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THE<br />

JOURNAL<br />

OF<br />

AMERICAN<br />

ARBITRATION<br />

<strong>2006</strong>/<strong>Vol</strong>. 5 <strong>No.1</strong>


Article<br />

Arbitration: The Basics<br />

Joseph L. Daly ∗<br />

I. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................3<br />

II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ARBITRATION ................................3<br />

A. Historical Precedents and the Development of Modern<br />

Arbitration................................................................................3<br />

B. Enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act...................................7<br />

III. OBJECTIVES OF ARBITRATION ...................................................10<br />

IV. HOW ARBITRATION BEGINS ......................................................12<br />

A. The Agreement to Arbitrate......................................................12<br />

B. The Arbitration Clause ............................................................14<br />

V. INITIATING THE ARBITRATION ...................................................19<br />

A. Arbitration Agency or Ad Hoc Proceeding...............................20<br />

B. Notifying the Arbitration Agency of Request for Arbitration.....28<br />

C. Choosing the Arbitrator...........................................................29<br />

D. Notification Requirements........................................................31<br />

E. Scheduling...............................................................................32<br />

F. Arbitrator Disclosure Requirements.........................................33<br />

∗ Professor of <strong>Law</strong>, <strong>Hamline</strong> <strong>University</strong> School of <strong>Law</strong>; Arbitrator for the<br />

American Arbitration Association (Labor, Commercial & International) and for the<br />

US Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (Labor). © Joseph L. Daly (<strong>2006</strong>).<br />

The author thanks <strong>Hamline</strong> <strong>Law</strong> students Michael Maza, Katie Thoennes, and Katy<br />

Bowen for their valuable research assistance.<br />

The Journal of American Arbitration © <strong>2006</strong> by Thomas Carbonneau and JurisNet, LLC


2 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

G. Tendency to Delay ...................................................................35<br />

H. Time Required .........................................................................36<br />

VI. PRE-ARBITRATION MATTERS ....................................................36<br />

A. Discovery ................................................................................36<br />

B. Subpoena Power of Persons and Materials..............................37<br />

C. Pre-Hearing Issues..................................................................40<br />

VII. THE HEARING ..........................................................................45<br />

A. The Place ................................................................................45<br />

B. Marking Exhibits and Other Preliminary Matters ....................47<br />

C. The Evidence...........................................................................48<br />

D. Theory of the Case...................................................................49<br />

E. Opening Statement...................................................................50<br />

F. Burden of Proof .......................................................................50<br />

G. Swearing the Witnesses............................................................52<br />

H. Out of Sequence Witnesses.......................................................52<br />

I. Direct Examination..................................................................52<br />

J. Use of Visuals ..........................................................................53<br />

K. Cross Examination ..................................................................53<br />

L. Redirect Examination ..............................................................54<br />

M. Re-Cross Examination.............................................................55<br />

N. Hyper-Aggressive Advocates....................................................55<br />

O. Closing Arguments versus Post-Hearing Briefs........................56<br />

VIII. THE DECISION..........................................................................57<br />

A. Use of the Contract, the <strong>Law</strong>, and Public Policy ......................57<br />

B. The Requirement of a Reasoned Decision ................................58<br />

C. Procedural Requirements for a Decision..................................60<br />

D. Sending the Decision to Reporting Bodies................................60<br />

E. Ability to Appeal an Arbitration Decision ................................61<br />

IX. PROBLEMS WITH ARBITRATION .................................................64<br />

A. Adhesive Nature of the Contract ..............................................64<br />

B. The Problem of Neutrality........................................................65<br />

C. Limited Discovery for Even Complex Cases.............................68<br />

D. Process Too Complicated, Too Slow, Too Expensive .................69<br />

E. Non-<strong>Law</strong>yer Oriented..............................................................71<br />

F. Arbitrability of Statutory Rights ...............................................72<br />

G. Lack of Transparency...............................................................74<br />

H. Arbitrator’s Lack of Power and Control...................................75<br />

I. Punitive Damages are Unusual Even when the Facts Warrant .75<br />

J. No Better Result Than Litigation..............................................76<br />

K. No Review or Appeal ...............................................................76


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 3<br />

L. Is the Process of Arbitration to Achieve a Final Decision or to<br />

Seek Truth and Find Justice ....................................................78<br />

X. CONCLUSION............................................................................78<br />

I. INTRODUCTION<br />

This is a description of the process of arbitration in the United<br />

States. It will focus on the basics of arbitration: its history; its objectives;<br />

its scheduling; how the process begins; pre-arbitration matters; the<br />

hearing; the award; and the problems with arbitration. The goal of this<br />

article is simple and straightforward: to explain the basics of the<br />

arbitration process used in the United States.<br />

II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ARBITRATION<br />

A. Historical Precedents and the Development of Modern<br />

Arbitration<br />

Arbitration is not a recent phenomenon; in fact, arbitration as a<br />

method for resolving disputes has a long and complex history. King<br />

Solomon’s decision to “split the baby” is the first recorded arbitration<br />

decision. 1 Thankfully, Solomon’s award to cut the baby in half was not<br />

executed. Once the loving mother offered to give up the child so the<br />

baby would live, Solomon wisely awarded the child to her. 2 The use of<br />

arbitration rapidly expanded in the formal law of the Romans, in early<br />

Judeo-Christian communities, in Islamic law, and in the settlement of<br />

1. 1 Kings 3:16-28. King Solomon is known for the judgment he passed when<br />

two women came before him both claiming to be the mother of the same child. Id.<br />

After each woman pleaded with him to giver her the child:<br />

And the king said, Bring me a sword. And they brought a sword before the king.<br />

And the king said, Divide the living child in two, and give half to the one, and half<br />

to the other. Then spake the woman whose the living child was unto the king, for<br />

her bowels yearned upon her son, and she said, O my lord, give her the living child,<br />

and in no wise slay it. But the other said, Let it be neither mine nor thine, but divide<br />

it. Then the king answered and said, Give her the living child, and in no wise slay<br />

it: she is the mother thereof. And all Israel heard of the judgment which the king<br />

had judged; and they feared the king: for they saw that the wisdom of God was in<br />

him, to do judgment.<br />

Id. at 3:24-28.<br />

2. Id.


4 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

commercial disputes of the Middle Ages. 3<br />

In early America, the use of arbitration to resolve disputes predates<br />

the United States government and, thus, the establishment of the federal<br />

3. DENNIS NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 2-3 (West<br />

Publishing Co. 1979); see Randy Linda Sturman, House of Judgment: Alternative<br />

Dispute Resolution in the Orthodox Jewish Community, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 417,<br />

418 (2000). For thousands of years, Jewish communities have made use of an<br />

alternative dispute resolution process known as the Bet Din, meaning “house of<br />

judgment.” Id. The Bet Din involves resolution of a dispute by a single rabbi or a<br />

panel of three rabbis. Id. Unlike arbitration, the parties have to agree to the<br />

process, since there is generally no contractual clause involved. Id. The parties<br />

agree to arbitrate for various reasons, such as “social pressure or religious<br />

convictions.” Id. The purpose of the Bet Din is the resolution of disputes by peers<br />

or other members of the Jewish community who have similar cultural beliefs and<br />

values. Id.<br />

For a discussion of arbitration in the Middle Ages, see Michael Clanchy,<br />

<strong>Law</strong> and Love in the Middle Ages, in DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENTS: LAW AND<br />

HUMAN RELATIONS IN THE WEST 52 (John Bossy ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1983).<br />

The approach used by Louis IX in the Middle Ages to settle disputes is described by<br />

the following romanticized passage:<br />

The atmosphere is relaxed: the king sits at the foot of his bed, or in summer with<br />

his back against an oak in the Bois de Vincennes, or on a carpet in the Jardin de<br />

Paris without any head covering other than a cap of white peacock’s feathers.<br />

Litigants come forward without formality and the king himself asks them, ‘Why<br />

don’t you take what our people offer you?’ When they reply that the offers are too<br />

little, the king does everything he can to ‘put them on a right and sensible<br />

course.’. . . [T]he method of adjudication is one of ‘delivering’ the litigants from<br />

their toils through discussion and bargaining.<br />

Id.<br />

For a discussion of arbitration in Islamic law, see Sarvenaz Bahar,<br />

Khomeinism, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and International <strong>Law</strong>: The Relevance of<br />

Islamic Political Ideology, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 145, 167 (Winter 1992) (stating that<br />

arbitration “found a place in the verses of the Qur’an as a respected Muslim<br />

tradition: O you who believe! Obey Allah, and the Apostle and those in authority<br />

among you; if you differ, bring it before Allah and the Apostle, if you believe in<br />

Allah and in the last day. (Qur’an 4:59)”); Charles N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe,<br />

International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase, 97 AM. J. INT’L<br />

L. 643, 643 (July 2003).<br />

Shortly after the founding of Islam, the Treaty of Medina of 622 A.D. (a<br />

security pact among the city’s Muslims, non-Muslim Arabs, and Jews) called for<br />

arbitration of any disputes by the Prophet Muhammad. Indeed, the Prophet himself<br />

resorted to arbitration in his conflict with the tribe of Banu Qurayza. Muslim rulers<br />

subsequently followed his example, notably in the disastrous arbitration between<br />

Muawiyah (the governor of Syria) and the Caliph Ali (the Prophet’s son-in-law) in<br />

659 A.D. . . . [which] made permanent Islam’s enduring split into the Shiite and<br />

Sunni branches. Id.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 5<br />

court system by the U.S. Constitution. Native American tribes used a<br />

hybrid form of arbitration/mediation (Arb-Med) as a tool for dispute<br />

resolution. 4 Additionally, religious communities in the colonial period<br />

developed many creative dispute resolution mechanisms such as “gospel<br />

order,” “brotherly fashion,” and “arbitration” for resolving conflicts. 5<br />

The first U.S. President, George Washington, mandated arbitration rather<br />

than litigation if his will was challenged. 6 Arbitration has been used in<br />

4. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 2-3; see, e.g., Matt Arbaugh, Making Peace the Old<br />

Fashioned Way: Infusing Traditional Tribal Practices in Modern ADR, 2 PEPP.<br />

DISP. RESOL. L.J. 303, 303 (2002). The traditional method used by many Native<br />

Americans to resolve disputes is known as peacemaking. Id. The focus of the<br />

peacemaking process is on saving relationships and finding a solution that is<br />

acceptable to all. Id. The goal is to solve the problem causing the dispute rather<br />

than on awarding remedial measures or punishing the parties. Id. at 309. See, e.g.,<br />

Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33<br />

TULSA L.J. 1, 4 (1997). Certain Native American Tribal Courts have incorporated<br />

traditional mediation into modern legal institutions. Id. The Navajo Peacemaker<br />

Court, for example, implements a process—<br />

[D]irected by a mediator, who acts to guide and encourage the parties to resolve<br />

their dispute. The process relies on parties’ participation and their commitment to<br />

reaching a solution, rather than on the imposition of a judgment by an impersonal<br />

decisionmaker in order to reach a successful conclusion.<br />

Id.<br />

5. Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the<br />

Search for Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 46-47 n.58 (2002). In<br />

Puritan communities, arbitration was the first step in a multistage process to resolve<br />

disputes. Id. If arbitration failed, the parties then relied on elders, the minister, or<br />

others in the community to help them come to a resolution. Id. The Quakers had a<br />

similar process called a “gospel order.” Id. This process required parties to come to<br />

an agreement in a “brotherly fashion.” Id. If this method failed the parties would<br />

submit the dispute to arbitration by disinterested members of the community. Id.<br />

Punishment for failure to accept the ruling of the arbitrators resulted in<br />

excommunication. Id.<br />

6. James R. Deye & Lesly L. Britton, Arbitration By the American Arbitration<br />

Association, 70 N.D. L. REV. 281, 289 n.52 (1994) (citing MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE<br />

ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION at 187-88 (Rev. ed. 1991)). The portion of George<br />

Washington’s will providing for arbitration reads:<br />

“But having endeavored to be plain and explicit in all the [d]evises—even at the<br />

expense of prolixity, perhaps tautology, I hope, and trust, that no disputes will arise<br />

concerning them; but if contrary to expectation the case should be otherwise from<br />

the want of legal expression, or the usual technical terms, or because too much or<br />

too little has been said on any of the devises to be consonant with law, my will and<br />

direction expressly is, that all disputes (if unhappily any should arise) shall be<br />

decided by three impartial and intelligent men, known for their probity and good<br />

understanding; two to be chosen by the disputants, each having the choice of one,


6 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

commercial disputes for hundreds of years. 7 Management and unions<br />

have used contractual arbitration to resolve labor disputes for decades. 8<br />

Arbitration gained considerable popularity in the United States in<br />

the 1920s when Wall Street pressed Congress to endorse arbitration as an<br />

alternative dispute resolution mechanism to resolve equities disputes. 9<br />

During the “Roaring 20s,” there were long delays in trying cases in the<br />

court systems of the state of New York. 10 Equities traders and buyers<br />

needed quicker dispute resolution. The traders convincingly argued that<br />

speed in the resolution of conflict facilitates business. A free market<br />

trading system prefers efficiency, economy, speed, and fairness in the<br />

resolution of conflict. 11 “The business of business is business,” not<br />

lawsuits. 12<br />

and the third by those two—which three men thus chosen shall, unfettered by <strong>Law</strong>,<br />

or legal constructions, declare their sense of the [t]estator’s intention; and such<br />

decision is, to all intents and purposes, to be as binding on the [p]arties as if it had<br />

been given in the Supreme Court of the United States.”<br />

Id. (quoting George Washington’s will).<br />

7. Lee Korland, What an Arbitrator Should Investigate and Disclose:<br />

Proposing a New Test for Evident Partiality Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 53<br />

CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815, 817 (2003) (noting that arbitration was used in several<br />

of the original U.S. colonies even prior to the American Revolution).<br />

8. Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights,<br />

30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 30 (1998) (“For decades, private arbitration has<br />

been the vehicle of choice for unions, and it has worked well in this context.<br />

Although unions are free to withdraw from arbitration, it is virtually unheard of for<br />

a union to do so.”).<br />

9. See Sarah Rudolf Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against<br />

Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and<br />

Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 465 (1996) (“Businessmen grew to favor<br />

arbitration not only because it offered them autonomy from governmental<br />

regulation, but also because it allowed for a faster and more reliable means of<br />

dispute resolution.”).<br />

10. See id. During this period, there was an increase in governmental regulation<br />

as the nation’s agricultural economy transformed into an urban industrial economy.<br />

Id. There was a subsequent increase in litigation because of the regulation, resulting<br />

in “extreme congestion and delay [in the court system] accompanied by high costs,<br />

inflexible procedures, and obsolete law.” Id.<br />

11. See American Arbitration Ass’n, Executive Summary, Dispute-Wise sm<br />

Business Management: Improving Economic and Non-Economic Outcomes in<br />

Managing Business Conflicts 5 (2003), available at http://www.adr.org/dw/ES.pdf<br />

(last visited Dec. 8, 2005).<br />

12. The quote, “the business of business is business” is usually attributed to<br />

Milton Friedman as a result of his seminal article on business ethics. Milton<br />

Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 7<br />

B. Enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act<br />

Despite historical and statutory acceptance, arbitration faced<br />

opposition in the courts because it seemingly usurped judicial authority.<br />

English courts were loath to accept arbitration agreements, 13 and this<br />

reluctance then carried to American courts. 14 Congress, in response to<br />

Wall Street’s urging, 15 enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 16 in<br />

1925 to combat this judicial hostility. 17<br />

The FAA makes arbitration agreements enforceable like any other<br />

contract. 18 Section 2 of the Act provides:<br />

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract<br />

evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by<br />

arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or<br />

transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save<br />

upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation<br />

TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.<br />

13. See Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J. EX. 308, 313 (H.L. 1856) (Campbell, L.J); James<br />

P. Buchele & Larry R. Rute, The Changing Face of Arbitration: What Once Was<br />

Old Is New Again, 72-AUG J. KAN. B.A. 36, 37 (2003). Judicial hostility towards<br />

arbitration dates back to the English common law of the 17th and 18th centuries.<br />

Id. Judges, fearing that their salaries would be reduced if arbitration grew<br />

widespread, developed the “ouster doctrine” which held that agreements to arbitrate<br />

were revocable until an award was issued. Id.<br />

14. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND<br />

PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 49 (rev. 3d ed. 2003); see also Buchele & Rute, supra<br />

note 13, at 37. The hostility of the English courts toward arbitration was carried<br />

into the American colonies, and arbitration agreements were usually unenforceable<br />

until the FAA was enacted. Id.; see also Cole, supra note 9, at 462-66.<br />

15. See Cole, supra note 9, at 465-66 (noting passage of New York arbitration<br />

statute in 1920 with support from a coalition of lawyers and businessmen, and<br />

introduction of the FAA in the U.S. House of Representatives by Congressman<br />

Mills of New York).<br />

16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, §§ 201-208, §§ 301-307 (2000). Chapter one, §§ 1-16,<br />

deals with domestic arbitration. Chapters two and three, §§ 201-208 and §§ 301-<br />

307, respectively, cover arbitration proceedings in an international context.<br />

17. See Roger J. Perlstadt, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to<br />

Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1983, 1983 (2002) (quoting Gilmer v.<br />

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (“Congress enacted the<br />

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) ‘to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to<br />

arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been<br />

adopted by American courts.’”)).<br />

18. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (stating that the<br />

FAA was designed to put arbitration agreements on “the same footing as other<br />

contracts”).


8 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

of any contract. 19<br />

The United States Supreme Court extended the application of the<br />

FAA, making the provisions applicable to arbitration agreements<br />

executed pursuant to state law. 20 The Court asserted that any state that<br />

attempts to invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable<br />

only to arbitration provisions will be met with opposition by the FAA. 21<br />

In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson, the Court recognized<br />

that, “States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under<br />

general contract law principles.” 22 But “[w]hat States may not do is<br />

decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price,<br />

service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.” 23<br />

Despite the enactment of the FAA with its strong policy favoring<br />

arbitration, some federal and state courts still refused to enforce<br />

arbitration agreements. 24 But, in 1974, the judicial hostility toward<br />

19. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (emphasis added); see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.<br />

Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1994). The Court adopted a broad interpretation of<br />

the phrase “involving commerce.” Id. The Court noted that “a broad interpretation<br />

of this language is consistent with the Act’s basic purpose, to put arbitration<br />

provisions on ‘the same footing’ as a contract’s other terms.” Id. at 275 (quoting<br />

Scherk, 417 U.S. at 511).<br />

20. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (“In creating a<br />

substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to<br />

foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration<br />

agreements.”).<br />

21. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).<br />

22. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281; see also Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686-87<br />

(holding that “the text of § 2 declares that state law may be applied ‘if that law arose<br />

to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of<br />

contracts generally.’ . . . Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,<br />

duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements<br />

without contravening § 2.”).<br />

23. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281; Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688 (quoting Scherk,<br />

417 U.S. at 511 (1974) (stating that “[b]y enacting § 2, . . . Congress precluded<br />

States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead<br />

that such provisions be placed ‘upon the same footing as other contracts.’”)).<br />

24. Stephen J. Ware, Basic Principles of Arbitration <strong>Law</strong>: Successful<br />

Challenges to Arbitration Agreements, in ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL<br />

SERVICES DISPUTES 1999, at 797, 802 (PLI Corporate <strong>Law</strong> Practice, Course<br />

Handbook Series No. B0-00C2, 1999); see, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438<br />

(1953) (“[T]he intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better<br />

carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration.”); Rueda v. Union<br />

Pac. RR. Co., 175 P.2d 778, 782 (Or. 1946) (stating that, with respect to agreements<br />

to arbitrate future disputes, “the ancient common-law hostility to agreements<br />

‘ousting the courts of jurisdiction’ becomes manifest, and it is often held that one


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 9<br />

arbitration turned to support when the Supreme Court held that an<br />

arbitral forum would be just as fair as a courtroom for parties to an<br />

international agreement who had agreed to arbitrate a securities fraud<br />

claim pursuant to U.S. law. 25 Since the decision in Scherk v. Alberto-<br />

Culver Co., the Supreme Court has “taken an active interest in promoting<br />

party recourse to arbitration and in protecting the autonomy and<br />

operation of the arbitral process,” 26 relying on the “liberal federal policy<br />

favoring arbitration agreements.” 27 Today, public policy in the United<br />

States favors arbitration as a valid and legal means of resolving<br />

disputes. 28 And, because of the judiciary’s stringent support of<br />

arbitration as a means to resolve all types of disputes, “[t]here is virtually<br />

no subject-matter inarbitrability defense to the enforcement of arbitral<br />

agreements and awards under U.S. law.” 29<br />

The use of arbitration to settle disputes is now widespread and is a<br />

standard feature in business, consumer, and employment contracts.<br />

International and national businesses view it as an essential tool to<br />

control the costs of resolving a dispute and preserve current and future<br />

business relationships. 30 Between 1998 and 1999, the American<br />

Arbitration Association (AAA) saw a fifty percent increase in arbitration<br />

filings, bringing the number of mediations and arbitrations conducted by<br />

the AAA in that year to 140,188. 31 By September 2005, the total number<br />

may bring an action in court without complying with the agreed arbitral<br />

procedure”); Vitaphone Corp. v. Elec. Research Prod., Inc., 166 A. 255, 261 (Del.<br />

Ch. 1933) (“Courts here and elsewhere are opposed to being ousted of jurisdiction<br />

by the agreement of parties to an arbitration.”).<br />

25. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20 (holding that “any dispute arising out of their<br />

international commercial transaction is to be respected and enforced by the federal<br />

courts”).<br />

26. CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 243.<br />

27. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24<br />

(1983).<br />

28. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)<br />

(quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24) (“[T]he Court has also long recognized<br />

and enforced a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.’”); JLM<br />

Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen, 387 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Hartford<br />

Accident & Indem. Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 246 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir.<br />

2001)) (“The FAA expresses ‘a strong federal policy favoring arbitration.’”); Masco<br />

Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 627 (6th Cir. 2004); Register v. White,<br />

599 S.E.2d 549, 556 (N.C. 2004); IMPACT Constr. Group, L.L.C. v. Superior<br />

Concrete Constructors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 901, 906-07 (Ind. 2004).<br />

29. CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 245.<br />

30. Korland, supra note 7, at 818.<br />

31. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, 1999 AMERICAN ARBITRATION


10 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

of cases administered in the history of the AAA exceeded 2,000,000. 32<br />

Because arbitration has become so widely accepted and used by<br />

clients, it is important for the legal profession and the business<br />

community to understand the arbitration process, its positives, and its<br />

negatives.<br />

III. OBJECTIVES OF ARBITRATION<br />

United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger provided<br />

impetus to the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement in 1984<br />

at an American Bar Association meeting when he asserted that “[o]ur<br />

[legal] system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for<br />

a truly civilized people.” 33 A report by the U.S. House of<br />

Representatives recognized that compared to litigation,<br />

The advantages of arbitration are many: it is usually cheaper and<br />

faster than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and<br />

evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less<br />

disruptive of ongoing and future business dealings among the<br />

parties; it is often more flexible in regard to scheduling of times<br />

and places of hearings and discovery devices. 34<br />

The mantra of arbitration is: quick, efficient, economical, and fair<br />

resolution of disputes. “Quick” because an arbitration hearing can be<br />

scheduled for any convenient time including weekends and nights. 35<br />

Ideally, the hearing is set and heard soon after the arbitrator has been<br />

appointed. 36 “Efficient” because the Rules of Evidence and the Rules of<br />

Civil Procedure which govern a trial are typically not applied. 37 The<br />

ASSOCIATION ANN. REP. (1999), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id =1540<br />

(last visited Dec. 8, 2005).<br />

32. American Arbitration Association, Fast Facts, at http://www.adr.org/FastFa<br />

cts (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).<br />

33. Warren E. Burger Former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court,<br />

quoted in Mid-Year Meeting of American Bar Association, 52 U.S.L.W. 2471, 2471<br />

(Feb. 28, 1984).<br />

34. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (citing<br />

H.R. REP. NO. 97-542, at 13 reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 777).<br />

35. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 307<br />

(Alan Ruben ed., BNA Books 6th ed. 2003).<br />

36. Id.<br />

37. See American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and<br />

Mediation Procedures (Including Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial<br />

Disputes) (Sept. 15, 2005), R-31, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22004


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 11<br />

arbitrator and the parties can design any useful arbitral process which<br />

works for them to deal with the conflict. 38 It is not uncommon for cases<br />

to be arbitrated within a few months from the origin of the conflict, not<br />

years. 39 “Economical” because the prevailing belief is that overall<br />

arbitration costs are usually less than traditional litigation costs. 40<br />

Arbitration, at least in theory, is “without the delays and exorbitant costs<br />

of litigation.” 41 “Fair” because notice and a hearing by a neutral decision<br />

maker, chosen by the parties, satisfies due process. 42 Arbitration<br />

provides a fair process which results in a just decision. This “fairness”<br />

concept is sometimes referred to as “industrial due process.” 43 It is a<br />

process that the parties feel they are due in order to resolve their dispute<br />

because the parties had a hand in shaping the arbitral clause, delineating<br />

which of their disputes would be submitted to arbitration. It is a process<br />

that demonstrates party autonomy in that the parties agree between and<br />

(last visited Oct. 25, 2005) [hereinafter AAA Rules].<br />

38. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 35, at 293-94.<br />

39. Scott S. Morrison, Consider Binding Arbitration to Resolve Your Next<br />

Dispute, 40-MAY RES GESTAE 18, 20 (May1997).<br />

40. See American Arbitration Association, supra note 11, at 7.<br />

41. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425,<br />

433-38 (1988). But see Frank E. Massengale & Karen Kaler Whitfield, Arbitration:<br />

Be Careful What You Wish For, 44 LA. B.J. 120, 121 (Aug. 1996) (citing Advanced<br />

Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 1012 (Cal. 1994) (confirming<br />

arbitration award)). Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. represents an extreme example<br />

in which arbitration was not the efficient procedure it is hailed to be. Id. In this<br />

case, “counsel originally estimated that the entire arbitration process should take six<br />

to eight weeks to complete; however, four and one-half years later, after 355 days of<br />

hearings and 42,000 pages of transcript, the arbitrator entered an award.” Id.<br />

42. Shafii v. British Airways, 872 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); see<br />

also American Arbitration Association, Consumer Due Process Protocol, Principle<br />

1, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).<br />

43. See Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int’l Brotherhood of<br />

Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1445 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that an employer did not<br />

violate industrial due process when it discharged an employee accused of sexual<br />

harassment, when the employer investigated the charges and when the employee<br />

had a chance to respond to the charges, had notice that his conduct could result in<br />

discharge, was informed of the source of the charge, and was informed that he was<br />

entitled to representation); Teamsters, Local Union 657 v. Stanley Structures, Inc.,<br />

735 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the employer “had notice of the<br />

grievances against it and an opportunity to be heard. It thus received industrial due<br />

process”); see also Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 990 (9th Cir.<br />

2001) (holding that the arbitration award “demonstrates that the NBA’s<br />

investigation ‘complied with industrial due process’ and that Sprewell received a<br />

full and fair hearing”).


12 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

among themselves to follow it. The parties thus stipulate that, “[A]ll<br />

disputes arising under a contract—whether statutory or contractual in<br />

character—can be submitted to arbitration.” 44<br />

IV. HOW ARBITRATION BEGINS<br />

A. The Agreement to Arbitrate<br />

Arbitration can be agreed to as a dispute resolution method predispute,<br />

post-dispute, or mandated by a court after a lawsuit has been<br />

filed. 45 With pre-dispute arbitration agreements, the parties agree to<br />

arbitration in advance of any dispute; they set forth in the terms of their<br />

contract a negotiated “arbitration clause.” 46 Pre-dispute arbitration<br />

agreements are the typical means by which parties assent to submit their<br />

44. CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 245.<br />

45. The AAA provides recommended arbitration clause language for both predispute<br />

and post-dispute situations:<br />

Arbitration<br />

The parties can provide for arbitration of future disputes by inserting the following<br />

clause into their contracts (the language in the brackets suggests possible<br />

alternatives or additions).<br />

STD 1. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the<br />

breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American<br />

Arbitration Association in accordance with its Commercial [or other] Arbitration<br />

Rules [including the Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection], and<br />

judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court<br />

having jurisdiction thereof.<br />

Arbitration of existing disputes may be accomplished by use of the following.<br />

STD 2. We, the undersigned parties, hereby agree to submit to arbitration<br />

administered by the American Arbitration Association under its Commercial [or<br />

other] Arbitration Rules the following controversy: [describe briefly]. We further<br />

agree that a judgment of any court having jurisdiction may be entered upon the<br />

award.<br />

American Arbitration Association, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses: A<br />

Practical Guide (July 1, 2004), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22020<br />

(last visited Oct. 25, 2005) [hereinafter AAA, Drafting Dispute Resolution<br />

Clauses]; see, e.g., MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.01 (2005) (All civil cases are subject<br />

to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes, except for those actions<br />

enumerated in MINN. STAT. § 484.76 and Rules 111.01 and 310.01 of these rules.).<br />

46. See CARBONNEAU supra note 14, at 16 (“The arbitral clause . . . is a contract<br />

under which the parties agree to submit future disputes to arbitration.”).


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 13<br />

disputes to arbitration. In other circumstances, parties may agree to<br />

arbitrate an existing controversy, i.e., after the conflict has arisen the<br />

parties may then decide arbitration is the best way to handle the conflict<br />

even though they had not agreed before the dispute to arbitrate the<br />

matter. 47 But these post-dispute arbitration agreements are rare. 48 In<br />

cases in which the parties agree to arbitrate after the dispute arises, the<br />

parties should enter into a written “Submission to Arbitration<br />

Agreement,” which is the equivalent of an arbitration clause setting forth<br />

the parties agreement to arbitrate and the general guidelines to be<br />

followed in the arbitration process. 49<br />

There have been recent developments in the court systems that<br />

permit a party, a party’s attorney, or the court on its own initiative, to<br />

divert a case out of the court system into non-binding arbitration even<br />

though neither party initially agreed to arbitration and even if one or both<br />

of the parties do not want non-binding arbitration as a step. 50 “Court<br />

mandated” or “court-annexed” arbitration has developed throughout the<br />

United States as a way to relieve overcrowded court dockets. 51 At least<br />

thirty-five States now have court mandated alternative dispute resolution<br />

programs. 52 For example, Rule 114 of the Minnesota Rules of General<br />

47. Some commentators suggest that certain types of disputes, like employment<br />

disputes should only be submitted to arbitration after the dispute arises. See<br />

Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment<br />

Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).<br />

48. Ware, supra note 24, at 801 (“In some instances, the parties agree to<br />

arbitrate a dispute that has already arisen. These post-dispute arbitration agreements<br />

are rare and uncontroversial. More commonly, the agreement to arbitrate is formed<br />

prior to any dispute.”)<br />

49. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 6.<br />

50. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.09 (2005). The Minnesota Rules of General<br />

Practice allow a party “to opt for binding or non-binding arbitration.” Id.<br />

According to the Rules, “the parties may construct or select a set of rules to govern<br />

the process.” Id. If the parties choose non-binding arbitration conducted according<br />

to the provisions set forth in Rule 114.09, the arbitrator’s award becomes final and<br />

binding, if neither party files “a request for a trial within 20 days after the award is<br />

filed.” Id.<br />

51. Jane W. Adler et al., Simple Justice: How Litigants Fare in the Pittsburgh<br />

Court Arbitration Program, in JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., MEDIATION AND OTHER<br />

NON-BINDING ADR PROCESSES 221 (Found. Press, Inc. 1996).<br />

52. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-133 (2004) (requiring “arbitration in all<br />

cases which are filed in superior court in which the court finds or the parties agree<br />

that the amount in controversy does not exceed the jurisdictional limit”); CAL. CIV.<br />

PROC. CODE § 1141.11 (2004); MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.01 (2005); D. MINN.<br />

LOCAL CT. R. 16.5(b)(1) (2004); M.D. FLA. LOCAL CT. R. 8.02(a) (2004); N.D.


14 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

Practice allows civil cases to be referred to some form of ADR solely on<br />

the initiative of the judge or only one of the attorneys representing a<br />

party. 53 If the case is referred to arbitration, the decision is non-binding<br />

and either party may reject the award and demand a trial. If after ten<br />

days neither party rejects the award of the arbitrator and demands a trial,<br />

the decision becomes binding. So, a “non-binding arbitration” can<br />

become “binding” if both parties accept the outcome or both wait too<br />

long to demand that the case be returned to court. 54<br />

B. The Arbitration Clause<br />

Arbitration is commonly known as a creature of contract. 55 In a<br />

free-market, free-trade economy, the parties to an arbitration agreement<br />

have wide latitude in drafting their arbitration clause. Because the<br />

arbitration clause affects how the entire arbitration process will proceed,<br />

careful drafting is required. The treatment given an arbitration clause<br />

resembles that of any free-market contract. 56<br />

Parties to a contract make their own law, and it is, of course, true<br />

that, subject to the rules of public policy and public order, the<br />

parties are free to agree upon such terms as they may choose.<br />

Nevertheless, agreements that are intended to have legal<br />

operation . . . create legal rights and duties, and legal rights and<br />

CAL. LOCAL CT. R. 4-2 (2005).<br />

53. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.01 (2005) (“All civil cases are subject to<br />

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes, except for those actions<br />

enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 484.76 and Rules 111.01 and 310.01 of these rules.”).<br />

54. See, e.g., MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.09(e) (2005) (stating that “[i]f no party<br />

has filed a request for a trial within 20 days after the award is filed, the court<br />

administrator shall enter the decision as a judgment . . . [which shall] have the same<br />

force and effect as . . . a judgment in a civil action or proceeding.”).<br />

55. See <strong>Vol</strong>t Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489<br />

U.S. 468, 472 (1989) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,<br />

219 (1985) (“[B]ecause ‘the thrust of the federal law is that arbitration is strictly a<br />

matter of contract,’ the parties to an arbitration agreement should be ‘at liberty to<br />

choose the terms under which they will arbitrate.’”)).<br />

56. See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (quoting<br />

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (“By enacting § 2, . . .<br />

Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect<br />

status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed ‘upon the same footing as<br />

other contracts.’”)); St. John’s Sanitary Dist. v. Town of Schereville, 621 N.E.2d<br />

1160, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing that when interpreting an arbitration<br />

clause, “the court will apply ordinary contract principles”); see also Ziegler v.<br />

Whale Secs. Co., 786 F. Supp. 739, 741 (N.D. Ind. 1992).


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 15<br />

duties cannot exist in a vacuum, but must have a place within a<br />

legal system. 57<br />

While contracts generally do not have to be in writing to be<br />

enforceable, arbitration clauses must be in writing to be valid. 58 Because<br />

both parties give up their right to go to court, the Federal Arbitration Act<br />

requires that an arbitration clause be in writing. 59 An agreement to<br />

arbitrate must be “openly and freely” entered into by both parties. 60<br />

Parties will not be compelled to arbitrate if they have not voluntarily<br />

contracted to use this mechanism to resolve their disputes. 61 Once the<br />

court has determined that the arbitration agreement is valid and that the<br />

parties contracted for arbitration of their dispute, they will be held to it. 62<br />

57. Angela L. Kimbrough, Arbitration: Demise of the Right to Trial by Jury, in<br />

1 AM. TRIAL LAW. ASS’N ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 397<br />

(2000) (quoting Lord McNair, The General Principals of <strong>Law</strong> Recognized by<br />

Civilized Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 7 (1957)).<br />

58. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (providing that “[a] written provision in any maritime<br />

transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by<br />

arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, . . . or<br />

an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out<br />

of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and<br />

enforceable”) (emphasis added).<br />

59. Id.; see Kilmer v. Flocar, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 66, 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing In<br />

re Arbitration Between Chung & President Enters. Corp., 943 F.2d 225, 229 (2d<br />

Cir. 1991) (noting that, “[g]enerally, the FAA governs all questions before a federal<br />

court regarding the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements if: (1) the<br />

parties have entered into a written arbitration agreement”)). The Kilmer court held<br />

that, because agreement was not in writing, it did not meet requirements of the<br />

FAA. Id.<br />

60. Benyon v. Garden Grove Med. Group, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (Cal. Ct.<br />

App. 1980) (“[I]n order to be enforceable an agreement to arbitrate must have been<br />

openly and fairly entered into by the parties.”); see also United Steel Workers of<br />

Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (“[A]rbitration is<br />

a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any<br />

dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”).<br />

61. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,<br />

626 (1985); Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 199 (1991) (quoting<br />

Hilton-Davis Chem. Co. v. Local 342, Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 185 N.L.R.B.<br />

241, 242 (1970) (“[T]he commitment to arbitrate is a ‘voluntary surrender of the<br />

right of final decision which Congress . . . reserved to [the] parties.’”)).<br />

62. Hahnemann Univ. v. Dist. 1199C, Nat. Union of Hosp. & Health Care<br />

Employees, 765 F.2d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Warrior & Gulf Navigation<br />

Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83) (“A court should order the reluctant party to submit the<br />

dispute to arbitration ‘unless it may be said with positive assurance that an<br />

arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted


16 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

The FAA then requires a court to “stay litigation” 63 and “compel<br />

arbitration.” 64<br />

The language of the arbitration clause is vital because it is what<br />

courts examine to determine whether parties have submitted a particular<br />

dispute to arbitration. Arbitration clauses run the gamut from the simple<br />

to the complex to the ridiculous. A simple, standard arbitration clause is<br />

often recommended for any type of dispute. For example, the American<br />

Arbitration Association (AAA) recommends this simple clause for all<br />

commercial contracts:<br />

Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract,<br />

or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered<br />

by the American Arbitration Association in accordance with its<br />

Commercial [or other] Arbitration Rules [including the Optional<br />

Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection], and judgment on<br />

the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any<br />

court having jurisdiction thereof. 65<br />

A similar simple clause is recommended even for large international<br />

disputes by agencies such as the London Court of International<br />

Arbitration (LCIA), 66 the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 67<br />

dispute.’”).<br />

63. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000) (providing that “[i]f any suit . . . be brought in any of<br />

the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an<br />

agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending,<br />

upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to<br />

arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay<br />

the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the<br />

terms of the agreement”).<br />

64. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (providing that “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure,<br />

neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration<br />

may petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such<br />

arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. [U]pon being<br />

satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue, the<br />

court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in<br />

accordance with the terms of the agreement”).<br />

65. See sources cited supra note 45.<br />

66. London Court of International Arbitration, Arbitration Rules: Recommended<br />

Clauses (Jan. 1, 1998), available at http://www.lcia.org/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).<br />

Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract, including any<br />

question regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and<br />

finally resolved by arbitration under the LCIA Rules, which Rules are deemed to be<br />

incorporated by reference into this clause. The number of arbitrators shall be<br />

[one/three].


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 17<br />

and the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration<br />

Commission (CIETAC). 68<br />

Parties who want to retain more control over the arbitration<br />

proceeding should include more detail in the arbitration clause. A more<br />

detailed arbitration clause will address: the method of selection and<br />

number of arbitrators; arbitrator qualifications; language used in the<br />

arbitration; governing law to be applied during the arbitration; conditions<br />

precedent to arbitration; preliminary relief; document discovery; duration<br />

of arbitration proceedings; remedies; reasoned opinion accompanying<br />

the award; assessment of attorneys fees; confidentiality; and appeal. 69<br />

Id.<br />

The seat, or legal place, of arbitration shall be [City and/or Country].<br />

The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be [ ].<br />

The governing law of the contract shall be the substantive law of [ ].<br />

67. International Chamber of Commerce, The Standard ICC Arbitration Clause:<br />

Drafting the Arbitration Agreement, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/engli<br />

sh/arbitration/model_clause.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). The ICC recommends<br />

parties to include the following clause in their contracts:<br />

All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall be finally<br />

settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce<br />

by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules.<br />

Id.<br />

68. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, Model<br />

Arbitration Clause, available at http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/model_clause/mo<br />

del_clause.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). CIETAC recommends the following<br />

clause:<br />

Any dispute arising from or in connection with this Contract shall be submitted to<br />

China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission for arbitration<br />

which shall be conducted in accordance with the Commission’s arbitration rules in<br />

effect at the time of applying for arbitration. The arbitral award is final and binding<br />

on both parties.<br />

Id.<br />

69. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 508 (1974). In the<br />

Scherk case, the arbitration clause provided that:<br />

The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out of this agreement<br />

or the breach thereof and either party shall request that the matter shall be settled by<br />

arbitration, the matter shall be settled exclusively by arbitration in accordance with<br />

the rules then obtaining of the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France,<br />

by a single arbitrator, if the parties shall agree upon one, or by one arbitrator<br />

appointed by each party and a third arbitrator appointed by the other arbitrators. In


18 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

But arbitration clauses can become “pathological” 70 when the clause<br />

is designed to give one side a disproportionate advantage. In one<br />

notorious case, the employer drafted the arbitration clause so one-sided<br />

that the court refused to uphold the agreement to arbitrate. 71 The Hooters<br />

restaurant chain used the following clause in its employment contract:<br />

Hooters and the employee agree to arbitrate all employment<br />

related disputes and controversies. Each agrees to arbitrate all<br />

disputes arising out of employment including any claim of<br />

discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation or wrongful<br />

discharge whether arising under federal or state law. The<br />

employee and the company agree to resolve any claims pursuant<br />

to the company’s rules and procedures for alternative resolution of<br />

employment related disputes, as promulgated by the company<br />

from time to time. 72<br />

The Hooters court stated that the provisions “when taken as a<br />

whole, however, are so one-sided that their only possible purpose is to<br />

undermine the neutrality of the proceeding.” 73 By entering into an<br />

case of any failure of a party to make an appointment referred to above within four<br />

weeks after notice of the controversy, such appointment shall be made by said<br />

Chamber. All arbitration proceedings shall be held in Paris, France, and each party<br />

agrees to comply in all respects with any award made in any such proceeding and<br />

to the entry of a judgment in any jurisdiction upon any award rendered in such<br />

proceeding. The laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and govern this<br />

agreement, its interpretation and performance.<br />

Id.<br />

70. For an analysis of flawed arbitration clauses, see Benjamin G. Davis,<br />

Pathological Clauses: Frédéric Eisman’s Still Vital Criteria, 7 ARB. INT’L 4 (1991).<br />

71. Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).<br />

72. Id. at 936.<br />

73. Id. at 938. In this case, the arbitration rules were procedurally biased in<br />

favor of Hooters. Id. Employees were required to provide Hooters with notice of<br />

their claims from the outset while Hooters was not required to provide responsive<br />

pleadings or notice of any defenses. Id. Hooters also had complete control over the<br />

arbitration panel. Id. at 938-39. Under the rules, the panel of three arbitrators<br />

would be selected from a list of eligible arbitrators compiled by Hooters. Id. The<br />

rules would have permitted Hooters to choose arbitrators who have existing<br />

financial or familial interests in the restaurant and was free to remove from the list<br />

arbitrators who rule against it. Id. at 939. Hooters was also allowed to expand the<br />

proceeding to include any matter whatsoever that it wished; however, the employee<br />

could not raise any issue which was not included in the Notice of Claim. Id. The<br />

rules granted Hooters numerous rights that it denied to the employee: the right to<br />

move for summary judgment, the right to bring a motion to vacate the arbitral award<br />

in court if the arbitrator exceeded his/her authority, to cancel the arbitration


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 19<br />

arbitration agreement, the parties agreed to submit their dispute to<br />

arbitration—a process in which their disputes should be decided fairly by<br />

a neutral third party. 74 By promulgating such one-sided arbitration rules,<br />

Hooters breached the sense of fundamental fairness in its agreement to<br />

arbitrate. 75 The American Arbitration Association has issued a “Due<br />

Process Protocol” refusing to administer such disputes with these types<br />

of “unfair” arbitration clauses. 76<br />

V. INITIATING THE ARBITRATION<br />

Most arbitration agencies simplify the process by handling most of<br />

the preliminary matters. For example, the American Arbitration<br />

Association will notify the other party of the initiation of the arbitration<br />

proceeding, 77 will assign an arbitrator if the parties cannot agree, 78 will<br />

notify the arbitrator that the arbitrator has been chosen, 79 and will assist<br />

in arranging a time and place for the parties to meet. 80 Simplicity and<br />

ease of use of the process are two of the reasons arbitration is used. 81<br />

But a party can forfeit the right to arbitration if the party fails to take<br />

affirmative steps to initiate arbitration. 82<br />

agreement upon thirty days notice. Id. Perhaps most egregiously, Hooters could<br />

change the rules without notice at any time, even during the arbitration proceeding.<br />

Id.<br />

74. Id. at 940.<br />

75. Id.<br />

76. American Arbitration Association, supra note 42, at Principle 1.<br />

77. AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-4.<br />

78. Id. R-11.<br />

79. Id. R-2<br />

80. Id. R-9, R-10, R-22.<br />

81. JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE<br />

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 36-41 (Kluwer <strong>Law</strong> Int’l 2003).<br />

82. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6201(a) (2004) (stating that, in<br />

disputes involving attorney fees, “the client’s failure to request arbitration within 30<br />

days after receipt of notice from the attorney shall be deemed a waiver of the<br />

client’s right to arbitration under the provisions of this article”); ME. REV. STAT.<br />

ANN. tit. 23, § 52-A (2004) (In contract disputes between a contractor and a<br />

subcontractor, “failure to submit [the claim] to arbitration as provided under this<br />

subsection shall constitute a waiver of the claim”); see also Engalla v. Permanente<br />

Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 909 (Cal. 1997). In Engalla, the defendant, Kaiser,<br />

administered its own arbitration program. Id. The arbitration agreement provided<br />

for three arbitrators and each party was to select one arbitrator of its own choosing<br />

within thirty days of initial service on the respondent. Id. Within an additional<br />

thirty days, the two party-appointed arbitrators were to jointly select a neutral


20 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

A. Arbitration Agency or Ad Hoc Proceeding<br />

When a “claimant” and a “respondent” agree to arbitrate predispute,<br />

post-dispute, or are mandated to participate in a non-binding<br />

arbitration by a court, they must make an important decision whether to<br />

utilize an arbitration agency or whether to rely on their own “ad hoc”<br />

arbitration proceeding. If the parties wish to utilize an agency, such as<br />

the AAA or the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), they should<br />

so specify in their agreement. 83 By utilizing an agency, the parties<br />

consent to conduct the arbitration according to the rules of that agency. 84<br />

arbitrator. Id. Engalla sought to bring a malpractice action against Kaiser for<br />

failure to diagnose his lung cancer in a timely manner. Id. His attorney requested<br />

expedited procedures numerous times, because plaintiff was terminally ill. Id. at<br />

910. Despite these requests, defendant continued to delay in choosing an arbitrator<br />

and arranging for discovery. Id. at 910-11. By the time the neutral arbitrator was<br />

chosen, 144 days had passed since the initial service on respondent. Id. at 912.<br />

Plaintiff died one day later. Id. As a result, his wife’s claim for loss of consortium<br />

merged with the medical malpractice claim. Id. at 914. Maximum damages that<br />

could be awarded were reduced from $500,000 to $250,000. Id. The Supreme<br />

Court of California found that there was substantial evidence indicating that the<br />

defendant had waived its right to arbitration through delay and remanded the issue<br />

to the trial court. Id. at 924.<br />

83. The following are some of the most well-known and widely used arbitration<br />

agencies in the world: the AAA (http://www.adr.org) deals with a wide range of<br />

international and domestic disputes, including construction, automotive, insurance<br />

claims, internet commerce, consumer finance, labor, and mass claims; the ICC<br />

(http://www.iccwbo.org) specializes in the resolution of international business<br />

disputes; the London Court of International Arbitration (http://www.lciaarbitration.com)<br />

works to resolve international and domestic commercial disputes;<br />

the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce<br />

(http://www.sccinstitute.com) is one of the leading international arbitration<br />

institutes in the world; the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration<br />

Commission (CIETAC) (http://www.cietac.org.cn) handles disputes arising from<br />

contractual or non-contractual, economic and trade transactions; the National<br />

Arbitration Forum (NAF) (http://www.arb-forum.com) handles national and<br />

international disputes involving commercial or individual claims; and the Federal<br />

Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) (http://www.fmcs.gov) deals<br />

specifically with labor disputes in the United States.<br />

84. Each agency provides rules to be used in the arbitration proceeding. Often<br />

the rules vary depending on the specific dispute. See American Arbitration<br />

Association, Rules and Procedures, at http://www.adr.org/RulesProcedures (last<br />

visited Oct. 25, 2005) (listing the various rules and procedures for different<br />

disputes). The AAA has particular rules regulating arbitration of accident claims,<br />

commercial disputes, labor disputes, international disputes, etc. Id. Agency rules<br />

also vary according to the agency utilized. Compare American Arbitration<br />

Association, International Dispute Resolution Procedures, available at


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 21<br />

In an “ad hoc” arbitration proceeding, no agency is selected and, thus,<br />

the parties set the rules and begin the process on their own. Before<br />

deciding whether to contract for “agency” arbitration or to proceed “ad<br />

hoc,” clients and their counsel should consider both the advantages and<br />

disadvantages of each.<br />

Administering arbitral institutions, like the AAA, the United States<br />

Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and the ICC, offer distinct<br />

advantages over ad hoc arbitration. They are easy to access, have time<br />

tested rules, maintain lists of qualified and experienced arbitrators, and<br />

have qualified staff to assist and to answer procedural questions. 85 Their<br />

rules and procedures are likely to produce consistent and predictable<br />

results—and their notable experience more easily allows them to deal<br />

with unusual circumstances. 86 Arbitration agencies contribute<br />

organization and control to the proceedings by providing administrative<br />

assistance to the parties, including maintaining files, investigating<br />

conflicts of interest, collecting fees, scheduling, and providing a site to<br />

hold the arbitration. 87 It is widely perceived that an institutional award<br />

will have greater cache, courts are likely to respect such institutions, and<br />

courts are more likely to give deference to the award of the arbitrator. 88<br />

One key disadvantage to using an agency is the costs and fees<br />

prescribed by the particular administering institution. For example, the<br />

AAA bases its filing fees on the amount in controversy in commercial<br />

arbitration cases. 89 Thus, a party bringing a claim of $160,000 is<br />

http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22090 (last visited Oct. 25, 2005) (allowing parties to<br />

choose their own method for appointing a panel of arbitrators), with International<br />

Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration, R-15 (Jan. 1, 1998), available at<br />

http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp (last visited Oct. 26,<br />

2005) (providing that each party shall choose an arbitrator with the third arbitrator<br />

appointed by the agency) [hereinafter ICC Rules].<br />

85. James K. Hoenig, The Pros and Cons of Administered Arbitration, 49 DISP.<br />

RESOL. J. 59, 60-61 (June 1994).<br />

86. Matthew Rasmussen, Overextending Immunity: Arbitral Institution Liability<br />

in the United States, England, and France, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1824, 1833<br />

(June 2003).<br />

87. Robert L. Ebe, The Nuts and Bolts of Arbitration, 22-FALL FRANCHISE L.J.<br />

85, 85 (Fall 2002).<br />

88. See LEW ET AL., supra note 81, at 36.<br />

89. American Arbitration Association, Resolving Commercial Financial<br />

Disputes: A Practical Guide (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.as<br />

p?id=22008 (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).<br />

The AAA Guide requires Administrative Fees for Commercial Arbitration<br />

according to the following schedule:


22 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

required to pay a $2,750 “filing fee” plus $1,250 for a “case service fee”<br />

to initiate arbitration proceedings. 90 Also, utilizing an agency can add to<br />

the time it takes to arrange the arbitration because there is an additional<br />

level of communication required between the administrator, the<br />

attorneys, the parties, and the arbitrator(s). 91<br />

Ad hoc arbitration does not rely on an agency, nor its good offices,<br />

nor its established rules and procedures. 92 Ad hoc arbitration allows the<br />

Amount of Claim Initial Filing Fee Case Service Fee<br />

Above $0 to $10,000 $500 $200<br />

Above $10,000 to $75,000 $750 $300<br />

Above $75,000 to $150,000 $1,500 $750<br />

Above $150,000 to $300,000 $2,750 $1,250<br />

Above $300,000 to $500,000 $4,250 $1,750<br />

Above $500,000 to $1,000,000 $6,000 $2,500<br />

Above $1,000,000 to $5,000,000 $8,000 $3,250<br />

Above $5,000,000 to $10,000,000 $10,000 $4,000<br />

Above $10,000,000 * *<br />

Nonmonetary Claims ** $3,250 $1,250<br />

*Contact your local AAA office for fees for claims in excess of $10 million.<br />

**This fee is applicable when a claim or counterclaim is not for a monetary amount.<br />

Where a monetary claim is not known, parties will be required to state a range of<br />

claims or be subject to the highest possible filing fee.<br />

Id.<br />

In addition, Rule 48 of the Arbitration Rules for Commercial Financial<br />

Disputes states:<br />

Members of the National Roster appointed as arbitrators will be compensated based<br />

on the amount of service involved and the number of hearings. Arbitrators shall<br />

charge a rate consistent with the arbitrator’s stated rate of compensation, beginning<br />

with the first day of hearing. If the parties fail to agree to the terms of<br />

compensation, an appropriate rate shall be established with the arbitrator by the<br />

AAA and communicated in writing to the parties.<br />

Any arrangement for the compensation of an arbitrator shall be made through the<br />

AAA and not directly between the parties and the arbitrator.<br />

American Arbitration Association, Arbitration Rules for Commercial Financial<br />

Disputes, R-48, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22008#ArbRules (last<br />

visited Dec. 5, 2005).<br />

90. AAA Practical Guide, supra note 89.<br />

91. Ebe, supra note 87, at 85-86.<br />

92. Joyce J. George, The Advantages of Administered Arbitration When Going<br />

It Alone Just Won’t Do, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 66, 68-69 (Aug.-Oct. 2002). George<br />

suggests that the following questions are left to the parties to answer in ad hoc


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 23<br />

parties to make fundamental decisions relating to the arbitration<br />

proceeding. 93 They can write their own rules, decide their own time<br />

schedule, and make the proceeding as flexible or inflexible as they<br />

choose. Ad hoc arbitration is more informal and more flexible than<br />

institutional arbitration. 94 The flexibility of ad hoc arbitration is a<br />

benefit; the parties do not have to deal with the bureaucracy of an<br />

agency. 95 Flexibility allows parties and their lawyers to use whatever<br />

arbitration rules and procedures they desire. 96 With ad hoc arbitration,<br />

there are no administrative fees. 97 It can be quicker and cheaper when<br />

the parties and their lawyers are in procedural agreement on the process.<br />

But there is a two-edged sword to ad hoc arbitration. The parties are<br />

responsible for all administrative aspects of the arbitration. The parties<br />

must mutually agree on the arbitrators they will use in the proceeding. 98<br />

If one party refuses to agree to an arbitrator, the proceeding cannot begin.<br />

Once a serious dispute has arisen between the parties, the cooperation<br />

needed to coordinate an arbitration can be unrealistic. 99 Because the<br />

rules and procedures are not set, if the parties cannot agree on how to<br />

proceed, they may find themselves in court—something they both had<br />

hoped to avoid by agreeing to arbitrate—just to litigate issues on how the<br />

arbitration:<br />

What is the nature of the dispute to be arbitrated? What is the scope of the<br />

arbitrators’ jurisdiction? How are notices to be given and when is an answer to be<br />

made? What selection process is to be used to name the arbitrators? What if a party<br />

fails to select an arbitrator? Should a default procedure be provided? If so, what<br />

procedure and how is agreement to be obtained between the parties? How can an<br />

arbitrator be removed or disqualified? Where is the arbitration to be held? What is<br />

the applicable law? What, if any, rules are to apply to the arbitration? What<br />

discovery procedures will be permitted? Can the arbitrator award any provisional<br />

remedies? What type of award is required? Is there any method for modifying an<br />

award once made? Is the arbitration to be binding? How and when is the arbitrator<br />

to be paid? Who pays the costs of the hearing facility?<br />

Id.<br />

93. See id. at 68.<br />

94. Rasmussen, supra note 86, at 1833.<br />

95. Ebe, supra note 87, at 86.<br />

96. Tom Arnold, Delay and Cost Booby Traps in Arbitration Practice and How<br />

to Avoid Them, CA13 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 99, 104 (American <strong>Law</strong> Institute—American<br />

Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, Course of Study, Jan. 25, 1996).<br />

97. Rasmussen, supra note 86, at 1833.<br />

98. See George, supra note 92, at 68.<br />

99. Thomas E. Carbonneau, International Commercial Arbitration: The<br />

Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND.<br />

J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189, 1207 (2003).


24 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

arbitration will be conducted. 100 The key problem with ad hoc<br />

arbitration is it lacks institutional oversight. Despite having a clear<br />

arbitration clause in the contract, if one side is recalcitrant and refuses to<br />

pick an arbitrator, it is difficult to force the party into the ad hoc<br />

arbitration. Furthermore, the parties lack the power that an arbitrator has<br />

to move the proceeding along. 101 For these reasons, and unless both<br />

parties and their attorneys have considerable experience with arbitration,<br />

it is best to utilize the services of an agency. 102 As mentioned previously,<br />

some of the well known arbitration providers are the American<br />

Arbitration Association (AAA), 103 the International Chamber of<br />

Commerce (ICC), 104 and the United States Federal Mediation and<br />

Conciliation Service (FMCS). 105 Many state agencies also provide<br />

100. See Arnold, supra note 96, at 108. In an ad hoc proceeding if “one party is<br />

recalcitrant and wants to obstruct the arbitration . . . the party desiring the arbitration<br />

must go to court to compel initiation of the arbitration.” Id. See also Hoenig, supra<br />

note 85, at 60. Any “dispute among the parties as to the appropriate venue for the<br />

arbitration would delay appointment of an arbitrator and most likely require a trip to<br />

court.” Id. at 62. If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator or did not specify a<br />

method to decide on an arbitrator, “the usual result is that the court will appoint an<br />

arbitrator.” Id. at 60.<br />

101. Rasmussen, supra note 86, at 1834; see, e.g., American Arbitration<br />

Association, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, Canon<br />

1(F) (March 1, 2004), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21958 (last visited Dec. 5,<br />

2005) [hereinafter AAA Code of Ethics]. The AAA Code of Ethics provides that<br />

“[a]n arbitrator should conduct the arbitration process so as to advance the fair and<br />

efficient resolution of the matters submitted for decision. An arbitrator should make<br />

all reasonable efforts to prevent delaying tactics, harassment of parties or other<br />

participants, or other abuse or disruption of the arbitration process.” Id.<br />

102. Carbonneau, supra note 99, at 1207.<br />

103. See American Arbitration Association, A Brief Overview of the American<br />

Arbitration Association, at http://www.adr.org/Overview (last visited Dec. 5, 2005).<br />

In 2002, the AAA administered 230,255 cases, which were resolved through<br />

mediation, arbitration, or less formal methods of dispute resolution. Id.<br />

104. See International Chamber of Commerce, Facts and Figures on ICC<br />

Arbitration in 2003, at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/right_topics/stat_2003.<br />

asp (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). Five-hundred eighty requests for arbitration were<br />

filed with the International Court of Arbitration. Id. Of these requests, the ICC<br />

rendered awards in 369 cases. Id.<br />

105. See Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Arbitration Statistics<br />

Fiscal Year 2004, at http://fmcs.gov/assets/files/Arbitration/CLOSEDCASESFOR0<br />

4.doc (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). In 2004, the number of panel requests received by<br />

the FMCS exceeded 18,000. Id. In the same year, the agency closed 2,485 of those<br />

requests. Id. This number is remarkable compared to the 260 cases that were<br />

closed by the agency only two years prior. Id.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 25<br />

arbitration services. 106<br />

106. State of Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services, About the Bureau of<br />

Mediation Services, at http://www.bms.state.mn.us (last visited Oct. 26, 2005). The<br />

State of Minnesota passed the Minnesota Labor Relations Act (MLRA) in 1939 to<br />

facilitate the settlement of labor-related disputes. Id. As part of the MLRA, the<br />

BMS was created to perform functions, including arbitration and mediation. Id.<br />

Many other state and local agencies exist for the application of ADR services<br />

including the following (links to these organizations are available on the website of<br />

the Association of Labor Relations Agencies (ALRA), at http://www.alra.org/lablin<br />

ks.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2005)):<br />

Alaska Labor Relations Agency<br />

Arkansas Department of Labor, Mediation and Conciliation Division<br />

California Agricultural Labor Relations Board<br />

California Public Employment Relations Board<br />

California State Mediation and Conciliation Service<br />

Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations<br />

Connecticut State Board of Mediation & Arbitration<br />

Delaware Public Employment Relations Board<br />

District of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board<br />

Florida Employees Relations Commission<br />

Hawaii Labor Relations Board<br />

Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board<br />

Illinois Labor Relations Board<br />

Indiana Education Employment Relations Board<br />

Los Angeles City Employee Relations Board<br />

Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission<br />

Maine Labor Relations Board<br />

Maryland Higher Education Labor Relations Board<br />

Massachusetts Board of Conciliation and Arbitration<br />

Massachusetts Joint Labor-Management Committee for Municipal Police and Fire<br />

Michigan Department of Civil Service<br />

Michigan Employment Relations Commission<br />

Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services<br />

Missouri State Board of Mediation<br />

Montana Board of Personnel Appeals<br />

Montana Labor Standards Bureau, Collective Bargaining Unit<br />

Nebraska Commission of Industrial Relations<br />

Nevada Local Government Employee-Management Relations Board<br />

New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board<br />

New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission<br />

New Mexico Public Employee Labor Relations Board<br />

New York City Office of Collective Bargaining<br />

New York State Employment Relations Board<br />

New York State Public Employment Relations Board<br />

North Carolina Employment Mediation Bureau<br />

Ohio State Employment Relations Board<br />

Oklahoma Public Employees Relations Board<br />

Oregon Employment Relations Board<br />

Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation<br />

Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board


26 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

The AAA, one of the largest private arbitration agencies in the<br />

United States, is frequently used for administering the arbitration<br />

process, providing rules, lists of arbitrators, and facilities for<br />

arbitration. 107 The AAA resolves domestic, international, labor,<br />

insurance and many other types of disputes, 108 utilizing a variety of<br />

alternative dispute mechanisms, such as arbitration, mediation, elections,<br />

and other out-of-court settlement procedures. 109 The AAA provides<br />

education and training for neutrals and arbitrators and works to design<br />

ADR systems for corporations, unions, government agencies, law firms<br />

and the courts. 110 The AAA has thirty-four offices nationwide and two<br />

international offices in New York and Dublin. 111<br />

Less well-known, but growing in recognition, are domestic agencies<br />

like JAMS, The Dispute Resolution Experts 112 and the National<br />

Arbitration Forum (NAF). 113 The decision as to which institution is best<br />

suited for a particular set of parties and their potential disputes requires<br />

due diligence to best represent the client.<br />

Phoenix Employment Relations Board<br />

Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board<br />

Vermont Labor Relations Board<br />

Virgin Islands Department of Labor<br />

Washington State Public Employment Relations Commission<br />

West Virginia Division of Labor<br />

Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission<br />

107. Jacob P. Hart & David W. Wolf, Grievance Arbitration—Some Hints on<br />

Arbitrator Selection, Preparation, and Trial, R176 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1401, 1416<br />

(American <strong>Law</strong> Institute—American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education,<br />

Labor & Employment <strong>Law</strong>, 6th ed. 1992).<br />

108. The AAA offers expertise in the following areas: Claims Programs,<br />

Commercial, Construction, Consumer, Domain Name Disputes, Elections,<br />

eCommerce, Employment, Energy, Fact Finding, Federal, Health Care, Insurance,<br />

International, Labor, Large Complex Cases, Mediation, Reinsurance, Safe Harbor,<br />

Securities, Sports-Olympic. American Arbitration Association, Focus Areas, at<br />

http://www.adr.org/Focusareas (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).<br />

109. American Arbitration Association, supra note 103.<br />

110. Id.<br />

111. Id.<br />

112. JAMS is a large private ADR service provider primarily based in California,<br />

but growing nationally at an exponential rate. The word JAMS is no longer an<br />

acronym. JAMS, The Dispute Resolution Experts, at http://www.jamsadr.com/ (last<br />

visited Oct. 19, 2005).<br />

113. Originally founded in 1986 to handle court-ordered ADR settlement of<br />

disputes, the National Arbitration Forum is now available to handle private disputes<br />

as well. National Arbitration Forum, at http://www.arb-forum.com/ (last visited<br />

Nov. 6, 2005).


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 27<br />

The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) is another<br />

provider of arbitration services in the United States. The FMCS is as an<br />

independent agency of the United States government. 114 Its mission is to<br />

promote labor-management peace and cooperation. 115 It provides<br />

services to both the public and private sectors. 116 The FMCS has its<br />

headquarters in Washington, D.C. and has two regional offices and more<br />

than seventy field offices throughout the United States. 117<br />

There are also many state agencies that provide arbitration services.<br />

For example, the State of Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services<br />

provides alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including<br />

conciliation, mediation, and arbitration, in an attempt to facilitate a<br />

constructive labor-management environment. 118<br />

The ICC is a world-wide business organization. 119 Its activities<br />

cover a broad spectrum from arbitration and dispute resolution to<br />

fighting corruption and combating commercial crime. 120 The ICC’s<br />

dispute resolution mechanisms are designed specifically to resolve<br />

business disputes of an international character. 121 The ICC International<br />

114. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 171-173 (2004). The FMCS was created as part of<br />

the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 to “prevent or minimize interruptions of<br />

the free flow of commerce growing out of labor disputes [and] to assist parties to<br />

labor disputes in industries affecting commerce to settle such disputes through<br />

conciliation and mediation.” 19 U.S.C. § 173. Section 171 provides that “[i]t is the<br />

policy of the United States—that sound and stable industrial peace and the<br />

advancement of the general welfare, health, and safety of the Nation and of the best<br />

interests of employers and employees can most satisfactorily be secured by the<br />

settlement of issues between employers and employees through the processes of<br />

conference and collective bargaining,” which “may be advanced by making<br />

available full and adequate governmental facilities for conciliation, mediation, and<br />

voluntary arbitration.” Id.<br />

115. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Serv., Who We Are, at http://www.fmcs.<br />

gov/internet/categoryList.asp?categoryID=13 (last visited Dec. 5, 2005).<br />

116. Id.<br />

117. Id.<br />

118. State of Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services, supra note 106.<br />

119. International Chamber of Commerce, What is ICC, at http://www.iccwbo.or<br />

g/home/menu_what_is_icc.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2005). The ICC aims “to serve<br />

world business by promoting trade and investment, open markets for goods and<br />

services, and the free flow of capital.” Id.<br />

120. Id.<br />

121. International Chamber of Commerce, Introduction to Arbitration, at<br />

http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/introduction.asp (last visited Nov.<br />

6, 2005). In an international setting, arbitration has an added benefit. Id. More<br />

than 130 nations are signatories of the 1958 United Nations Convention on the<br />

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (commonly known as the


28 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

Court of Arbitration [in fact, a private, non-governmental organization],<br />

established in 1923, is the arbitration body of the ICC and ensures the<br />

application of the ICC’s rules. 122 The ICC’s headquarters are in Paris<br />

and it currently has national committees operating in eighty-four<br />

countries throughout the world. 123<br />

Parties in international commercial investment disputes can also<br />

utilize the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes<br />

(ICSID). ICSID is an outgrowth of the World Bank and operates as an<br />

autonomous organization with services that may be invoked by<br />

agreement of the parties who are members of contracting nations under<br />

the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States<br />

and Nationals of Other States. 124<br />

B. Notifying the Arbitration Agency of Request for Arbitration<br />

If the parties choose to use an arbitration agency to facilitate<br />

resolution of their dispute, the first step is to notify the agency that the<br />

claimant wants the arbitration to begin. The claimant should send (1) a<br />

New York Convention). Id. The result is that arbitral awards enjoy greater<br />

recognition than judicial decisions. Id.<br />

122. International Chamber of Commerce, Introducing ICC Dispute Resolution<br />

Services, at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/intro_court/introduction.asp (last<br />

visited Nov. 6, 2005); International Chamber of Commerce, supra note 119; see<br />

William K. Slate II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference?,<br />

31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 47 (1996):<br />

The ICC Rules contemplate further institutional guidance and supervision over the<br />

arbitration proceedings than do the rules of other institutions. These rules delegate<br />

to the institution certain functions that are typically reserved for the arbitrator. For<br />

instance, whereas other institutional rules provide that it is the arbitrator who<br />

decides the prima facie validity of the arbitration agreement, under the ICC Rules,<br />

it is the institution that has the authority to make this determination.<br />

Additionally, and rather importantly, the ICC reviews the arbitrator’s final award,<br />

prior to its signing, to ensure its enforceability. The ICC Rules require the<br />

arbitrator, before signing the award, to submit it in draft form to the International<br />

Court of Arbitration. The Court may lay down modifications as to the form of the<br />

award and, without affecting the arbitrator’s liberty of decision, draw the<br />

arbitrator’s attention to substantive issues.<br />

Id.<br />

123. International Chamber of Commerce, supra note 119.<br />

124. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, About<br />

ICSID, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm (last visited Oct. 26,<br />

2005). The ICSID was established under the Convention on the Settlement of<br />

Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, October 14,<br />

1966. Id.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 29<br />

cover letter to the agency requesting arbitration, (2) a check for the filing<br />

fee, and (3) a copy of the contract highlighting the arbitration clause.<br />

The cover letter to the arbitration agency should provide a basic<br />

description of the claim, as well as the name, address and phone number<br />

of the respondent. 125 Once these materials are received by the agency<br />

from the claimant, the agency will take over. The agency will ensure the<br />

respondent has been notified that arbitration has been requested and will<br />

send copies of the claim and the arbitration clause to the respondent, who<br />

will have an opportunity to respond within a certain time limit. 126<br />

C. Choosing the Arbitrator<br />

After the request for arbitration has been filed with the arbitration<br />

agency and the respondent has had an opportunity to answer, the parties<br />

decide on the arbitrator(s) who will resolve the dispute. The parties are<br />

free to choose the number of arbitrators that will be used. Typically,<br />

agency rules allow for one arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators, with<br />

three arbitrators being the typical number of arbitrators in international<br />

disputes. 127 The trend today in most State and federal arbitrations is to<br />

use a single arbitrator in order to reduce the cost. 128<br />

Whether the parties opt for a single arbitrator or a panel of three<br />

arbitrators, it is important to weigh the relative benefit of each method<br />

against the corresponding cost. It is economical to have one neutral<br />

arbitrator chosen by mutual agreement between the parties. But it can be<br />

advantageous to have three arbitrators to provide various levels and types<br />

of expertise, to allow the arbitrators the ability to divide up tasks, and to<br />

give the arbitrators the opportunity to meet and confer with each other<br />

about the facts and applicable law. 129 A panel of three arbitrators is the<br />

best choice in complex cases. The usual method of picking three<br />

125. See e.g., AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-4; ICC Rules, supra note 84, arts. 4<br />

& 5.<br />

126. See sources cited supra note 125.<br />

127. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Pre-hearing Techniques to Promote Speed and Cost-<br />

Effectiveness—Some Thoughts Concerning Arbitral Process Design, 2 PEPP. DISP.<br />

RESOL. L.J. 53, 59-60 (2002) (“Three-person tribunals, although not a mandatory<br />

characteristic of international arbitration, are part of a standard model. Indeed, under<br />

many formulae, a tribunal of three is the default rule.”).<br />

128. See AAA Rules, supra note 37, R. 15 (providing that, “[i]f the arbitration<br />

agreement does not specify the number of arbitrators, the dispute shall be heard and<br />

determined by one arbitrator, unless the AAA, in its discretion, directs that three<br />

arbitrators be appointed”).<br />

129. Id.


30 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

arbitrators is: the claimant picks one, the respondent picks one, and the<br />

two arbitrators pick the third arbitrator, who will be the chair of the<br />

arbitration panel.<br />

For a three person arbitral tribunal, the selection process permits<br />

each party to select an arbitrator with the third being chosen by the two<br />

party-appointed arbitrators. 130 For example, the AAA recommends the<br />

following clause in the arbitration agreement:<br />

The arbitrator selected by the claimant and the arbitrator selected by<br />

respondent shall, within ten days of their appointment, select a third<br />

neutral arbitrator. In the event that they are unable to do so, the<br />

parties or their attorneys may request the American Arbitration<br />

Association to appoint the third neutral arbitrator. 131<br />

If the parties choose to use a single arbitrator, the agency will send a<br />

list of qualified arbitrators to both parties. Typically, there will be five to<br />

seven names of qualified arbitrators, who the agency has vetted and<br />

deemed qualified to arbitrate the claims. The claimant and respondent<br />

attorneys discuss the names on the list. They may decide to pick one<br />

person from the list, or they may decide to use the “alternative strike”<br />

method. The U.S. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service allows<br />

“[e]ach party alternately strikes a name from the submitted panel until<br />

one remains.” 132 Another method requires the parties to rank their<br />

choices, and the person with the highest rank is appointed arbitrator. 133<br />

130. See AAA, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses, supra note 45; see also ICC<br />

Rules, supra note 84, art. 8 (“[E]ach party shall nominate . . . one arbitrator for<br />

confirmation. If a party fails to nominate an arbitrator, the appointment shall be<br />

made by the Court. The third arbitrator, who will act as chairman of the Arbitral<br />

Tribunal, shall be appointed by the Court.”).<br />

131. AAA, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses, supra note 45.<br />

132. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Policies and Procedures, §<br />

1404.12, Selection by Parties and Appointments of Arbitrators, available at<br />

http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=197&itemID=16959 (last<br />

visited Oct. 16, 2005).<br />

133. See id. The FMCS rules allow “[e]ach party advises the OAS of its order of<br />

preference by numbering each name on the panel and submitting the numbered lists<br />

in writing to the OAS. The name that has the lowest combined number will be<br />

appointed.” Id.; see also AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-11. The AAA commercial<br />

arbitration rules provide that:<br />

If the parties are unable to agree upon an arbitrator, each party to the dispute shall<br />

have 15 days from the transmittal date in which to strike names objected to, number<br />

the remaining names in order of preference, and return the list to the AAA. . . .<br />

From among the persons who have been approved on both lists, and in accordance<br />

with the designated order of mutual preference, the AAA shall invite the


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 31<br />

If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator from the first list, either can<br />

request the agency to send another list of arbitrators. The AAA rules<br />

provide that the agency may make the appointment if the first list does<br />

not prompt the appointment of an arbitrator. 134 Most arbitration agencies<br />

will permit two lists to be used. If the parties cannot agree to an<br />

arbitrator after the second list is sent, the agency will appoint an<br />

arbitrator. 135<br />

However the parties set up the method of choosing the arbitrator, it<br />

is important to note that, in arbitration, “[t]he arbitrator is the decisive<br />

element. . . . his or her ability, expertness, fairness and impartiality are at<br />

the base of the arbitration process.” 136 The arbitrator decides the<br />

outcome of the case; thus, it is important for parties to take the time to<br />

decide if one or three arbitrators will be best for their potential dispute.<br />

D. Notification Requirements<br />

Once the parties have decided on the arbitrator(s), the arbitration<br />

agency notifies the arbitrator that he or she has been chosen. The<br />

American Arbitration Association sends a written confirmation letter<br />

acceptance of an arbitrator to serve.<br />

Id.<br />

134. AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-11. If the parties cannot decide on an<br />

arbitrator from the first list, “the AAA shall have the power to make the<br />

appointment from among other members of the National Roster without the<br />

submission of additional lists.” Id.<br />

135. The rules for appointing arbitrators vary according to the agency utilized.<br />

See ICC Rules, supra note 84, art. 8. According to the ICC rules:<br />

Where the parties have agreed that the dispute shall be settled by a sole arbitrator,<br />

they may, by agreement, nominate the sole arbitrator for confirmation. If the parties<br />

fail to nominate a sole arbitrator . . . the sole arbitrator shall be appointed by the<br />

Court.<br />

Id. See also Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, supra note 132,<br />

§ 1404.11. The FMCS rules state that:<br />

If the parties do not agree on an arbitrator from the first panel, the OAS will furnish<br />

a second and third panel to the parties upon joint request and payment of an<br />

additional fee. Requests for a second or third panel should be accompanied by a<br />

brief explanation as to why the previous panel(s) was inadequate. If parties are<br />

unable to agree on a selection after having received three panels, the OAS will<br />

make a direct appointment upon joint request.<br />

Id.<br />

136. GABRIEL WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 24-1 (Larry<br />

Edmonson ed., Thomson West 2003).


32 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

notifying the arbitrator he/she has been chosen. The AAA Arbitration<br />

Rules for Resolving Commercial Financial Disputes state:<br />

Notice of the appointment of any arbitrator, whether appointed<br />

unilaterally by a party, mutually by the parties or by the AAA,<br />

shall be sent to the arbitrator by the AAA, together with a copy of<br />

these rules, and the signed acceptance of the arbitrator shall be<br />

filed with the AAA prior to the opening of the first hearing. 137<br />

It is usual for one or both of the attorneys to send confirming letters<br />

to the arbitrator informing the arbitrator that he/she has been chosen as<br />

the arbitrator in the matter. Under the Federal Mediation and<br />

Conciliation Service rules, the parties are responsible for notifying the<br />

Office of Arbitration Services (OAS) “of their selection of an arbitrator<br />

or of the decision not to proceed with arbitration. Upon notification of<br />

the selection of an arbitrator, the OAS will make a formal appointment of<br />

the arbitrator.” 138<br />

The party seeking to begin the arbitration process is required to<br />

notify the respondent. Fundamental fairness requires that the respondent<br />

be notified of the claims being brought against them. 139 If the parties<br />

utilize an agency, notice of the claim is sent by the agency to the<br />

respondent. 140 The respondent has an opportunity to respond and/or<br />

counterclaim. 141<br />

E. Scheduling<br />

Under the FMCS rules, “[t]he arbitrator, upon notification of<br />

appointment, is expected to communicate with the parties within<br />

[fourteen] days to arrange for preliminary matters, such as the date and<br />

place of hearing.” 142 The arbitrator will provide potential hearing dates<br />

for which the arbitrator is available. The usual way for the arbitrator to<br />

contact the advocates for the claimant and the respondent is to send a<br />

letter jointly addressed to both informing them of a series of dates the<br />

arbitrator is available. The arbitrator will ask the parties to contact each<br />

137. American Arbitration Association, supra note 89.<br />

138. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, supra note 132, § 1404.12.<br />

139. Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost—How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity<br />

for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.<br />

RTS. 1, 18 (1994).<br />

140. AAA Rules, supra note 37.<br />

141. See id.<br />

142. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, supra note 132, § 1404.12.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 33<br />

other and choose a mutually convenient date. A typical letter from the<br />

arbitrator is jointly addressed to the claimant’s attorney and the<br />

respondent’s attorney saying: “Below are dates the arbitrator is available<br />

for the arbitration hearing. Kindly contact each other immediately,<br />

choose a mutually convenient date, time, and place. Let the arbitrator<br />

know right away. Please know the arbitrator has these dates out in other<br />

matters, so the sooner you choose the better.” Because the typical<br />

arbitrator is busy, it is important for the advocates to contact the arbitrator<br />

as soon as possible with a mutually convenient date for the arbitration, so<br />

the arbitrator can block the time on his or her calendar. If the parties are<br />

having difficulty arranging a time, the arbitrator will have a conference<br />

call with both advocates. At the conference call, the parties and the<br />

arbitrator coordinate their calendars and choose a mutually convenient<br />

date for the arbitration. The sooner the date, the more likely the<br />

arbitration process is able to fulfill the “quick” objective of arbitration.<br />

Some agencies leave it to the arbitrator to arrange a mutually<br />

convenient time. Others agencies arrange for the arbitration date by<br />

talking with the advocates for the claimant, the respondent, and the<br />

arbitrator. 143 Once a time is blocked on the arbitrator’s calendar the<br />

parties are responsible for a cancellation fee if the matter is settled prior<br />

to the hearing.<br />

F. Arbitrator Disclosure Requirements<br />

Arbitrators as neutrals must disclose all actual and potential<br />

conflicts of interest reasonably known. 144 After disclosure, the neutral<br />

143. See AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-22 (“The arbitrator shall set the date,<br />

time, and place for each hearing. The parties shall respond to requests for hearing<br />

dates in a timely manner, be cooperative in scheduling the earliest practicable date,<br />

and adhere to the established hearing schedule.”); ICC Rules, art. 21 (stating that<br />

“[w]hen a hearing is to be held, the Arbitral Tribunal, giving reasonable notice, shall<br />

summon the parties to appear before it on the day and at the place fixed by it”).<br />

144. See AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-16. Any person appointed or to be<br />

appointed as an arbitrator shall disclose to the AAA any circumstance likely to give<br />

rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence. Id.<br />

CANON II. AN ARBITRATOR SHOULD DISCLOSE ANY INTEREST<br />

OR RELATIONSHIP LIKELY TO AFFECT IMPARTIALITY OR<br />

WHICH MIGHT CREATE AN APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY.<br />

A. Persons who are requested to serve as arbitrators should, before<br />

accepting, disclose:<br />

(1) any known direct or indirect financial or personal interest in the


34 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

outcome of the arbitration;<br />

(2) any known existing or past financial, business, professional or personal<br />

relationships which might reasonably affect impartiality or lack of<br />

independence in the eyes of any of the parties. For example, prospective<br />

arbitrators should disclose any such relationships which they personally<br />

have with any party or its lawyer, with any co-arbitrator, or with any<br />

individual whom they have been told will be a witness. They should also<br />

disclose any such relationships involving their families or household<br />

members or their current employers, partners, or professional or business<br />

associates that can be ascertained by reasonable efforts;<br />

(3) the nature and extent of any prior knowledge they may have of the<br />

dispute; and<br />

(4) any other matters, relationships, or interests which they are obligated to<br />

disclose by the agreement of the parties, the rules or practices of an<br />

institution, or applicable law regulating arbitrator disclosure.<br />

B. Persons who are requested to accept appointment as arbitrators should<br />

make a reasonable effort to inform themselves of any interests or<br />

relationships described in paragraph A.<br />

C. The obligation to disclose interests or relationships described in<br />

paragraph A is a continuing duty which requires a person who accepts<br />

appointment as an arbitrator to disclose, as soon as practicable, at any stage<br />

of the arbitration, any such interests or relationships which may arise, or<br />

which are recalled or discovered.<br />

D. Any doubt as to whether or not disclosure is to be made should be<br />

resolved in favor of disclosure.<br />

E. Disclosure should be made to all parties unless other procedures for<br />

disclosure are provided in the agreement of the parties, applicable rules or<br />

practices of an institution, or by law. Where more than one arbitrator has<br />

been appointed, each should inform the others of all matters disclosed.<br />

F. When parties, with knowledge of a person’s interests and relationships,<br />

nevertheless desire that person to serve as an arbitrator, that person may<br />

properly serve.<br />

G. If an arbitrator is requested by all parties to withdraw, the arbitrator<br />

must do so. If an arbitrator is requested to withdraw by less than all of the<br />

parties because of alleged partiality, the arbitrator should withdraw unless<br />

either of the following circumstances exists:<br />

(1) An agreement of the parties, or arbitration rules agreed to by the<br />

parties, or applicable law establishes procedures for determining challenges<br />

to arbitrators, in which case those procedures should be followed; or<br />

(2) In the absence of applicable procedures, if the arbitrator, after carefully<br />

considering the matter, determines that the reason for the challenge is not


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 35<br />

shall decline to participate unless all parties choose to retain the neutral.<br />

G. Tendency to Delay<br />

There is a tendency on the part of the advocates to delay scheduling<br />

the arbitration hearing. It often is simply a matter of procrastination.<br />

Advocates are busy. Parties delay by failing to cooperate in scheduling,<br />

by refusing to stipulate to uncontested facts, and by failing to respect<br />

time tables and document exchanges. 145 The rules of the Federal<br />

Mediation and Conciliation Services warn that, “[t]he arbitrator may,<br />

unless prohibited by law, proceed in the absence of any party who, after<br />

due notice, fails to be present or to obtain a postponement.” 146<br />

Arbitrators themselves can be guilty of delaying the process.<br />

Although an arbitrator’s role is markedly different from that of a judge,<br />

Changing the name of homosapiens from “judge” to “arbitrator”<br />

does not change his procrastination stripes. When he has a big<br />

complex case he wants to carve out a big unit of time to work on<br />

it. Whether he is called “judge” or “arbitrator,” a steady stream of<br />

smaller, easier projects flow across his desk, pre-empt his time, so<br />

that he never gets that big unit of time he wants for this complex<br />

case. 147<br />

Most arbitrators understand it requires some pressure to push the<br />

advocates into choosing a time which is “sooner rather than later.” A key<br />

objective of arbitration is quick resolution of disputes. The further out<br />

the arbitration is scheduled, the less likely this objective is fulfilled.<br />

Conflicting schedules of the parties can cause the arbitration to be<br />

delayed for a significant period of time; sometimes exceeding the time it<br />

substantial, and that he or she can nevertheless act and decide the case<br />

impartially and fairly.<br />

H. If compliance by a prospective arbitrator with any provision of this<br />

Code would require disclosure of confidential or privileged information,<br />

the prospective arbitrator should either:<br />

(1) Secure the consent to the disclosure from the person who furnished the<br />

information or the holder of the privilege; or<br />

(2) Withdraw.<br />

Id.<br />

145. William Sharpe, The Art of Being a Good Advocate, 50 DISP. RESOL. J. 60,<br />

61 (Jan. 1995).<br />

146. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, supra note 132, § 1404.13.<br />

147. Arnold, supra note 96, at 106.


36 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

would have taken to litigate the case in court. 148 If a dispute cannot be<br />

heard and settled by arbitration much sooner than it would be heard and<br />

decided in court, arbitration looses its efficacy. Delay usurps the promise<br />

of arbitration as “quick, efficient, economical and fair.” 149<br />

H. Time Required<br />

There is a tendency on the part of advocates to underestimate the<br />

amount of time required for the arbitration. 150 It is not unusual for an<br />

advocate to inform the arbitrator that the hearing “will last, at most, one<br />

day.” But experience has shown that more than one day might be<br />

required for even some of the simplest matters. Advocates need to be<br />

aware of the fact that arbitration may require a more significant time<br />

commitment than expected and should avoid understating to the parties<br />

and the arbitrator the time needed to resolve the dispute. Remember, it<br />

takes time for the question and answer method of direct examination and<br />

cross examination to develop the testimony. Be realistic in the estimate<br />

of the entire time for the arbitration by knowing the number of witnesses<br />

and the approximate time it will take for direct examination and cross<br />

examination of each of the witnesses. Many agencies permit expedited<br />

arbitration which limits the time an arbitration can run—typically, one<br />

day.<br />

VI. PRE-ARBITRATION MATTERS<br />

A. Discovery<br />

A primary reason parties choose arbitration is to avoid the expense<br />

and time involved in the discovery necessary to prepare a case if it went<br />

to court. The arbitration process attempts to avoid extensive discovery<br />

that is often involved in a trial. There is very limited discovery in<br />

arbitration. The United State Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit<br />

recognized that “[a]n arbitration hearing is not a court of law . . . . When<br />

contracting parties stipulate that disputes will be submitted to arbitration,<br />

they relinquish the right to certain procedural niceties that are normally<br />

associated with a formal trial . . . . One of these accoutrements is the right<br />

148. Allen Poppleton, The Arbitrator’s Role in Expediting the Large and<br />

Complex Commercial Case, 36-DEC. DISP. RESOL. J. 6 (Dec. 1981).<br />

149. See text accompanying notes 33-44.<br />

150. John Wilkinson, Streamlining Arbitration of the Complex Case, 55 DISP.<br />

RESOL. J. 8, 10 (Oct. 2000).


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 37<br />

to pre-trial discovery.” 151<br />

Civil court trials in the United States often involve extensive<br />

discovery, using interrogatories, depositions, and requests for production<br />

of documents. Arbitration involves some discovery, but it is intended to<br />

be limited because arbitration is a process intended to expedite the<br />

resolution of the dispute. A telephone conference between the arbitrator<br />

and advocates can deal with almost any discovery matter that needs to be<br />

addressed. The AAA describes the discovery process this way:<br />

At the request of any party or at the discretion of the arbitrator,<br />

consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration, the arbitrator<br />

may direct the production of documents and other information,<br />

and the identification of any witnesses to be called. At least five<br />

business days prior to the hearing, the parties shall exchange<br />

copies of all exhibits they intend to submit at the hearing. The<br />

arbitrator is authorized to resolve any disputes concerning the<br />

exchange of information. 152<br />

B. Subpoena Power of Persons and Materials<br />

An arbitrator in the United States is given the power to subpoena a<br />

person or materials, and such subpoenas are enforceable in a court of<br />

law. The Federal Arbitration Act permits an arbitrator to issue a<br />

subpoena requiring a person to testify at the arbitration or a subpoena<br />

duces tecum to bring materials to the arbitration. 153 The Uniform<br />

Arbitration Act (UAA) 154 and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of<br />

151. Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980).<br />

152. AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-21.<br />

153. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2004) (stating that an arbitrator “may summon in writing any<br />

person to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper case to<br />

bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed<br />

material as evidence in the case”).<br />

154. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT (1956), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu<br />

/bll/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/uaa55.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). Prior to the Revised<br />

Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) (2000), the UAA (1956) was adopted by fortynine<br />

of the states in the United States. CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 113.<br />

Several states have repealed adoption of the UAA in favor of the RUAA. REVISED<br />

UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 17(a), amended 2000, available at http://www.nccus<br />

l.org/update (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). As of 2004, the RUAA has been adopted<br />

by twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia in some form (also, Oklahoma<br />

has enacted legislation to adopt the RUAA in <strong>2006</strong>). UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED,<br />

ARB., REFS & ANNOS, UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT (1956) REFS & ANNOS, (current<br />

through 2004 Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on


38 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

2000 (RUAA) 155 permit an arbitrator to issue a subpoena for the person<br />

or a subpoena duces tecum for materials. 156 Under the UAA, subpoenas<br />

Uniform State <strong>Law</strong>s).<br />

155. REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, supra note 154. The RUAA is the<br />

result of the work performed by the National Conference of Commissioners on<br />

Uniform State <strong>Law</strong>s (NCCUSL). “[NCCUSL], now 113 years old, provides states<br />

with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity<br />

and stability to critical areas of the law. NCCUSL’s work supports the federal<br />

system and facilitates the movement of individuals and the business of<br />

organizations with rules that are consistent from state to state.” Id. The entire<br />

RUAA is currently adopted by twelve states (Alaska has adopted without repeal of<br />

their RUAA adoption).<br />

156. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 17(a). “An arbitrator may issue a subpoena<br />

for the attendance of a witness and for the production of records and other evidence<br />

at any hearing and may administer oaths. A subpoena must be served in the manner<br />

for service of subpoenas in a civil action and, upon [motion] to the court by a party<br />

to the arbitration proceeding or the arbitrator, enforced in the manner for<br />

enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action. Id.; see American Arbitration<br />

Association, Commercial/Business Forms, available at http://www.adr.org/upload/<br />

LIVESITE/Forms/downlLoadable/subpoena.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2005). The<br />

AAA provides standard forms for the subpoena of a witness:<br />

The Arbitration Tribunals of the<br />

American Arbitration Association<br />

_________________________________________________________<br />

In the Matter of the Arbitration between<br />

Subpoena<br />

_________________________________________________________<br />

FROM THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF<br />

to<br />

GREETING:<br />

WE COMMAND YOU that, all business and excuses being laid aside, you and each<br />

of you appear<br />

and attend before<br />

, arbitrator(s)<br />

acting under the arbitration law of this state, at<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

___________<br />

(address)<br />

on the _______________day of_______________ , 20 ___, at<br />

____________o’clock, to testify and<br />

give evidence in a certain arbitration, then and there to be held between the above<br />

entitled parties.<br />

Signed: ______________________________<br />

Signed: ______________________________<br />

Arbitrator(s)<br />

Requested by: _______________________________


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 39<br />

can be issued “for the attendance of witnesses and for the production of<br />

___________________________________________<br />

Name of Representative<br />

___________________________________________<br />

Address Zip Code<br />

___________________________________________<br />

Telephone<br />

Dated:______________________________________<br />

Form G9-11/89<br />

Id.<br />

The AAA also provides standard forms for a subpoena duces tecum:<br />

The Arbitration Tribunals of the<br />

American Arbitration Association<br />

_________________________________________________________<br />

In the Matter of the Arbitration between<br />

Subpoena Duces Tecum<br />

(Documents)<br />

_________________________________________________________<br />

FROM THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF<br />

to<br />

GREETING:<br />

WE COMMAND YOU that, all business and excuses being laid aside, you and each<br />

of you appear and attend before<br />

, arbitrator(s)<br />

acting under the arbitration law of this state, at<br />

___________________________________________________________________<br />

___________<br />

(address)<br />

on the ______________ day of ______________ , 20___ , at ___________o’clock,<br />

to testify and<br />

give evidence in a certain arbitration, then and there to be held between the above<br />

entitled parties, and that you bring with you and produce certain<br />

now in your custody.<br />

Signed: ______________________________<br />

Signed: ______________________________<br />

Arbitrator(s)<br />

Requested by: _______________________________<br />

___________________________________________<br />

Name of Representative<br />

___________________________________________<br />

Address Zip Code<br />

___________________________________________<br />

Telephone<br />

Dated:______________________________________<br />

Form G9-11/89<br />

Id.


40 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

books, records, documents and other evidence.” 157 Under the RUAA,<br />

“An arbitrator may issue a subpoena for the attendance of a witness for<br />

the production of records and other evidence at any hearing and may<br />

administer oaths.” 158<br />

Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, “[a]ll laws compelling a person<br />

under subpoena to testify . . . apply to an arbitration proceeding as if the<br />

controversy were the subject of a civil action in this State.” 159 For<br />

example, the Uniform Arbitration Act of Minnesota provides that a<br />

subpoena may be “enforced, in the manner provided by law for the<br />

service and enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action.” 160 Section 7 of<br />

the Federal Arbitration Act provides for enforcement of subpoenas if the<br />

jurisdiction permits their use:<br />

[I]f any person or persons so summoned to testify shall refuse or<br />

neglect to obey said summons, upon petition the United States<br />

district court for the district in which such arbitrators, or a<br />

majority of them, are sitting may compel the attendance of such<br />

person or persons before said arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish<br />

said person or persons for contempt in the same manner provided<br />

by law for securing the attendance of witnesses or their<br />

punishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the courts of the<br />

United States. 161<br />

C. Pre-Hearing Issues<br />

If there are issues relating to discovery, confidentiality, or difficult<br />

and contentious issues, it may be necessary to hold a pre-hearing<br />

conference. An extra hearing is contrary to the “economy” objective of<br />

arbitration. Arbitration is supposed to be quicker, more efficient, and less<br />

costly than a trial. However, a pre-hearing conference held weeks before<br />

the arbitration may be necessary to deal with difficult preliminary issues,<br />

“to specify the issues to be resolved [or] to stipulate uncontested<br />

facts,” 162 or to deal with myriad of disagreements which can arise prior<br />

157. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, § 17(a) (2000).<br />

158. Id.<br />

159. Id. § 17(f).<br />

160. MINN. STAT. § 572.14 (2004).<br />

161. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2004); see Robert E. Benson, The Power of Arbitrators and<br />

Courts to Order Discovery in Arbitration—Part II, 25-MAR. COLO. LAW 35, 36-37<br />

(Mar. 1996).<br />

162. American Arbitration Association, Patent Arbitration Rules, R-9 (July 1,<br />

2003), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=26401 (last visited Dec. 8, 2005)


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 41<br />

to the arbitration hearing. The American Arbitration Association<br />

recognizes that a preliminary hearing may be necessary,<br />

[T]he arbitrator may, at the preliminary hearing, establish (i) the<br />

extent of and schedule for the production of relevant documents<br />

and other information, (ii) the identification of any witnesses to be<br />

called and (iii) a schedule for further hearings to resolve the<br />

dispute. 163<br />

The Pre-Hearing Conference might be held months, weeks, or days<br />

before the arbitration hearing.<br />

Confidentiality issues can arise during the pre-hearing phase. For<br />

example, in labor arbitration, one of the parties may be seeking private<br />

data protected by Government Data Practices laws. Many data practice<br />

laws in the U.S. give authority to arbitrators to issue subpoenas and hold<br />

hearings prior to an arbitration to determine if special protection needs to<br />

be given to the data. 164<br />

[hereinafter AAA Patent Arbitration Rules]; see also AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-<br />

20.<br />

163. AAA Patent Arbitration Rules, supra note 162, R-9.<br />

164. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subd. 6 (2004). The Minnesota Statute<br />

states:<br />

If a state agency, political subdivision, or statewide system opposes discovery of<br />

government data or release of data pursuant to court order on the grounds that the<br />

data are classified as not public, the party that seeks access to the data may bring<br />

before the appropriate presiding judicial officer, arbitrator, or administrative law<br />

judge an action to compel discovery or an action in the nature of an action to<br />

compel discovery.<br />

The presiding officer shall first decide whether the data are discoverable or<br />

releasable pursuant to the rules of evidence and of criminal, civil, or administrative<br />

procedure appropriate to the action.<br />

If the data are discoverable the presiding officer shall decide whether the benefit to<br />

the party seeking access to the data outweighs any harm to the confidentiality<br />

interests of the agency maintaining the data, or of any person who has provided the<br />

data or who is the subject of the data, or to the privacy interest of an individual<br />

identified in the data. In making the decision, the presiding officer shall consider<br />

whether notice to the subject of the data is warranted and, if warranted, what type<br />

of notice must be given. The presiding officer may fashion and issue any protective<br />

orders necessary to assure proper handling of the data by the parties. If the data are<br />

a videotape of a child victim or alleged victim alleging, explaining, denying, or<br />

describing an act of physical or sexual abuse, the presiding officer shall consider<br />

the provisions of section 611A.90, subdivision 2, paragraph (b).<br />

Id.; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(b)(5) (2004). The California Code provides<br />

that:<br />

A provider of health care, a health care service plan, or a contractor shall disclose


42 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

A pre-hearing conference may be required to deal with<br />

“arbitrability”—whether the dispute is actually subject to arbitration.<br />

Does the arbitrator have authority to determine if the dispute is<br />

arbitrable? Courts are in disagreement concerning the question of who<br />

determines “arbitrability.” Does the arbitrator at a pre-hearing<br />

conference determine the answer or does a court? Some courts have held<br />

that arbitrators are to make determinations relating to arbitrability. 165 In<br />

international law, the concept of kompetenz-kompetenz permits the<br />

arbitrator to determine his or her own competence over this primary<br />

jurisdictional matter. 166 U.S. courts favor assigning the duty to the<br />

courts, but allow the parties to assign determination of jurisdictional<br />

matters to the arbitrator via the arbitration clause itself, 167 whereas<br />

medical information if the disclosure is compelled by . . . an arbitrator or arbitrator<br />

panel, when arbitration is lawfully requested by either party, pursuant to a<br />

subpoena duces tecum issued under Section 1282.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure,<br />

or any other provision authorizing discovery in a proceeding before an arbitrator or<br />

arbitration panel.<br />

Id.<br />

165. See Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp., 197 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Minn. 1972)<br />

(overruled on other grounds). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that:<br />

(1) If the parties evinced a clear intent to arbitrate a controversy arising out of<br />

specific provisions of the contract, the matter is for the arbitrators to determine and<br />

not the court. (2) If the intention of the parties is reasonably debatable as to the<br />

scope of the arbitration clause, the issue of arbitrability is to be initially determined<br />

by the arbitrators subject to the rights of either party [to submit an application<br />

requesting that the court vacate the award].<br />

Id.<br />

166. See LEW ET AL., supra note 81, at 332-34; STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL,<br />

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS 2 (Cambridge Univ.<br />

Press 1987).<br />

167. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Allstate Ins.<br />

Co. v. Stinebaugh, 824 A.2d 87, 94 (Md. 2003) (quoting Gold Coast Mall Inc. v.<br />

Larmar Corp., 468 A.2d 91, 95-97 (Md. 1983)). The Maryland Supreme Court<br />

delegated the responsibility for determining arbitrability differently than the<br />

Minnesota court, stating that:<br />

[I]f an arbitration clause is clear, it is initially for the courts to determine whether<br />

the subject matter of a dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration clause. . . [I]f<br />

an arbitration clause is unclear “as to whether the subject matter of the dispute falls<br />

within the scope of the arbitration agreement,” the question of arbitrability<br />

ordinarily should be left to the arbitrator.<br />

Id. (internal citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court took an all<br />

together different approach, stating that “[t]he question whether parties have<br />

submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question of arbitrability,’ is<br />

‘an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 43<br />

international courts favor allowing the arbitrator to determine<br />

jurisdictional issues. 168<br />

Another important concept which works in tandem with kompetenzkompetenz<br />

is the “separability” doctrine. This doctrine states that the<br />

arbitration clause is enforceable, separate and distinct from the remainder<br />

of the contract, and survives a finding that the contract is void unless the<br />

arbitration clause itself is found to be invalid. 169 In June 2005, the<br />

United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cardegna v Buckeye<br />

Check Cashing, Inc. to determine this important question of<br />

“separability” and who has the authority to determine “arbitrability,” the<br />

arbitrator or a judge. 170<br />

The arbitrator’s authority is derived from the contract, which serves<br />

as the basis for the arbitrator’s jurisdiction in arbitration proceedings. 171<br />

In the absence of a valid, binding agreement in writing or a court<br />

mandate to go to arbitration, the arbitrator is without power to hear the<br />

case. 172 Agreements not properly ratified, procured by fraud, or expired<br />

are not valid agreements and, therefore, may deprive the arbitrator of<br />

authority to hear the case. 173 In other words, the case is not “arbitrable.”<br />

In situations where the contract was procured through fraud, however,<br />

the “separability doctrine” permits the arbitration clause to stand alone,<br />

unless the fraud goes also to the making of the arbitration clause itself. 174<br />

provide otherwise.’” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 531 U.S. 79, 79<br />

(2003) (quoting AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643,<br />

649 (1986)).<br />

168. See LEW ET AL., supra note 81, at 330-32.<br />

169. CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 20-21.<br />

170. Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2005), cert.<br />

granted, 125 S. Ct. 2937 (U.S. 2005) (arguing that allowing arbitration clause to<br />

survive otherwise void and illegal contract would be wrong result).<br />

171. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 88. The United States Court of Appeals for the<br />

Seventh Circuit noted that “arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes<br />

from the prior agreement of the parties to submit their grievances to arbitration.”<br />

Int’l Med. Group, Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 312 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir.<br />

2002) (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S.<br />

643, 648 (1986)).<br />

172. Id. at 88-89; see First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943<br />

(1995). Justice Breyer noted that “arbitration is simply a matter of contract between<br />

the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes—but only those disputes—that the<br />

parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.” Id.<br />

173. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.<br />

174. SCHWEBEL, supra note 166, at 2-3. Under the “separability doctrine,” when<br />

“a dispute arises concerning the initial validity or continued existence of the main<br />

contract, the arbitration clause, being independent, continues to be valid and binding


44 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

Another issue relating to arbitrability, which may require<br />

consideration at a pre-hearing conference, involves whether parties are<br />

free to submit statutory claims to arbitration. Statutory claims may be<br />

the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the<br />

FAA. 175 The United States Supreme Court has held that antitrust 176 and<br />

RICO 177 claims are among the statutory claims that parties may agree to<br />

arbitrate. The Court said “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a<br />

party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only<br />

submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” 178<br />

At the pre-hearing conference, an arbitrator may be tempted to put<br />

on a mediator’s hat. Should an arbitrator attempt to mediate a dispute<br />

during pre-arbitration hearings? Should he/she use med-arb as a<br />

technique? There is much debate on the matter. Most arbitrators avoid<br />

on the parties even if the main contract is void.” Janet A. Rosen, Arbitration Under<br />

Private International <strong>Law</strong>: The Doctrines of Separability and Competence de la<br />

Competence, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 599, 607 (1994). For the arbitration clause to<br />

be struck down, the fraud must go to the making of the arbitration clause itself. See<br />

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967) (stating<br />

that arbitration clauses “are ‘separable’ from the contracts in which they are<br />

embedded, and that where no claim is made that fraud was directed to the<br />

arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause will be held to encompass<br />

arbitration of the claim that the contract itself was induced by fraud”); Republic of<br />

Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 477 (9th Cir. 1991); Sauer-Getriebe<br />

KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1983).<br />

175. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). The Court<br />

in Gilmer stated that “[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of<br />

an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.” Id. at 26. The Court<br />

held that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act were arbitrable.<br />

Id. at 35. See also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 (2002) (holding<br />

that claims brought by employee against employer may be subject to arbitration<br />

under the Americans with Disabilities Act, but such arbitration does not interfere<br />

with the EEOC’s right to bring a claim in court on behalf of the employee);<br />

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 619-20<br />

(1985) (holding that claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act are arbitrable).<br />

176. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 629 (recognizing that “concerns of<br />

international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals,<br />

and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability<br />

in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement [to<br />

arbitrate their antitrust claims]”).<br />

177. Shearson /Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987)<br />

(finding “no basis for concluding that Congress intended to prevent enforcement of<br />

agreements to arbitrate RICO claims,” and thus, a “RICO claim is arbitrable under<br />

the terms of the [Federal] Arbitration Act”).<br />

178. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 534 U.S. at 628.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 45<br />

attempting to mediate the dispute. 179 But some commentators argue that<br />

it is appropriate for the arbitrator to assume the hybrid role of<br />

mediator/arbitrator, 180 especially during the pre-hearing conference. 181<br />

VII. THE HEARING<br />

A. The Place<br />

An arbitration hearing can be scheduled anywhere in the world. 182<br />

Considerations similar to those for “forum non conveniens” govern the<br />

selection of an appropriate place for an arbitration. The Supreme Court<br />

set forth factors used to determine “forum non conveniens,” including:<br />

[T]he relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of<br />

compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of<br />

obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of<br />

premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other<br />

practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and<br />

inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability<br />

of a judgment if one is obtained. 183<br />

Arbitration proceedings are not limited, like a trial, to a courtroom.<br />

They can be held in any convenient place. Arbitration proceedings can<br />

be held in a principal place of business, a hotel, a conference center, a<br />

lawyer’s office, or any other place that is convenient for the parties and<br />

the arbitrator. If the parties are working with an arbitration agency, such<br />

as the AAA, ICC, or LCIA, there are facilities provided by the agency.<br />

179. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 10-11 (criticizing the evolution of<br />

arbitration beyond the traditional process, and med-arb specifically).<br />

180. See JOHN W. COOLEY, ARBITRATION ADVOCACY 3 (2d ed. 2003).<br />

181. Id. at 90. For more information on med-arb, see JOHN W. COOLEY,<br />

MEDIATION ADVOCACY § 1.1 (2d ed. 2002). Med-arb (mediation-arbitration) is a<br />

hybrid process in which the parties first mediate their dispute with the assistance of<br />

a third-party neutral. Id. Once mediation is completed, the parties submit any<br />

unresolved issues to arbitration. Id. The same party may conduct both the<br />

mediation and arbitration, or the parties may select a different neutral to conduct the<br />

arbitration. Id. Med-arb is different than traditional mediation because “it gives the<br />

mediator the power to decide the matter for the parties if they are unable to do so<br />

themselves. Med-arb also differs from traditional arbitration because the mediator’s<br />

role extends past that of serving only as a private judge.” Christopher Honeyman &<br />

Ellen A. Waldman, San Diego Moveable East: Competition in Cooperation-<br />

Building, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 173, 185 (2004).<br />

182. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).<br />

183. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).


46 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

The site of ad-hoc arbitration will most often be the arbitrator’s office,<br />

the office of one of the parties, or a rented conference room. 184<br />

Given the nature of the arbitration process, additional factors should<br />

be taken into consideration in determining the most convenient location<br />

for an arbitration, including neutrality, formality, and cost. Because the<br />

parties may choose any convenient place, neutrality of the situs of the<br />

arbitration can be at issue. Some advocates prefer that the hearing<br />

always be held in a neutral place. To other advocates, neutrality of place<br />

is not important, as long as the location is convenient to all parties. Cost<br />

is an important consideration, keeping in mind that the purpose of<br />

arbitration is to reduce the time and cost spent on resolving the<br />

dispute. 185 To reduce time and travel expenses, parties can choose a<br />

forum that is close to the parties. If the parties rent a conference room in<br />

a hotel, they will split the cost of the room unless the contract specifies<br />

something different. Formality can be an issue. The environment should<br />

be conducive to a dignified arbitration hearing; there is a danger if the<br />

place is too informal. For example, “arbitrations held in hotel rooms,<br />

offices, union halls, or other places associated with non-judicial business<br />

can increase the likelihood that the proceeding will degenerate from a<br />

true hearing into a free form meeting.” 186<br />

Generally, parties to a dispute are responsible for deciding on a<br />

location that is acceptable to both parties. As an alternative, parties may<br />

choose to have the arbitration administered by an agency, such as the<br />

AAA; in which case, a Case Manager will be assigned to the arbitration<br />

proceedings and will talk with the parties and reach a decision as to the<br />

location, time, and date of the arbitration hearing. 187 Factors the AAA<br />

184. Glen Spencer, Administered vs. Non-administered Arbitration, 54 DISP.<br />

RESOL. J. 42, 46 (Feb. 1999). In ad-hoc arbitration:<br />

[T]he arbitrator’s offices are most commonly used. Sometimes, hotel<br />

conference rooms are rented for the hearing when no other option exists.<br />

From time to time, parties complain that the arbitrator conducts too much<br />

other business during the hearing day, thus delaying the proceedings. The<br />

likelihood of this happening is highest if the arbitrator is hosting the<br />

hearing at his or her office.<br />

Id.<br />

185. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers,<br />

Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 445-49<br />

(1992).<br />

186. Hart & Wolf, supra note 107, at 1441.<br />

187. Michael D. Young, Endispute Rules and Procedures, in LITIGATION 1993,<br />

at 241, 245 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H4-5177,


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 47<br />

considers important in determining an appropriate place for an arbitration<br />

proceeding include:<br />

(1) [T]he convenience of the location (e.g., availability of<br />

witnesses, local counsel, transportation, hotels, meeting facilities,<br />

court reporters, etc.); (2) the available pool of qualified arbitrators<br />

within the geographical area; and (3) the applicable procedural<br />

and substantive law. Of particular importance in international<br />

cases is the applicability of a convention providing for recognition<br />

and enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards and the<br />

arbitration regime at the chosen site. 188<br />

B. Marking Exhibits and Other Preliminary Matters<br />

Because arbitration is intended to be less formal than litigation, the<br />

Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure<br />

applicable in a trial do not apply; unless, of course, the parties agree they<br />

should apply. It is typical for the advocates to come to the hearing with<br />

exhibits for the arbitration hearing. It is efficient to pre-mark the exhibits<br />

in advance. For example, the claimant’s exhibits may be marked C1-<br />

C20, while the respondent’s exhibits may be marked R1-R12. Before the<br />

hearing, the parties should agree on joint exhibits, J1-J5. The premarking<br />

of exhibits and the agreement on joint exhibits makes the<br />

hearing more efficient, a key objective in arbitration. Once the hearing<br />

begins, proper foundation should be laid, after which the advocate should<br />

1993).<br />

188. AAA, Drafting Arbitration Clauses, supra note 45. Without recognition of<br />

an award in an international jurisdiction, the award obviously can not be enforced.<br />

International recognition and enforcement are facilitated by the United Nations<br />

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New<br />

York Convention):<br />

[The Convention] was prepared and entered into force in 1959. As of October<br />

1994, ratifications and accessions to the New York Convention totaled 101<br />

countries. The New York Convention provides for mutual recognition and<br />

enforcement of arbitral awards by contracting states, and limits the defenses that<br />

may be raised in opposition to the confirmation of an award, in an attempt to<br />

eliminate duplicative litigation following an arbitration. The New York<br />

Convention applies to awards made in the territory of a state other than the state in<br />

which the recognition and enforcement of the award is sought, as well as to<br />

“arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the state where the<br />

recognition and enforcement are sought.”<br />

Slate, supra note 122, at 44.


48 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

offer the exhibit into evidence. 189<br />

C. The Evidence<br />

Arbitrators typically are not bound by State or Federal Rules of<br />

Evidence. 190 Fundamental Fairness (Due Process) 191 requires that parties<br />

be afforded the opportunity to present evidence 192 and defenses. 193 The<br />

evidence at an arbitration hearing consists of testimony, paper exhibits,<br />

the contract (with the arbitration clause), and real evidence, such as<br />

examples of the shoddy merchandise. “Arbitrators are not bound to hear<br />

all the evidence tendered by the parties; they need only afford each party<br />

the opportunity to present their arguments and evidence.” 194 But the best<br />

practice is to allow the parties to present the evidence they think is<br />

important. 195<br />

The arbitrator judges on the “weight and materiality of documentary<br />

evidence.” 196 Because an arbitrator need not admit all evidence<br />

presented by the parties, an arbitrator may exclude repetitious,<br />

defamatory, or irrelevant evidence. The arbitrator may exclude hearsay<br />

(e.g., “he said, that she said, that he said”) evidence upon objection of the<br />

other side. Some arbitrators will permit all evidence “for what it’s<br />

worth.” Because of Section 10 of the FAA, arbitrators will typically<br />

189. David Crystal II, Anatomy of an Arbitration Case, in SECURITIES<br />

ARBITRATION 1996, at 337, 362 (PLI Corporate <strong>Law</strong>, Course Handbook Series No.<br />

B4-7147, 1996).<br />

190. AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-31.<br />

191. See AAA, Due Process Protocol, supra note 42. Arbitration due process in<br />

the labor and employment setting is also now described as “industrial due process.”<br />

See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) (requiring<br />

“industrial due process”); ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 35, at 967 (stating<br />

“arbitrators have fashioned an ‘industrial due process’ doctrine” in dealing<br />

discipline and discharge cases).<br />

192. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) (stating that “[t]he right to a<br />

hearing embraces . . . the right to present evidence”).<br />

193. Am. Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932) (recognizing that “[d]ue<br />

process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available defense”).<br />

194. Terk Techs. Corp. v. Dockery, 86 F. Supp. 2d 706, 709 (E.D. Mich. 2000).<br />

195. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). Awards may be vacated “where the arbitrators were<br />

guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause<br />

shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or<br />

of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.”<br />

Id.<br />

196. Kent B. Scott, Arbitration Advocacy Part Two: The Arbitration Hearing,<br />

15-NOV UTAH B.J. 20, 21 (2002); see also Hart & Wolf, supra note 107, at 1448-<br />

49.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 49<br />

accept whatever evidence the parties think is necessary to prove their<br />

case. 197<br />

D. Theory of the Case<br />

The “theory of the case” is an appealing story of what really<br />

happened. The theory of the case should be one or two sentences, which<br />

encapsulate the essence of the case. It must grab the attention of the<br />

arbitrator, so that the arbitrator wants to award the advocate the decision<br />

as soon as it is spoken. The theory of the case is a “sound bite” which<br />

appeals to the listener. It is the architecture of the case. It takes all the<br />

facts of the case and uses them, the good with the bad, to construct an<br />

appealing work of art. Think of the theory of the case like the work of an<br />

architect. You have a given set of facts to build an appealing edifice.<br />

You must use the good bricks (facts) and the bad bricks (facts) to wind<br />

up with a visually appealing building. Your theory of the case should<br />

incorporate all the facts. “What really happened.” It is your version of<br />

what happened. Start by listing the good facts (left side) and the bad<br />

facts (right side) on a sheet of paper. Draw a line across the top and think<br />

of a one or two sentence theory which incorporates all of them. Write<br />

the theory across the top of the facts. It should be pithy, appealing, and<br />

rhetorical. Here is an example: “This case is about a good employee<br />

who lost his job because someone wrote an anonymous letter saying he<br />

was blind. Yet his own eye doctor says he can do the job.” Its not about<br />

“disability discrimination,” it is about a person. The case is about “a<br />

good worker who did and can do the job.” The theory and theme should<br />

be emotionally compelling. 198 You should present a “theory of the case”<br />

in every arbitration proceeding: “[The theory of the case] must seize the<br />

moral ground by showing that your client is the ‘good guy’ that needs<br />

and deserves the [arbitrator’s] help.” 199 The more attractive and realistic<br />

theory, the one that fits the actual evidence, the more likely it is that the<br />

arbitrator will adopt your story as what really happened. The theory of<br />

the case is the driving point of the case. It determines the questions you<br />

ask on direct and cross examination. Each witness is used to obtain<br />

evidence which supports your theory of the case. Even on cross<br />

examination, the opponent’s witnesses are used to get from them, to the<br />

197. Hart & Wolf, supra note 107, at 1448.<br />

198. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 509 (Aspen <strong>Law</strong> & Bus., 6th ed.<br />

2002).<br />

199. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIALS 8 (Aspen Publishers 2005).


50 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

extent possible, evidence which supports the theory of your case. The<br />

opening and closing arguments apply the facts to your theory of the case.<br />

E. Opening Statement<br />

It is traditional for the advocates in an arbitration hearing to make<br />

opening statements. Opening statements should explain the “theory of<br />

the case” and give an overview of what the advocate will do. Who goes<br />

first—the claimant or the respondent? The rule of thumb is—whoever<br />

carries the burden of proof goes first in the opening statement and last in<br />

the closing statement. 200 The opening statement should educate the<br />

arbitrator as to the applicable law, alert him/her to the claimant and the<br />

respondent, and summarize the dispute. 201 Parties should refrain from<br />

absolutes; instead, general terms are most appropriate. 202 The theory of<br />

the case should be explained in the opening, and the evidence which<br />

supports the theory should be emphasized. Remember, the arbitrator is<br />

most open at the beginning of the case. Do not waive an opening<br />

statement. “Primacy” is also important. A case can be won in the<br />

opening if it is done effectively. 203 The arbitrator may be moved toward<br />

the claimant’s or the respondent’s side at the very beginning of the<br />

arbitration hearing; it may be hard to move the arbitrator back from that<br />

point. Think of the opening as a first chance to convince the arbitrator<br />

that the advocate’s side of the case is most compelling. In fact, the<br />

opening should be a somewhat less argumentative form of the closing,<br />

with the intention of convincing the arbitrator at the start of the case.<br />

Remember, the arbitration, while not a trial, is still an adversarial<br />

hearing. Only one side will win.<br />

F. Burden of Proof<br />

In the United States, the burden of proof is carried by the<br />

200. Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Anthony V. Sinicropi, Improving the Arbitration<br />

Process: A Primer For Advocates, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 463, 480-81 (Summer<br />

1991).<br />

201. Theodore A. Krebsbach, Openings, Summations and Legal Briefs:<br />

Techniques and Strategies, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1994, at 531, 535-56 (PLI<br />

Corporate <strong>Law</strong> Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-7072, 1994).<br />

202. Id. at 538-39.<br />

203. See John J. Eannance, An Art—Not a Science: A Criminal <strong>Law</strong>yers<br />

Perspective on Opening, NBA MAG., November/December, 1997, at 41<br />

(commenting that studies indicate that in 80% of jury trials, the party who is favored<br />

by the jury after opening statements wins).


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 51<br />

plaintiff/claimant in three different ways:<br />

1. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence;<br />

2. Proof by clear and convincing evidence;<br />

3. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt.<br />

In arbitration, the person who is claiming a violation of the contract<br />

usually carries the burden of proof. The claimant must convince the<br />

arbitrator by either a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and<br />

convincing evidence that the other side has breached the contract. Most<br />

arbitrators will use the preponderance of the evidence as the burden of<br />

proof required. 204 Some arbitrators will hold that, if the loss the claimant<br />

faces, e.g., loss of a job, is great, or the conduct charged is a crime, the<br />

employer must meet a higher burden of proof, i.e., clear and convincing<br />

evidence, or even beyond a reasonable doubt. 205<br />

In arbitration, the burden of proof is thought to consist of “two<br />

separate components: (1) the initial burden of going forward with the<br />

evidence; and (2) the burden of persuading the trier of fact concerning<br />

the ultimate resolution of some fact or issue. In both instances, the<br />

burden may depend upon the nature of the issue, the specific contract<br />

provision, or a usage established by the parties.” 206<br />

The burden of proof and the party carrying the burden may vary<br />

depending upon the nature of the breach. Some arbitrators require clear<br />

and convincing evidence if the result of the breach of contract is<br />

dramatic. For example, in a labor arbitration, if the worker has lost his or<br />

her job and is claiming that the employer violated a union contract by not<br />

having “just cause” to terminate, the burden of proof will rest with the<br />

employer to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it had just cause<br />

to terminate the employee. In this case, the burden is switched to the<br />

employer even though the employee is claiming a violation of the<br />

contract. The employer has the burden to prove the positive—that the<br />

employer had just cause to terminate the employee, rather than the<br />

employee having the burden to prove the negative—that the employer<br />

did not have just cause.<br />

204. Deborah J. Crumb & Kenneth Jennings, Resolving Cases of Patient Abuse<br />

in Health-Care Facilities, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 36, 39-40 (Feb. 1998).<br />

205. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 35, at 949-52.<br />

206. Hill & Sinicropi, supra note 200, at 491.


52 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

G. Swearing the Witnesses<br />

It is traditional for witnesses to take an oath promising they will tell<br />

the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Rule 27 of the<br />

American Arbitration Association Rules of Commercial Arbitration<br />

states, “[t]he arbitrator may require witnesses to testify under oath<br />

administered by any duly qualified person and, if it is required by law or<br />

requested by any party, shall do so.” 207 The Uniform Arbitration Act<br />

gives arbitrators in the states authority to administer such oaths. 208 The<br />

witness is asked to swear or affirm under the penalty of perjury that what<br />

he or she says is true. If a witness lies, the arbitrator does not have the<br />

authority to prosecute the witness, but the arbitrator can present the<br />

evidence to the prosecuting authorities if the arbitrator thinks the witness<br />

has perjured himself. 209<br />

H. Out of Sequence Witnesses<br />

It is not uncommon in arbitration hearings for the advocates to call<br />

witnesses as they wish for the sake of convenience. Arbitration is much<br />

more flexible than a trial, so it is common to permit out of sequence<br />

witnesses to testify with the arbitrator’s approval. Sometimes a witness<br />

is only available at a certain time. So, for example, even though the<br />

claimant has not put in his or her case-in-chief through all his witnesses,<br />

the respondent may ask to call a witness because it is the only time the<br />

witness is available.<br />

I. Direct Examination<br />

Whoever carries the burden of proof calls the first witness. The<br />

207. AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-25.<br />

208. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 17(a), as amended 2000, 7 U.L.A. 36 (Supp.<br />

2004).<br />

209. Brian N. Smiley, The <strong>Law</strong> and Ethics of Witness Preparation, in SECURITIES<br />

ARBITRATION 1998, at 659, 669-70 (PLI Corporate <strong>Law</strong> Practice, Course Handbook<br />

Series No. B0-001K, 1998) (recognizing that “[a]rbitrations are not considered<br />

federal proceedings under the federal perjury statutes. Nonetheless, since testimony<br />

is taken under oath, arbitration testimony may be covered by state perjury statutes,<br />

and false evidence in arbitrations can result in prosecution under other federal<br />

acts”); see United States v. Coyle, No. 1S 93 Cr. 68 (SS), 1993 WL 378332, at *1<br />

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1993) (unreported case) (involving a case charging defendant<br />

“with engaging in a conspiracy to deprive [plaintiff] of her right to recover<br />

moneys . . . in the course of her arbitration proceeding through the use of a forged<br />

document and perjurious testimony”).


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 53<br />

witness is sworn and asked a series of questions. Direct examination<br />

questions are usually wide open questions starting with “who,” “what,”<br />

“when,” “where,” “how,” and “why.” For example: “Where were you?”<br />

“What happened that day?” “Why did you file for arbitration?” The<br />

focus is on the witness during direct exam. The focus should not be on<br />

the advocate who is asking the short questions. The witness should be<br />

making the music. The advocate is simply asking the questions so the<br />

evidence can come in through the witness. The objective is for the<br />

witness to explain on direct examination through questions what<br />

happened. The advocate is the conductor but the witness is the musician.<br />

J. Use of Visuals<br />

“Ours is the age of visual media.” 210 Social science research<br />

supports the shift from auditory to visual in learning and retention. 211<br />

“Show and tell” also works with arbitrators. In every arbitration, there<br />

are one or two critical exhibits: language from the contract, a location,<br />

and a physical object. The exhibit can become the center of attention.<br />

Diagrams, models, maps, drawings and demonstrations by witnesses,<br />

computer-generated graphics and three dimensional simulations can be<br />

worth a thousand words. They can be powerful. “[S]tudies confirm that<br />

if information is presented through multiple ‘channels’—aural, written,<br />

and visual—understanding and memory are again substantially<br />

improved. In short, visual exhibits are important not only in presenting<br />

new information in an attractive, memorable way, but also in<br />

highlighting and summarizing information already presented through<br />

another medium.” 212<br />

K. Cross Examination<br />

Once the witness has finished on direct examination, the opposing<br />

advocate has an opportunity to cross examine the witness. Crossexamination<br />

“is the greatest engine ever invented for the discovery of<br />

truth,” proclaims Professor Irving Younger. 213 Cross-examination is<br />

designed to elicit information from the witness which supports the theory<br />

of your case; and to attack and weaken the other party’s case and the<br />

210. MAUET, supra note 198, at 167.<br />

211. Id.<br />

212. Id.<br />

213. IRVING R. YOUNGER, AN IRREVERENT INTRODUCTION TO HEARSAY 2 (ABA<br />

1977).


54 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

credibility of the other party. 214 Usually the cross-examiner is eliciting<br />

information from the witness which supports the theory of the crossexaminer’s<br />

case.<br />

Cross examination questions should be closed, controlled questions<br />

in which the advocate is seeking a “yes” or “no” answer. For example,<br />

“You signed the contract, didn’t you?” “You understood you were<br />

obligating yourself and your company when you signed the contract?”<br />

“You did not make the list of reasons until after you terminated the<br />

contract, did you?” Sometimes the cross-examiner might ask a wideopen<br />

question like “why.” The best practice in arbitration, however, is<br />

for the cross-examiner to ask a series of controlled questions to bring out<br />

the specific and precise points through the witness that he or she wishes<br />

to highlight. Typically, don’t ask “why” or “how” or other direct<br />

examination questions. Ask questions which take from the witness, to<br />

the extent possible, all the facts the witness has which support the cross<br />

examiner’s theory of the case. On cross examination highlight the<br />

information the witness has which supports the examiners theory of the<br />

case. It is important when an advocate cross examines a witness, the<br />

advocate is absolutely sure as to what his or her theory of the case is.<br />

“For maximum effect, the questions on cross-examination should be<br />

crisp and short . . . [S]hort pauses can focus [the arbitrator’s] attention on<br />

the questions and answers more fully than if the cross-examination<br />

questions are fired at the witness in rapid succession.” 215 Be very civil.<br />

Ask questions in a calm, respectful manner. Do not attack the witness.<br />

If the witness being cross examined does not answer the question you<br />

just asked, simply blame yourself in the way you asked the question and<br />

ask it exactly the same way only more gently. “I am sorry if I asked the<br />

question so you did not understand it, you read this contract when you<br />

signed it, didn’t you?”<br />

L. Redirect Examination<br />

Once cross examination is finished, the advocate who originally<br />

called the witness has an opportunity for redirect examination to clarify<br />

any points the advocate wishes, which were brought out on cross-<br />

214. Rt. Hon. Lord Mackay, The Advocate: Should He Speak or Write?, 60<br />

FORDHAM L. REV. 953, 959-60 (1992).<br />

215. David E. Robbins, Discovery and Hearing Presentation Techniques, in<br />

SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1992, at 545, 578 (PLI Corporate <strong>Law</strong> Practice, Course<br />

Handbook Series No. B4-7006, 1992) (quoting CRAIG A. PETERSON & CLAIRE<br />

MCCARTHY, ARBITRATION STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUE (1986)).


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 55<br />

examination. The redirect examination should only address what was<br />

brought out in cross-examination. The redirect examination is not<br />

intended to be a restatement of the direct examination. The goal is to<br />

narrow the scope of the witness’ testimony.<br />

M. Re-Cross Examination<br />

Once the redirect examination is finished, the opposing lawyer has<br />

an opportunity to re-cross examine the witness. Again, the re-cross<br />

examination is intended to be very narrow. It is intended to be limited to<br />

only those issues that were raised on redirect examination.<br />

N. Hyper-Aggressive Advocates<br />

It is with the right combination of reason and emotion that an<br />

advocate can be most effective. 216 “Many opinions have been expressed<br />

from time to time about the character of the highest advocacy and the<br />

highest oratory. It would seem to be the view of those best qualified to<br />

judge that simplicity of speech, linked with the expression of the deepest<br />

feelings of mankind, has always had the power to stir men’s blood in all<br />

ages of the world’s history.” 217 For this reason, in arbitration, the hyperaggressive<br />

advocate is less effective than the advocate who is civil.<br />

Civility is essential for the effective and efficient operation of an<br />

arbitration hearing. Some advocates do not recognize the value of<br />

civility as an effective advocacy tool and display excessive aggression<br />

that disrupts the arbitration hearing. For example, some advocates use<br />

hyper-aggressive methods in their questioning. “If you weren’t lying,<br />

you would know, wouldn’t you, that the light was green?” The other<br />

advocate is offended and attacks the behavior in words, tone, and anger.<br />

In an attempt to control such aggression from both sides, one method<br />

used by experienced arbitrators is to take a break and ask to speak to the<br />

advocates. Out of the hearing of the parties and witnesses, the arbitrator<br />

may simply tell the hyper-aggressive advocate that he/she is making a<br />

bad impression on the arbitrator, the decision-maker. The arbitrator can<br />

repeat back to the advocate what he/she said, and tell the advocate that, if<br />

the advocate is doing this to impress the client, then the arbitrator<br />

understands. But if the advocate is doing this to impress the arbitrator, it<br />

216. John C. Shephard & Jordan Cherrick, Advocacy and Emotion, 138 F.R.D.<br />

619, 619 (1991).<br />

217. Id. at 620 (quoting NORMAN BIRKETT, SIX GREAT ADVOCATES 109-10<br />

(Penguin Books 1961)).


56 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

is not working. An arbitrator may deal with the situation by simply<br />

refraining from taking notes when the hyper-aggressive advocate<br />

continues the behavior. If the hyper-aggressive advocate is acting in<br />

such a fashion to impress his or her client, so be it. It is important to<br />

remember that such aggression will not help the aggressive party’s case<br />

and, more often than not, be detrimental.<br />

O. Closing Arguments versus Post-Hearing Briefs<br />

As stated by Francis Bacon, “[r]eading maketh a full man;<br />

conference a ready man; and writing an exact man.” 218 In traditional<br />

arbitration hearings in the United States, the parties choose either oral<br />

closing arguments or post-hearing briefs. In deciding between a closing<br />

argument and a post-hearing brief, the parties should consider the nature<br />

of the dispute and the benefits of using one form over the other.<br />

A closing argument allows the advocates to summarize the<br />

evidence, apply the evidence to the theory of the case, and argue the<br />

result the advocate thinks the arbitrator should reach. The parties may<br />

prefer an oral closing argument because of the time and cost involved in<br />

preparing a post-hearing brief; plus the postponement of the decision as a<br />

result of the extra time required to prepare a brief. 219 A post-hearing<br />

brief may be helpful in dealing with complicated cases which have lasted<br />

for more than several days. 220 Post-hearing briefs are useful because<br />

they allow the advocates to summarize the evidence in writing and argue<br />

their respective positions. Post-hearing briefs allow the advocates to<br />

research and cite relevant arbitration precedent and court cases, if<br />

applicable.<br />

218. Mackay, supra note 214, at 954.<br />

219. See Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Arbitration Statistics<br />

Fiscal Year 2004, Oct. 5, 2004, available at http://www.fmcs.gov/assets/files/Avera<br />

geDays.doc (last visited Dec. 8, 2005). The average time for submitting a posthearing<br />

brief has increased from 31.0 days in fiscal 1990 to 65.31 days in fiscal<br />

2004. Id. Despite the increased time and cost associated with submitting a brief,<br />

the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service “Arbitration Statistics Fiscal 2004”<br />

reports that briefs were filed in 2,094 of 2,581 cases, or in 81.1% of the cases. See<br />

Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Arbitration Statistics Fiscal Year 2004,<br />

Oct. 5, 2004, available at http://www.fmcs.gov/assets/files/IssesBriefsTranscriptsW<br />

aivers.doc (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).<br />

220. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 32.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 57<br />

VIII. THE DECISION<br />

A. Use of the Contract, the <strong>Law</strong>, and Public Policy<br />

Arbitrators have great latitude when rendering a decision and can<br />

decide cases based on their own subjective notions of justice and equity,<br />

disregarding substantive law. 221 It is argued that arbitrators should base<br />

their decision on the four corners of the contract. 222 In some<br />

circumstances, however, arbitrators might want to take into account<br />

substantive law and public policy in making determinations. 223<br />

Arbitrators who favor the contract as the basis of the decision view the<br />

221. See, e.g., Hill v. Cloud, 648 So. 2d 1383, 1389 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting<br />

Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association) (stating that<br />

“[t]he arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and<br />

equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties”).<br />

222. See Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141,<br />

147 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 31,<br />

933 F.2d 225, 226-28 (4th Cir.1991)) (stating that, “[a]lthough we may disagree<br />

with an arbitrator’s interpretation of a contract, we must uphold it as long as it<br />

‘draws its essence from the agreement’”); In re Copaz Packing Corp., 105 LA 1074<br />

(Feldman 1995):<br />

“[T]he language of the four corners of the agreement are generally the only<br />

language that can be dealt with when an arbitrator determines the result in a labor<br />

arbitration matter. There are a few exceptions to that general rule but those<br />

exceptions do not apply in this particular case. The language of the contract of<br />

collective bargaining revealed the wages to be paid to a group of individuals who<br />

have already reached the applicable base labor rate and a wage will be paid to job<br />

entry personnel. Wages are a creature of the contract. In other words, evidence<br />

outside the four corners of the agreement, unless it is specifically referred in the<br />

contract do not control the meanings and statements within the four corners of the<br />

agreement.”<br />

Id.<br />

223. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)<br />

(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,<br />

628 (1985)) (stating that, “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does<br />

not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their<br />

resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum”); In re Cargill, Inc., 117 LA<br />

214 (Feldman 2002):<br />

Under the modem evolution of that, has come findings that show that outside law<br />

may be engrafted upon a contract of collective bargaining whether that collective<br />

bargaining contract contains such language or not of placing that outside law within<br />

the terms and meanings of the four corners of the contract.<br />

Id. (holding the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 would be engrafted<br />

onto contract).


58 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

contract as the source from which arbitrators receive their authority. 224<br />

They reason that only the contract is significant and that neither the law<br />

nor public policy should be of concern to an arbitrator. These arbitrators<br />

assert that unless the contract calls for the application of a specific law<br />

and/or the accounting of public policy, only the contract matters.<br />

On the other hand, there are arbitrators who contend that law and<br />

public policy are implied in any contract. 225 Such arbitrators argue that<br />

the parties choose them because of their training in the law and their<br />

understanding of public policy. Consequently, the interpretation of any<br />

contract will always be within the context of law and public policy. “A<br />

court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s award under a collectivebargaining<br />

agreement because it is contrary to public policy is a specific<br />

application of the more general doctrine, rooted in the common law, that<br />

a court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate law or public<br />

policy.” 226 “Such a public policy, however, must be well defined and<br />

dominant, and is to be ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal<br />

precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public<br />

interests.’” 227<br />

B. The Requirement of a Reasoned Decision<br />

Arbitrators usually submit written awards. Some arbitration awards<br />

do not require findings of fact or conclusions of law. 228 Labor<br />

224. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,<br />

597 (1960) (stating that an arbitrator “may of course look for guidance from many<br />

sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the<br />

collective bargaining agreement”).<br />

225. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.<br />

574, 581-82 (1960) (stating that “[t]he labor arbitrator’s source of law is not<br />

confined to the express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law—<br />

the practices of the industry and the shop—is equally a part of the collective<br />

bargaining agreement although not expressed in it”).<br />

226. United Paperworkers Int’l Union Inc. v. Misco Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987)<br />

(citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766, (1983); Hurd v.<br />

Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35, (1948)).<br />

227. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766, (1983) (citing<br />

Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945).<br />

228. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir.<br />

1992) (holding that “arbitrators are not required to state the reasons for their<br />

decisions”); Escobar v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 461, 463<br />

(D.P.R. 1991) (stating that “arbitrators are not required to disclose the basis on<br />

which their awards are made”); Cobec Brazilian Trading & Warehousing Corp. of<br />

United States v. Isbrandtsen, 524 F. Supp. 7, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 59<br />

Arbitration Awards and International Commercial Arbitration Awards are<br />

fully reasoned awards with findings of fact, conclusions of law, and<br />

rationale for the final award. There are three general kinds of Arbitration<br />

Awards;<br />

1. A simple decision;<br />

2. A decision with limited findings of fact and conclusions;<br />

3. A fully reasoned decision with contentions of the parties,<br />

findings of fact, and decision and rationale.<br />

A simple decision need only set out the basic information such as<br />

which party prevails and how much money is awarded. A simple award<br />

is quick, efficient, and saves time and money. And the dispute is settled.<br />

A fully reasoned decision, on the other hand, delineates the contentions<br />

of both parties, findings of fact by the arbitrator, and a decision and<br />

rationale for that decision. A written, reasoned decision takes<br />

considerably more time and effort. It is common for a Labor Arbitration<br />

Award in the United States to be ten to fifteen pages long, sometimes<br />

longer. An International Commercial Arbitration Award can be upward<br />

of one hundred pages.<br />

The determination to provide a fully reasoned decision is based on<br />

tradition that has developed in certain arbitration contexts.<br />

Considerations of efficiency, cost, and importance of the decision weigh<br />

into whether a reasoned decision is used.<br />

The nature of the case is one factor arbitrators use in determining the<br />

sort of decision to award. The FMCS provides that non-reasoned, or<br />

“expedited,” decisions “may be appropriate in certain non-precedential<br />

cases or those that do not involve complex or unique issues.” 229<br />

Arbitration decisions in national commercial arbitrations, insurance<br />

arbitrations, and sports arbitrations, are usually simple decisions with<br />

very limited explanations. But fully reasoned decisions are expected in<br />

arbitrations involving labor and international commercial disputes.<br />

The amount of money involved is not the primary consideration in<br />

determining which type of written award an arbitrator will issue. It is not<br />

unusual to see non-reasoned decisions even when the dispute involves<br />

large amounts of money. Time, efficiency, the expectation of the parties,<br />

the expectation of the administrative agency, the precedential value of<br />

229. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, supra note 132, § 1404.17.


60 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

the decision, and the ability of the court to review a decision all are<br />

considerations for the kind of written award issued by an arbitrator. An<br />

arbitration award which fails to state the basis for the award cannot serve<br />

as precedent. 230 An award is beyond a court’s ability to review if the<br />

arbitrator does not state the basis for his/her award. 231 One concern is<br />

“written opinions might open avenues for attack on the award by the<br />

losing party.” 232 So, common wisdom in the world of arbitration is the<br />

“less said the better.” 233<br />

C. Procedural Requirements for a Decision<br />

The AAA sets forth certain procedural rules that are to be followed<br />

by the arbitrators in making their award. The rule states:<br />

The award must be signed by the arbitrators and, under the laws of<br />

some states, be notarized or witnessed. If two or more arbitrators are<br />

involved, the award must have the signatures of a majority.<br />

Arbitrators usually meet after the last hearing to agree on the award.<br />

They might disagree on some points. Their conversations should be<br />

kept confidential. No arbitrator should disclose what any other<br />

member of the panel said during these conferences. The majority<br />

rules, but any arbitrator who disagrees may note a dissent on the<br />

award form or elect not to sign the award. 234<br />

D. Sending the Decision to Reporting Bodies<br />

Arbitration decisions do not have precedential value. 235 They are<br />

230. See Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141,<br />

147 (4th Cir. 1993).<br />

231. Reichman v. Creative Real Estate Consultants, 476 F. Supp. 1276, 1282<br />

(D.C.N.Y. 1979) (stating that “the task of a reviewing court, especially one<br />

confronted by a claim of manifest disregard of the law, is made more difficult in<br />

cases where no reasons are given by the arbitrator”).<br />

232. American Arbitration Association, A Guide for Commercial Arbitrators<br />

(2004), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22016 (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).<br />

233. Herbert L. Marx Jr., Who Are Labor Arbitration Opinions Written For? And<br />

Other Musings About Award Writing, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 22, 23 (2003).<br />

234. American Arbitration Association, supra note 232.<br />

235. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d at 147 (stating that “arbitration awards<br />

have no precedential value”). While arbitration awards theoretically have no<br />

precedential value because of the sui generis nature of arbitration, some are<br />

nonetheless published, with a resulting impact on future arbitral proceedings. For a<br />

discussion of the pros and cons of published awards, see ELKOURI & ELKOURI,<br />

supra note 35, at 568-73.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 61<br />

“sui generis.” 236 Yet published decisions are useful. A published<br />

decision can provide insight into the factual, legal, and decision-making<br />

reasoning of the arbitrator. Arbitrators with similar cases can use the<br />

rationale to assist in the determination of the present case. So, in fact,<br />

they do have persuasive value. Reporting bodies, such as the Bureau of<br />

National Affairs, 237 the Commerce Clearing House, 238 the AAA, 239 and<br />

many state agencies publish arbitration decisions with names of the<br />

parties redacted to assist advocates and arbitrators in understanding the<br />

development of the body of arbitrable law. While arbitration decisions<br />

do not set precedent, they are nevertheless useful in understanding how<br />

arbitrators determine disputes such as past practice, discipline, contract<br />

interpretation, and arbitrability. It is not unusual for arbitrators in labor<br />

disputes to cite other arbitration decisions in their awards. 240<br />

E. Ability to Appeal an Arbitration Decision<br />

It is very difficult to get a court to overturn an arbitration decision.<br />

Arbitration decisions are regarded as final and binding. 241 Courts are<br />

reluctant to review the merits of an arbitration award. 242 Parties do,<br />

however, have limited ability to appeal to a court to vacate an arbitrator’s<br />

decision. Some agencies even allow a second arbitration panel as a<br />

236. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc., 481 F.2d 817,<br />

820 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v.<br />

Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding “we are<br />

obliged to recognize that arbitration proceedings are sui generis”).<br />

237. The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. publishes labor arbitration awards in<br />

the Labor Arbitration Reporter ® . See http://www.bna.com/products/labor/lelw.htm<br />

(2005).<br />

238. The Commerce Clearing House publishes securities arbitration awards, see<br />

http://scan.cch.com/ (2005), and labor arbitration awards, see http://hr.cch.com/<br />

(2005).<br />

239. The AAA maintains databases of arbitration awards it issues. See<br />

http://www.adr.org/AAAawards/ (2005).<br />

240. NCR Corp., E & M-Wichita v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace<br />

Workers, Dist., 906 F.2d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that arbitrator, in<br />

interpreting a contract, may look to “the negotiating and contractual history of the<br />

parties, past practices, the common law of the shop, and a number of arbitration,<br />

NLRB, and judicial decisions providing definition to the key terms”).<br />

241. Hill & Sinicropi, supra note 200, at 472.<br />

242. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,<br />

596 (1960) (recognizing that “[t]he federal policy of settling labor disputes by<br />

arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the<br />

awards”).


62 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

method to appeal an arbitration decision. For example, the AAA outlines<br />

this interesting appeals process:<br />

Within 30 days of receipt of any award (which shall not be binding if<br />

an appeal is taken), any party may notify the AAA of an intention to<br />

appeal to a second arbitral tribunal, constituted in the same manner as<br />

the initial tribunal. The appeal tribunal shall be entitled to adopt the<br />

initial award as its own, modify the initial award or substitute its own<br />

award for the initial award. The appeal tribunal shall not modify or<br />

replace the initial award except [for manifest disregard of law or<br />

facts] [for clear errors of law or because of clear and convincing<br />

factual errors]. The award of the appeal tribunal shall be final and<br />

binding, and judgment may be entered by a court having jurisdiction<br />

thereof. 243<br />

Even when a court decides to review an arbitration award, its legal<br />

right to review the arbitration decision is very limited. 244 Dissatisfaction<br />

with the amount is not grounds to vacate an award. 245 Judicial review is<br />

substantially limited. Section 10 of the FAA lists four grounds for a<br />

court to vacate an arbitration award: (1) corruption, fraud, or undue<br />

means was employed in reaching the award; (2) partiality or corruption<br />

exhibited by arbitrators; 246 (3) refusing to postpone the hearing upon<br />

sufficient cause; (4) arbitrators exceeded their powers. 247<br />

In vacating an award, a court can rely on several doctrines: manifest<br />

disregard of the law, unconscionability, and public policy. “Manifest<br />

disregard” of the law is a high standard. It requires a showing that the<br />

arbitrator knew and understood the law but chose to not apply it. 248<br />

243. AAA, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses, supra note 45.<br />

244. See, e.g., French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d<br />

902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d<br />

1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that “[a]n arbitrator’s decision must be upheld<br />

unless it is ‘completely irrational’”).<br />

245. Biscanin v Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F. 3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005).<br />

246. One test that has been proposed for evaluating an arbitrator’s bias includes a<br />

reasonable person standard. If a reasonable person would conclude that the<br />

arbitrator was partial, then the arbitral award may be vacated. No actual bias must<br />

be shown under this standard. However, bias must be “direct, definite, and capable<br />

of demonstration, not remote, uncertain or speculative.” Lisa B. Bingham, On<br />

Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of<br />

Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 248 (1998).<br />

247. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (2004).<br />

248. Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 933 F.2d 225, 229<br />

(4th Cir. 1994). The court held that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the law “may<br />

only be overturned where it is in manifest disregard of the law.” Id. The court


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 63<br />

“Unconscionability” can be a basis for vacating an award, 249 but even an<br />

arbitration agreement pre-packaged in a computer box was not<br />

unconscionable or adhesionary enough to warrant a court’s intervention<br />

to stay the arbitration. 250 There are two categories of unconscionability:<br />

substantive and procedural. 251 When terms are extremely favorable to<br />

one side, the contract is said to be of substantive unconscionability. 252<br />

“Courts have suggested . . . a large amount of one type of<br />

unconscionability can make up for only a small amount of the other.” 253<br />

Courts have overturned arbitration decisions on “public policy”<br />

grounds. 254 For example, an arbitrator who returned a police officer to<br />

his job, even though the officer had engaged in a pattern of offensive and<br />

predatory conduct toward women for ten years, was reversed by a court<br />

because “the arbitrator’s decision under the extreme facts of this case<br />

violated public policy.” 255 But for a court to overturn an arbitration<br />

decision the public policy violated must be “well defined and<br />

elaborated further stating that “[a]n arbitration award is enforceable ‘even if the<br />

award resulted from a misinterpretation of law, faulty legal reasoning or erroneous<br />

legal conclusion.’” Id. (quoting George Day Constr. Co. v. United Brothers of<br />

Carpenters Local 354, 722 F.2d 1471, 1479 (9th Cir.1984)). An arbitration decision<br />

“may only be reversed ‘when arbitrators understand and correctly state the law, but<br />

proceed to disregard the same.’” Id. (quoting San Martine Compañía de<br />

Navegación, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961)).<br />

249. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, § 4.28, at 552-53<br />

(Aspen <strong>Law</strong> & Bus. 1998) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208).<br />

250. Hill v Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522<br />

US 808 (1997).<br />

251. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (N.Y. App. Div.<br />

1998).<br />

252. Id. at 574.<br />

253. FARNSWORTH, supra note 249.<br />

254. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (quoting<br />

Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)) (holding that to invalidate an<br />

arbitration award on public policy grounds, “a public policy . . . must be well<br />

defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal<br />

precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests’”). But<br />

see E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass’n of E. Chi.,<br />

Inc., 790 F.2d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook , J., concurring) (expressing<br />

the opinion that “power to set aside awards on grounds of public policy, as distinct<br />

from rules of law, is too sweeping”). For further discussion, see Daryl Andrews,<br />

The Public Policy Exception to Arbitral Finality: Protecting Children and<br />

Preserving the Sanctity of Arbitration, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 461 (2003).<br />

255. City of Brooklyn Ctr. v. <strong>Law</strong> Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., 635 N.W.2d<br />

236, 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).


64 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

dominant.” 256<br />

IX. PROBLEMS WITH ARBITRATION 257<br />

A. Adhesive Nature of the Contract<br />

Arbitration has advanced dramatically since the enactment of the<br />

FAA in 1925. It has now advanced to the point where some contracts<br />

contain arbitration provisions for which the parties did not really<br />

negotiate. These contracts are on a “take it or leave it” basis. For<br />

example, credit card companies, including Visa, Master Card, and<br />

Discover Card, now have arbitration clauses in their member agreements<br />

specifying arbitration as the mechanism to resolve any claim or dispute<br />

that arises; neither party has the right to litigate the claim in court. 258<br />

Consumers have challenged such adhesion arbitration clauses, arguing<br />

that they had no choice but to accept the clause because virtually all<br />

credit card company agreements contain arbitration clauses. 259 But the<br />

courts have refused to call these contracts of adhesion.<br />

Arbitration clauses are increasingly being included in employment<br />

contracts. Employees may not realize that they are waiving their right to<br />

a trial by signing the agreement. When an offer of employment is<br />

conditioned upon signing an employment contract with an arbitration<br />

agreement, the employee may have no choice but to sign if he/she really<br />

wants the job. Most courts will say this is not a contract of adhesion,<br />

256. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766.<br />

257. The concept for Section IX: Problems with Arbitration, came from an article<br />

written by Scott Atlas, Chair of the Section of Litigation of the American Bar<br />

Association. See Scott Atlas, Have You Ever Tried to Make Up Your Mind—About<br />

Arbitration?, 29 NO. 1 LITIG. 1 (Fall 2002).<br />

258. See, e.g., Discover Card, Discover Platinum Card Important Information,<br />

2005, at https://www.discovercard.com/cardmembersvcs/discovercard/apply-for-a-c<br />

ard/importantInfo?card=PLAT (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).<br />

The Cardmember Agreement provides that we may choose to resolve a claim<br />

relating to your Account by binding arbitration, in which case, you will not have<br />

the right to have that claim resolved by a judge or jury. You may reject the<br />

arbitration provision with respect to your new Account within 30 days after<br />

receiving your Card.<br />

Id.<br />

259. Nefores v. Branddirect Mktg., Inc., No. 02-CA-0012, 2002 WL 31057387,<br />

at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002). Cardmember argued that “the subject arbitration clause<br />

is unenforceable since ‘one-sided arbitration clauses forced on the consumer via an<br />

adhesion contract are unenforceable in Ohio as against public policy.’” Id.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 65<br />

even though it can be argued the clause is the very definition of<br />

“adhesion contract.” 260<br />

B. The Problem of Neutrality<br />

The neutrality of the arbitration proceeding is also a concern. The<br />

manner in which arbitrators are chosen, the potential for bias on the part<br />

of a party-appointed arbitrator, institutional bias, the “repeat player<br />

effect,” and the potential for bias of arbitrators who sit on permanent<br />

panels are all situations which can affect the neutrality of an arbitrator.<br />

The Supreme Court stated that “any tribunal permitted by law to try<br />

cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid<br />

even the appearance of bias.” 261 An unbiased arbitrator is critical for a<br />

fair arbitration, especially because an arbitrator’s decision is subject to<br />

limited review. 262<br />

First, there is concern that the arbitrators on the agency list are not<br />

chosen by a balanced neutral manner. 263 The choice of an arbitrator from<br />

a pool is meaningless if the system of choosing arbitrators for the pool is<br />

biased. 264 How does someone get on an agency’s list of approved<br />

arbitrators? Is diversity part of the mix?<br />

Second, arbitration proceedings involving party-appointed<br />

arbitrators can raise questions of neutrality of the proceeding. A partyappointed<br />

arbitrator may feel obligated to the party who chose him/her.<br />

The arbitrator may be closely allied to the industry by experience and<br />

training. 265 Yet this “industry bias” is permissible bias under the AAA<br />

260. Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Circuit<br />

City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)). Many commentators argue that<br />

employees should have the choice to arbitrate after a dispute has arisen. The<br />

assumption that post-dispute arbitration agreements are better for employees<br />

assumes that the employer would agree to arbitrate at that point. Once a dispute has<br />

arisen, however, the employer may often see a tactical benefit from litigating the<br />

claim. For example, if an employer knows that an employee does not have a large<br />

enough claim to retain an attorney, the employer will not agree to arbitrate. Maltby,<br />

supra note 8, at 43.<br />

261. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150<br />

(1968).<br />

262. Maltby, supra note 139, at 18.<br />

263. Id. at 21 (stating that “[b]efore a court can legitimately defer to the decision<br />

of an arbitrator, it must know that the pool from which the arbitrator was chosen<br />

was not biased”).<br />

264. Id.<br />

265. Robert D. Taichert, Why Not Provide for Neutral Party-Appointed<br />

Arbitrators?, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 22 (2003).


66 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

rule. 266 Parties might favor experience in an industry over impartiality,<br />

“Familiarity with a discipline often comes at the expense of complete<br />

impartiality.” 267<br />

A third concern involves institutional bias. Institutional bias refers<br />

to a “tendency for arbitration outcomes to favor one class of participants<br />

over another.” 268 Institutional bias is sometimes alleged in internet<br />

domain name arbitration and in securities arbitration. 269 Institutional<br />

bias can occur because of the “repeat player effect.” Evidence shows<br />

that an arbitrator may render a decision in favor of an institutional client<br />

because the arbitrator wants repeat business from the client. 270 In<br />

employment cases, the employer may arbitrate many claims, often using<br />

the same arbitrator. 271 On the other hand, the employee is not likely to<br />

266. AAA, Code of Ethics, supra note 101, at Canon X (A)(1), cited in Sunkist<br />

Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 759-60 (11th Cir. 1993).<br />

The AAA Code of Ethics provides that arbitrators “act in good faith and with<br />

integrity and fairness.”<br />

267. Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,<br />

748 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984)<br />

268. Roger J. Perlstadt, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69<br />

U. CHI. L. REV. 1983, 1986-87 (2002).<br />

269. Id. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)<br />

deals with disputes over domain names. Id. Under ICANN’s dispute resolution<br />

policy, trademark holders may institute a claim against a person who has registered<br />

a domain name (the registrant may not bring a claim against a trademark holder).<br />

Id. Because only four arbitration companies can administer ICANN disputes, the<br />

companies have an incentive to find for the trademark holder to secure their repeat<br />

business. Id. According to two studies, trademark holders prevail approximately<br />

60% of the time in front of a panel of arbitrators and 83% of the time before a single<br />

arbitrator who was chosen by the arbitration provider. Id. at 1987. The securities<br />

arbitration system is often criticized, because the majority of the arbitrators are<br />

older, white men who are former securities industry executives; however, in spite of<br />

this criticism, there is some evidence that employees in securities arbitration fare<br />

better than in litigation. Maltby, supra note 8, at 50.<br />

270. Stuart H. Bompey, Michael Delikat, & Lisa K. McClelland, The Attack on<br />

Arbitration and Mediation of Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 37 (1997);<br />

see Bingham, supra note 246, at 234. According to one study of 270 arbitration<br />

awards, employees bringing claims against one-time player employers win over<br />

70% of the time. Id. When employees bring claims against repeat player<br />

employers, the win rate drops to 16%. Id. In addition, in repeat player arbitrations,<br />

plaintiffs recovered approximately 11% of the amount demanded. Id. In non-repeat<br />

player arbitration, the amount recovered was 48% of the amount demanded. Id.<br />

271. See Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory<br />

Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1355 (1997). It has been suggested<br />

that the lawyers for both plaintiff and defendant are the true “repeat players” rather<br />

than the employers themselves.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 67<br />

need the services of this or any other arbitrator after the resolution of the<br />

claim. 272<br />

Fourth, there is concern that an arbitrator who sits on a permanent<br />

panel is less likely to be impartial. In labor disputes between an<br />

employer and a union, a permanent arbitrator may unconsciously or<br />

consciously keep the number of decisions balanced so neither the<br />

employer nor the union wins too often. The arbitrator may want to keep<br />

the decisions balanced for fear of being removed from the panel by the<br />

union or the employer. An arbitrator on a permanent panel becomes<br />

quite familiar with the advocates.<br />

Until recently, arbitrators have rarely been removed for bias.<br />

Partiality of the arbitrator is a more recent basis to challenge an<br />

arbitration award. 273 A court can vacate an award if the arbitrator has<br />

had substantial past communications with one of the parties, or fails to<br />

disclose past dealings which may present a conflict of interest. 274 But,<br />

failure to disclose a conflict will not necessarily result in the vacatur of<br />

an arbitral award on the basis of evident partiality. 275 Justice White<br />

272. Alternative explanations other than bias exist to explain the repeat player<br />

effect. For example, it is possible that cases that go to mandatory arbitration have<br />

little merit, because employers settle stronger claims earlier. Lisa B. Bingham, Selfdetermination<br />

in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI<br />

L. REV. 873, 900 (2002). Repeat players enjoy a number of advantages over nonrepeat<br />

players: “(1) experience leading to changes in how the repeat player<br />

structures the next similar transaction; (2) expertise, economies of scale, and access<br />

to specialist advocates; (3) informal continuing relationships with institutional<br />

incumbents; (4) reputation and credibility in bargaining; (5) long-term strategies<br />

facilitating risk-taking in appropriate cases; (6) influence over rules through<br />

lobbying and other use of resources; (7) playing for precedent and favorable future<br />

rules; (8) distinguishing symbolic and actual defeats; and (9) resources invested in<br />

getting rules favorable to them implemented.” Bingham, supra note 246, at 223.<br />

273. Korland, supra note 7, at 815. The FAA, however, does not establish<br />

guidelines for determining if there is a conflict, so guidelines are distilled from case<br />

law and the recommendations of various organizations. Id. at 821. For example,<br />

the American Bar Association’s Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial<br />

Disputes provides that an arbitrator must reveal any “‘financial or personal interest<br />

in the outcome of the arbitration,’ as well as business, professional, familiar, or<br />

social relationships with any party, counsel, or witness that might impugn their own<br />

impartiality.” Id. at 822.<br />

274. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150<br />

(1968) (holding that it is improper “to authorize litigants to submit their cases and<br />

controversies to arbitration boards that might reasonably be thought biased against<br />

one litigant and favorable to another”).<br />

275. Korland, supra note 7, at 821-822. In ANR Coal v. Cogentrix of North<br />

Carolina, Inc., the Fourth Circuit set fourth four factors to consider when an


68 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

cautions courts to “minimize [their] role . . . as judge of the arbitrators’<br />

impartiality. That role is best consigned to the parties, who are the<br />

architects of their own arbitration process and are far better informed of<br />

the prevailing ethical standards and reputations within their business.” 276<br />

The AAA has become so concerned with potential conflicts of interest<br />

that it requires a detailed check sheet and cautions that, if there is an<br />

allegation of conflict of interest, the arbitrator will be removed from the<br />

list of arbitrators until the matter is settled. 277<br />

C. Limited Discovery for Even Complex Cases<br />

The arbitration process limits discovery. One of the key objectives<br />

of arbitration is to avoid the complex procedures and costly and time<br />

consuming discovery which seems part of even the most ordinary of<br />

lawsuits. According to a court in Colorado, “[a]s a general rule,<br />

discovery as to arbitrable disputes is denied except upon a showing of<br />

need.” 278 The court further stated that discovery may be permitted<br />

arbitrator fails to disclose a potential conflict of interest: “(1) the extent and<br />

character of the personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, of the arbitrator in the<br />

proceeding; (2) the directness of the relationship between the arbitrator and the<br />

party he is alleged to favor; (3) the connection of that relationship to the arbitration;<br />

and (4) the proximity in time between the relationship and the arbitration<br />

proceeding.” Id. at 828 (citing ANR Coal v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 172 F.3d 493,<br />

500 (4th Cir. 1999)). Rule 16 of the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules<br />

provides:<br />

(a) Any person appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator shall disclose to the<br />

AAA any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator’s<br />

impartiality or independence, including any bias or any financial or personal<br />

interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present relationship with the<br />

parties or their representatives. Such obligation shall remain in effect throughout<br />

the arbitration.<br />

(b) Upon receipt of such information from the arbitrator or another source, the<br />

AAA shall communicate the information to the parties and, if it deems it<br />

appropriate to do so, to the arbitrator and others.<br />

(c) In order to encourage disclosure by arbitrators, disclosure of information<br />

pursuant to this Section R-16 is not to be construed as an indication that the<br />

arbitrator considers that the disclosed circumstance is likely to affect impartiality or<br />

independence.”<br />

Id. (citing AAA Rules, supra note 37, R-16).<br />

276. Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 151 (White, J., concurring).<br />

277. AAA Code of Ethics, supra note 101, Cannon II; AAA Rules, supra note<br />

37, R-17, R-18.<br />

278. Block 175 Corp. v. Fairmont Hotel Mgmt. Co., 648 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D.<br />

Colo. 1986).


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 69<br />

“where the taking of discovery would not unnecessarily delay the<br />

arbitration proceedings and the plaintiff could obtain evidence to prove<br />

its case to the arbitrators that was otherwise unavailable.” 279 In complex<br />

arbitration cases there may be more than minimal discovery necessary,<br />

but the extent of discovery is still limited and not as expansive as court<br />

litigation would allow. 280 Arbitrators are not inclined to grant extensive<br />

discovery even when the advocates think it may be necessary. 281<br />

Extensive discovery is contrary to the “quick, efficient, economical and<br />

fair” objectives of the arbitration process. Some arbitrators see discovery<br />

as inimical to the very reason for arbitration. The parties can include in<br />

the arbitration clause language which permits extensive or limited prearbitration<br />

discovery. Such language will be binding on the parties. 282<br />

D. Process Too Complicated, Too Slow, Too Expensive<br />

As the use of arbitration has increased, the process has become more<br />

complicated, legalistic, expensive, and slow. 283 The complexity of the<br />

arbitration procedure has increased. Rules have developed almost like<br />

rules of civil procedure. The process can be much too slow. The Federal<br />

Mediation and Conciliation Services (FMCS) reported that in 2004,<br />

476.08 days was the average time for an arbitration to reach resolution<br />

once a grievance was filed. 284 The arbitration hearing itself averaged<br />

279. Id.<br />

280. AAA Rules, supra note 37, L-4(c). “The parties may conduct such<br />

discovery as may be agreed to by all the parties provided, however, that the<br />

arbitrator(s) may place such limitations on the conduct of such discovery as the<br />

arbitrator(s) shall deem appropriate. If the parties cannot agree on production of<br />

documents and other information, the arbitrator(s), consistent with the expedited<br />

nature of arbitration, may establish the extent of the discovery.” Id.<br />

281. See Maltby, supra note 8, at 33. In an employment discrimination claim,<br />

limited discovery is more likely to hurt the plaintiff-employee than the employer.<br />

Id. The plaintiff carries the burden of proof, and the employer is likely to have<br />

information that the employee cannot easily get access to. Id. The employer<br />

maintains employee records and has access to other employees who may be<br />

witnesses. Id.<br />

282. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding<br />

that the court “must rigorously enforce the parties’ agreement as they wrote it”).<br />

283. See Frank E. Massengale & Karen Kaler Whitfield, Arbitration: Be Careful<br />

What You Wish For, 44 LA. B.J. 120, 121 (1996); see also Alain Frécon, Delaying<br />

Tactics in Arbitration, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 40 (2004).<br />

284. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Arbitration Statistics, supra<br />

note 219.


70 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

317.14 days from panel request to final award. 285 This may be faster<br />

than getting to trial, but not that much faster in many states. 286<br />

The arbitration process can be too expensive. One of the often cited<br />

benefits of arbitration is that it saves money. 287 Yet, there is no scientific<br />

evidence to prove that litigation is actually more costly than<br />

arbitration. 288 Arbitrators in large commercial disputes and important<br />

labor disputes are well paid. It is not unusual for well-known arbitrators<br />

in the United States to charge two to three thousand dollars per day. 289<br />

International arbitrators charge fees in excess of their domestic<br />

counterparts. 290 The nature and complexity of disputes submitted to<br />

285. Id.<br />

286. U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, Rules of Procedure for<br />

Expedited Trials (effective July 2, 2001), http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/ (expedited<br />

trial rule is separate from U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota Local<br />

Rules L-1 thru L-83 (effective May 16, 2005)).<br />

287. Bompey, Delikat, & McClelland, supra note 270, at 34.<br />

288. Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of<br />

Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration<br />

Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777, 784 (2003).<br />

289. Richard M. Alderman, Pre-dispute Mandatory Arbitration In Consumer<br />

Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1250 n.53 (2001).<br />

290. See ICC Rules, supra note 84, at app. III(B). In the following table adapted<br />

from the ICC, one can see that an arbitrator handling a $100 million case for the<br />

ICC would be compensated between $61,750 and $285,800. Id.<br />

Sum in Dispute Administrative Arbitrators’ Fees<br />

(in US dollars) Expenses<br />

Minimum Maximum<br />

up to 50,000 2500 2500 17% of amount in<br />

dispute<br />

50,001 to 100,000 2500 + 3.5% of 2500 + 2% of amt. 8500 + 11% of<br />

amt. over 50,000 over $50,000 amt. over 50,000<br />

100,001 to 4250 + 1.7% of 3500 + 1% of amt. 14,000 + 5.5% of<br />

500,000<br />

500,001 to<br />

1,000,000<br />

1,000,001 to<br />

2,000,000<br />

2,000,001 to<br />

5,000,000<br />

amt. over 100,000<br />

11,050 + 1.15% of<br />

amt. over 500,000<br />

16,800 + .7% of<br />

amt. over<br />

1,000,000<br />

23,800 + .3% of<br />

amt. over<br />

2,000,000<br />

over 100,000<br />

7500 + .75% of<br />

amt. over<br />

1,000,000<br />

11,250 + .5% of<br />

amt. over<br />

1,000,000<br />

16,250 + .25% of<br />

amt. over<br />

2,000,000<br />

amt. over 100,000<br />

36,000 + 3.5% of<br />

amt. over 500,000<br />

53,500 + 2.75% of<br />

amt. over<br />

1,000,000<br />

81,000 + 1.12% of<br />

amt. over<br />

2,000,000


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 71<br />

arbitration have increased. The costs of arbitrating highly complex<br />

claims are similar to the costs of litigation. 291 Yet, in favor of arbitration<br />

it is said that “adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of<br />

arbitration.” 292 Maybe for these reasons, arbitration is favored today.<br />

E. Non-<strong>Law</strong>yer Oriented<br />

The arbitration process uses both lawyer and non-lawyer arbitrators<br />

and advocates. In labor arbitration, it is not unusual for a non-lawyer,<br />

business representative to act as the advocate in a grievance arbitration<br />

hearing. Because of business expertise, business experts are chosen as<br />

arbitrators. The AAA rules do not require an arbitrator to have a legal<br />

background. “[T]hey are experts in their own fields, they are known for<br />

their good judgment, they are respected for their fairness, and they are<br />

honored for putting time and talent at the disposal of others without<br />

thought of personal gain.” 293<br />

But, non-lawyer arbitrators may lack the legal knowledge to deal<br />

with the dispute and the procedural knowledge needed to run a fair<br />

hearing. The United States Supreme Court recognized that “the<br />

specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the<br />

5,000,001 to<br />

10,000,000<br />

10,000,001 to<br />

50,000,000<br />

50,000,001 to<br />

80,000,000<br />

80,000,001 to<br />

100,000,000<br />

32,800 + .2% of<br />

amt. over<br />

5,000,000<br />

42,800 + .07% of<br />

amt. over<br />

10,000,000<br />

70,800 + .06% of<br />

amt. over<br />

50,000,000<br />

23,750 + .1% of<br />

amt. over<br />

5,000,000<br />

28,750 + .05% of<br />

amt. over<br />

10,000,000<br />

48,750 + .03% of<br />

amt. over<br />

50,000,000<br />

88,800 57,750 + .02% of<br />

amt. over<br />

80,000,000<br />

over 100,000,000 88,800 61,750 + .01% of<br />

amt. over<br />

100,000,000<br />

114,600 + .616%<br />

of amt. over<br />

5,000,000<br />

145,400 + .193%<br />

of amt. over<br />

10,000,000<br />

222,600 + .136%<br />

of amt. over<br />

50,000,000<br />

263, 400 + .112%<br />

of amt. over<br />

80,000,000<br />

285,800 + .056%<br />

of amt. over<br />

100,000,000<br />

291. Kelly Burton Beam, Administering Last Rites to Employee Rights:<br />

Arbitration Enforcement and Employment <strong>Law</strong> in the Twenty-first Century, 40<br />

HOUSTON L. REV. 499, 530 (2003).<br />

292. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,<br />

633 (1985).<br />

293. American Arbitration Association, supra note 232.


72 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

shop, not the law of the land.” 294 The various arbitration agencies list<br />

arbitrators who do have both legal and procedural knowledge. It is<br />

possible for even an experienced arbitrator, especially a non-law trained<br />

arbitrator, to lack the specific legal knowledge involved in the conflict.<br />

The consequences of an arbitrator’s lack of legal knowledge can be<br />

serious in cases that implicate important institutional and legal matters<br />

such as Civil Rights, Antitrust, RICO, intellectual property, tax disputes,<br />

etc. 295 Nonetheless, such disputes can be heard by lawyer and nonlawyer<br />

arbitrators. In these cases, the arbitrator may have to take into<br />

account the law and social policy. Application of legal and public policy<br />

considerations may be particularly problematic for an arbitrator who has<br />

not received legal training.<br />

F. Arbitrability of Statutory Rights<br />

Some argue that disputes which implicate a party’s statutory rights<br />

should be dealt with only by courts and not by arbitrators, especially<br />

non-lawyer arbitrators. 296 The United States Supreme Court, however,<br />

has repeatedly held that such disputes are arbitrable, even though they<br />

involve a party’s statutory rights. 297 The important question becomes<br />

294. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).<br />

295. CARBONNEAU, supra note 14, at 245-46; see Shearson/Am. Express v.<br />

McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding disputes under the Securities Exchange<br />

Act of 1934, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)<br />

are arbitrable); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1996)<br />

(dismissing complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and<br />

compelling arbitration).<br />

296. Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in<br />

American <strong>Law</strong>, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1958 (1996):<br />

The Court’s unbridled support for arbitration is at once surprising and unnecessary.<br />

The Court’s willingness to curtail major constitutional and political interests - such<br />

as states’ rights and federalism, civil rights, federal regulatory authority over the<br />

marketplace, and generally, due process guarantees—to bolster arbitration benefits<br />

neither the legal culture nor, in the long run, the institution of arbitration itself. In<br />

addition, the quality of the Court’s reasoning in these cases detracts from the<br />

credibility of the announced doctrine. To have the highest court in a legal system<br />

dominated by the technicalities of legal procedure state that arbitration is a “mere<br />

form of trial” that does not affect the content of the statutory rights submitted to<br />

arbitration, is incredible and preposterous. Foreign and even domestic arbitrators<br />

will view legal claims arising under U.S. statutes differently than federal judges<br />

and will conduct hearings in a different fashion.<br />

Id.<br />

297. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (holding<br />

that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are arbitrable);


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 73<br />

whether an arbitrator should examine the law before making the decision<br />

or whether an arbitrator should strictly interpret the “four corners” of the<br />

contract without regard to statutory law. The question frequently arises<br />

in employment dispute cases because many employment disputes<br />

involve civil rights, such as racial discrimination, disability<br />

discrimination, or age discrimination. In the employment arbitration, the<br />

arbitrator is often required to deal with socially sensitive areas where<br />

Congress has enacted specific laws.<br />

Critics of arbitration argue that arbitration is not the appropriate<br />

forum for dealing with these sorts of conflicts. The critics contend<br />

arbitration of such disputes hinders the development of the law, that<br />

arbitration will affect the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s<br />

ability to enforce the law, 298 that arbitration is too expensive, and that<br />

arbitration does not have sufficient procedural safeguards to allow<br />

effective vindication of such claims. 299 Opponents of arbitration argue<br />

that some mandatory pre-dispute agreements are inherently<br />

unconscionable because there is unequal bargaining power between the<br />

parties. 300 Even the critics do not oppose agreements to arbitrate<br />

employment disputes after the dispute (post-dispute) has arisen. 301<br />

The Court stated that arbitrators can, and should, if the contract<br />

demands, apply substantive law in disputes that deal with statutory<br />

rights. 302 In Gilmer, the Court found that, “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a<br />

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989)<br />

(holding that claims under the Securities Act of 1933 are arbitrable).<br />

298. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297-98 (2002) (holding that<br />

while employee was compelled arbitrate, EEOC was not barred from pursuing<br />

enforcement action and victim specific relief on behalf of employee).<br />

299. David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute <strong>Vol</strong>untary<br />

Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment<br />

Discrimination <strong>Law</strong> Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (2003).<br />

Despite criticism that arbitration will affect the EEOC’s ability to enforce laws<br />

against discrimination, employees can file a claim with the EEOC even when they<br />

are forced to arbitrate their claims. Id. at 24. The EEOC can still litigate on behalf<br />

of an employee, and the employees can be awarded all statutory remedies. Id. It<br />

should also be noted that the EEOC has taken the position that employees bringing<br />

Title VII claims should not be subject to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration<br />

agreements. Id. at 5 (citing EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 10, 1997)).<br />

300. Samuel Estreicher, supra note 271, at 1353.<br />

301. Id. at 1344. If employees could choose whether they wished to engage in<br />

arbitration, employers would be forced to either design a fair arbitral scheme or<br />

litigate all claims brought against them. Maltby, supra note 8, at 37.<br />

302. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. It should be noted, however, that a party does<br />

forfeit certain procedural rights by agreeing to submit a dispute to arbitration.


74 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by<br />

the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a<br />

judicial forum.” 303 The Gilmer Court held that, “[a]lthough all statutory<br />

claims may not be appropriate for arbitration, ‘[h]aving made the bargain<br />

to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has<br />

evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the<br />

statutory rights at issue.’” 304<br />

G. Lack of Transparency<br />

If arbitration involves a socially sensitive area, should the arbitration<br />

be open to the public? 305 An arbitration hearing is closed—open only to<br />

parties, advocates and witnesses except by agreement of the parties that it<br />

be open to the public. Arbitration matters are not transparent. But this<br />

can be a problem. A particular arbitration decision might have a<br />

dramatic impact on society. Lack of transparency can mean a decision is<br />

made where the pubic is affected but the public does not know about the<br />

Employees who are forced to arbitrate their claims give up the right to a jury trial.<br />

Maltby, supra note 8, at 37. The right to a trial by jury is such an important right<br />

that many argue that employees should not be forced to waive it as a condition of<br />

employment. Id. However, a trial is not a reality for most employees. Id. at 57. A<br />

plaintiff must have approximately $60,000 in provable damages before a lawyer<br />

will accept the case on a contingency basis. Id. In addition, many attorneys charge<br />

a retainer of about $3,000 and require the plaintiff to pay all out of pocket expenses<br />

(estimated between $10,000 and $25,000) as they occur. Id. Approximately 95%<br />

of employees who seek legal representation for an employment discrimination claim<br />

are not able to retain legal counsel. Id. at 58. Due process may also be<br />

compromised when the employer has the ability to choose the only arbitrator. Id. at<br />

33. In 1994, the American Bar Association developed a due process protocol for<br />

arbitration which has been adopted by the AAA and JAMS/Endispute. Id. at 39.<br />

The American Civil Liberties Union, National Employment <strong>Law</strong>yer’s Association,<br />

and the AFL-CIO were involved in the development of the protocol. Id. A fair<br />

arbitration process includes: “(a) a neutral and unbiased arbitrator; (b) right of the<br />

employee to an equal role in selecting the arbitrator; (c) right to counsel; (d) right to<br />

reasonable discovery; (e) identical remedies to those available in court; and (f) a<br />

written opinion.” Id.<br />

303. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-<br />

Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).<br />

304. Id.<br />

305. Maltby, supra note 8, at 42-43. When employers know that an arbitration<br />

proceeding will remain private, they have less incentive to change discriminatory<br />

policies, because there is not a risk of adverse publicity. Id. However, employees<br />

may also benefit from the privacy aspect of arbitration if the claim involves a<br />

sensitive personal matter. Id.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 75<br />

decision because it is confidential.<br />

H. Arbitrator’s Lack of Power and Control<br />

In some respects, arbitrators lack the power and control needed to<br />

carry on an effective adversarial proceeding. The arbitrator has no<br />

authority to impose fines or sanctions on an advocate, as a judge does<br />

under Rule 11 of Civil Procedure. 306 Arbitrators are unable to sanction<br />

attorneys for filing frivolous cases, bad behavior, or unethical actions.<br />

However, the parties in their contract can agree to give the arbitrator the<br />

power to impose sanctions.<br />

An arbitrator lacks the power to compel a person to comply with a<br />

decision or a subpoena. 307 The arbitrator has no power or authority to<br />

order the decision to be implemented. The arbitrator has no authority to<br />

enforce a subpoena. A subpoena or a decision rendered in an arbitration<br />

proceeding is only enforceable in a court of law. “A right without a<br />

remedy is not a legal right; it is merely a hope or a wish.” 308<br />

I. Punitive Damages are Unusual Even when the Facts Warrant<br />

An arbitrator has the power to award equitable remedies. 309 “To<br />

deny arbitrators the full range of remedial tools generally available under<br />

the law would be to hamstring arbitrators and to lessen the value and<br />

efficiency of arbitration as an alternative method of dispute<br />

resolution.” 310<br />

What if one side engaged in outrageous conduct? In a civil lawsuit,<br />

punitive damages might be permitted. 311 While punitive damages are<br />

legally permitted in arbitration, arbitrators are hesitant to use them. 312<br />

306. Rule 11 allows a judge to sanction an attorney, law firm or party who bring<br />

a lawsuit for purposes of harassment or who brings a frivolous suit. FED. R. CIV. P.<br />

11.<br />

307. Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act grants an arbitrator the power to<br />

“summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness<br />

and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or<br />

paper.” 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2004).<br />

308. Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the<br />

Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 665, 678 (1987).<br />

309. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int’l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353<br />

(N.D. Ala. 1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985); see UNIFORM ARBITRATION<br />

ACT § 21 (2000).<br />

310. Willoughby Roofing & Supply, 598 F. Supp. at 362.<br />

311. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (2004).<br />

312. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 35, at 1216-17 (noting that punitive


76 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

Perhaps arbitrators should use punitive damages in egregious<br />

circumstances. “Punitive damages are damages . . . awarded against a<br />

person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and<br />

others like him from similar conduct in the future.” 313<br />

J. No Better Result Than Litigation<br />

There is no proof that arbitrators’ decisions and awards are superior<br />

to judge and jury awards. Research has shown that employees are more<br />

likely to win in arbitration but that they receive lower awards than if they<br />

had won in litigation. 314 Some argue that the reason for such a result is<br />

the tendency on the part of arbitrators to split the decision, but empirical<br />

study of this phenomenon is scarce and conflicting. 315 It may be easier<br />

to split the difference rather than make a principled decision, especially if<br />

the arbitrator hopes to be picked again. 316<br />

K. No Review or Appeal<br />

One of the strengths of arbitration is that, once an arbitrator issues<br />

an award, the decision is final. 317 But what if the arbitrator is wrong?<br />

damages may adversely affect continuing working relationships, or may expose an<br />

award to vacation by the courts if it is believed the arbitrator exceeding his authority<br />

by awarding punitive damages).<br />

313. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908; see Mastrobuono v. Shearson<br />

Lehman Hutton, Inc. 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995) (holding that the “decisions in Allied-<br />

Bruce, Southland, and Perry make clear that if contracting parties agree to include<br />

claims for punitive damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that<br />

their agreement will be enforced according to its terms even if a rule of state law<br />

would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration”). However, if an arbitration<br />

agreement or the rules governing the arbitration require the arbitrator to follow the<br />

substantive law, the arbitrator exceeds his power if he fails to apply the substantive<br />

law. As a result, the award may be vacated. Buchele & Rute, supra note 13, at 44.<br />

314. See Maltby, supra note 8, at 48, 49, tbl. 1. According to one study,<br />

employees won 68% of cases submitted to arbitration, but received only 25% of the<br />

amount of damages requested. Id. In litigation, employees won only 14.9% of<br />

claims brought, but prevailing employees received 70% of the relief requested. Id.<br />

315. Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67 LAW<br />

& CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 114-18 (2004).<br />

316. Alan Scott Rau, Integrity In Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 523<br />

(1997).<br />

317. Maltby, supra note, 139, at 25. Employees are often unable to bear the cost<br />

of litigation. Arbitration is supposed to address this problem “by providing a final<br />

decision in an affordable tribunal.” Id. However, “[t]his solution is diluted if the<br />

wealthier party can afford to initiate expensive judicial review.” Id.


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 77<br />

Case law has allowed incorrect factual and incorrect legal analysis by an<br />

arbitrator to stand. 318 There are limited grounds for appeal of an<br />

arbitration decision. 319 The standard for overturning an arbitration award<br />

is very high and difficult for the parties to meet. 320 “An arbitrator, in<br />

absence of any agreement limiting his authority, is the final judge of both<br />

law and fact, including the interpretation of the terms of any contract,<br />

and his award will not be reviewed or set aside for mistake of either law<br />

or fact in absence of fraud, mistake in applying his own theory,<br />

318. See Local Union 59, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Green Corp.,<br />

725 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1984). “The promotion of the national policy favoring<br />

the resolution of labor disputes by arbitration eliminates searching judicial review of<br />

the factual and legal accuracy of arbitrators’ findings.” Id.<br />

319. See supra notes 241-254 and accompanying text for a discussion on the<br />

appealability of an arbitral decision.<br />

320. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2004).<br />

Section 10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing<br />

a. In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district<br />

wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the<br />

application of any party to the arbitration<br />

1. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.<br />

2. Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of<br />

them.<br />

3. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the<br />

hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and<br />

material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any<br />

party have been prejudiced.<br />

4. Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them<br />

that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not<br />

made.<br />

5. Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required<br />

the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a<br />

rehearing by the arbitrators.<br />

Id. For enforcement under international law, reference the requirements of the New<br />

York Convention. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement<br />

of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V (1958).<br />

Parties have begun to include provisions in their arbitration agreements that<br />

provide for expanded judicial review of an arbitrator’s award. Both the courts and<br />

commentators are divided on whether such a provision is valid. See Lee Goldman,<br />

Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV. NEGOTIATION L.<br />

REV. 171, 174 (2003). Proponents of expanded review argue that since arbitration<br />

is a creature of contract, parties should be able to contract for more expansive<br />

grounds for review. Id. at 175.


78 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION [<strong>Vol</strong>. 5:1<br />

misconduct or other disregard of duty.” 321<br />

L. Is the Process of Arbitration to Achieve a Final Decision or to Seek<br />

Truth and Find Justice<br />

Justice Thurgood Marshall proposed that, “the governing principle<br />

of a humane society and a good legal system . . . [is to] recognize the<br />

worth and importance of every person . . . [and] be perceived by all the<br />

people as providing equal justice.” 322 Ultimately, what should an<br />

arbitrator do? Is an arbitrator only to interpret the four corners of the<br />

contract? Or, is the arbitrator’s role to find truth and justice? Is the<br />

process of arbitration simply a process to lead to a final decision; or is it<br />

a process to seek truth and find justice?<br />

X. CONCLUSION<br />

Thomas Jefferson wrote, “I know no safe depository of the ultimate<br />

powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them<br />

not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome<br />

discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their<br />

discretion.” 323 Arbitration puts power in the hands of the parties in the<br />

conflict. The parties are responsible for drafting the arbitration clauses,<br />

which determine the who, what, when, where, how, and why of settling<br />

disputes.<br />

Arbitration is intended to be an economical process. But<br />

“[i]nexpensive, expeditious and informal adjudication is not always<br />

synonymous with fair and just adjudication.” 324 Arbitration must be an<br />

equitable process equivalent to litigation. 325 In the end the AAA Code of<br />

321. Ehlert v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 207 N.W.2d 334, 336 (1973) (quoting<br />

Cournoyer v. Am. Television & Radio Co., 83 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1957)).<br />

322. Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration of<br />

Future Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the Unwary Consumer, 5<br />

LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 112 (1993) (citing Mr. Justice Marshall Lives on in His<br />

Words, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 8, 1993, at 8 (Statements by Justice Thurgood Marshall at<br />

the Eighth Conference on the <strong>Law</strong> of the World, (1977)).<br />

323. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820),<br />

cited in Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court,<br />

115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 86 (2001).<br />

324. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?,<br />

99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 679 (1986).<br />

325. See AAA, Code of Ethics, supra note 101, at Canon I(A). Canon I(A) of the<br />

AAA Code of Ethics states:


<strong>2006</strong>] ARBITRATION: THE BASICS 79<br />

Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes states it well, “[a]n<br />

arbitrator has a responsibility not only to the parties but also to the<br />

process of arbitration itself, and must observe high standards of conduct<br />

so that the integrity and fairness of the process will be preserved.” 326<br />

An arbitrator has a responsibility not only to the parties but also to the process of<br />

arbitration itself, and must observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity<br />

and fairness of the process will be preserved. Accordingly, an arbitrator should<br />

recognize a responsibility to the public, to the parties whose rights will be decided,<br />

and to all other participants in the proceeding. This responsibility may include pro<br />

bono service as an arbitrator where appropriate.<br />

326. Id.

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