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(hereafter: IMF) from 1985-1986 dismantled the system of self-management and abolished the organizations of associated labor. 68 On the one hand, it is true that the capability of this system to generate economic growth was low and this became visible to foreign scholars much earlier. 69 On the other hand, the symbolic power of self-management must not be underestimated. Self-management was the “Yugoslav road to socialism”, the entire pride arising from Tito’s “no” to Stalin, a trump in foreign policy, an object of fascination for foreigners, and along with the partisan myth a core element of “Yugoslav” identity. 70 Noting this, one must be aware of how important this brace, which was taken away by the reform from 1985-1986, had been. 3.3. Increasing of Ethnic Tensions The cleansings of Croatian Spring had led to a subdued attitude of the Croatian Communist Party in the eighties, which in turn lacked legitimacy from the Croatian population. 71 As there was no official political forum, nationalism spread latently through the civil society in Croatia. It was promoted by the processes going on in Serbia. Milošević picked up what was provided by the church and the intellectuals. 72 He put it on the political stage and made it accessible to a broader population so that nationalism could spread. He used mass-movements and an anti-bureaucratic revolution against the institutionalized system of the provinces “impeding” Serbian power (in his nationalistic sense). Thus he brought down the provincial leadership in Vojvodina, cleansed the leadership in Kosovo, and seized power with his allies in Montenegro. 73 Tensions also became appreciable in Croatia. In the late eighties pro- Serbian demonstrations of Croatian Serbs took for example place in Knin. 74 This was another step in the spiral of ethnic mobilization in Croatia, which also shifted the Croatian national/istic estimation to a higher level. The Croatian Communist Party (except for many of the Serbian party members) and the Croatian population took a critical view of Milošević’s policy. 75 While throughout the eighties the media became less and less restricted and diverse political opinions were present in public, a definitively open stadium of ethnic mobilization was only reached with the legalization of other parties for democratic elections besides the Communist Party. It looked like now “nationalism” had an open political stage in Croatia and BiH. 68 Ramet, 50. 69 See for example the critical assessment of Wolfgang Gumpel from 1975; Gumpel, 212- 214. 70 See Allcock, 422; von Kohl, 19; Tadeusz Szymczak, Jugosławia. Państwo Federacyjne (Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, Łódź 1982), 202. From the point of view of the “official” Yugoslav ideology, “a common progress and goals in a socialist self-managing community of peoples“ was the factor uniting multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, considered even as more important than the partisan myth. See Michael B. Petrovich, “Population structure”, in Klaus-Detlev Grothausen (ed.), Handbuch Südosteuropa. Band I.Jugoslawien (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1975), 322-344, at 337 71 Petricusic, 5. 72 Pešić, 13. 73 Petricusic, p. 6, cited after: Paul Garde, Život i smrt Jugoslavije (Ceres, Zagreb, 1997), 246-255. 74 Petricusic, 6. 75 Petricusic, 6. 20
Nevertheless, the political protagonists promoting nationalism who emerged in the nineties came from the opposition in Croatia - although Tuđman was a former partisan and a Communist Party member, he belonged to the group of dissidents who were imprisoned for their (nationalistic) opinions and attitude against the regime in the seventies and eighties. The fact that the republics sought independence by building nation states loomed seriously ahead. This concept was suitable for all the republics, except BiH in which no nation had an absolute majority. 76 The situation that arose at the eve of the war was dominated by two rival nationalisms striving for contradictory political and economical aims. 76 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, , 7. 21
Page 1 and 2: Nina Baltic, Tomasz Milej Synthetic
Page 3 and 4: Human and Minority Rights in Violen
Page 5 and 6: 5. Minorities in the New Republics
Page 7 and 8: Abstract The Synthetic Report elabo
Page 9 and 10: process. The next subsection points
Page 11 and 12: 2.4. Perception The Yugoslav leader
Page 13 and 14: 2.6. Ethno-Mobilization The table b
Page 15 and 16: society. 25 In Croatia and Serbia e
Page 17 and 18: political position (which in the Yu
Page 19 and 20: Under the international law the rig
Page 21: the professional management and aga
Page 25 and 26: September 1990 which bore Muslim-na
Page 27 and 28: themselves more and more nationalis
Page 29 and 30: Muslim fundamentalist pressure. 117
Page 31 and 32: Ordinary people could not escape et
Page 33 and 34: killings of clergy during the wars
Page 35 and 36: 5.2. Macedonia The new Macedonian C
Page 37 and 38: The fate of the Albanian ethnic gro
Page 39 and 40: 7. Third-Party Intervention 7.1. In
Page 41 and 42: 7.3. Individual states on the geopo
Page 43 and 44: for BiH as it created tensions resu
Page 45 and 46: then the EU failed to take the role
Page 47 and 48: the crucial point - the crisis fram
Page 49 and 50: Gesellschaft, Vorträge der Michael

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