In the newly created nation states, new national minorities emerged, e.g. Serbs in Croatia. These minorities had enjoyed a status of a constituent nation in the SFRY. From the legal point of view, the shift of status from constituent nation to national minority does not per se mean that the set of rights conferred upon a given community is reduced. Nevertheless, the perception of these rights and the right to self-determination and the right to secede in particular, does differ. Because of this different perception, not only “new” minorities like Serbs in Croatia, but also Albanians in Kosovo and in Macedonia, 170 were not willing to accept the status of a national minority and kept struggling for another status, e.g. being recognized as a constituent nation within Macedonia. The negative perception of the status of a national minority was reinforced, as the minorities were exposed to the nationalistic pressure of the respective majority. Answering the question of when the normal frame shifted to the crisis frame, one must address the new minorities individually. As for the Serbs in Croatia, one may argue that the prospect of becoming the minority in an independent Croatian state and thus loosing the status of constituent nation was decisive. This seems to be, however, not convincing, even given the negative perception of minority status. Taking the decentralized structure of the SFRY into account and the fact that according to the constitution of 1974 the decisive powers were overwhelmingly vested within the socialist republics, the Serbs in Croatia must be considered as being de facto national minority on Croatia since then (1974). Moreover, there are no findings that the exercise of the collective rights granted to Serbs under the Constitution of SR Croatia was subject to dispute. 171 The independence of a Croatia willing to assure a basic set of minority rights would have led to a symbolic loss of the status of constituent nation, but would not have had any actual impact on the real state of affairs and living conditions. The mere symbolic loss of the constituent status cannot be sufficient to change the normal frame to the crisis frame. Rather, the change of frame seems to be brought about by the electoral victory of the HDZ and Tuđman in April/May 1990. Given the victors’ ambiguous attitude to the Ustaša regime and nationalistic rhetoric, the Serbs were for the first time confronted with the perspective of living in a state with a genocidal past. 172 The memory of World War II was revived and irrespective of all formal guarantees of minority rights given by the Croatian state, the victory of nationalistic forces was perceived as a clear sign that Serbs under the new rule would not be respected and safe. 173 A similar observation has been made by Hansjörg Eiff, German Ambassador to SFRY from 1988 to 1992. In his opinion, the real far-reaching deterioration of the relationships began as Tuđman came into power, because with him a counterplayer to Milošević appeared on the field. Tuđman himself had no scruples to enter a conflict with Serbs, and it was his seizure of power that gave Serbs a reason and pretext to revolt. According to Eiff, the Serbs would not have revolted had Ivica Račan (the Prime Minister after 2000) won the election in 1990. 174 The history of relative observance of minority rights in the SFRY did not seem to be relevant, as the observance of minority rights in the normal frame does not necessarily mean its observance in the crisis frame. Furthermore, all nation states opposed the introduction or, in the case of Serbia, the implementation of adequate minority rights provisions as they considered them as counter-productive in their struggle for sovereignty over their republican territory. 170 Ilievski, 5. 171 See Baltić, 41. 172 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging. Journeys into the New Nationalism, (Farrar, Straus & Griraoux, New York 1993), 47, as quoted by Radan, 178. 173 Oberschall, 991. 174 Eiff, 194. 34
The fate of the Albanian ethnic group in Macedonia was influenced and closely connected to the fate of the Albanians living in Kosovo. The change of frame seems to be influenced from there. In Kosovo, on the other hand, the Albanians and Serbs were acting within the crisis frame since the riots in 1981 at the latest. 35
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