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Port Security Applied Policy Project - Belfer Center for Science and ...

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Problem 3: Incompatible Communications Systems<br />

receive instructions from its own agency’s comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control system. When<br />

assets from various agencies are working together in the same vicinity, there may be<br />

circumstances where communication between them is appropriate. For example, in a<br />

typical search <strong>and</strong> rescue case where both the Coast Guard <strong>and</strong> another agency<br />

respond, the Coast Guard will not tell the other agency’s boat where to go, but once<br />

on scene, the boats will contact each other to coordinate the rescue ef<strong>for</strong>t. 149<br />

Consideration must also be given to the volume of radio traffic that an interoperable<br />

system would have to support. A study of first response at the World Trade <strong>Center</strong><br />

on September 11, 2001 conducted by McKinsey & Company concluded that<br />

communications were completely overwhelmed by police officers, EMS personnel,<br />

<strong>and</strong> firefighters speaking at the same time. 150 If the port agencies’ primary<br />

communications channels were all patched onto a single frequency, a similar failure<br />

may occur, resulting in response delays or unnecessary loss of life.<br />

3) Accessibility: Solutions must be readily accessible during an emergency at the port<br />

complex.<br />

The purpose of having interoperable communications capabilities is <strong>for</strong> first<br />

responders to be able to communicate while responding to a major emergency.<br />

Solutions that require excessive time to transport or configure will be of limited use.<br />

4) Vulnerability of infrastructure: Solutions cannot not rely on a fragile infrastructure.<br />

Systems that rely on a fragile infrastructure are inherently vulnerable. The<br />

communications infrastructure may sustain damage during a terrorist attack, or might<br />

suffer a technical failure. Centralized common systems require more redundancy<br />

because they are vulnerable, <strong>and</strong> breakdown could have disastrous consequences.<br />

5) Cost: Higher priced solutions do not necessarily buy better results.<br />

Communications solutions range in price from $50 cell phones to satellite systems<br />

that cost hundreds of millions of dollars. High-end solutions do not guarantee<br />

effective results <strong>and</strong> may not be the best choice <strong>for</strong> the port complex’s needs.<br />

Additionally, there is an enormous gap between local homel<strong>and</strong> security needs <strong>and</strong><br />

the availability of federal money to fund those needs. Given this challenge, cost<br />

effectiveness is critical.<br />

6) Technological limitations: Consideration must be given to the possible technological<br />

limitations of solutions.<br />

Although a thorough technical analysis of each alternative is beyond the scope of this<br />

study, we seek to identify possible technological pitfalls that should be considered<br />

when evaluating solutions.<br />

149 Comm<strong>and</strong>er George Cummings, USCG, interview.<br />

150 McKinsey & Company, Improving FDNY’s Preparedness, (New York: McKinsey, 2002), 8.<br />

60 Department of <strong>Policy</strong> Studies, UCLA School of Public <strong>Policy</strong> <strong>and</strong> Social Research

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