Synthetic report - EURAC

Ordinary people could not escape ethnic polarization. In an interview a
Serb taxi driver explained: “No one wanted the coming war, but if I
don’t fight, someone from my side will kill me, and if my Muslim friends
don’t fight, other Muslims will kill them” 131
There are no reasons to believe that the situation in this regard was much
different outside BiH. However the exclusion of moderates was, as noted, a
general political plan which was only reinforced by threats of violence. The only
republic in which the paramilitary units played a more or less autonomous role in
this regard was Macedonia with the NLA. 132
The declining JNA made it possible for Serb rebels in Croatia and BiH to
keep the territories won by force. The Serb military, police and paramilitary forces
helped stabilize the occupation through ethnic cleansing conducted by executions,
deportation of non-Serb civilians, or in BH by deportation. Similar tactics were used
by the Croatian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnian Croats were assisted financially and technically by Croatia and the
Croatian army. Once ethno-mobilization captured the ARBH, each of the three
armies stood for one ethnic group and religion.
4.4. Influence of Diaspora
The role of the diaspora was very important among the Croats, Albanians and
Macedonians, even if the modes of influence fundamentally differ.
The situation in Croatia is best explained with the citation from the Croatian
report, which comprises all that can be said.
General Martin Špegelj, first minister of defence, argues that the
Ustashism in Croatia has “been brought from outside, by the return of
extreme emigrants in Croatia. They were not high or lower ranking
officers of former NDH, but those who thought that heritage of
Ustashism will be good ground for creation of new power in Croatia, and
that they would obtain personal profit. Indeed, they won power and
personal profits; however, their presence in politics has caused shaking
of power and big problems even nowadays. That fact, alongside with
undermining of Serb’s houses in Spring 1991, made worse damage to the
Croatia’s defence than whole JNA aggression. We have suffered
consequences ever since and witness different sorts of neo-fascism
emergence”. 133
The Macedonian diaspora supported the independence of Macedonia and the rights
of Macedonian minorities in the neighbouring countries in the sight of disputes with
Greece and Bulgaria. 134
The Albanian diaspora, of which some members had immigrated to western
countries to find refuge and were politically involved, endowed Albanians in Kosovo
financially. 135 Some of the young diaspora members returned to Kosovo to take part
in the hostilities. 136
131
Oberschall, 996.
132
Ilievski, 17-18.
133
Petricusic, 21, cited after Martin Špegelj , Sjećanje vojnika (Memories of a Soldier)
(Znanje, Zagreb, 2001), 55-56.
134
Ilievski, 4.
135
MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming); Ilievski, 4.
There are estimations that about half a million of Kosovo Albanians were living abroad, paying
regularly 3 % of their income for the maintenance of the “shadow state” led my Ibrahim
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