Port Security Applied Policy Project - Belfer Center for Science and ...
Port Security Applied Policy Project - Belfer Center for Science and ...
Port Security Applied Policy Project - Belfer Center for Science and ...
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Problem 3: Incompatible Communications Systems<br />
receive instructions from its own agency’s comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control system. When<br />
assets from various agencies are working together in the same vicinity, there may be<br />
circumstances where communication between them is appropriate. For example, in a<br />
typical search <strong>and</strong> rescue case where both the Coast Guard <strong>and</strong> another agency<br />
respond, the Coast Guard will not tell the other agency’s boat where to go, but once<br />
on scene, the boats will contact each other to coordinate the rescue ef<strong>for</strong>t. 149<br />
Consideration must also be given to the volume of radio traffic that an interoperable<br />
system would have to support. A study of first response at the World Trade <strong>Center</strong><br />
on September 11, 2001 conducted by McKinsey & Company concluded that<br />
communications were completely overwhelmed by police officers, EMS personnel,<br />
<strong>and</strong> firefighters speaking at the same time. 150 If the port agencies’ primary<br />
communications channels were all patched onto a single frequency, a similar failure<br />
may occur, resulting in response delays or unnecessary loss of life.<br />
3) Accessibility: Solutions must be readily accessible during an emergency at the port<br />
complex.<br />
The purpose of having interoperable communications capabilities is <strong>for</strong> first<br />
responders to be able to communicate while responding to a major emergency.<br />
Solutions that require excessive time to transport or configure will be of limited use.<br />
4) Vulnerability of infrastructure: Solutions cannot not rely on a fragile infrastructure.<br />
Systems that rely on a fragile infrastructure are inherently vulnerable. The<br />
communications infrastructure may sustain damage during a terrorist attack, or might<br />
suffer a technical failure. Centralized common systems require more redundancy<br />
because they are vulnerable, <strong>and</strong> breakdown could have disastrous consequences.<br />
5) Cost: Higher priced solutions do not necessarily buy better results.<br />
Communications solutions range in price from $50 cell phones to satellite systems<br />
that cost hundreds of millions of dollars. High-end solutions do not guarantee<br />
effective results <strong>and</strong> may not be the best choice <strong>for</strong> the port complex’s needs.<br />
Additionally, there is an enormous gap between local homel<strong>and</strong> security needs <strong>and</strong><br />
the availability of federal money to fund those needs. Given this challenge, cost<br />
effectiveness is critical.<br />
6) Technological limitations: Consideration must be given to the possible technological<br />
limitations of solutions.<br />
Although a thorough technical analysis of each alternative is beyond the scope of this<br />
study, we seek to identify possible technological pitfalls that should be considered<br />
when evaluating solutions.<br />
149 Comm<strong>and</strong>er George Cummings, USCG, interview.<br />
150 McKinsey & Company, Improving FDNY’s Preparedness, (New York: McKinsey, 2002), 8.<br />
60 Department of <strong>Policy</strong> Studies, UCLA School of Public <strong>Policy</strong> <strong>and</strong> Social Research