parties complain that the arbitrator conducts too much<br />
other business during the hearing day, thus delaying the proceedings. The<br />
likelihood of this happening is highest if the arbitrator is hosting the<br />
hearing at his or her office.<br />
Id.<br />
185. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers,<br />
Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 445-49<br />
(1992).<br />
186. Hart & Wolf, supra note 107, at 1441.<br />
187. Michael D. Young, Endispute Rules and Procedures, in LITIGATION 1993,<br />
at 241, 245 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H4-5177,
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 47<br />
considers important in determining an appropriate place for an arbitration<br />
proceeding include:<br />
(1) [T]he convenience of the location (e.g., availability of<br />
witnesses, local counsel, transportation, hotels, meeting facilities,<br />
court reporters, etc.); (2) the available pool of qualified arbitrators<br />
within the geographical area; and (3) the applicable procedural<br />
and substantive law. Of particular importance in international<br />
cases is the applicability of a convention providing for recognition<br />
and enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards and the<br />
arbitration regime at the chosen site. 188<br />
B. Marking Exhibits and Other Preliminary Matters<br />
Because arbitration is intended to be less formal than litigation, the<br />
Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure<br />
applicable in a trial do not apply; unless, of course, the parties agree they<br />
should apply. It is typical for the advocates to come to the hearing with<br />
exhibits for the arbitration hearing. It is efficient to pre-mark the exhibits<br />
in advance. For example, the claimant’s exhibits may be marked C1-<br />
C20, while the respondent’s exhibits may be marked R1-R12. Before the<br />
hearing, the parties should agree on joint exhibits, J1-J5. The premarking<br />
of exhibits and the agreement on joint exhibits makes the<br />
hearing more efficient, a key objective in arbitration. Once the hearing<br />
begins, proper foundation should be laid, after which the advocate should<br />
1993).<br />
188. AAA, Drafting Arbitration Clauses, supra note 45. Without recognition of<br />
an award in an international jurisdiction, the award obviously can not be enforced.<br />
International recognition and enforcement are facilitated by the United Nations<br />
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New<br />
York Convention):<br />
[The Convention] was prepared and entered into force in 1959. As of October<br />
1994, ratifications and accessions to the New York Convention totaled 101<br />
countries. The New York Convention provides for mutual recognition and<br />
enforcement of arbitral awards by contracting states, and limits the defenses that<br />
may be raised in opposition to the confirmation of an award, in an attempt to<br />
eliminate duplicative litigation following an arbitration. The New York<br />
Convention applies to awards made in the territory of a state other than the state in<br />
which the recognition and enforcement of the award is sought, as well as to<br />
“arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the state where the<br />
recognition and enforcement are sought.”<br />
Slate, supra note 122, at 44.
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offer the exhibit into evidence. 189<br />
C. The Evidence<br />
Arbitrators typically are not bound by State or Federal Rules of<br />
Evidence. 190 Fundamental Fairness (Due Process) 191 requires that parties<br />
be afforded the opportunity to present evidence 192 and defenses. 193 The<br />
evidence at an arbitration hearing consists of testimony, paper exhibits,<br />
the contract (with the arbitration clause), and real evidence, such as<br />
examples of the shoddy merchandise. “Arbitrators are not bound to hear<br />
all the evidence tendered by the parties; they need only afford each party<br />
the opportunity to present their arguments and evidence.” 194 But the best<br />
practice is to allow the parties to present the evidence they think is<br />
important. 195<br />
The arbitrator judges on the “weight and materiality of documentary<br />
evidence.” 196 Because an arbitrator need not admit all evidence<br />
presented by the parties, an arbitrator may exclude repetitious,<br />
defamatory, or irrelevant evidence. The arbitrator may exclude hearsay<br />
(e.g., “he said, that she said, that he said”) evidence upon objection of the<br />
other side. Some arbitrators will permit all evidence “for what it’s<br />
worth.” Because of Section 10 of the FAA, arbitrators will typically<br />
189. David Crystal II, Anatomy of an Arbitration Case, in SECURITIES<br />
ARBITRATION 1996, at 337, 362 (PLI Corporate <strong>Law</strong>, Course Handbook Series No.<br />
B4-7147, 1996).<br />
190. AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-31.<br />
191. See AAA, Due Process Protocol, supra note 42. Arbitration due process in<br />
the labor and employment setting is also now described as “industrial due process.”<br />
See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) (requiring<br />
“industrial due process”); ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 35, at 967 (stating<br />
“arbitrators have fashioned an ‘industrial due process’ doctrine” in dealing<br />
discipline and discharge cases).<br />
192. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) (stating that “[t]he right to a<br />
hearing embraces . . . the right to present evidence”).<br />
193. Am. Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932) (recognizing that “[d]ue<br />
process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available defense”).<br />
194. Terk Techs. Corp. v. Dockery, 86 F. Supp. 2d 706, 709 (E.D. Mich. 2000).<br />
195. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). Awards may be vacated “where the arbitrators were<br />
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause<br />
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or<br />
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.”<br />
Id.<br />
196. Kent B. Scott, Arbitration Advocacy Part Two: The Arbitration Hearing,<br />
15-NOV UTAH B.J. 20, 21 (2002); see also Hart & Wolf, supra note 107, at 1448-<br />
49.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 49<br />
accept whatever evidence the parties think is necessary to prove their<br />
case. 197<br />
D. Theory of the Case<br />
The “theory of the case” is an appealing story of what really<br />
happened. The theory of the case should be one or two sentences, which<br />
encapsulate the essence of the case. It must grab the attention of the<br />
arbitrator, so that the arbitrator wants to award the advocate the decision<br />
as soon as it is spoken. The theory of the case is a “sound bite” which<br />
appeals to the listener. It is the architecture of the case. It takes all the<br />
facts of the case and uses them, the good with the bad, to construct an<br />
appealing work of art. Think of the theory of the case like the work of an<br />
architect. You have a given set of facts to build an appealing edifice.<br />
You must use the good bricks (facts) and the bad bricks (facts) to wind<br />
up with a visually appealing building. Your theory of the case should<br />
incorporate all the facts. “What really happened.” It is your version of<br />
what happened. Start by listing the good facts (left side) and the bad<br />
facts (right side) on a sheet of paper. Draw a line across the top and think<br />
of a one or two sentence theory which incorporates all of them. Write<br />
the theory across the top of the facts. It should be pithy, appealing, and<br />
rhetorical. Here is an example: “This case is about a good employee<br />
who lost his job because someone wrote an anonymous letter saying he<br />
was blind. Yet his own eye doctor says he can do the job.” Its not about<br />
“disability discrimination,” it is about a person. The case is about “a<br />
good worker who did and can do the job.” The theory and theme should<br />
be emotionally compelling. 198 You should present a “theory of the case”<br />
in every arbitration proceeding: “[The theory of the case] must seize the<br />
moral ground by showing that your client is the ‘good guy’ that needs<br />
and deserves the [arbitrator’s] help.” 199 The more attractive and realistic<br />
theory, the one that fits the actual evidence, the more likely it is that the<br />
arbitrator will adopt your story as what really happened. The theory of<br />
the case is the driving point of the case. It determines the questions you<br />
ask on direct and cross examination. Each witness is used to obtain<br />
evidence which supports your theory of the case. Even on cross<br />
examination, the opponent’s witnesses are used to get from them, to the<br />
197. Hart & Wolf, supra note 107, at 1448.<br />
198. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 509 (Aspen <strong>Law</strong> & Bus., 6th ed.<br />
2002).<br />
199. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIALS 8 (Aspen Publishers 2005).
50 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
extent possible, evidence which supports the theory of your case. The<br />
opening and closing arguments apply the facts to your theory of the case.<br />
E. Opening Statement<br />
It is traditional for the advocates in an arbitration hearing to make<br />
opening statements. Opening statements should explain the “theory of<br />
the case” and give an overview of what the advocate will do. Who goes<br />
first—the claimant or the respondent? The rule of thumb is—whoever<br />
carries the burden of proof goes first in the opening statement and last in<br />
the closing statement. 200 The opening statement should educate the<br />
arbitrator as to the applicable law, alert him/her to the claimant and the<br />
respondent, and summarize the dispute. 201 Parties should refrain from<br />
absolutes; instead, general terms are most appropriate. 202 The theory of<br />
the case should be explained in the opening, and the evidence which<br />
supports the theory should be emphasized. Remember, the arbitrator is<br />
most open at the beginning of the case. Do not waive an opening<br />
statement. “Primacy” is also important. A case can be won in the<br />
opening if it is done effectively. 203 The arbitrator may be moved toward<br />
the claimant’s or the respondent’s side at the very beginning of the<br />
arbitration hearing; it may be hard to move the arbitrator back from that<br />
point. Think of the opening as a first chance to convince the arbitrator<br />
that the advocate’s side of the case is most compelling. In fact, the<br />
opening should be a somewhat less argumentative form of the closing,<br />
with the intention of convincing the arbitrator at the start of the case.<br />
Remember, the arbitration, while not a trial, is still an adversarial<br />
hearing. Only one side will win.<br />
F. Burden of Proof<br />
In the United States, the burden of proof is carried by the<br />
200. Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Anthony V. Sinicropi, Improving the Arbitration<br />
Process: A Primer For Advocates, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 463, 480-81 (Summer<br />
1991).<br />
201. Theodore A. Krebsbach, Openings, Summations and Legal Briefs:<br />
Techniques and Strategies, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1994, at 531, 535-56 (PLI<br />
Corporate <strong>Law</strong> Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-7072, 1994).<br />
202. Id. at 538-39.<br />
203. See John J. Eannance, An Art—Not a Science: A Criminal <strong>Law</strong>yers<br />
Perspective on Opening, NBA MAG., November/December, 1997, at 41<br />
(commenting that studies indicate that in 80% of jury trials, the party who is favored<br />
by the jury after opening statements wins).
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 51<br />
plaintiff/claimant in three different ways:<br />
1. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence;<br />
2. Proof by clear and convincing evidence;<br />
3. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt.<br />
In arbitration, the person who is claiming a violation of the contract<br />
usually carries the burden of proof. The claimant must convince the<br />
arbitrator by either a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and<br />
convincing evidence that the other side has breached the contract. Most<br />
arbitrators will use the preponderance of the evidence as the burden of<br />
proof required. 204 Some arbitrators will hold that, if the loss the claimant<br />
faces, e.g., loss of a job, is great, or the conduct charged is a crime, the<br />
employer must meet a higher burden of proof, i.e., clear and convincing<br />
evidence, or even beyond a reasonable doubt. 205<br />
In arbitration, the burden of proof is thought to consist of “two<br />
separate components: (1) the initial burden of going forward with the<br />
evidence; and (2) the burden of persuading the trier of fact concerning<br />
the ultimate resolution of some fact or issue. In both instances, the<br />
burden may depend upon the nature of the issue, the specific contract<br />
provision, or a usage established by the parties.” 206<br />
The burden of proof and the party carrying the burden may vary<br />
depending upon the nature of the breach. Some arbitrators require clear<br />
and convincing evidence if the result of the breach of contract is<br />
dramatic. For example, in a labor arbitration, if the worker has lost his or<br />
her job and is claiming that the employer violated a union contract by not<br />
having “just cause” to terminate, the burden of proof will rest with the<br />
employer to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it had just cause<br />
to terminate the employee. In this case, the burden is switched to the<br />
employer even though the employee is claiming a violation of the<br />
contract. The employer has the burden to prove the positive—that the<br />
employer had just cause to terminate the employee, rather than the<br />
employee having the burden to prove the negative—that the employer<br />
did not have just cause.<br />
204. Deborah J. Crumb & Kenneth Jennings, Resolving Cases of Patient Abuse<br />
in Health-Care Facilities, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 36, 39-40 (Feb. 1998).<br />
205. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 35, at 949-52.<br />
206. Hill & Sinicropi, supra note 200, at 491.
52 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
G. Swearing the Witnesses<br />
It is traditional for witnesses to take an oath promising they will tell<br />
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Rule 27 of the<br />
American Arbitration Association Rules of Commercial Arbitration<br />
states, “[t]he arbitrator may require witnesses to testify under oath<br />
administered by any duly qualified person and, if it is required by law or<br />
requested by any party, shall do so.” 207 The Uniform Arbitration Act<br />
gives arbitrators in the states authority to administer such oaths. 208 The<br />
witness is asked to swear or affirm under the penalty of perjury that what<br />
he or she says is true. If a witness lies, the arbitrator does not have the<br />
authority to prosecute the witness, but the arbitrator can present the<br />
evidence to the prosecuting authorities if the arbitrator thinks the witness<br />
has perjured himself. 209<br />
H. Out of Sequence Witnesses<br />
It is not uncommon in arbitration hearings for the advocates to call<br />
witnesses as they wish for the sake of convenience. Arbitration is much<br />
more flexible than a trial, so it is common to permit out of sequence<br />
witnesses to testify with the arbitrator’s approval. Sometimes a witness<br />
is only available at a certain time. So, for example, even though the<br />
claimant has not put in his or her case-in-chief through all his witnesses,<br />
the respondent may ask to call a witness because it is the only time the<br />
witness is available.<br />
I. Direct Examination<br />
Whoever carries the burden of proof calls the first witness. The<br />
207. AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-25.<br />
208. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 17(a), as amended 2000, 7 U.L.A. 36 (Supp.<br />
2004).<br />
209. Brian N. Smiley, The <strong>Law</strong> and Ethics of Witness Preparation, in SECURITIES<br />
ARBITRATION 1998, at 659, 669-70 (PLI Corporate <strong>Law</strong> Practice, Course Handbook<br />
Series No. B0-001K, 1998) (recognizing that “[a]rbitrations are not considered<br />
federal proceedings under the federal perjury statutes. Nonetheless, since testimony<br />
is taken under oath, arbitration testimony may be covered by state perjury statutes,<br />
and false evidence in arbitrations can result in prosecution under other federal<br />
acts”); see United States v. Coyle, No. 1S 93 Cr. 68 (SS), 1993 WL 378332, at *1<br />
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1993) (unreported case) (involving a case charging defendant<br />
“with engaging in a conspiracy to deprive [plaintiff] of her right to recover<br />
moneys . . . in the course of her arbitration proceeding through the use of a forged<br />
document and perjurious testimony”).
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 53<br />
witness is sworn and asked a series of questions. Direct examination<br />
questions are usually wide open questions starting with “who,” “what,”<br />
“when,” “where,” “how,” and “why.” For example: “Where were you?”<br />
“What happened that day?” “Why did you file for arbitration?” The<br />
focus is on the witness during direct exam. The focus should not be on<br />
the advocate who is asking the short questions. The witness should be<br />
making the music. The advocate is simply asking the questions so the<br />
evidence can come in through the witness. The objective is for the<br />
witness to explain on direct examination through questions what<br />
happened. The advocate is the conductor but the witness is the musician.<br />
J. Use of Visuals<br />
“Ours is the age of visual media.” 210 Social science research<br />
supports the shift from auditory to visual in learning and retention. 211<br />
“Show and tell” also works with arbitrators. In every arbitration, there<br />
are one or two critical exhibits: language from the contract, a location,<br />
and a physical object. The exhibit can become the center of attention.<br />
Diagrams, models, maps, drawings and demonstrations by witnesses,<br />
computer-generated graphics and three dimensional simulations can be<br />
worth a thousand words. They can be powerful. “[S]tudies confirm that<br />
if information is presented through multiple ‘channels’—aural, written,<br />
and visual—understanding and memory are again substantially<br />
improved. In short, visual exhibits are important not only in presenting<br />
new information in an attractive, memorable way, but also in<br />
highlighting and summarizing information already presented through<br />
another medium.” 212<br />
K. Cross Examination<br />
Once the witness has finished on direct examination, the opposing<br />
advocate has an opportunity to cross examine the witness. Crossexamination<br />
“is the greatest engine ever invented for the discovery of<br />
truth,” proclaims Professor Irving Younger. 213 Cross-examination is<br />
designed to elicit information from the witness which supports the theory<br />
of your case; and to attack and weaken the other party’s case and the<br />
210. MAUET, supra note 198, at 167.<br />
211. Id.<br />
212. Id.<br />
213. IRVING R. YOUNGER, AN IRREVERENT INTRODUCTION TO HEARSAY 2 (ABA<br />
1977).
54 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
credibility of the other party. 214 Usually the cross-examiner is eliciting<br />
information from the witness which supports the theory of the crossexaminer’s<br />
case.<br />
Cross examination questions should be closed, controlled questions<br />
in which the advocate is seeking a “yes” or “no” answer. For example,<br />
“You signed the contract, didn’t you?” “You understood you were<br />
obligating yourself and your company when you signed the contract?”<br />
“You did not make the list of reasons until after you terminated the<br />
contract, did you?” Sometimes the cross-examiner might ask a wideopen<br />
question like “why.” The best practice in arbitration, however, is<br />
for the cross-examiner to ask a series of controlled questions to bring out<br />
the specific and precise points through the witness that he or she wishes<br />
to highlight. Typically, don’t ask “why” or “how” or other direct<br />
examination questions. Ask questions which take from the witness, to<br />
the extent possible, all the facts the witness has which support the cross<br />
examiner’s theory of the case. On cross examination highlight the<br />
information the witness has which supports the examiners theory of the<br />
case. It is important when an advocate cross examines a witness, the<br />
advocate is absolutely sure as to what his or her theory of the case is.<br />
“For maximum effect, the questions on cross-examination should be<br />
crisp and short . . . [S]hort pauses can focus [the arbitrator’s] attention on<br />
the questions and answers more fully than if the cross-examination<br />
questions are fired at the witness in rapid succession.” 215 Be very civil.<br />
Ask questions in a calm, respectful manner. Do not attack the witness.<br />
If the witness being cross examined does not answer the question you<br />
just asked, simply blame yourself in the way you asked the question and<br />
ask it exactly the same way only more gently. “I am sorry if I asked the<br />
question so you did not understand it, you read this contract when you<br />
signed it, didn’t you?”<br />
L. Redirect Examination<br />
Once cross examination is finished, the advocate who originally<br />
called the witness has an opportunity for redirect examination to clarify<br />
any points the advocate wishes, which were brought out on cross-<br />
214. Rt. Hon. Lord Mackay, The Advocate: Should He Speak or Write?, 60<br />
FORDHAM L. REV. 953, 959-60 (1992).<br />
215. David E. Robbins, Discovery and Hearing Presentation Techniques, in<br />
SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1992, at 545, 578 (PLI Corporate <strong>Law</strong> Practice, Course<br />
Handbook Series No. B4-7006, 1992) (quoting CRAIG A. PETERSON & CLAIRE<br />
MCCARTHY, ARBITRATION STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUE (1986)).
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 55<br />
examination. The redirect examination should only address what was<br />
brought out in cross-examination. The redirect examination is not<br />
intended to be a restatement of the direct examination. The goal is to<br />
narrow the scope of the witness’ testimony.<br />
M. Re-Cross Examination<br />
Once the redirect examination is finished, the opposing lawyer has<br />
an opportunity to re-cross examine the witness. Again, the re-cross<br />
examination is intended to be very narrow. It is intended to be limited to<br />
only those issues that were raised on redirect examination.<br />
N. Hyper-Aggressive Advocates<br />
It is with the right combination of reason and emotion that an<br />
advocate can be most effective. 216 “Many opinions have been expressed<br />
from time to time about the character of the highest advocacy and the<br />
highest oratory. It would seem to be the view of those best qualified to<br />
judge that simplicity of speech, linked with the expression of the deepest<br />
feelings of mankind, has always had the power to stir men’s blood in all<br />
ages of the world’s history.” 217 For this reason, in arbitration, the hyperaggressive<br />
advocate is less effective than the advocate who is civil.<br />
Civility is essential for the effective and efficient operation of an<br />
arbitration hearing. Some advocates do not recognize the value of<br />
civility as an effective advocacy tool and display excessive aggression<br />
that disrupts the arbitration hearing. For example, some advocates use<br />
hyper-aggressive methods in their questioning. “If you weren’t lying,<br />
you would know, wouldn’t you, that the light was green?” The other<br />
advocate is offended and attacks the behavior in words, tone, and anger.<br />
In an attempt to control such aggression from both sides, one method<br />
used by experienced arbitrators is to take a break and ask to speak to the<br />
advocates. Out of the hearing of the parties and witnesses, the arbitrator<br />
may simply tell the hyper-aggressive advocate that he/she is making a<br />
bad impression on the arbitrator, the decision-maker. The arbitrator can<br />
repeat back to the advocate what he/she said, and tell the advocate that, if<br />
the advocate is doing this to impress the client, then the arbitrator<br />
understands. But if the advocate is doing this to impress the arbitrator, it<br />
216. John C. Shephard & Jordan Cherrick, Advocacy and Emotion, 138 F.R.D.<br />
619, 619 (1991).<br />
217. Id. at 620 (quoting NORMAN BIRKETT, SIX GREAT ADVOCATES 109-10<br />
(Penguin Books 1961)).
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is not working. An arbitrator may deal with the situation by simply<br />
refraining from taking notes when the hyper-aggressive advocate<br />
continues the behavior. If the hyper-aggressive advocate is acting in<br />
such a fashion to impress his or her client, so be it. It is important to<br />
remember that such aggression will not help the aggressive party’s case<br />
and, more often than not, be detrimental.<br />
O. Closing Arguments versus Post-Hearing Briefs<br />
As stated by Francis Bacon, “[r]eading maketh a full man;<br />
conference a ready man; and writing an exact man.” 218 In traditional<br />
arbitration hearings in the United States, the parties choose either oral<br />
closing arguments or post-hearing briefs. In deciding between a closing<br />
argument and a post-hearing brief, the parties should consider the nature<br />
of the dispute and the benefits of using one form over the other.<br />
A closing argument allows the advocates to summarize the<br />
evidence, apply the evidence to the theory of the case, and argue the<br />
result the advocate thinks the arbitrator should reach. The parties may<br />
prefer an oral closing argument because of the time and cost involved in<br />
preparing a post-hearing brief; plus the postponement of the decision as a<br />
result of the extra time required to prepare a brief. 219 A post-hearing<br />
brief may be helpful in dealing with complicated cases which have lasted<br />
for more than several days. 220 Post-hearing briefs are useful because<br />
they allow the advocates to summarize the evidence in writing and argue<br />
their respective positions. Post-hearing briefs allow the advocates to<br />
research and cite relevant arbitration precedent and court cases, if<br />
applicable.<br />
218. Mackay, supra note 214, at 954.<br />
219. See Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Arbitration Statistics<br />
Fiscal Year 2004, Oct. 5, 2004, available at http://www.fmcs.gov/assets/files/Avera<br />
geDays.doc (last visited Dec. 8, 2005). The average time for submitting a posthearing<br />
brief has increased from 31.0 days in fiscal 1990 to 65.31 days in fiscal<br />
2004. Id. Despite the increased time and cost associated with submitting a brief,<br />
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service “Arbitration Statistics Fiscal 2004”<br />
reports that briefs were filed in 2,094 of 2,581 cases, or in 81.1% of the cases. See<br />
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Arbitration Statistics Fiscal Year 2004,<br />
Oct. 5, 2004, available at http://www.fmcs.gov/assets/files/IssesBriefsTranscriptsW<br />
aivers.doc (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).<br />
220. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 32.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 57<br />
VIII. THE DECISION<br />
A. Use of the Contract, the <strong>Law</strong>, and Public Policy<br />
Arbitrators have great latitude when rendering a decision and can<br />
decide cases based on their own subjective notions of justice and equity,<br />
disregarding substantive law. 221 It is argued that arbitrators should base<br />
their decision on the four corners of the contract. 222 In some<br />
circumstances, however, arbitrators might want to take into account<br />
substantive law and public policy in making determinations. 223<br />
Arbitrators who favor the contract as the basis of the decision view the<br />
221. See, e.g., Hill v. Cloud, 648 So. 2d 1383, 1389 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting<br />
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association) (stating that<br />
“[t]he arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and<br />
equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties”).<br />
222. See Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141,<br />
147 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 31,<br />
933 F.2d 225, 226-28 (4th Cir.1991)) (stating that, “[a]lthough we may disagree<br />
with an arbitrator’s interpretation of a contract, we must uphold it as long as it<br />
‘draws its essence from the agreement’”); In re Copaz Packing Corp., 105 LA 1074<br />
(Feldman 1995):<br />
“[T]he language of the four corners of the agreement are generally the only<br />
language that can be dealt with when an arbitrator determines the result in a labor<br />
arbitration matter. There are a few exceptions to that general rule but those<br />
exceptions do not apply in this particular case. The language of the contract of<br />
collective bargaining revealed the wages to be paid to a group of individuals who<br />
have already reached the applicable base labor rate and a wage will be paid to job<br />
entry personnel. Wages are a creature of the contract. In other words, evidence<br />
outside the four corners of the agreement, unless it is specifically referred in the<br />
contract do not control the meanings and statements within the four corners of the<br />
agreement.”<br />
Id.<br />
223. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)<br />
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,<br />
628 (1985)) (stating that, “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does<br />
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their<br />
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum”); In re Cargill, Inc., 117 LA<br />
214 (Feldman 2002):<br />
Under the modem evolution of that, has come findings that show that outside law<br />
may be engrafted upon a contract of collective bargaining whether that collective<br />
bargaining contract contains such language or not of placing that outside law within<br />
the terms and meanings of the four corners of the contract.<br />
Id. (holding the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 would be engrafted<br />
onto contract).
58 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
contract as the source from which arbitrators receive their authority. 224<br />
They reason that only the contract is significant and that neither the law<br />
nor public policy should be of concern to an arbitrator. These arbitrators<br />
assert that unless the contract calls for the application of a specific law<br />
and/or the accounting of public policy, only the contract matters.<br />
On the other hand, there are arbitrators who contend that law and<br />
public policy are implied in any contract. 225 Such arbitrators argue that<br />
the parties choose them because of their training in the law and their<br />
understanding of public policy. Consequently, the interpretation of any<br />
contract will always be within the context of law and public policy. “A<br />
court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s award under a collectivebargaining<br />
agreement because it is contrary to public policy is a specific<br />
application of the more general doctrine, rooted in the common law, that<br />
a court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate law or public<br />
policy.” 226 “Such a public policy, however, must be well defined and<br />
dominant, and is to be ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal<br />
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public<br />
interests.’” 227<br />
B. The Requirement of a Reasoned Decision<br />
Arbitrators usually submit written awards. Some arbitration awards<br />
do not require findings of fact or conclusions of law. 228 Labor<br />
224. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,<br />
597 (1960) (stating that an arbitrator “may of course look for guidance from many<br />
sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the<br />
collective bargaining agreement”).<br />
225. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.<br />
574, 581-82 (1960) (stating that “[t]he labor arbitrator’s source of law is not<br />
confined to the express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law—<br />
the practices of the industry and the shop—is equally a part of the collective<br />
bargaining agreement although not expressed in it”).<br />
226. United Paperworkers Int’l Union Inc. v. Misco Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987)<br />
(citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766, (1983); Hurd v.<br />
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35, (1948)).<br />
227. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766, (1983) (citing<br />
Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945).<br />
228. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir.<br />
1992) (holding that “arbitrators are not required to state the reasons for their<br />
decisions”); Escobar v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 461, 463<br />
(D.P.R. 1991) (stating that “arbitrators are not required to disclose the basis on<br />
which their awards are made”); Cobec Brazilian Trading & Warehousing Corp. of<br />
United States v. Isbrandtsen, 524 F. Supp. 7, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 59<br />
Arbitration Awards and International Commercial Arbitration Awards are<br />
fully reasoned awards with findings of fact, conclusions of law, and<br />
rationale for the final award. There are three general kinds of Arbitration<br />
Awards;<br />
1. A simple decision;<br />
2. A decision with limited findings of fact and conclusions;<br />
3. A fully reasoned decision with contentions of the parties,<br />
findings of fact, and decision and rationale.<br />
A simple decision need only set out the basic information such as<br />
which party prevails and how much money is awarded. A simple award<br />
is quick, efficient, and saves time and money. And the dispute is settled.<br />
A fully reasoned decision, on the other hand, delineates the contentions<br />
of both parties, findings of fact by the arbitrator, and a decision and<br />
rationale for that decision. A written, reasoned decision takes<br />
considerably more time and effort. It is common for a Labor Arbitration<br />
Award in the United States to be ten to fifteen pages long, sometimes<br />
longer. An International Commercial Arbitration Award can be upward<br />
of one hundred pages.<br />
The determination to provide a fully reasoned decision is based on<br />
tradition that has developed in certain arbitration contexts.<br />
Considerations of efficiency, cost, and importance of the decision weigh<br />
into whether a reasoned decision is used.<br />
The nature of the case is one factor arbitrators use in determining the<br />
sort of decision to award. The FMCS provides that non-reasoned, or<br />
“expedited,” decisions “may be appropriate in certain non-precedential<br />
cases or those that do not involve complex or unique issues.” 229<br />
Arbitration decisions in national commercial arbitrations, insurance<br />
arbitrations, and sports arbitrations, are usually simple decisions with<br />
very limited explanations. But fully reasoned decisions are expected in<br />
arbitrations involving labor and international commercial disputes.<br />
The amount of money involved is not the primary consideration in<br />
determining which type of written award an arbitrator will issue. It is not<br />
unusual to see non-reasoned decisions even when the dispute involves<br />
large amounts of money. Time, efficiency, the expectation of the parties,<br />
the expectation of the administrative agency, the precedential value of<br />
229. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, supra note 132, § 1404.17.
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the decision, and the ability of the court to review a decision all are<br />
considerations for the kind of written award issued by an arbitrator. An<br />
arbitration award which fails to state the basis for the award cannot serve<br />
as precedent. 230 An award is beyond a court’s ability to review if the<br />
arbitrator does not state the basis for his/her award. 231 One concern is<br />
“written opinions might open avenues for attack on the award by the<br />
losing party.” 232 So, common wisdom in the world of arbitration is the<br />
“less said the better.” 233<br />
C. Procedural Requirements for a Decision<br />
The AAA sets forth certain procedural rules that are to be followed<br />
by the arbitrators in making their award. The rule states:<br />
The award must be signed by the arbitrators and, under the laws of<br />
some states, be notarized or witnessed. If two or more arbitrators are<br />
involved, the award must have the signatures of a majority.<br />
Arbitrators usually meet after the last hearing to agree on the award.<br />
They might disagree on some points. Their conversations should be<br />
kept confidential. No arbitrator should disclose what any other<br />
member of the panel said during these conferences. The majority<br />
rules, but any arbitrator who disagrees may note a dissent on the<br />
award form or elect not to sign the award. 234<br />
D. Sending the Decision to Reporting Bodies<br />
Arbitration decisions do not have precedential value. 235 They are<br />
230. See Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141,<br />
147 (4th Cir. 1993).<br />
231. Reichman v. Creative Real Estate Consultants, 476 F. Supp. 1276, 1282<br />
(D.C.N.Y. 1979) (stating that “the task of a reviewing court, especially one<br />
confronted by a claim of manifest disregard of the law, is made more difficult in<br />
cases where no reasons are given by the arbitrator”).<br />
232. American Arbitration Association, A Guide for Commercial Arbitrators<br />
(2004), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22016 (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).<br />
233. Herbert L. Marx Jr., Who Are Labor Arbitration Opinions Written For? And<br />
Other Musings About Award Writing, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 22, 23 (2003).<br />
234. American Arbitration Association, supra note 232.<br />
235. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d at 147 (stating that “arbitration awards<br />
have no precedential value”). While arbitration awards theoretically have no<br />
precedential value because of the sui generis nature of arbitration, some are<br />
nonetheless published, with a resulting impact on future arbitral proceedings. For a<br />
discussion of the pros and cons of published awards, see ELKOURI & ELKOURI,<br />
supra note 35, at 568-73.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 61<br />
“sui generis.” 236 Yet published decisions are useful. A published<br />
decision can provide insight into the factual, legal, and decision-making<br />
reasoning of the arbitrator. Arbitrators with similar cases can use the<br />
rationale to assist in the determination of the present case. So, in fact,<br />
they do have persuasive value. Reporting bodies, such as the Bureau of<br />
National Affairs, 237 the Commerce Clearing House, 238 the AAA, 239 and<br />
many state agencies publish arbitration decisions with names of the<br />
parties redacted to assist advocates and arbitrators in understanding the<br />
development of the body of arbitrable law. While arbitration decisions<br />
do not set precedent, they are nevertheless useful in understanding how<br />
arbitrators determine disputes such as past practice, discipline, contract<br />
interpretation, and arbitrability. It is not unusual for arbitrators in labor<br />
disputes to cite other arbitration decisions in their awards. 240<br />
E. Ability to Appeal an Arbitration Decision<br />
It is very difficult to get a court to overturn an arbitration decision.<br />
Arbitration decisions are regarded as final and binding. 241 Courts are<br />
reluctant to review the merits of an arbitration award. 242 Parties do,<br />
however, have limited ability to appeal to a court to vacate an arbitrator’s<br />
decision. Some agencies even allow a second arbitration panel as a<br />
236. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc., 481 F.2d 817,<br />
820 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v.<br />
Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding “we are<br />
obliged to recognize that arbitration proceedings are sui generis”).<br />
237. The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. publishes labor arbitration awards in<br />
the Labor Arbitration Reporter ® . See http://www.bna.com/products/labor/lelw.htm<br />
(2005).<br />
238. The Commerce Clearing House publishes securities arbitration awards, see<br />
http://scan.cch.com/ (2005), and labor arbitration awards, see http://hr.cch.com/<br />
(2005).<br />
239. The AAA maintains databases of arbitration awards it issues. See<br />
http://www.adr.org/AAAawards/ (2005).<br />
240. NCR Corp., E & M-Wichita v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace<br />
Workers, Dist., 906 F.2d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that arbitrator, in<br />
interpreting a contract, may look to “the negotiating and contractual history of the<br />
parties, past practices, the common law of the shop, and a number of arbitration,<br />
NLRB, and judicial decisions providing definition to the key terms”).<br />
241. Hill & Sinicropi, supra note 200, at 472.<br />
242. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,<br />
596 (1960) (recognizing that “[t]he federal policy of settling labor disputes by<br />
arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the<br />
awards”).
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method to appeal an arbitration decision. For example, the AAA outlines<br />
this interesting appeals process:<br />
Within 30 days of receipt of any award (which shall not be binding if<br />
an appeal is taken), any party may notify the AAA of an intention to<br />
appeal to a second arbitral tribunal, constituted in the same manner as<br />
the initial tribunal. The appeal tribunal shall be entitled to adopt the<br />
initial award as its own, modify the initial award or substitute its own<br />
award for the initial award. The appeal tribunal shall not modify or<br />
replace the initial award except [for manifest disregard of law or<br />
facts] [for clear errors of law or because of clear and convincing<br />
factual errors]. The award of the appeal tribunal shall be final and<br />
binding, and judgment may be entered by a court having jurisdiction<br />
thereof. 243<br />
Even when a court decides to review an arbitration award, its legal<br />
right to review the arbitration decision is very limited. 244 Dissatisfaction<br />
with the amount is not grounds to vacate an award. 245 Judicial review is<br />
substantially limited. Section 10 of the FAA lists four grounds for a<br />
court to vacate an arbitration award: (1) corruption, fraud, or undue<br />
means was employed in reaching the award; (2) partiality or corruption<br />
exhibited by arbitrators; 246 (3) refusing to postpone the hearing upon<br />
sufficient cause; (4) arbitrators exceeded their powers. 247<br />
In vacating an award, a court can rely on several doctrines: manifest<br />
disregard of the law, unconscionability, and public policy. “Manifest<br />
disregard” of the law is a high standard. It requires a showing that the<br />
arbitrator knew and understood the law but chose to not apply it. 248<br />
243. AAA, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses, supra note 45.<br />
244. See, e.g., French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d<br />
902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d<br />
1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that “[a]n arbitrator’s decision must be upheld<br />
unless it is ‘completely irrational’”).<br />
245. Biscanin v Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F. 3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005).<br />
246. One test that has been proposed for evaluating an arbitrator’s bias includes a<br />
reasonable person standard. If a reasonable person would conclude that the<br />
arbitrator was partial, then the arbitral award may be vacated. No actual bias must<br />
be shown under this standard. However, bias must be “direct, definite, and capable<br />
of demonstration, not remote, uncertain or speculative.” Lisa B. Bingham, On<br />
Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of<br />
Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 248 (1998).<br />
247. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (2004).<br />
248. Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 933 F.2d 225, 229<br />
(4th Cir. 1994). The court held that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the law “may<br />
only be overturned where it is in manifest disregard of the law.” Id. The court
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 63<br />
“Unconscionability” can be a basis for vacating an award, 249 but even an<br />
arbitration agreement pre-packaged in a computer box was not<br />
unconscionable or adhesionary enough to warrant a court’s intervention<br />
to stay the arbitration. 250 There are two categories of unconscionability:<br />
substantive and procedural. 251 When terms are extremely favorable to<br />
one side, the contract is said to be of substantive unconscionability. 252<br />
“Courts have suggested . . . a large amount of one type of<br />
unconscionability can make up for only a small amount of the other.” 253<br />
Courts have overturned arbitration decisions on “public policy”<br />
grounds. 254 For example, an arbitrator who returned a police officer to<br />
his job, even though the officer had engaged in a pattern of offensive and<br />
predatory conduct toward women for ten years, was reversed by a court<br />
because “the arbitrator’s decision under the extreme facts of this case<br />
violated public policy.” 255 But for a court to overturn an arbitration<br />
decision the public policy violated must be “well defined and<br />
elaborated further stating that “[a]n arbitration award is enforceable ‘even if the<br />
award resulted from a misinterpretation of law, faulty legal reasoning or erroneous<br />
legal conclusion.’” Id. (quoting George Day Constr. Co. v. United Brothers of<br />
Carpenters Local 354, 722 F.2d 1471, 1479 (9th Cir.1984)). An arbitration decision<br />
“may only be reversed ‘when arbitrators understand and correctly state the law, but<br />
proceed to disregard the same.’” Id. (quoting San Martine Compañía de<br />
Navegación, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961)).<br />
249. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, § 4.28, at 552-53<br />
(Aspen <strong>Law</strong> & Bus. 1998) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208).<br />
250. Hill v Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522<br />
US 808 (1997).<br />
251. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (N.Y. App. Div.<br />
1998).<br />
252. Id. at 574.<br />
253. FARNSWORTH, supra note 249.<br />
254. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (quoting<br />
Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)) (holding that to invalidate an<br />
arbitration award on public policy grounds, “a public policy . . . must be well<br />
defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal<br />
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests’”). But<br />
see E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass’n of E. Chi.,<br />
Inc., 790 F.2d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook , J., concurring) (expressing<br />
the opinion that “power to set aside awards on grounds of public policy, as distinct<br />
from rules of law, is too sweeping”). For further discussion, see Daryl Andrews,<br />
The Public Policy Exception to Arbitral Finality: Protecting Children and<br />
Preserving the Sanctity of Arbitration, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 461 (2003).<br />
255. City of Brooklyn Ctr. v. <strong>Law</strong> Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., 635 N.W.2d<br />
236, 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
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dominant.” 256<br />
IX. PROBLEMS WITH ARBITRATION 257<br />
A. Adhesive Nature of the Contract<br />
Arbitration has advanced dramatically since the enactment of the<br />
FAA in 1925. It has now advanced to the point where some contracts<br />
contain arbitration provisions for which the parties did not really<br />
negotiate. These contracts are on a “take it or leave it” basis. For<br />
example, credit card companies, including Visa, Master Card, and<br />
Discover Card, now have arbitration clauses in their member agreements<br />
specifying arbitration as the mechanism to resolve any claim or dispute<br />
that arises; neither party has the right to litigate the claim in court. 258<br />
Consumers have challenged such adhesion arbitration clauses, arguing<br />
that they had no choice but to accept the clause because virtually all<br />
credit card company agreements contain arbitration clauses. 259 But the<br />
courts have refused to call these contracts of adhesion.<br />
Arbitration clauses are increasingly being included in employment<br />
contracts. Employees may not realize that they are waiving their right to<br />
a trial by signing the agreement. When an offer of employment is<br />
conditioned upon signing an employment contract with an arbitration<br />
agreement, the employee may have no choice but to sign if he/she really<br />
wants the job. Most courts will say this is not a contract of adhesion,<br />
256. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766.<br />
257. The concept for Section IX: Problems with Arbitration, came from an article<br />
written by Scott Atlas, Chair of the Section of Litigation of the American Bar<br />
Association. See Scott Atlas, Have You Ever Tried to Make Up Your Mind—About<br />
Arbitration?, 29 NO. 1 LITIG. 1 (Fall 2002).<br />
258. See, e.g., Discover Card, Discover Platinum Card Important Information,<br />
2005, at https://www.discovercard.com/cardmembersvcs/discovercard/apply-for-a-c<br />
ard/importantInfo?card=PLAT (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).<br />
The Cardmember Agreement provides that we may choose to resolve a claim<br />
relating to your Account by binding arbitration, in which case, you will not have<br />
the right to have that claim resolved by a judge or jury. You may reject the<br />
arbitration provision with respect to your new Account within 30 days after<br />
receiving your Card.<br />
Id.<br />
259. Nefores v. Branddirect Mktg., Inc., No. 02-CA-0012, 2002 WL 31057387,<br />
at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002). Cardmember argued that “the subject arbitration clause<br />
is unenforceable since ‘one-sided arbitration clauses forced on the consumer via an<br />
adhesion contract are unenforceable in Ohio as against public policy.’” Id.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 65<br />
even though it can be argued the clause is the very definition of<br />
“adhesion contract.” 260<br />
B. The Problem of Neutrality<br />
The neutrality of the arbitration proceeding is also a concern. The<br />
manner in which arbitrators are chosen, the potential for bias on the part<br />
of a party-appointed arbitrator, institutional bias, the “repeat player<br />
effect,” and the potential for bias of arbitrators who sit on permanent<br />
panels are all situations which can affect the neutrality of an arbitrator.<br />
The Supreme Court stated that “any tribunal permitted by law to try<br />
cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid<br />
even the appearance of bias.” 261 An unbiased arbitrator is critical for a<br />
fair arbitration, especially because an arbitrator’s decision is subject to<br />
limited review. 262<br />
First, there is concern that the arbitrators on the agency list are not<br />
chosen by a balanced neutral manner. 263 The choice of an arbitrator from<br />
a pool is meaningless if the system of choosing arbitrators for the pool is<br />
biased. 264 How does someone get on an agency’s list of approved<br />
arbitrators? Is diversity part of the mix?<br />
Second, arbitration proceedings involving party-appointed<br />
arbitrators can raise questions of neutrality of the proceeding. A partyappointed<br />
arbitrator may feel obligated to the party who chose him/her.<br />
The arbitrator may be closely allied to the industry by experience and<br />
training. 265 Yet this “industry bias” is permissible bias under the AAA<br />
260. Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Circuit<br />
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)). Many commentators argue that<br />
employees should have the choice to arbitrate after a dispute has arisen. The<br />
assumption that post-dispute arbitration agreements are better for employees<br />
assumes that the employer would agree to arbitrate at that point. Once a dispute has<br />
arisen, however, the employer may often see a tactical benefit from litigating the<br />
claim. For example, if an employer knows that an employee does not have a large<br />
enough claim to retain an attorney, the employer will not agree to arbitrate. Maltby,<br />
supra note 8, at 43.<br />
261. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150<br />
(1968).<br />
262. Maltby, supra note 139, at 18.<br />
263. Id. at 21 (stating that “[b]efore a court can legitimately defer to the decision<br />
of an arbitrator, it must know that the pool from which the arbitrator was chosen<br />
was not biased”).<br />
264. Id.<br />
265. Robert D. Taichert, Why Not Provide for Neutral Party-Appointed<br />
Arbitrators?, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 22 (2003).
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rule. 266 Parties might favor experience in an industry over impartiality,<br />
“Familiarity with a discipline often comes at the expense of complete<br />
impartiality.” 267<br />
A third concern involves institutional bias. Institutional bias refers<br />
to a “tendency for arbitration outcomes to favor one class of participants<br />
over another.” 268 Institutional bias is sometimes alleged in internet<br />
domain name arbitration and in securities arbitration. 269 Institutional<br />
bias can occur because of the “repeat player effect.” Evidence shows<br />
that an arbitrator may render a decision in favor of an institutional client<br />
because the arbitrator wants repeat business from the client. 270 In<br />
employment cases, the employer may arbitrate many claims, often using<br />
the same arbitrator. 271 On the other hand, the employee is not likely to<br />
266. AAA, Code of Ethics, supra note 101, at Canon X (A)(1), cited in Sunkist<br />
Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 759-60 (11th Cir. 1993).<br />
The AAA Code of Ethics provides that arbitrators “act in good faith and with<br />
integrity and fairness.”<br />
267. Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,<br />
748 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984)<br />
268. Roger J. Perlstadt, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69<br />
U. CHI. L. REV. 1983, 1986-87 (2002).<br />
269. Id. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)<br />
deals with disputes over domain names. Id. Under ICANN’s dispute resolution<br />
policy, trademark holders may institute a claim against a person who has registered<br />
a domain name (the registrant may not bring a claim against a trademark holder).<br />
Id. Because only four arbitration companies can administer ICANN disputes, the<br />
companies have an incentive to find for the trademark holder to secure their repeat<br />
business. Id. According to two studies, trademark holders prevail approximately<br />
60% of the time in front of a panel of arbitrators and 83% of the time before a single<br />
arbitrator who was chosen by the arbitration provider. Id. at 1987. The securities<br />
arbitration system is often criticized, because the majority of the arbitrators are<br />
older, white men who are former securities industry executives; however, in spite of<br />
this criticism, there is some evidence that employees in securities arbitration fare<br />
better than in litigation. Maltby, supra note 8, at 50.<br />
270. Stuart H. Bompey, Michael Delikat, & Lisa K. McClelland, The Attack on<br />
Arbitration and Mediation of Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 37 (1997);<br />
see Bingham, supra note 246, at 234. According to one study of 270 arbitration<br />
awards, employees bringing claims against one-time player employers win over<br />
70% of the time. Id. When employees bring claims against repeat player<br />
employers, the win rate drops to 16%. Id. In addition, in repeat player arbitrations,<br />
plaintiffs recovered approximately 11% of the amount demanded. Id. In non-repeat<br />
player arbitration, the amount recovered was 48% of the amount demanded. Id.<br />
271. See Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory<br />
Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1355 (1997). It has been suggested<br />
that the lawyers for both plaintiff and defendant are the true “repeat players” rather<br />
than the employers themselves.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 67<br />
need the services of this or any other arbitrator after the resolution of the<br />
claim. 272<br />
Fourth, there is concern that an arbitrator who sits on a permanent<br />
panel is less likely to be impartial. In labor disputes between an<br />
employer and a union, a permanent arbitrator may unconsciously or<br />
consciously keep the number of decisions balanced so neither the<br />
employer nor the union wins too often. The arbitrator may want to keep<br />
the decisions balanced for fear of being removed from the panel by the<br />
union or the employer. An arbitrator on a permanent panel becomes<br />
quite familiar with the advocates.<br />
Until recently, arbitrators have rarely been removed for bias.<br />
Partiality of the arbitrator is a more recent basis to challenge an<br />
arbitration award. 273 A court can vacate an award if the arbitrator has<br />
had substantial past communications with one of the parties, or fails to<br />
disclose past dealings which may present a conflict of interest. 274 But,<br />
failure to disclose a conflict will not necessarily result in the vacatur of<br />
an arbitral award on the basis of evident partiality. 275 Justice White<br />
272. Alternative explanations other than bias exist to explain the repeat player<br />
effect. For example, it is possible that cases that go to mandatory arbitration have<br />
little merit, because employers settle stronger claims earlier. Lisa B. Bingham, Selfdetermination<br />
in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI<br />
L. REV. 873, 900 (2002). Repeat players enjoy a number of advantages over nonrepeat<br />
players: “(1) experience leading to changes in how the repeat player<br />
structures the next similar transaction; (2) expertise, economies of scale, and access<br />
to specialist advocates; (3) informal continuing relationships with institutional<br />
incumbents; (4) reputation and credibility in bargaining; (5) long-term strategies<br />
facilitating risk-taking in appropriate cases; (6) influence over rules through<br />
lobbying and other use of resources; (7) playing for precedent and favorable future<br />
rules; (8) distinguishing symbolic and actual defeats; and (9) resources invested in<br />
getting rules favorable to them implemented.” Bingham, supra note 246, at 223.<br />
273. Korland, supra note 7, at 815. The FAA, however, does not establish<br />
guidelines for determining if there is a conflict, so guidelines are distilled from case<br />
law and the recommendations of various organizations. Id. at 821. For example,<br />
the American Bar Association’s Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial<br />
Disputes provides that an arbitrator must reveal any “‘financial or personal interest<br />
in the outcome of the arbitration,’ as well as business, professional, familiar, or<br />
social relationships with any party, counsel, or witness that might impugn their own<br />
impartiality.” Id. at 822.<br />
274. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150<br />
(1968) (holding that it is improper “to authorize litigants to submit their cases and<br />
controversies to arbitration boards that might reasonably be thought biased against<br />
one litigant and favorable to another”).<br />
275. Korland, supra note 7, at 821-822. In ANR Coal v. Cogentrix of North<br />
Carolina, Inc., the Fourth Circuit set fourth four factors to consider when an
68 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
cautions courts to “minimize [their] role . . . as judge of the arbitrators’<br />
impartiality. That role is best consigned to the parties, who are the<br />
architects of their own arbitration process and are far better informed of<br />
the prevailing ethical standards and reputations within their business.” 276<br />
The AAA has become so concerned with potential conflicts of interest<br />
that it requires a detailed check sheet and cautions that, if there is an<br />
allegation of conflict of interest, the arbitrator will be removed from the<br />
list of arbitrators until the matter is settled. 277<br />
C. Limited Discovery for Even Complex Cases<br />
The arbitration process limits discovery. One of the key objectives<br />
of arbitration is to avoid the complex procedures and costly and time<br />
consuming discovery which seems part of even the most ordinary of<br />
lawsuits. According to a court in Colorado, “[a]s a general rule,<br />
discovery as to arbitrable disputes is denied except upon a showing of<br />
need.” 278 The court further stated that discovery may be permitted<br />
arbitrator fails to disclose a potential conflict of interest: “(1) the extent and<br />
character of the personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, of the arbitrator in the<br />
proceeding; (2) the directness of the relationship between the arbitrator and the<br />
party he is alleged to favor; (3) the connection of that relationship to the arbitration;<br />
and (4) the proximity in time between the relationship and the arbitration<br />
proceeding.” Id. at 828 (citing ANR Coal v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 172 F.3d 493,<br />
500 (4th Cir. 1999)). Rule 16 of the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules<br />
provides:<br />
(a) Any person appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator shall disclose to the<br />
AAA any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator’s<br />
impartiality or independence, including any bias or any financial or personal<br />
interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present relationship with the<br />
parties or their representatives. Such obligation shall remain in effect throughout<br />
the arbitration.<br />
(b) Upon receipt of such information from the arbitrator or another source, the<br />
AAA shall communicate the information to the parties and, if it deems it<br />
appropriate to do so, to the arbitrator and others.<br />
(c) In order to encourage disclosure by arbitrators, disclosure of information<br />
pursuant to this Section R-16 is not to be construed as an indication that the<br />
arbitrator considers that the disclosed circumstance is likely to affect impartiality or<br />
independence.”<br />
Id. (citing AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-16).<br />
276. Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 151 (White, J., concurring).<br />
277. AAA Code of Ethics, supra note 101, Cannon II; AAA Rules, supra note<br />
37, R-17, R-18.<br />
278. Block 175 Corp. v. Fairmont Hotel Mgmt. Co., 648 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D.<br />
Colo. 1986).
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 69<br />
“where the taking of discovery would not unnecessarily delay the<br />
arbitration proceedings and the plaintiff could obtain evidence to prove<br />
its case to the arbitrators that was otherwise unavailable.” 279 In complex<br />
arbitration cases there may be more than minimal discovery necessary,<br />
but the extent of discovery is still limited and not as expansive as court<br />
litigation would allow. 280 Arbitrators are not inclined to grant extensive<br />
discovery even when the advocates think it may be necessary. 281<br />
Extensive discovery is contrary to the “quick, efficient, economical and<br />
fair” objectives of the arbitration process. Some arbitrators see discovery<br />
as inimical to the very reason for arbitration. The parties can include in<br />
the arbitration clause language which permits extensive or limited prearbitration<br />
discovery. Such language will be binding on the parties. 282<br />
D. Process Too Complicated, Too Slow, Too Expensive<br />
As the use of arbitration has increased, the process has become more<br />
complicated, legalistic, expensive, and slow. 283 The complexity of the<br />
arbitration procedure has increased. Rules have developed almost like<br />
rules of civil procedure. The process can be much too slow. The Federal<br />
Mediation and Conciliation Services (FMCS) reported that in 2004,<br />
476.08 days was the average time for an arbitration to reach resolution<br />
once a grievance was filed. 284 The arbitration hearing itself averaged<br />
279. Id.<br />
280. AAA Rules, supra note 37, L-4(c). “The parties may conduct such<br />
discovery as may be agreed to by all the parties provided, however, that the<br />
arbitrator(s) may place such limitations on the conduct of such discovery as the<br />
arbitrator(s) shall deem appropriate. If the parties cannot agree on production of<br />
documents and other information, the arbitrator(s), consistent with the expedited<br />
nature of arbitration, may establish the extent of the discovery.” Id.<br />
281. See Maltby, supra note 8, at 33. In an employment discrimination claim,<br />
limited discovery is more likely to hurt the plaintiff-employee than the employer.<br />
Id. The plaintiff carries the burden of proof, and the employer is likely to have<br />
information that the employee cannot easily get access to. Id. The employer<br />
maintains employee records and has access to other employees who may be<br />
witnesses. Id.<br />
282. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding<br />
that the court “must rigorously enforce the parties’ agreement as they wrote it”).<br />
283. See Frank E. Massengale & Karen Kaler Whitfield, Arbitration: Be Careful<br />
What You Wish For, 44 LA. B.J. 120, 121 (1996); see also Alain Frécon, Delaying<br />
Tactics in Arbitration, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 40 (2004).<br />
284. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Arbitration Statistics, supra<br />
note 219.
70 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
317.14 days from panel request to final award. 285 This may be faster<br />
than getting to trial, but not that much faster in many states. 286<br />
The arbitration process can be too expensive. One of the often cited<br />
benefits of arbitration is that it saves money. 287 Yet, there is no scientific<br />
evidence to prove that litigation is actually more costly than<br />
arbitration. 288 Arbitrators in large commercial disputes and important<br />
labor disputes are well paid. It is not unusual for well-known arbitrators<br />
in the United States to charge two to three thousand dollars per day. 289<br />
International arbitrators charge fees in excess of their domestic<br />
counterparts. 290 The nature and complexity of disputes submitted to<br />
285. Id.<br />
286. U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, Rules of Procedure for<br />
Expedited Trials (effective July 2, 2001), http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/ (expedited<br />
trial rule is separate from U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota Local<br />
Rules L-1 thru L-83 (effective May 16, 2005)).<br />
287. Bompey, Delikat, & McClelland, supra note 270, at 34.<br />
288. Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of<br />
Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration<br />
Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777, 784 (2003).<br />
289. Richard M. Alderman, Pre-dispute Mandatory Arbitration In Consumer<br />
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1250 n.53 (2001).<br />
290. See ICC Rules, supra note 84, at app. III(B). In the following table adapted<br />
from the ICC, one can see that an arbitrator handling a $100 million case for the<br />
ICC would be compensated between $61,750 and $285,800. Id.<br />
Sum in Dispute Administrative Arbitrators’ Fees<br />
(in US dollars) Expenses<br />
Minimum Maximum<br />
up to 50,000 2500 2500 17% of amount in<br />
dispute<br />
50,001 to 100,000 2500 + 3.5% of 2500 + 2% of amt. 8500 + 11% of<br />
amt. over 50,000 over $50,000 amt. over 50,000<br />
100,001 to 4250 + 1.7% of 3500 + 1% of amt. 14,000 + 5.5% of<br />
500,000<br />
500,001 to<br />
1,000,000<br />
1,000,001 to<br />
2,000,000<br />
2,000,001 to<br />
5,000,000<br />
amt. over 100,000<br />
11,050 + 1.15% of<br />
amt. over 500,000<br />
16,800 + .7% of<br />
amt. over<br />
1,000,000<br />
23,800 + .3% of<br />
amt. over<br />
2,000,000<br />
over 100,000<br />
7500 + .75% of<br />
amt. over<br />
1,000,000<br />
11,250 + .5% of<br />
amt. over<br />
1,000,000<br />
16,250 + .25% of<br />
amt. over<br />
2,000,000<br />
amt. over 100,000<br />
36,000 + 3.5% of<br />
amt. over 500,000<br />
53,500 + 2.75% of<br />
amt. over<br />
1,000,000<br />
81,000 + 1.12% of<br />
amt. over<br />
2,000,000
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 71<br />
arbitration have increased. The costs of arbitrating highly complex<br />
claims are similar to the costs of litigation. 291 Yet, in favor of arbitration<br />
it is said that “adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of<br />
arbitration.” 292 Maybe for these reasons, arbitration is favored today.<br />
E. Non-<strong>Law</strong>yer Oriented<br />
The arbitration process uses both lawyer and non-lawyer arbitrators<br />
and advocates. In labor arbitration, it is not unusual for a non-lawyer,<br />
business representative to act as the advocate in a grievance arbitration<br />
hearing. Because of business expertise, business experts are chosen as<br />
arbitrators. The AAA rules do not require an arbitrator to have a legal<br />
background. “[T]hey are experts in their own fields, they are known for<br />
their good judgment, they are respected for their fairness, and they are<br />
honored for putting time and talent at the disposal of others without<br />
thought of personal gain.” 293<br />
But, non-lawyer arbitrators may lack the legal knowledge to deal<br />
with the dispute and the procedural knowledge needed to run a fair<br />
hearing. The United States Supreme Court recognized that “the<br />
specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the<br />
5,000,001 to<br />
10,000,000<br />
10,000,001 to<br />
50,000,000<br />
50,000,001 to<br />
80,000,000<br />
80,000,001 to<br />
100,000,000<br />
32,800 + .2% of<br />
amt. over<br />
5,000,000<br />
42,800 + .07% of<br />
amt. over<br />
10,000,000<br />
70,800 + .06% of<br />
amt. over<br />
50,000,000<br />
23,750 + .1% of<br />
amt. over<br />
5,000,000<br />
28,750 + .05% of<br />
amt. over<br />
10,000,000<br />
48,750 + .03% of<br />
amt. over<br />
50,000,000<br />
88,800 57,750 + .02% of<br />
amt. over<br />
80,000,000<br />
over 100,000,000 88,800 61,750 + .01% of<br />
amt. over<br />
100,000,000<br />
114,600 + .616%<br />
of amt. over<br />
5,000,000<br />
145,400 + .193%<br />
of amt. over<br />
10,000,000<br />
222,600 + .136%<br />
of amt. over<br />
50,000,000<br />
263, 400 + .112%<br />
of amt. over<br />
80,000,000<br />
285,800 + .056%<br />
of amt. over<br />
100,000,000<br />
291. Kelly Burton Beam, Administering Last Rites to Employee Rights:<br />
Arbitration Enforcement and Employment <strong>Law</strong> in the Twenty-first Century, 40<br />
HOUSTON L. REV. 499, 530 (2003).<br />
292. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,<br />
633 (1985).<br />
293. American Arbitration Association, supra note 232.
72 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
shop, not the law of the land.” 294 The various arbitration agencies list<br />
arbitrators who do have both legal and procedural knowledge. It is<br />
possible for even an experienced arbitrator, especially a non-law trained<br />
arbitrator, to lack the specific legal knowledge involved in the conflict.<br />
The consequences of an arbitrator’s lack of legal knowledge can be<br />
serious in cases that implicate important institutional and legal matters<br />
such as Civil Rights, Antitrust, RICO, intellectual property, tax disputes,<br />
etc. 295 Nonetheless, such disputes can be heard by lawyer and nonlawyer<br />
arbitrators. In these cases, the arbitrator may have to take into<br />
account the law and social policy. Application of legal and public policy<br />
considerations may be particularly problematic for an arbitrator who has<br />
not received legal training.<br />
F. Arbitrability of Statutory Rights<br />
Some argue that disputes which implicate a party’s statutory rights<br />
should be dealt with only by courts and not by arbitrators, especially<br />
non-lawyer arbitrators. 296 The United States Supreme Court, however,<br />
has repeatedly held that such disputes are arbitrable, even though they<br />
involve a party’s statutory rights. 297 The important question becomes<br />
294. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).<br />
295. CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 245-46; see Shearson/Am. Express v.<br />
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding disputes under the Securities Exchange<br />
Act of 1934, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)<br />
are arbitrable); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1996)<br />
(dismissing complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and<br />
compelling arbitration).<br />
296. Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in<br />
American <strong>Law</strong>, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1958 (1996):<br />
The Court’s unbridled support for arbitration is at once surprising and unnecessary.<br />
The Court’s willingness to curtail major constitutional and political interests - such<br />
as states’ rights and federalism, civil rights, federal regulatory authority over the<br />
marketplace, and generally, due process guarantees—to bolster arbitration benefits<br />
neither the legal culture nor, in the long run, the institution of arbitration itself. In<br />
addition, the quality of the Court’s reasoning in these cases detracts from the<br />
credibility of the announced doctrine. To have the highest court in a legal system<br />
dominated by the technicalities of legal procedure state that arbitration is a “mere<br />
form of trial” that does not affect the content of the statutory rights submitted to<br />
arbitration, is incredible and preposterous. Foreign and even domestic arbitrators<br />
will view legal claims arising under U.S. statutes differently than federal judges<br />
and will conduct hearings in a different fashion.<br />
Id.<br />
297. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (holding<br />
that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are arbitrable);
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 73<br />
whether an arbitrator should examine the law before making the decision<br />
or whether an arbitrator should strictly interpret the “four corners” of the<br />
contract without regard to statutory law. The question frequently arises<br />
in employment dispute cases because many employment disputes<br />
involve civil rights, such as racial discrimination, disability<br />
discrimination, or age discrimination. In the employment arbitration, the<br />
arbitrator is often required to deal with socially sensitive areas where<br />
Congress has enacted specific laws.<br />
Critics of arbitration argue that arbitration is not the appropriate<br />
forum for dealing with these sorts of conflicts. The critics contend<br />
arbitration of such disputes hinders the development of the law, that<br />
arbitration will affect the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s<br />
ability to enforce the law, 298 that arbitration is too expensive, and that<br />
arbitration does not have sufficient procedural safeguards to allow<br />
effective vindication of such claims. 299 Opponents of arbitration argue<br />
that some mandatory pre-dispute agreements are inherently<br />
unconscionable because there is unequal bargaining power between the<br />
parties. 300 Even the critics do not oppose agreements to arbitrate<br />
employment disputes after the dispute (post-dispute) has arisen. 301<br />
The Court stated that arbitrators can, and should, if the contract<br />
demands, apply substantive law in disputes that deal with statutory<br />
rights. 302 In Gilmer, the Court found that, “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a<br />
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989)<br />
(holding that claims under the Securities Act of 1933 are arbitrable).<br />
298. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297-98 (2002) (holding that<br />
while employee was compelled arbitrate, EEOC was not barred from pursuing<br />
enforcement action and victim specific relief on behalf of employee).<br />
299. David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute <strong>Vol</strong>untary<br />
Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment<br />
Discrimination <strong>Law</strong> Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (2003).<br />
Despite criticism that arbitration will affect the EEOC’s ability to enforce laws<br />
against discrimination, employees can file a claim with the EEOC even when they<br />
are forced to arbitrate their claims. Id. at 24. The EEOC can still litigate on behalf<br />
of an employee, and the employees can be awarded all statutory remedies. Id. It<br />
should also be noted that the EEOC has taken the position that employees bringing<br />
Title VII claims should not be subject to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration<br />
agreements. Id. at 5 (citing EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 10, 1997)).<br />
300. Samuel Estreicher, supra note 271, at 1353.<br />
301. Id. at 1344. If employees could choose whether they wished to engage in<br />
arbitration, employers would be forced to either design a fair arbitral scheme or<br />
litigate all claims brought against them. Maltby, supra note 8, at 37.<br />
302. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. It should be noted, however, that a party does<br />
forfeit certain procedural rights by agreeing to submit a dispute to arbitration.
74 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by<br />
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a<br />
judicial forum.” 303 The Gilmer Court held that, “[a]lthough all statutory<br />
claims may not be appropriate for arbitration, ‘[h]aving made the bargain<br />
to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has<br />
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the<br />
statutory rights at issue.’” 304<br />
G. Lack of Transparency<br />
If arbitration involves a socially sensitive area, should the arbitration<br />
be open to the public? 305 An arbitration hearing is closed—open only to<br />
parties, advocates and witnesses except by agreement of the parties that it<br />
be open to the public. Arbitration matters are not transparent. But this<br />
can be a problem. A particular arbitration decision might have a<br />
dramatic impact on society. Lack of transparency can mean a decision is<br />
made where the pubic is affected but the public does not know about the<br />
Employees who are forced to arbitrate their claims give up the right to a jury trial.<br />
Maltby, supra note 8, at 37. The right to a trial by jury is such an important right<br />
that many argue that employees should not be forced to waive it as a condition of<br />
employment. Id. However, a trial is not a reality for most employees. Id. at 57. A<br />
plaintiff must have approximately $60,000 in provable damages before a lawyer<br />
will accept the case on a contingency basis. Id. In addition, many attorneys charge<br />
a retainer of about $3,000 and require the plaintiff to pay all out of pocket expenses<br />
(estimated between $10,000 and $25,000) as they occur. Id. Approximately 95%<br />
of employees who seek legal representation for an employment discrimination claim<br />
are not able to retain legal counsel. Id. at 58. Due process may also be<br />
compromised when the employer has the ability to choose the only arbitrator. Id. at<br />
33. In 1994, the American Bar Association developed a due process protocol for<br />
arbitration which has been adopted by the AAA and JAMS/Endispute. Id. at 39.<br />
The American Civil Liberties Union, National Employment <strong>Law</strong>yer’s Association,<br />
and the AFL-CIO were involved in the development of the protocol. Id. A fair<br />
arbitration process includes: “(a) a neutral and unbiased arbitrator; (b) right of the<br />
employee to an equal role in selecting the arbitrator; (c) right to counsel; (d) right to<br />
reasonable discovery; (e) identical remedies to those available in court; and (f) a<br />
written opinion.” Id.<br />
303. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-<br />
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).<br />
304. Id.<br />
305. Maltby, supra note 8, at 42-43. When employers know that an arbitration<br />
proceeding will remain private, they have less incentive to change discriminatory<br />
policies, because there is not a risk of adverse publicity. Id. However, employees<br />
may also benefit from the privacy aspect of arbitration if the claim involves a<br />
sensitive personal matter. Id.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 75<br />
decision because it is confidential.<br />
H. Arbitrator’s Lack of Power and Control<br />
In some respects, arbitrators lack the power and control needed to<br />
carry on an effective adversarial proceeding. The arbitrator has no<br />
authority to impose fines or sanctions on an advocate, as a judge does<br />
under Rule 11 of Civil Procedure. 306 Arbitrators are unable to sanction<br />
attorneys for filing frivolous cases, bad behavior, or unethical actions.<br />
However, the parties in their contract can agree to give the arbitrator the<br />
power to impose sanctions.<br />
An arbitrator lacks the power to compel a person to comply with a<br />
decision or a subpoena. 307 The arbitrator has no power or authority to<br />
order the decision to be implemented. The arbitrator has no authority to<br />
enforce a subpoena. A subpoena or a decision rendered in an arbitration<br />
proceeding is only enforceable in a court of law. “A right without a<br />
remedy is not a legal right; it is merely a hope or a wish.” 308<br />
I. Punitive Damages are Unusual Even when the Facts Warrant<br />
An arbitrator has the power to award equitable remedies. 309 “To<br />
deny arbitrators the full range of remedial tools generally available under<br />
the law would be to hamstring arbitrators and to lessen the value and<br />
efficiency of arbitration as an alternative method of dispute<br />
resolution.” 310<br />
What if one side engaged in outrageous conduct? In a civil lawsuit,<br />
punitive damages might be permitted. 311 While punitive damages are<br />
legally permitted in arbitration, arbitrators are hesitant to use them. 312<br />
306. Rule 11 allows a judge to sanction an attorney, law firm or party who bring<br />
a lawsuit for purposes of harassment or who brings a frivolous suit. FED. R. CIV. P.<br />
11.<br />
307. Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act grants an arbitrator the power to<br />
“summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness<br />
and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or<br />
paper.” 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2004).<br />
308. Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the<br />
Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 665, 678 (1987).<br />
309. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int’l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353<br />
(N.D. Ala. 1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985); see UNIFORM ARBITRATION<br />
ACT § 21 (2000).<br />
310. Willoughby Roofing & Supply, 598 F. Supp. at 362.<br />
311. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (2004).<br />
312. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 35, at 1216-17 (noting that punitive
76 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
Perhaps arbitrators should use punitive damages in egregious<br />
circumstances. “Punitive damages are damages . . . awarded against a<br />
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and<br />
others like him from similar conduct in the future.” 313<br />
J. No Better Result Than Litigation<br />
There is no proof that arbitrators’ decisions and awards are superior<br />
to judge and jury awards. Research has shown that employees are more<br />
likely to win in arbitration but that they receive lower awards than if they<br />
had won in litigation. 314 Some argue that the reason for such a result is<br />
the tendency on the part of arbitrators to split the decision, but empirical<br />
study of this phenomenon is scarce and conflicting. 315 It may be easier<br />
to split the difference rather than make a principled decision, especially if<br />
the arbitrator hopes to be picked again. 316<br />
K. No Review or Appeal<br />
One of the strengths of arbitration is that, once an arbitrator issues<br />
an award, the decision is final. 317 But what if the arbitrator is wrong?<br />
damages may adversely affect continuing working relationships, or may expose an<br />
award to vacation by the courts if it is believed the arbitrator exceeding his authority<br />
by awarding punitive damages).<br />
313. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908; see Mastrobuono v. Shearson<br />
Lehman Hutton, Inc. 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995) (holding that the “decisions in Allied-<br />
Bruce, Southland, and Perry make clear that if contracting parties agree to include<br />
claims for punitive damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that<br />
their agreement will be enforced according to its terms even if a rule of state law<br />
would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration”). However, if an arbitration<br />
agreement or the rules governing the arbitration require the arbitrator to follow the<br />
substantive law, the arbitrator exceeds his power if he fails to apply the substantive<br />
law. As a result, the award may be vacated. Buchele & Rute, supra note 13, at 44.<br />
314. See Maltby, supra note 8, at 48, 49, tbl. 1. According to one study,<br />
employees won 68% of cases submitted to arbitration, but received only 25% of the<br />
amount of damages requested. Id. In litigation, employees won only 14.9% of<br />
claims brought, but prevailing employees received 70% of the relief requested. Id.<br />
315. Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67 LAW<br />
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 114-18 (2004).<br />
316. Alan Scott Rau, Integrity In Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 523<br />
(1997).<br />
317. Maltby, supra note, 139, at 25. Employees are often unable to bear the cost<br />
of litigation. Arbitration is supposed to address this problem “by providing a final<br />
decision in an affordable tribunal.” Id. However, “[t]his solution is diluted if the<br />
wealthier party can afford to initiate expensive judicial review.” Id.
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 77<br />
Case law has allowed incorrect factual and incorrect legal analysis by an<br />
arbitrator to stand. 318 There are limited grounds for appeal of an<br />
arbitration decision. 319 The standard for overturning an arbitration award<br />
is very high and difficult for the parties to meet. 320 “An arbitrator, in<br />
absence of any agreement limiting his authority, is the final judge of both<br />
law and fact, including the interpretation of the terms of any contract,<br />
and his award will not be reviewed or set aside for mistake of either law<br />
or fact in absence of fraud, mistake in applying his own theory,<br />
318. See Local Union 59, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Green Corp.,<br />
725 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1984). “The promotion of the national policy favoring<br />
the resolution of labor disputes by arbitration eliminates searching judicial review of<br />
the factual and legal accuracy of arbitrators’ findings.” Id.<br />
319. See supra notes 241-254 and accompanying text for a discussion on the<br />
appealability of an arbitral decision.<br />
320. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2004).<br />
Section 10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing<br />
a. In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district<br />
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the<br />
application of any party to the arbitration<br />
1. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.<br />
2. Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of<br />
them.<br />
3. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the<br />
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and<br />
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any<br />
party have been prejudiced.<br />
4. Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them<br />
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not<br />
made.<br />
5. Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required<br />
the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a<br />
rehearing by the arbitrators.<br />
Id. For enforcement under international law, reference the requirements of the New<br />
York Convention. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement<br />
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V (1958).<br />
Parties have begun to include provisions in their arbitration agreements that<br />
provide for expanded judicial review of an arbitrator’s award. Both the courts and<br />
commentators are divided on whether such a provision is valid. See Lee Goldman,<br />
Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV. NEGOTIATION L.<br />
REV. 171, 174 (2003). Proponents of expanded review argue that since arbitration<br />
is a creature of contract, parties should be able to contract for more expansive<br />
grounds for review. Id. at 175.
78 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />
misconduct or other disregard of duty.” 321<br />
L. Is the Process of Arbitration to Achieve a Final Decision or to Seek<br />
Truth and Find Justice<br />
Justice Thurgood Marshall proposed that, “the governing principle<br />
of a humane society and a good legal system . . . [is to] recognize the<br />
worth and importance of every person . . . [and] be perceived by all the<br />
people as providing equal justice.” 322 Ultimately, what should an<br />
arbitrator do? Is an arbitrator only to interpret the four corners of the<br />
contract? Or, is the arbitrator’s role to find truth and justice? Is the<br />
process of arbitration simply a process to lead to a final decision; or is it<br />
a process to seek truth and find justice?<br />
X. CONCLUSION<br />
Thomas Jefferson wrote, “I know no safe depository of the ultimate<br />
powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them<br />
not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome<br />
discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their<br />
discretion.” 323 Arbitration puts power in the hands of the parties in the<br />
conflict. The parties are responsible for drafting the arbitration clauses,<br />
which determine the who, what, when, where, how, and why of settling<br />
disputes.<br />
Arbitration is intended to be an economical process. But<br />
“[i]nexpensive, expeditious and informal adjudication is not always<br />
synonymous with fair and just adjudication.” 324 Arbitration must be an<br />
equitable process equivalent to litigation. 325 In the end the AAA Code of<br />
321. Ehlert v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 207 N.W.2d 334, 336 (1973) (quoting<br />
Cournoyer v. Am. Television & Radio Co., 83 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1957)).<br />
322. Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration of<br />
Future Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the Unwary Consumer, 5<br />
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 112 (1993) (citing Mr. Justice Marshall Lives on in His<br />
Words, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 8, 1993, at 8 (Statements by Justice Thurgood Marshall at<br />
the Eighth Conference on the <strong>Law</strong> of the World, (1977)).<br />
323. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820),<br />
cited in Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court,<br />
115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 86 (2001).<br />
324. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?,<br />
99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 679 (1986).<br />
325. See AAA, Code of Ethics, supra note 101, at Canon I(A). Canon I(A) of the<br />
AAA Code of Ethics states:
<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 79<br />
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes states it well, “[a]n<br />
arbitrator has a responsibility not only to the parties but also to the<br />
process of arbitration itself, and must observe high standards of conduct<br />
so that the integrity and fairness of the process will be preserved.” 326<br />
An arbitrator has a responsibility not only to the parties but also to the process of<br />
arbitration itself, and must observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity<br />
and fairness of the process will be preserved. Accordingly, an arbitrator should<br />
recognize a responsibility to the public, to the parties whose rights will be decided,<br />
and to all other participants in the proceeding. This responsibility may include pro<br />
bono service as an arbitrator where appropriate.<br />
326. Id.