Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective

Michelle Parlevliet
5; Saunders 2001, 2; Lutz et al. 2003, 179). Yet another explanation can be found in Bell’s argument
that human rights promoters and conflict resolvers have a fundamentally different analysis of the
causes of conflict, neither of which leaves room for the other. At the root of conflict lies either intergroup
hatred (i.e. subjective issues such as emotions, perceptions, relationships – the domain of
conflict resolvers) or a lack of democracy (i.e. substantive issues, which are the domain of human
rights promoters). Hence, strategies for intervention differ fundamentally and are at odds with one
another (Bell 2006, 356-357). 16
The discussion in this article suggests that both conflict analyses are valid at one and the
same time. Governance-related issues and relationships are intertwined, forming structural conditions
that create tensions in society which provide fertile ground for violent conflict. As the peace and
conflict field has started to focus more on the notion of conflict transformation, concerns with justice
and fundamental reform have become more explicit. In the same vein, it would be unwise to dismiss
relationships as being irrelevant to human rights, given that the latter are rooted in human dignity
and that rights standards help to cultivate a certain type of relationships in the public sphere.
There is probably no one, definitive, explanation of why the ‘clash’ perception remains so
strong and the resultant stereotypes are so persistent. As recognized earlier, real differences between
the two fields do exist, and simplistic interpretations are hard to eradicate. Yet something else may be
at play too, besides the factors noted above. My own hypothesis (as yet untested), is that the human
rights and the conflict fields, much as they complement one another, also tap into one another’s
‘weak spot’. While the human rights field’s emphasis on tackling structural, underlying conditions
is accepted by the conflict transformation field, this is an area where we find it hard to show results
and develop effective strategies. On the other hand, the human rights field tends to perceive the
world in terms of right and wrong, black and white, while peace and conflict work highlights – and
capitalises on – the areas of grey that exist in reality. This can be difficult for human rights actors in
that it may create a slippery slope of morality. In other words, each field touches at the core of what
actors in the other field struggle with and/or feel sensitive about. However contentious this thesis
may be, the question it seeks to address does matter, because the lasting stereotypes and sense of
division can fuel mistrust, impatience, and lack of understanding between human rights actors and
conflict workers that can complicate the interventions in which they are both involved.
The central argument in this article has been that the transformation of violent conflict
to sustainable peace requires insights and strategies from both the human rights and the conflict
transformation fields. Considering the two in conjunction enhances one’s analysis of the underlying
causes, dynamics and manifestations of conflict. A human rights perspective highlights the sociopolitical
nature of conflict transformation. It suggests the need to recognize the role and responsibility
of the state and the nature and functioning of systems of governance. While Azar’s work on
protracted social conflict (1990) – which attributes considerable weight to the state – has informed
our thinking on conflict transformation, ongoing practice and scholarship has focused extensively
on civil society initiatives, relationship-building and bottom-up processes. Less attention has been
given to the crucial role of the state in generating (violent) conflict or causing it to escalate.
This means that more explicit attention should be devoted to issues of power in the analysis
of conflict and in the design of processes for addressing and transforming conflict. Considering
human rights in relation to conflict transformation substantiates the latter’s normative basis and
makes it more explicit. It reflects that the project of conflict transformation is not geared towards just
16 Bell does not comment on it, but the question can also be raised how educational background comes into play, given the
extent to which one’s analysis may be shaped differently by the law (prevalent in the human rights field) or social sciences
(widespread amongst conflict transformation scholars and practitioners).
© Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management
Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective
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