Disarmament and International Security - World Model United Nations

Disarmament and 

International Security 

World Model UN 2012 

Background Guide

Letter from the Secretary General............................................................................... 

Letter from the Under-Secretary General.................................................................... 

Letter from the Chair.................................................................................................... 

Introduction..................................................................................................2 

History of the Committee...........................................................................................2 

Topic A: 

History and Discussion of the Problem...................................................................................3 

Current Situation....................................................................................................................10 

Past UN Actions......................................................................................................................14 

Proposed Solutions..................................................................................................................15 

Key Actors and Positions........................................................................................................16 

Relevant Partners....................................................................................................................19 

QARMA................................................................................................19 

Suggestions for Further Research............................................................................................20 

Topic B: 

History and Discussion of the Problem..............................................................................20 

Current Situation....................................................................................................................29 

Past UN Actions.....................................................................................................................30 

Proposed Solutions..................................................................................................................32 

Key Actors and Positions........................................................................................................34 

Relevant Partners....................................................................................................................36 

QARMA..............................................................................................36 

Suggestions for Further Research...........................................................................................37 

Position Papers.........................................................................................................37 

Closing Remarks.......................................................................................................37 

Bibliography................................................................................................46 

Cover image courtesy of Vancouver Tourism Board. 

Table of ConTenTs

KATHLEEN TANG 

Secretary-General 

SAMIR PATEL 

Director-General 

KEVIN LIU HUANG 

Under-Secretary-General for 

General Assemblies 

ANNA TROWBRIDGE 

Under-Secretary-General 

for Economic and Social 

Councils and Regional 

Bodies 

APARAJITA TRIPATHI 


Specialized Agencies 

RICHARD EBRIGHT 


Operations 

SAMUEL LEITER 


Administration 

SCOTT YU 


Business 

Letter from the Secretary-General 

Dear Delegates, 

My name is Kathleen Tang and I am serving as the Secretary- 

General of the WorldMUN 2012 conference. After being a part 

of WorldMUN for the past few years it is a bittersweet experience 

to be running my last WorldMUN ever, but I could not be more 

excited to share this experience with all of you! 

Within the pages of this guide you will find the topics that the 

WorldMUN staff has been hard at work on over the past few 

months. Each chair worked hard to find a topic that they are truly 

passionate about and provide the best guides possible through 

extensive research. However, the background guide should 

only be the first step in your substantive learning process. Read 

through the guide thoroughly and note what areas of debate are 

particularly interesting for your chair and use this as a starting 

point for your own research on the topic. Remember that you 

will be representing a country, a people, and a culture outside of 

your own during your week of debate. What viewpoints does your 

country have on this topic? What would they say to the issues the 

chair brings up in the guide? In what ways would your country 

most like to see these issues ‘resolved’? There are always more 

sources to look at and more news to be up to date with so the 

learning never stops! 

Of course, if you ever need help along the way there are many 

resources up online for you - WorldMUN 101 and the Rules of 

Procedure are both up on our website (www.worldmun.org) and 

will help you better understand how to write a study guide and 

how debate will run March 11-15th, 2012. Feel free to also reach 

out to your chair or USG via email. They are here to help you feel 

comfortable and prepared for the conference. 

I hope you enjoy the research presented here and also the learning 

process that comes with doing your own research on the topic. 

I look forward to meeting you in March! 

Sincerely, 

Kathleen Tang 


World Model United Nations 2012 

secretarygeneral@worldmun.org

KATHLEEN TANG 


SAMIR PATEL 









Bodies 






Operations 

SAMUEL LEITER 



SCOTT YU 


Business 


It is my sincere pleasure to welcome you to the General Assemblies! 

You are joining the largest organ of the conference and the 

primary policymaking body of the United Nations, where every 

nation is recognized as having an equal stake in the future of the 

world. The world has come a long way since the end of World War 

II; by gathering in such large numbers, the General Assemblies 

are a display of the international community’s seriousness and 

commitment to solving world issues. Our conference, even if just 

a simulation, is a rare display of international unity about which I 

hope you are as delighted as I! 

My name is Kevin Liu Huang, and I am a junior at Harvard 

College, studying as a Government-Statistics double major. My 

home is a small town in New Jersey, where I grew up playing 

tennis and soccer and making weekend trips to New York City. 

At school, in addition to working Harvard’s many Model United 

Nations and Model Congress simulations on campus, I also have 

taken up ballroom and Latin dancing. 

My job at this conference is to make your General Assembly 

experience as exhilarating and positive as possible. If you have 

any suggestions or complaints either throughout your conference 

experience or before it, feel free to get in touch with me directly 

or through your faculty advisor! 

Please feel free to connect with me through my e-mail! I am excited 

to serve as your Under-Secretary-General of General Assemblies 

for my very first Harvard World Model United Nations conference, 

and I am looking forward to a conference like no other. 

See you in March! 

Sincerely, 

Kevin Liu Huang 

Under-Secretary-General of the 


ga@worldmun.org

KATHLEEN TANG 


SAMIR PATEL 









Bodies 






Operations 

SAMUEL LEITER 



SCOTT YU 


Business 

Letter from the Chair 


It is my distinct pleasure to welcome you to the Disarmament and 

International Security Committee at Harvard WorldMUN 2012. 

My name is Dominik Nieszporowski, and I am absolutely thrilled 

to be you committee chair during the fantastic week that you will 

spend in Vancouver next year, debating and learning from people 

from diverse backgrounds. 

Originally from Warsaw, Poland, I have participated in Model 

United Nations since high school, both as a delegate and committee 

chair at several conferences throughout Europe, Asia, and North 

America. My other passions include international development 

and public service – I have been particularly involved with 

programs creating educational opportunities for children in 

Africa. 

At Harvard, I am currently a senior in the glorious Kirkland 

House, concentrating in Applied Mathematics and Economics. 

On campus, I am mostly occupied serving as Secretary-General 

of Harvard National Model United Nations 2012, an annual 

college Model UN conference held in Boston in February, and 

coordinating HNMUN’s expansion abroad in the form of our new 

international conference – HNMUN Latin America 2012. 

This year at WorldMUN, DISEC will be debating two of the most 

important contemporary issues concerning international security 

– the militarization of the Arctic and the safeguarding of nuclear 

materials. As you embark on your research into these topics, I 

hope you will find them both interesting and thought-provoking. 

Please feel free to e-mail me to questions you might have or just to 

introduce yourself. I am certainly looking forward to an exciting 

debate and meeting many great people at WorldMUN 2012! 

Best regards, 

Dominik Nieszporowski 

Disarmament and International Security 

Committee

I n t r o d u c t I o n 

The Disarmament and International Security Committee, 

officially the First Committee of the General Assembly 

of the United Nations, is one of the six main committees 

of the UNGA. The scope of DISEC’s competences and the 

significance of the issues it deals with – from security to 

international law – make it one of the most crucial organs of 

the United Nations. 

The topics that will be discussed at our session at WorldMUN 

2012 could serve as paragons of the caliber of the issues that 

the First Committee usually addresses. The problem of safety 

and security of nuclear materials is a relatively long-lasting 

concern that has recently gained some urgency due to a 

combination of several geopolitical factors in the modern 

world. The proliferation of nuclear weapons that are now in 

possession of at least four countries outside of the original 

five-power nuclear club, combined with concerns over the 

protection levels of non-military nuclear materials, seem 

to justify these concerns. This global problem merits the 

attention of the general membership of the United Nations, 

and the First Committee is the most appropriate venue to 

address it. The other topic, the militarization of the Arctic, 

is a long-unsolved regional issue that has global implications 

because of the direct involvement of some of the world’s 

mightiest powers – the United States, Russia, Canada, 

Norway, and Denmark. In view of the international status 

of the area, as well as the conflicting interests of the nations 

involved, it is crucial that the questions of territorial claims 

and military presence in the region be addressed by the 

General Assembly of the United Nations. 

As delegates to the Disarmament and International Security 

Committee, you have an opportunity to discuss these issues 

of supreme importance and to work collectively on designing 

viable solutions through the process of negotiation and 

compromise. 

H I s t o r y of tHe commIt t e e 

The United Nations was established at the United Nations 

Conference on International Organization in San 

Francisco, at which representatives of 50 independent states 

congregated to discuss the creation of ‘a general international 

organization to maintain peace and security.’ The Charter of 

the United Nations was written and ratified there, and the 

Organization was officially formed on 24 October 1945. 


also known as the First Committee of the General Assembly of 

the United Nations, is a consensus-building body that gathers 

representatives of all 192 member states to collectively discuss 

issues pertaining to world peace and to handle all questions 

relating to security and international law. Initially established 

as the Political and Security Committee (POLISEC), the First 

Committee was reorganized in the late 1970s in response 

to a growing number of additional political matters, and 

the Special Political Committee was created. In view of the 

progress of decolonization movements and the declining 

number of issues to be addressed such as trust territories, 

the functions of the Special Political Committee were later 

merged during the 1990s into the Fourth Committee, which 

initially dealt with Trusteeship and Decolonization matters. 


just as any other of the six committees of the General 

Assembly, allows every nation represented to suggest or 

consider proposals relevant to the substantive topics covered, 

and to recommend resolutions for adoption by the General 

Representatives from all Member States convene at a 

Disarmament and International Security Committee 

meeting to debate key security issues. http://graphics8. 

nytimes.com/images/2006/09/18/world/18un.l.jpg 

Assembly. While these resolutions are not legally binding, the 

fact that each of them represents an agreement of the majority 

of the member states implies that resolutions adopted by the 

General Assembly have a significant normative role. This 

means that they can indicate the establishment of common 

standards, customs and guidelines for the behavior of 

Harvard WorldMUN 2012 

Disarmament and International Security 2

states on the international scene. 1 Resolutions adopted by 

consensus have an additional role of featuring substantive 

areas of agreement concerning world peace and can lay 

foundations for the creation of international treaties and the 

emergence of international legal norms. 2 

Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations authorizes 

the General Assembly to discuss any questions relating to the 

maintenance of international peace and security and to make 

recommendations with regard to any such questions to the 

state or states concerned, to the Security Council, or to both. 3 

The First Committee provides a platform for member states 

to present their positions on disarmament-related matters, 

and provides an opportunity for nations to reach common 

understandings and 

to agree on universal 

norms of behavior. 

Instead of ensuring 

security through the 

size of their arsenals, 

all states can discuss 

ways of arriving at 

collective security 

arrangements 

through the process 

of multilateral 

disarmament. 

The First Committee 

convenes every year 

in October for a 

4-5 week session, 

following a general 

debate of the 

General Assembly. 

At the beginning 

of each session, the 

Committee elects a Chairman, three Vice Chairmen and a 

Rapporteur to conduct the workings of the body. 

The most significant past successes of the Disarmament 

and International Security Committee include the passage 

of the following treaties and acts: the Treaty on the Non- 

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological Weapons 

Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 

Partial Test Ban Treaty, among others. 

t o p I c A r e A A: m I l I tA r I z At I o n o f t H e 

A r c t I c 

History and Discussion of the Problem 

Geographical Features of the Region 

The Arctic is a region around the North Pole of the Earth, 

which includes the Arctic Ocean and parts of Canada, 

Russia, the United States, Greenland, as a territory of 

Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. There exist 

different concepts about the region’s borders. It can be defined 

as the area north of the Arctic Circle (66° 30’N), which is the 

approximate limit of the midnight sun and the polar night. 

The polar night 

refers to the 

periods when 

the sun does 

not set or it does 

not rise. 4 This 

borderline has 

no geographical 

meaning, since 

it does not 

correspond to 

any features 

of the terrain. 

Alternatively, 

the Arctic can 

be defined as the 

northernmost 

limit of the 

The Arctic Map. http://invisibleman.com/arctic-map.gif 

stand of trees, 

which is roughly 

followed by the 

isotherm at the 

boundary of the 

region where 

the average temperature for the warmest month does not 

exceed 10°C. 

Brief History of Arctic Exploration 

By the time the first European explorers, the Norsemen 

or Vikings, visited the Arctic area, many parts of the 

region had already been settled by the Eskimos and other 

people of Mongolic stock. 5 The quest to further explore the 

vast and mysterious lands above the 50th parallel in North 

America and above the 70th parallel in Eurasia began in the 

16th century and led to numerous expeditions over the scope 

of the next four centuries. Probably the most illustrious goal 



Peary’s boys claiming finders-keepers on the North Pole. http://freedy89. 

files.wordpress.com/2009/02/peary5.jpg 

in the early history of Arctic exploration was the discovery 

of the Northern Passage – the legendary connection between 

the Pacific and the Atlantic, around North America or 

Eurasia – which would constitute a possible attractive trade 

route. 

The initial driving force for finding an alternate trade route to 

the Orient was the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 

1453, which allowed them to control the Strait of Bosphorus 

and to interrupt trade between Europe and the Orient. 6 The 

first known expeditions for a new trade route to the Orient 

began with Columbus in 1492, followed by John Cabot, 

who, in 1497, landed much farther north than Columbus, 

probably in Newfoundland, Giovanni da Verrazzano, who 

looked for a northwest passage around the recently explored 

land and, in 1524, sailed as far north as Maine or Nova Scotia, 

and Jacques Cartier, who discovered the 

St. Lawrence River in 1535. 7 The journey 

further north and the passage through 

the Arctic Islands of Canada proved to be 

more demanding and the early explorers 

had to contend with ice, Arctic weather, 

and scurvy, among other obstacles. The 

results of these early expeditions by 

European explorers and the subsequent 

ones – among them those by William 

Barentz, Martin Frobisher, William 

Baffin, Henry Hudson, and John Davis 

– were largely disappointing and caused 

the initial wave of interest to wane. 8 These 

expeditions played a great role, however, in 

adding to the Western Civilization’s initial 

knowledge of the Arctic. 

In the 19 th century, several new explorers 

took up the challenge of the Arctic – 

primarily British naval officers John 

Franklin, F. W. Beechey, John Ross, James 

Ross, W. E. Parry, P. W. Dease, Thomas 

Simpson, George Back, and John Rae. 9 In 

1845, one of the most famous expeditions 

ever to attempt the Northwest Passage, by 

Sir John Franklin, disappeared and gave 

rise to more than 40 searching parties 

that scoured the Arctic Islands for several 

decades vainly looking for Franklin and 

his crew. 10 This drawback cooled Great 

Britain’s ambition to be the leader in the 

race for the Northern Passage and made 

most explorers shift their focus to the 

North Pole. These expeditions moved 

the ‘discovery line’ further north and explored and mapped 

Greenland, together with some smaller Arctic islands. 

The Northwest Passage between the Bering Strait, which 

separates Russia and Alaska, and Baffin Bay on the Atlantic 

Ocean was eventually conquered by Roald Amundsen in 

1903-1906, 25 years after the Northeast Passage had been first 

navigated by Nils A. E. Nordenskjöld. 11 In 1909, the race to the 

North Pole was arguably won by Robert E. Peary; however, his 

achievement was undermined by Frederic A. Cook’s subsequent 

announcement that he had reached the Pole a year before. 

There is still a considerable controversy as to whether either 

man actually reached the Pole, given the primitive navigation 

techniques of that period. In subsequent years, several field 

expeditions were sent out by British, Soviet, Norwegian, Danish, 



Canadian and American organizations, but their objectives 

focused mainly on gathering meteorological, hydrological 

and magnetic data and establishing environmental and radio 

stations. 

During World War II, interest in studying the Arctic conditions 

was further fuelled by the need to transport supplies, and this 

interest continued also after the war had ended. Scientific 

work in the Arctic region increased greatly after 1945, with the 

intensified use of new methods of exploration. After 1947, the 

United States started carrying out routine weather-reporting 

flights over the Arctic Ocean and used icebreakers to conduct 

oceanographic work in the Beaufort Sea. The first American and 

Soviet weather stations were established in the 1950s, and by 

the end of the decade there were several stations on ice islands, 

which were occupied and maintained until they drifted into a 

region where they ceased to be of interest to the scientists. 12 In 

regards to the Northwest Passage, in 1954 the first crossing by a 

deep-draught vessel was made by HMCS Labrador, a Canadian 

naval icebreaker, and in 1969 the Manhattan, one of the world’s 

largest commercial ships of that time, smashed through more 

than 1,000 km of ice between Baffin Bay and Point Barrow to 

assess the commercial feasibility of the passage. 13 Up to this 

day, however, the Northwest Passage has never been used as a 

regular commercial route. 

Presently, the discovery phase of the exploration of the 

Arctic region is over. Today, there remain no unexplored 

areas, as scientific research yielded reasonably accurate maps 

and technological progress has made this once elusive area 

increasingly accessible. Nowadays, commercial airlines can 

fly across the North Pole, and the Arctic regions have become 

the focus of research concerning global warming and climate 

change. 

Early Territorial Claims 

As a result of scientific exploration of the Arctic, it became 

increasingly attractive for many nations to claim their 

rights to territorial sovereignty over some portions of the 

region. From the very beginning, exploration of the Arctic 

often combined scientific, geopolitical, and even commercial 

purposes with the pursuit of national prestige. Therefore, 

arctic exploration was undertaken not only by the states 

bordering on the Arctic Ocean: the United States, the Soviet 

Union/Russia, Canada, Denmark-Greenland and Norway, 

but also by actors such as Germany, the United Kingdom 

and Poland. 14 However, territorial claims were mainly made 

by the former group of states – mainly the United States, 

the Soviet Union/Russia and Canada. As late as in the first 

decades of the 20th century, there was no international 

statute in place that would clearly regulate boundaries for 

all states in the Arctic region, but there seemed to be no 

urgent necessity to create one at that time. All countries of 

the Arctic rim traditionally accepted the sector principle, 

a version of the doctrine of contiguity, and facilely based 

their territorial claims on this agreement. According to the 

sector principle, the northern coastlines of the countries 

adjacent to the Arctic Circle were to indicate the northern 

boundaries of their respective sectors in the Arctic Ocean, 

while longitudinal parallels extending from their eastern 

and western borders bounded these sectors from the other 

two sides 15 . 

In the past, international law stated that national claims of 

sovereignty over particular areas in the Arctic Ocean were to 

be recognized only if accompanied by physical occupation. 

Initially, there were two competing theories regarding 

national sovereignty in the Arctic: (1) that no nation could 

achieve sovereignty over the Arctic, termed ‘res nullius’ and 

(2) that every nation shared an undivided sovereignty over 

this region, called ‘res communes.’ According to current 

international law, sovereignty is considered to be a derivative 

of government control and of notoriety over new territory. 

Consequently, many claims of sovereignty over some portions 

of the Arctic region that were supported by existing exercise 

of the government functions became more plausible. On the 

other hand, claims resting solely on territorial justifications 

such as the sector principle were denied legal force by many 

nations, including the United States, which purchased Alaska 

from Russia in 1867, thus reaffirming its presence in the 

region. 

Extended sea sovereignty conflicts and disputes in the Arctic 

between the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union/Russia, 

Denmark-Greenland, Norway, and Iceland started in the 

1920s. The beginning of the wave of claims was marked by 

Norway’s acquisition of the Svalbard Archipelago, which was 

recognized by the Spitsbergen Treaty and which gave this 

country a large Arctic area. The littoral states of Canada and 

the Soviet Union argued that their coastal reach should be 

extended northwards, repeating the argument that was made 

by claimants to the newly explored Antarctica. Canada’s claim 

involved extending their national boundaries up to the Pole, 

which would then cover the area between longitudes 60°W 

and 141°W and include the islands between the northern coast 

of Canada and the Pole. Russia followed suit, and established 

a claim to the area between the northern coasts of both its 

European and Asiatic parts and the North Pole. The Russian 

sector was to be bounded by two lines: from Murmansk to the 

North Pole (35°E) and from Chukchi Peninsula to the North 



Svalbard serves as Norway’s Arctic refuge. http://www.etravelphotos.com/photos/2005sv/2005sv-0731-012d-w.jpg 

Pole (170°W). In the same manner, Norway decided to claim 

its sovereign rights to the sector between longitudes 5°E and 

35°E, and the United States did the same, claiming the sector 

between 141°W and 170°W. Following this logic, Denmark 

could also claim its sovereignty over the sector between 60°W 

and 10°W, but it contented itself with Greenland, which was 

internationally recognized as Danish territory in 1933. 

A new addition to the dispute over Arctic territory after 

World War II was the strategic military component, which 

emerged due to the new security situation when East-West 

tensions cemented. During the Cold War, all states bordering 

on the Arctic Ocean - the United States, the Soviet Union, 

Canada, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark-Greenland - divided 

themselves into the East-West confrontation framework. 16 

The Arctic’s strategic significance in this new era dramatically 

increased, as the region marked the shortest distance between 

the United States and the Soviet Union. Additional factors were 

also crucial in reviving the dispute over national sovereignty 

in the Arctic. From the Soviet Union’s perspective, the littoral 

coast of the Arctic Ocean played a key role in their naval 

build-up, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union had no 

warm-water ports with direct access to the world’s oceans. 17 

On the other hand, the United States had no direct way to 

respond to this naval threat – they had no access to the Arctic 

waters save for Alaska and had to rely on agreements with 

other states like Canada, Denmark, and Iceland to build up 

their defenses. 

As the United States security policy became increasingly 

dependent upon the relatively free access to the Canadian 

Arctic, disputes arose over whether Canadian cooperation 



which regulated the practical 

issues without addressing 

the sovereignty dispute. 

According to the agreement, 

no vessels that were engaged 

in research, including US 

Coast Guard vessels, could 

enter the Canadian Arctic 

waters without permission of 

the Canadian government. 22 

was strictly or legally necessary. 18 The United States rejected 

the Canadian jurisdiction over the Northwest Passage – 

while it still recognized Canada’s rights to sovereignty over 

the islands of the Arctic Archipelago, it considered the Arctic 

Ocean as international waters. The United States claimed that 

the Northwest Passage in its entirety should be regarded as an 

international strait where foreign vessels have the unrestricted 

right of transit passage. Canada, on the other hand, claimed 

the Northwest Passage and the waters of the Canadian Arctic 

Archipelago as internal waters based on a liberal application 

of the doctrine of straight baselines. 19 

This long-running dispute featured intermittent testing 

behavior. In 1969, the world’s largest commercial vessel – 

the American tanker Manhattan – traveled through the 

Northwest Passage to test whether Alaskan oil could be 

delivered to the east coast of the United States by this route. 20 

The trip itself was not a problem for the Canadians, but the 

fact that the voyage took place without asking for permission 

of the Canadian government spurred indignation in this 

northern country. A similar journey was made by the United 

States icebreaker Polar Sea in 1985, again without previous 

consultation with the authorities in Ottawa. 21 The Convention of the Law 

of the Sea 

The issue of competing 

claims for sovereignty 

over territorial waters was 

raised in the United Nations 

in 1967 by Malta, and this 

led to convening the Third 

United Nations Conference 

on the Law of the Sea in 

1973. In order to reduce 

the influence of organized 

groups of states influencing 

the negotiations, the standard 

majority vote was replaced 

with a consensus process. This prolonged the negotiations, 

and the final agreement was reached only in 1982. The final 

treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

(UNCLOS), was ratified in 1994 and became the single most 

significant international agreement regulating the rights and 

responsibilities of nations in their use of the world’s high seas. 

Probably the single most important provision of the UNCLOS 

permitted coastal states to establish exclusive economic zones 

extending up to 200 nautical miles within which they could 

exercise sovereign rights over both the waters and the seabed. 

Furthermore, the treaty assured that this sovereign territory 

could be extended depending on how far the continental land 

mass belonging to a nation extended out under the ocean. 

As a result of 

these incidents, in 1988, the governments of Canada and of 

the United States signed an agreement, ‘Arctic Cooperation’, 

23 S.S. Manhattan’s epic journey through the Northwest Passage rendered Canada 

indignant. http://drake.marin.k12.ca.us/academics/rock/NWP_then_files/405_ 

Manhattan.jpg 

To 

date, the Convention on the Law of the Sea has been ratified by 

158 countries, the United States being a noteworthy exception. 

Active Militarization 

Prior to World War II, the Arctic region was a complete 

military vacuum. During the War, its strategic role 

included mainly being a transit area for the Arctic convoys 

delivering vital supplies to the Arkhangelsk Soviet Union 

from the United Kingdom and the United States under the 

Lend-Lease Act. The region was also the area of a few smaller 



engagements, like the Battle of the Barents Sea and the 

Battle of the North Cape. It was the post-war period, with its 

technological advances in the military sphere, however, that 

marked a boost in strategic importance of the Arctic. Defined 

solely in terms of its significance in scientific research, the 

Arctic started being 

regarded as the 

Circumpolar 

North – a potential 

core of national 

security interests of 

several countries. 24 

The Arctic region 

became an area 

for ballistic missile 

threats, early 

warning systems, 

and even potential 

naval conflicts. 25 

This development 

can be explained 

on the basis of the 

interplay of the 

following three 

factors: (1) the 

East-West conflict, 

which created 

the political 

framework for 

bloc formation; (2) 

the developments 

in military 

technology, 

including nuclear 

weapons and longrange 

means of 

delivery; and (3) 

the geo-strategic 

factors particular to 

the Arctic region. 26 

While the first 

two factors created a need for deployment areas in general, 

the universal features of the Arctic explain the particular 

significance of this region. These geo-strategic properties of the 

Circumpolar North are commonly known. First, the shortest 

distance between Europe, Asia and North America, and thus 

between the two superpowers of the Cold War period, the 

United States and the Soviet Union, is over the Arctic Ocean. 

The superpowers can be also said to have an almost common 

border in this area, where the Soviet Union is separated from 

Alaska by only 91 km of the Bering Strait. 27 Furthermore, 

eighty percent of the world’s industrial production takes place 

north of 30°N, while seventy percent of the world’s major 

cities are located north of 23.5°N. 28 These factors explain why 

the Arctic started being regarded as a natural route for any 

nuclear attack using 

or intercontinental 

missiles or strategic 

bombers and the rise 

of the Cold War. 

In addition to this, 

the Soviet Union 

gradually developed 

its Northern Fleet, 

based at the Kola 

Peninsula, to become 

its most powerful 

fleet. The reasons 

for this were purely 

pragmatic – the 

Soviet Union aspired 

to be a naval power, 

but being a partly 

landlocked country, 

it faced obvious 

geographical 

restrictions in its 

access to the world’s 

high seas. All of its 

fleets – the Black 

Sea, the Baltic, the 

Northern, and – 

partly – the Pacific 

Fleet were dependent 

on passing through 

straits that were 

controlled by powers 

with a history of 

imperfect relations 

with the Soviet 

Union. 29 The Soviets thus faced a constant risk of seeing these 

straits closed for passage at the most crucial moments. The 

Northern Fleet was an exception in this regard, having a direct 

access to the world’s oceans and thus played a crucial role in 

assuring the Soviet Union’s naval strength. The introduction 

of the Delta-class submarines in 1972 further increased the 

potential of the Northern Fleet, which did not have to rely on 

the barrier-protected GIUK gap, which is between Greenland, 

Russia has crucial naval facilities in the Barents Sea. http://www.astrosol. 

ch/images/northernfleetmap.jpg 



Iceland and the United Kingdom, anymore – since Delta 

submarines were capable of striking any target in Europe or 

North America from the Arctic waters. 30 This withdrawal of the 

Northern Fleet’s strategic forces to the Arctic Ocean has led the 

United States to follow suit and transformed this region into a 

military front. 31 Also the airspace over the Arctic Ocean began 

to be utilized for strategic deterrence in the 1950s and 1960s. 

Due to the long-range missile threat, the United States set up 

several chains of early warning systems against attacks from 

the Circumpolar North. The Distant Early Warning (DEW) 

stations were established between Alaska and Greenland, in 

cooperation with Canada and Denmark. In addition to these, 

three additional chains of radars were built in North America: 

the Mid Canada line, the Pinetree line, and the Ballistic 

Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). 32 Other countries 

also assured their safety in case of war. Sweden, even though 

it decided to remain neutral, also maintained substantial 

forces in its northern areas to ensure that no country would be 

tempted to utilize its territory to conduct an assault. Norway 

also made appropriate provisions to ensure it could respond 

to a Soviet attack. 

The climax of the process of militarization and of the role of 

the Arctic as a theatre for the operations of strategic weapons 

systems came in the 1980s. As land-based intercontinental 

ballistic missiles (ICBMs) became increasingly vulnerable to 

counterforce strikes, submarine-launched ballistic missiles 

(SLBMs) began to play a pivotal role in military strategy of 

both the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same 

time, development of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) 

allowed military strategists to achieve huge advantages by 

deploying them in the Arctic. First, SSBNs in patrol stations 

in the Arctic Ocean could strike virtually all enemy targets 

without venturing far from their respective homelands – 

for example, Soviet-built missiles mounted on Delta-class 

submarines stationed in Arctic waters could attack targets 

in North America and Europe. Similarly, American Trident 

submarines carrying C-4 missiles were able to deliver nuclear 

warheads to targets throughout the Soviet Union – all from 

the Arctic waters. Simultaneously, the operation of SSBNs in 

the Arctic Ocean was remarkably safe due to the difficulties 

of locating submarines in Arctic conditions. The effectiveness 

of acoustical monitoring devices like sonar systems was 

significantly compromised by the ambient noise of the pack 

of ice. 33 

These military advantages were eagerly exploited by both 

the Soviets and the Americans during the 1980s: over half 

of the Soviet SSBNs were stationed with the Northern Fleet 

in the Kola Peninsula, with an easy access to Arctic waters. 

Although the United States did not have a comparable base, 

their SSBNs that were stationed in Bangor, Washington were 

fully operational in Arctic waters even for extended periods 

of time. The United States accelerated the construction of its 

fleet of Ohio-class submarines, equipped with Trident II or 

D-5 missiles. In fact, the safety and ease of operation offered 

by Arctic waters convinced the American military strategists 

to deploy vessels extensively in this region, even though the 

United States did not share the Soviet Union’s problems such 

as penetrating the GIUK gap. 34 

The situation was largely similar with air-launched cruise 

missiles (ALCMs), which were developed so that they could 

deliver nuclear warheads with great precision. Their advantage 

over ballistic missiles results from their maneuverability – 

unlike SSBMs, ALCMs are subject to control at all points 

along their flight paths – and their ability to confuse ordinary 

radar scanners. By flying at low speeds and altitudes, they were 

often capable of avoiding conventional air defense systems. 

In the 1980s, long-range cruise missiles could travel up to 

3,000 km to their target areas and, when mounted on heavy 

bombers, were fully operational in the Arctic airspace. The 

United States had over a thousand long-range cruise missiles 

in their inventory and several squadrons of B-52G bombers 

to carry them. The Soviet Union lagged somewhat behind 

in this technology, but the Soviets were also in possession 

of long-range ALCMs that they mounted on their Backfire 

and Bear H bombers. The deployment of long-range ALCMs 

and the latest generations of manned bombers significantly 

increased the importance of the Arctic airspace as a potential 

battlefield. These missiles were capable of reaching most 

targets in North America, Europe and the Soviet Union when 

launched from the airspace over the Arctic region, which 

potentially made standoff nuclear strikes relatively safe and 

effective. 35 

As a result of these developments of offensive military 

systems in the Arctic, there emerged a much stronger need 

for sea and air defense systems in the region. In regards 

to sea defense, conventional methods of monitoring the 

movements of submarines from aircraft, satellites or other 

acoustical devices were rather useless in tracking the activities 

of SSBNs operating under the ice of the Arctic Ocean. The 

only measure of defense was deploying attack submarines 

in the Arctic, which increased the military presence in the 

region even further. A similar surge of interest in air defense 

systems, caused by the deployment of ALCMs, precipitated a 

modernization of the DEW line from the 1950s in the United 

States. This resulted in creation of the North Warning System 

in cooperation with Canada, which was based on a military 



agreement from 1985. The North Warning System contained 

13 medium-range microwave radars and 39 short-range 

radars. In a separate agreement, the United States and Iceland 

agreed to construct two additional radar stations in Iceland to 

monitor Soviet activities in the Arctic. 36 

After the end of the Cold War, most Arctic nations reduced 

the accumulation of forces in their northern areas. The 

explanation for this change can be attributed to a combination 

of economic challenges faced by the newly transformed 

Russian Federation, and the growing need for US military 

resources to be deployed elsewhere. This led to the decreasing 

necessity for major Arctic powers to maintain their large 

military presence in the Arctic region. 

Current Situation 

The Arctic is presently re-emerging as a strategic area where 

vital interests of many countries coincide. The region’s 

geopolitical and geo-economic significance, combined with 

its wealth in natural resources, is transforming the Arctic 

into a hotly contested frontier of the 21st century. 

Natural Resources 

The United States 

Geological 

Survey estimates 

that the Arctic may 

contain a fifth of the 

world’s yet-to-bediscovered 

oil and 

natural gas reserves. 

The assessment, 

which took four 

years, found that 

the region may 

hold as much as 

90 billion barrels 

of undiscovered 

oil reserves, which 

constitutes 13% of 

the estimated total 

world reserves, 

and 47.3 trillion 

cubic meters of 

undiscovered natural 

gas reserves, which 

is 30% of the world’s 

reserves. 37 At today’s 

consumption rate of 

86 million barrels per 

day, the potential oil to be drilled in the Arctic could meet 

global demand for almost three years. 38 The Arctic’s potential 

natural gas resources are three times bigger and equal to 

Russia’s proven gas reserves, which are the world’s largest. The 

survey looked at resources believed to be recoverable using 

existing technology, but with the important assumptions for 

offshore areas that the resources would be recoverable even in 

the presence of permanent sea ice and oceanic water depth. 39 

Two regions of the Arctic stand out according to this survey. 

A third of the yet-to-be-discovered Arctic oil, or about 30 

billion barrels, is off the coast of Alaska. 40 Historically, 

the North Slope, which is the region of Alaska from the 

Canadian border on the east to the Chukchi Sea Outer 

Continental Shelf on the west has contributed significantly to 

US oil production. The United States Department of Energy 

reported that the North Slope potentially holds 36 billion 

barrels of oil and 3.8 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, close 

to Nigeria’s proven reserves. 41 These reserves are also quite 

unique and attractive because their development is much less 

limited by government legislation. Therefore, they are much 

more accessible to drilling than other similar oilfields. Last 

year, oil companies spent US$2.6 billion to acquire leases on 

Oil exploration and drilling damage the Arctic blossoms. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/ 

news/bigphotos/images/070824-arctic-oil_big.jpg 


Disarmament and International Security 10 10

government-controlled offshore tracts. 42 Currently, however, 

many oil fields in the North Slope are in decline and many 

people in America look toward the offshore areas to revive 

the Alaskan oil industry and enhance US energy security. 

For example, the 10-billion-barrel oil reserves in the Arctic 

National Wildlife Refuge could lead to an additional 1 million 

barrels per day in American production capacity, which 

would save the United States US$123 billion in petroleum 

imports and create US$7.7 billion in new economic activity 43 . 

The other area of the Arctic that is particularly rich in 

natural resources is the ‘Russian area of water proper,’ 

composed of the Barents Sea, the Pechora Sea, the Kara Sea, 

the East Siberian Sea, the Chukchi Sea, and the Laptev Sea. 

According to a report by the Russian Ministry for Natural 

Resources, oil deposits there could reach 418 million tons, 

which is equivalent to 3 billion barrels, and proven natural 

gas reserves could amount to 7.7 trillion cubic meters. 

Unexplored reserves are far larger – this region could hold 

as much as 67.7 billion barrels of oil and 88.3 trillion cubic 

meters of gas. 44 

Beside oil and gas, the Arctic seabed could also hold other 

natural wealth, such as significant deposits of precious 

stones – gold, silver, copper, iron, platinum, lead, tin, nickel, 

manganese, zinc and even diamonds. In the current state 

of global economy, demand for these commodities steadily 

increases. Furthermore, it has been proven that there are large 

deposits of methane hydrates located on the deep seabed 

of the Arctic Ocean. While no technology currently exists 

that would make extracting them possible, the emergence 

of this capability seems to be an imminent prospect. Several 

countries are interested in developing methane hydrate 

processing as a commercially viable energy source, including 

the United States, Japan, and South Korea. 45 

Climate Change 

Nowhere else on the planet have such dramatic 

consequences of climate change been observed as in 

the Arctic. Biologists and climate researchers observe with 

mounting fear how the sea ice 

in the Arctic Ocean is rapidly 

decreasing and the permafrost 

on the ground is melting. 

According to data gathered 

by satellites, it is apparent that 

there is less sea ice between 

Greenland and Siberia than 

ever before. 46 In August 2006, 

the Russian ship Akademik 

Fyodorov successfully managed 

to cross the North Pole 

without needing assistance of 

icebreakers; there are hardly any 

ice floes left in the Northwest 

Passage. 47 Some researchers 

hypothesize that by the end of 

the century the Arctic Ocean 

could become completely free 

of all ice in the summer and 

up to 90% of the hard-rock 

surface could melt, shifting the 

permafrost border hundreds of 

kilometers to the north. 48 The 

warming effect also threatens 

to bring massive changes to 

the region’s environmental 

condition, whose balance 

Arctic ice is melting faster than ever before. http://www.spiegel.de/international/ has already been shaken by 

spiegel/0,1518,409001,00.html 

pollution and higher levels of 



ultraviolet rays. 

However, as scientists and conservationists worry about the 

potentially dire consequences of global warming, politicians 

and businessmen have already started battling over how to 

reap the economic benefits of the global meltdown. A broad 

range of potential opportunities is opening up as the ice is 

melting. Cargo may be able to travel from North America 

to Asia more quickly and cheaply, as the Northern Route 

just north of the coast of Siberia opens up. Similarly, the 

fabled Northern Passage becomes much more accessible and 

becomes a feasible commercial route from the west to the east 

coast of the United States. Local governments and firms are 

A robotic arm of a Russian mini submarine planting a 

titanium capsutre with a Russian flag under the icecaps 

of the Arctice Ocean at the North Pole. 

http://wwwimage.cbsnews.com/images/2007/09/21/ 

image3284091g.jpg 

also hoping for newly accessible fishing grounds, especially 

around the Bering Strait. 49 More than anything else, however, 

it is the wealth of newly available natural resources that sparks 

the imagination of many. If the environmental processes that 

are currently underway continue, excavating the Arctic’s vast 

oil and natural gas reserves will soon become financially 

viable. 50 Several Arctic nations have recently started lining 

up to claim their rights to explore the Arctic’s riches. 

Recent Territorial Claims 

Until the end of the 20th century, there was a general 

consensus among most countries that the North Pole 

and most of the Arctic Ocean should be regarded as an 

international territory. At the same time, several states have 

reinforced their pre-existing claims to national sovereignty 

over certain areas in the region in view of the recent 

phenomenon of global warming and the resulting Arctic 

shrinkage. These emerging opportunities have led others 

to even establish completely new claims. According to the 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, countries 

are entitled to exclusive economic zones up to 200 miles 

from their shores, but some nations have recently filed claims 

to extend their respective areas. 

In 2001, Russia submitted to the UNCLOS a formal claim 

for an area of 1.2 million square kilometers that extends 

from the undersea Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev Ridge 

to the North Pole. 51 The claim stated that the Lomonosov 

and Mendeleev submerged ridges were in fact extensions of 

Russia’s continental shelf. The United Nations commission 

rejected the claim and asked for more evidence in support of 

the Russian sovereign rights to this area. In response, Moscow 

sent a scientific expedition in 2007 of a nuclear-powered 

icebreaker and two submarines to the region in question. 

The mission collected samples from the Lomonosov Ridge to 

prove that the ridge is part of the Eurasian landmass. During 

a spectacular media event, the submarines also dropped a 

titanium capsule containing a Russian flag onto the seafloor 

at the North Pole at a depth of 4,261 meters. This symbolic 

act by the Russians suddenly transformed the question of 

sovereign rights in the Arctic region from a purely scientific 

and legal case into an urgent political issue. 52 On the basis 

of the samples found, Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources 

said that a preliminary analysis ‘confirms the fact that the 

structure of the Lomonosov Ridge crust matches world 

analogs of continental crust’. The Russian government used 

this fact to announce that the North Pole is part of Mother 

Russia and that under international law, Russia can lay claim 

to the potentially oil-rich seabed under the Arctic ice. 53 Many 

experts challenge this view, however, saying that the samples 

only prove that the Lomonosov Ridge’s rocks are continental 

in nature, but this doesn’t necessarily mean that the ridge is 

part of Russia – it could as well be Canadian or Danish. 54 

Meanwhile, scientists from other Arctic nations are looking 

for evidence to support very different versions of the 

truth about the Lomonosov Ridge. Danish geologists are 

attempting to prove that the ridge is connected to Greenland, 

and Canadian scientists are searching for connections 

between this geological formation and the Ellesmere Island, 

a Canadian territory. 55 The dispute over which country’s 

continental shelf extends to the Lomonosov Ridge is crucial 

in determining which country has sovereign rights over 

the seabed around the North Pole. Some of the other hotly 



contested areas of the Arctic are the boundary between Alaska 

and Canada, and the East Barents Basins, where Russia and 

Norway are involved in bilateral discussions concerning the 

offshore boundary. 56 

In 2006, Norway followed Russia and also made an official 

submission into the United Nations Commission on the 

Limits of the Continental Shelf in accordance with the 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Article 

76, Paragraph 8). The claim to extend the Norwegian 200 

nautical miles (370 km) zone in three areas of the Arctic – the 

Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean, the Loop Hole in 

the Barents Sea and the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea 

– was backed by the United Nations commission, and thus 

the extension was effective and the total gain for Norway 

amounted to 235,000 square kilometers. 57 In 2007, a US Coast 

Guard icebreaker USCGC Healy headed to the Arctic to map 

the bottom of the Arctic Ocean the Outer Continental Shelf. 

One of the purposes of mapping was to determine whether 

the United States had any legitimate claims to territory 

beyond its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. 58 

Recent Militarization 

In August 2007, shortly after sending the scientific 

expedition to the Lomonosov Ridge that placed the 

Russian flag on the seabed, Moscow ordered resumption of 

regular air patrols over the Arctic Ocean. Strategic bombers 

including the turboprop Tu-95 (Bear), supersonic Tu-160 

(Blackjack), and Tu-22M3, as well as the long-range antisubmarine 

warfare patrol aircraft Tu-142 have flown patrols 

since then. 59 According to the Russian Air Force, the Tu- 

95 bombers refueled in-flight to extend their operational 

patrol area. 60 American newspapers reported that Russian 

bombers penetrated the 12-mile air defense identification 

zone surrounding Alaska several times since 2007. 61 Also 

the Russian navy is intensifying its patrols in the Arctic – 

this is the first such phenomenon since the end of the Cold 

War. High ranking Russian army officers say that Russia’s 

military strategy might be reoriented to meet threats to 

the country’s interests in the Arctic and that the Northern 

Fleet’s operational radius is being extended. 62 In July 2008, 

the Russian Navy officially announced that it has resumed its 

warship presence in the Arctic. 

The intensified Russian military activity in the Arctic is 

interpreted as an attempt to increase its leverage vis-à-vis 

territorial claims in the region. Moscow’s strategy seems to be 

to display its military might while invoking international law. 

For example, the Russian Navy deployed an anti-submarine 

warfare destroyer and guided-missile cruiser designed 

Maritime zones as defined by international law. http:// 

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Zonmar-en.svg 

to destroy aircraft carriers in the area of the Spitsbergen 

Archipelago. The Spitsbergen unambiguously belongs to 

Norway, but Russia refuses to recognize Norway’s rights to a 

200-nautical-mile economic zone around the Archipelago. 63 

The sorties of the Northern Fleet in the area are being justified 

by the Russian Navy as ‘fulfilled strictly in accordance with 

the international maritime law, including the UNCLOS 64 . In 

a recent report released in May 2009, the Russian Security 

Council, which includes the Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, 

and heads of the military and intelligence agencies, raised a 

possibility of war in the Arctic within a decade over control 

of the regions huge wealth of natural resources. 65 



In response, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

partners re-supply the Thule Air Base in Greenland, which 

operates under agreements with Denmark. Another example 

of this increased military attention given to the Arctic region 

is the strategic cooperation between the United States and 

Canada in strengthening the North American Aerospace 

Defense Command (NORAD). There are also plans in the 

United States to establish a Joint Task Force–Arctic Region 

Command and an Arctic Coast Guard Forum modeled after 

the highly successful North Pacific Coast Guard Forum. 66 

Canada joined the trend by announcing in 2007 and that 

it would build six to eight navy patrol ships to guard the 

Northwest Passage, as well as two military bases and a deepwater 

port inside the Arctic Circle. 67 \ 

Past UN Actions 

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

The questions of jurisdiction over the Arctic and the 

militarization of the region have not yet been the topics 

of any major international treaty. The single most important 

agreement regulating sovereign rights in the Arctic, as well 

as in the other sea areas of the world, is the United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The agreement, 

which is often described as the ‘constitution for the oceans’, 

was concluded in 1982 after nine years of work by the United 

Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and 

came into force in 1994 after the 60th country ratified the 

treaty. To date, 158 countries have ratified the Convention, 

but the United States has not yet done so, although it helped 

shape the Convention and signed the 1994 Agreement on 

Implementation. 

The Convention is crucial in regulating navigation in 

the Arctic waters, particularly in the Northwest Passage. 

According to the Convention, each country can extend its 

sovereign territorial waters to a maximum of 12 nautical 

miles (22 km) beyond its coast, but foreign vessels are 

granted the right of innocent passage through this zone, as 

long as they do not engage in hostile activities against the 

coastal state. The Convention also endorses a new concept of 

‘transit passage,’ which is in fact a compromise that combines 

the legally accepted provisions of innocent passage through 

territorial waters and freedom of navigation on the high seas. 

The concept of transit passage retains the international status 

of the straits and gives all countries the right to unimpeded 

navigation and flight over these waters that the world’s naval 

powers insisted on. The only conditions that have to be 

satisfied by vessels or aircraft in transit passage are observing 

international regulations on navigational safety and civilian 

air-traffic control, as well as proceeding without delay except 

in distress situations and refraining from any threat or use of 

force against the coastal State. 68 

However, the Convention is not perfect and tends to be 

slightly outdated, as critics point out its lack of clarity in some 

aspects. For example, the Convention does not expressly 

provide the right to submerged transit through international 

straits by submarines, which might mean that all submarines 

in transit passage have to surface to reveal their presence. 

Some international lawyers argue, however, that this right 

can be deduced from the provisions of the Convention, 

particularly from Article 39, which specifies common duties 

of vessels in transit passage. The article says that vessels 

exercising their right of transit passage shall ‘refrain from any 

activities other than those incidental to their normal modes 

of continuous and expeditious transit.’ 69 Most experts agree 

that, since submarines are by definition underwater vehicles, 

submerged passage is by definition the ‘normal mode’ of 

such craft. 70 Most experts affirm that the proceedings of the 

Convention and circumstances of the conclusion of the 1982 

Treaty seem to unquestionably confirm the interpretation 

given above. 71 Therefore, navigation through the Northwest 

Passage should be free and unencumbered if it is to be 

considered as an international strait. However, Canada 

regards the Passage as part of its internal waters, which is 

rejected by several countries and has led to several incidents. 

Such problems are usually resolved on the basis of subsequent 

bilateral treaties between the countries concerned, but some 

voices are being presently raised suggesting that it might be 

the time for a specific treaty regime for the Arctic. 

Another aspect of the militarization of the Arctic to 

which the Convention on the Law of the Sea is relevant is 

the issue of territorial claims in the region. According to 

the Convention, all coastal states can establish exclusive 

economic zones extending up to 200 nautical miles (370 km) 

within which they can exercise their sovereign rights over 

both the waters and the seabed. Furthermore, a country’s 

sovereign territory may be extended depending on how 

far the continental mass extends out under the ocean, if 

the outer boundaries of this so-called continental shelf 

are precisely defined and documented. 72 The Convention 

employs the definition of continental shelf adopted by the 

International Law Commission in 1958, which defined the 

continental shelf to include ‘the seabed and subsoil of the 

submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of 

the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters, or, beyond that 

limit, to where the depth of the adjacent waters admits of 

the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.’ 73 

Exact cut-off lines are determined by a number of factors, 


Disarmament and International Security 14 

14

such as the structure of the ocean floor, sediment thickness, 

and ocean depth. Problems arise when these factors are 

a matter of dispute, as it is the case with the Lomonosov 

Ridge, where determining whether this geological 

formation is part of the continental shelf of Canada, Russia, 

or Greenland is crucial to establishing which country has 

sovereign rights over the seabed around the North Pole. 74 

To control claims extending beyond 200 nautical miles, or 

to handle conflicting claims, the Commission on the Limits 

of the Continental Shelf was established. The Commission 

considers evidence data submitted by coastal states and 

makes recommendations to the United Nations. 

From its very conclusion in 1982, 

the UNCLOS was not considered 

a final treatment of the Law of the 

Sea, but rather a ‘sea constitution’, 

intended to provide an essential 

framework for future solutions. 

The UNCLOS was supposed to 

serve as a basis for dealing with a 

myriad of legal issues that would 

arise in drafting more specific, 

regional treaties. Nowadays, some 

experts and politicians call for a 

new Arctic treaty, modeled on the 

Antarctic agreement. 

The Ilulissat Declaration 

In May 2008, representatives of the five coastal States 

bordering on the Arctic Ocean – Canada, Denmark, 

Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States of 

America – met at the political level in Ilulissat, Greenland, 

to hold discussions about the future of the Arctic region. 

The result of these discussions was the Ilulissat Declaration, 

adopted on 28 May 2008, which presents the common 

position of the five Arctic states in regards to climate change, 

maritime safety, and sovereign rights in the area. One major 

objective of the Declaration, accepted by nations gathered at 

the conference, was the blockage of any ‘new comprehensive 

international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.’ 75 

The parties of the Declaration confirmed that the Law of 

the Sea Convention, along with the International Maritime 

Organization and the Arctic Council, form the core of 

the regime that governs the Arctic, and that within the 

framework of this regime the five Arctic states recognized 

their responsibility to manage activities in the region, 

including both development and environmental protection. 76 

In the Declaration, the five nations also pledged to ‘remain 

committed to this legal framework and to the orderly 

In the Declaration, the five 

nations also pledged to 

‘remain committed to this 

legal framework and to 

the orderly settlement of 

any possible overlapping 

claims.’ 

settlement of any possible overlapping claims.’ 77 

The consequences of the Declaration were twofold. In 

reaffirming the role of the existing international law in 

governing the issues concerning the Arctic, the signatories 

also recognized that other states would participate in 

development and protection of the Arctic, through the 

international Maritime Organization, the Arctic Council, 

and other relevant international forums. However, the 

Declaration also made it clear that there will be no 

negotiation of an alternative regime for the Arctic Ocean 

that would be contrary to the provisions of the UNCLOS. 78 

Proposed Solutions 

An Arctic Treaty 

With the Arctic ice melting, 

an increased interest in 

the Arctic’s natural resources and 

navigation, and a recent phenomenon 

of many nations piling up arms and 

planting flags in the region, calls have 

emerged for a comprehensive Arctic 

Treaty to govern the ‘lawless’ Arctic 

region. Many non-governmental 

organizations and some politicians 

are arguing for an international 

agreement that would adopt a legal 

framework for dealing with issues 

such as polar oil and mineral exploration, commercial activity, 

maritime security, navigation and environmental regulation. 

Such an agreement could be achieved under the auspices of 

the United Nations and could replace the United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea as the primary piece of 

legislation concerning the Arctic region, being modeled after 

the Antarctic Treaty of the early 1960s. In the same way as 

the Antarctic Treaty does, an Arctic Treaty could set aside the 

Arctic as a scientific preserve and ban all military activity in that 

area, while freezing all territorial claims. Proponents of a new 

Arctic Treaty believe that such an agreement could facilitate 

arranging for sustainable development of Arctic resources, 

developing shipping shortcuts through the northern passages, 

setting technological standards for ships that navigate the icy 

waters and guarding the welfare of the more than one million 

indigenous people living within the Arctic Circle. 79 

On the other hand, many governments, including the major 

Arctic powers, are strongly opposed to establishing another 

treaty regime in the Arctic and believe that the UNCLOS and 

other existing international law provides a comprehensive set 



of rules governing use of the world’s oceans, and is sufficient 

to govern the Arctic region as well. The argument follows 

that since the situations in the Arctic and the Antarctic are 

hardly analogous – the Antarctic is a continent surrounded by 

oceans, while the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by continents 

– similar rules of suspension of claims to sovereignty cannot 

be applied. It is argued that the Arctic Ocean is already subject 

to international legislation, and that it has already been divided 

up, so few territorial disputes can emerge. The parties that 

oppose establishing a new treaty for the Arctic believe that 

in instances where the maritime claims of coastal nations 

overlap, international law sets forth principles for them to 

apply in resolving their disputes. 80 These actors customarily 

regard Russia’s planting of flags on the North Pole seabed as 

‘a symbolic act of no legal standing or material consequence,’ 81 

and they believe the real challenge in regulating the Arctic is 

the execution of the existing rules, rather than adopting new 

ones. 

Alternatively, those who believe the entire Arctic Ocean 

should be divided into national sovereignty zones present 

two major ways of delimitating the territory. One is ‘the 

sector method,’ which would divvy up the region by drawing 

lines south to the countries involved, using the North Pole 

as the centre, like slicing up a pie. Another way would be 

to divide the Arctic waters between countries according 

to the length of their nearest coastline to the Pole. Either 

way, a comprehensive and multidimensional international 

agreement would be necessary to legitimize such a novel 

solution, which could well be achieved by the General 

Assembly of the United Nations. 

Arms Limitations 

Even if a political Arctic treaty should not be adopted, 

there is still a possibility of establishing an arms 

limitation agreement for the Arctic region. Although such 

an agreement is likely to be a regional one, global input is 

necessary as an objective voice of how demilitarization of 

the Arctic can assure that there would be no conflict in the 

area, which could potentially spread to the rest of the world. 

A successful implementation of strong confidence-building 

measures could help significantly reduce the need for Arctic 

countries to guard their national interests in the region 

with the use of military power. For example, an extensive 

cooperative surveillance system could be established for the 

area, in which many states could work together to assure that 

there are no national security risks for any nation. A naval 

arms limitation agreement could thus be adopted, and also 

include terms establishing a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in 

the Arctic Ocean, to prevent any unnecessary tensions in the 

region. Furthermore, global agreements could be concluded 

concerning the safe usage of the Northern Passage. Such an 

agreement should be prepared as an effect of a consensus 

building process with participation of both the major Arctic 

powers and other nations interested in creating a stable 

policy system for the Arctic. Several national needs should 

be taken into account when drafting such a treaty to ensure 

its subsequent ratification. For example, if such agreements 

were to be acceptable for Canada, they would need to contain 

solutions to the potential problems of trafficking of drugs, 

arms, and illegal immigrants to the Canadian territory. 

Key Actors and Positions 

Russian Federation 

The Arctic region is of crucial significance to the country’s 

economic and strategic interests. In the first aspect, the 

Russian Arctic areas are an effective engine for the nation’s 

economy, producing 11% of Russia’s GDP and 22% of GDP 

growth, and representing a crucial resource base: up to 

80% of Russia’s discovered industrial gas potential. In the 

strategic aspect, the Arctic gives Russia an access to three 

oceans, and its military bases there are crucial for protecting 

the country’s extensive borderline. The current issues of 

concern for the Russian Federation in the Arctic region focus 

mainly on the delimitation of the boundary between Russia 

and Norway in the Barents Sea, and between Russia and 

the United States in the Bering Sea, as well as on economic 

activities in Spitsbergen’s 200-nautical mile zone and the 

other overlapping EEZ claims. 

The Russian Federation strongly opposes the 

internationalization of the Arctic. Russia’s claims to 

sovereignty rights over the areas that were the object of 

the submissions to the United Nations Committee for 

Continental Shelf are expected to continue, perhaps with new 

evidence being produced by the Russians, who believe they 

will eventually be able to back their assertions and to begin oil 

exploration in the region. As expressed in a statement by the 

Russian Security Council, outlining the government’s policy 

for the next 10 years, Russia plans to deploy special military 

forces to protect its national interests in the disputed Arctic 

region, to ‘guarantee military security under various military 

and political situations.’ 82 The government in Moscow is 

determined to consider the Arctic as crucial to Russia’s 

national security and is likely to suggest that military threats 

could be used to resolve problems that would devastate the 

balance near Russia’s borders. 



16

US and Russian spheres of interest in the Arctic area. http://www.heritage.org/research/energyandenvironmen/ 

images/b2202_map1.jpg 

Harvard WorldMUN 2012 Disarmament and International Security 17 17

The United States 

In his last days in the Office of the President, George W. 

Bush signed a presidential security directive devoted to 

the United States Arctic policy, which focused on security 

issues and the economic utilization of the oil-rich region, 

and emphasized the strategic significance of the Arctic 

for the United States in relation to the missile defense and 

early warning systems. 83 The directive states that ‘the United 

States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling 

interests in the region’, including ‘broad and fundamental 

national security interests and is prepared to operate 

either independently or in conjunction with other states to 

safeguard these interests.’ 84 It is further stated that the United 

States government will ‘take all actions necessary to establish 

the outer limit of the continental shelf appertaining to the 

United States, in the Arctic and in other regions, to the fullest 

extent permitted under international law,’ 85 which practically 

means that the United States is entering the scientific and 

military race for sovereignty over parts of the Arctic. The 

policy also addressed the energy development in the Arctic 

region and its important role in meeting the growing global 

energy demands, but does not present an aggressive program 

for economic development. 86 

The Obama administration supports the United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea, with the United States 

Secretary of State Hilary Clinton known to be its strong 

proponent. The Obama administration also indicated its 

commitment to ratifying the Convention. The United States 

government emphasizes the necessity of international 

cooperation and stresses the role of the Arctic Council. 

However, the United States does not wish to empower the 

Arctic Council to deal with Security issues, and believes it 

should stay neutered and operate within its limited mandate. 

The United States has also always supported the need for 

freedom of navigation in the Arctic Ocean, emphasizing that 

its vessels have the right of international navigation both 

through the Northwest Passage and through straits along 

the Northern Sea Route, which may be a potential point of 

tension with Canada. 

Canada 

The Canadian government, headed by Prime Minister 

Stephen Harper, emphasized that the ‘northern strategy’ 

played an important role in its foreign policy. On the 

occasion of announcing the creation of two military bases 

in the Canadian Arctic, Stephen Harper remarked that his 

country has only two choices regarding its position in the 

Arctic: ‘either we use it or we lose it.’ He then continued: ‘and 

make no mistake, this government intends to use it. Because 

Canada’s Arctic is central to our identity as a northern nation. 

It is part of our history and it represents the tremendous 

potential of our future.’ 87 To underline the determination 

of Canada to maintain its sovereignty in the Arctic, Harper 

also announced that eight patrol vessels would be built and 

deployed in this region. 88 

Canada regards the calls from the United States and the 

European Union for freedom of navigation in the Arctic as 

an attempt to question the Canadian jurisdiction regarding 

navigation and safety in the Northwest Passage. Canada sees 

the Passage as part of its internal waters and claims that it 

should be regulated by Canadian national law. Another 

issue of dispute between Canada and the United States is 

the question of delimiting the border in the Beaufort Sea. 

Canada, following the path taken by the other Arctic nations, 

is also planning to launch a survey of its continental shelf in 

the fall of 2009, to determine where Canada can claim its 

sovereign rights. 89 

Norway 

Norway differs from its Nordic neighbors, Finland and 

Sweden, because it is the only Scandinavian country to 

have direct access to the Arctic region. Norwegian territories 

in the high Arctic include the Svalbard archipelago and the 

island of Jan Mayen in the Norwegian-Greenland Sea. 90 

In consequence, Norway’s Arctic focus is devoted mainly 

to issues such as resource management, the environment, 

and maritime transport, uncommon for other European 

countries. Norway considers the United Nations Convention 

on the Law of the Sea an important set of rights and 

obligations concerning issues related to the Arctic Ocean, 

such as the delineation of the outer limits of the continental 

shelf, protection of the marine environment, and freedom 

of navigation. 91 Norway is also committed to developing 

the Arctic cooperation further, within the framework 

of the mandate of the Arctic Council, and welcomes the 

EU’s involvement in Arctic governance. On the issue of 

militarization, Norway is aware of Russia’s increased military 

presence in the Arctic region, and observes with concern 

Russian bombers flying near the Norwegian coast. Its air 

space monitoring, conducted within the NATO framework, 

is aimed at preventing the Russian Federation from viewing 

the area as part of the home ground for Russian bombers. 92 

Denmark 

The Danish government published its detailed policy 

on the Arctic in a 44-page document in May 2008, 

taking account of Greenland’s interests and position within 



18

the Danish kingdom. 93 Danish interests in the region are 

manifold and concern both the eastern and the western side 

of Greenland, which is the nearest coastline to the North 

Pole. Denmark argues that the Lomonosov Ridge is actually 

an extension of Greenland and attempts to prove it through 

several scientific expeditions, such as LORITA-1 and 

LOMROG. 94 Denmark has a territorial dispute with Canada 

over the status of the Hans Island in the Kennedy Channel, 

but it is generally very supportive of Arctic cooperation 

and actively participates in the works of the Arctic Council. 

Furthermore, Denmark is the only Nordic country that is a 

member of both the European Union and the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization – although this does not apply to 

Greenland – and thus it could successfully play an important 

role as a bridge between many camps in the United Nations 

General Assembly. 

The European Union 

Europe seems to be making steps towards joining the race 

for the Arctic’s vast natural resources, declaring for the 

first time that the oil and gas reserves from the region could 

play a role in enhancing the European Union’s energy security. 

In March 2008, the European Commission published a 

paper spelling out Europe’s interests in the Arctic’s energy 

resources, fisheries, new shipping routes, security concerns 

and environmental perils, in what was called ‘the first step 

towards an EU Arctic policy.’ In the document, the European 

Commission highlighted the security threats for Europe as 

result of the melting Arctic ice, and mentioned the opening 

up of new waterways and international trade routes, as well as 

the changing geostrategic dynamics of the region due to the 

increased accessibility of enormous hydrocarbon resources. 

The Commission said that ‘exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbon 

resources and the opening of new navigation routes can be 

of benefit’ and that the aim was to ‘keep the right balance 

between the priority goal of preserving the environment and 

the need for sustainable use of natural resources including 

hydrocarbons.’ 95 The European Union decisively opposes the 

idea of a new Arctic treaty – as the European Commission 

communication puts it, ‘The full implementation of already 

existing obligations, rather than proposing new instruments 

should be advocated.’ 96 With three member states – Denmark, 

Finland, and Sweden – bordering the Arctic, the EU also said 

it wanted a permanent observer status on the Arctic Council, 

in order to further its interests alongside the United States, 

Russia, Canada, Norway, and Iceland. 

Relevant Partners 

Probably the most important partner in determining 

the shape of the future status of the Arctic region is the 

Arctic Council, which is an intergovernmental forum formed 

by the eight Arctic countries: Canada, the United States, 

Russia, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, and Finland, to 

deal with political and social issues facing the region. The 

Council employs a significant number of experts who serve 

as advisors to national governments and who could help 

settle the debate over the Arctic in its proper framework 

in the United Nations General Assembly. Furthermore, 

although the decisions and formal documents of the council 

are non-binding, they usually represent consensus policies 

of its members – the most prominent actors on this arena 

– and thus constitute an excellent reference point for future 

discussions. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could also 

serve as an important player on this issue, given its statutory 

aim of ensuring the safety of its members and providing them 

with means of collective defense in case of a hostile action 

by an external party. Five Arctic countries are members of 

the NATO – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and the 

United States – and the Organization treats the region as 

one of immense significance for the security of its members, 

and thus the NATO attempts to expand its presence in the 

Arctic Ocean by creating military bases there. Therefore, the 

NATO is an important actor to be considered when making 

decisions about the future of the region. 

Several other non-governmental organizations are capable of 

providing crucial expertise in areas related to the question 

of militarization of the Arctic, for example in regards to 

natural resource exploration, global warming and its effects 

on navigation, etc. Furthermore, more scientifically-oriented 

NGOs could offer advice in regard to the geotectonic status 

of some parts of the Arctic, which could prove a valuable 

objective voice in the consideration of national claims to 

sovereignty over these areas. 

Questions a Resolution Must Answer 

Should the United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea remain as the single source of international 

legislation concerning the Arctic region, or is there a 

need for a new, region specific international agreement: 

an Arctic Treaty? 



19

How should claims for territorial sovereignty rights in the 

Arctic region be handled? Should priority be given to 

the past claims, or should any new claims be accepted? 

What should be the status of the Arctic Ocean? Should 

it be regarded as international waters in its entirety, 

or should any national restrictions be considered 

legitimate? 

What should be done in regards to military presence in 

the Arctic? Should any particular nations be allowed to 

station weapons in the Arctic? 

What can further actions can the international community 

undertake to ensure peace, environmental stability, and 

security in the region? 

Suggestions for Further Research 

As the Arctic is becoming an important focus of attention 

in the spheres of international relations, natural resource 

economy and most importantly international security, news 

on the developments in the region are frequently published 

in the world’s many mass media. Therefore, a good way of 

making sure you are well informed about the ongoing updates 

on the issue is to follow a couple of major international news 

services, such as the BBC or the CNN, perhaps by looking 

through their websites once in a while. The same applies 

to the many printed news sources, such as the Times, The 

Guardian, Le Monde, Der Spiegel, or the New York Times, 

whose online archives can provide information about the 

developments from the past 20 years, which is very difficult 

to obtain from scholarly publications. The Guardian’s website 

even has a special regional section devoted solely to the 

Arctic, which can offer the reader a comprehensive overview 

of the many issues concerning this area. 

“...5 kg of pure U-235 

could make a very 

powerful atomic 

bomb equivalent to 

several thousand 

tonnes of dynamite.” 

Another excellent and reliable source of recent information is 

the United Nations Foundation’s e-mail news service: the UN 

Wire. Upon subscription (http://www.smartbrief.com/un_ 

wire/), you will be provided with daily e-mail news briefings 

covering the United Nations and the world, including 

regional updates, also concerning the Far North. In addition 

to this, there are several international bodies, which devote 

their activity to monitoring the Arctic Ocean, and often 

touch upon issues like the international status and stability 

of the region. This includes several non-governmental 

organizations, but also some high-level intergovernmental 

forums such as the Arctic Council, which publishes its 

research online. 

When it comes to scholarly texts, the recent nature of the 

escalation of interest in the Arctic after a period of relative 

indifference – at least from the military perspective – implies 

that most publications on the issue were written before the 

end of the Cold War. The few most recent books could be 

rather hard to access, but there are definitely a couple that 

could deepen your research. I would personally recommend 

Arctic Politics, The Arctic: Choices for Peace, and Security 

and Negotiating the Arctic, because of their specific focus on 

the problems that our committee will be touching upon. 

t o p I c A r e A B: s A f e g u A r d I n g n u c l e A r 

m At e r I A l s 

History and Discussion of the Problem 

Nuclear Advancements 

The branch of science often referred to as nuclear 

physics and the corresponding issue of nuclear energy 

trace back to the turn of the 20th century, when the first 

discoveries in atomic radiation, atomic change, and nuclear 

fission were made. Ionizing radiation was discovered by 

Wilhelm Rontgen in 1895, and was later investigated and 

developed by scientists such as Marie Curie-Sklodowska, 

Henri Becquerel, Ernest Rutherford, Niels Bohr, Enrico 

Fermi, and Albert Einstein, among many others. By 1939, it 

was clear that fission not only released a lot of energy but 

that it also produced additional neutrons which could cause 

fission in other uranium nuclei and possibly a self-sustaining 

chain reaction leading to an enormous release of energy. 97 

This realization sparked activity in many laboratories, 

and the final piece that made the idea of a fission bomb a 

plausible project was added in 1939 by Francis Perrin: this 

was the concept of the critical mass of uranium required 

to produce a self-sustaining release of energy. Scientists in 



some countries, especially Britain, Germany, Russia and the 

United States, began pressuring their governments to make 

use of this immense strategic opportunity, quoting as in 

the Frisch-Peierls Memorandum to the British government 

that an amount of about 5 kg of pure U-235 could make a 

very powerful atomic bomb equivalent to several thousand 

tonnes of dynamite. 98 As further discoveries were made that 

provided evidence proving the enormous potential of the 

nuclear design and that achieved further advancements in 

regards to conceptualizing the process of construction of 

a nuclear bomb, the project began attracting the attention 

of the American government. What eventually swayed the 

cabinet of President Roosevelt to the idea of pursuing a 

nuclear weapons program was a popular suspicion that Nazi 

Germany was conducting one too. The final decision was 

made after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and America 

entered the war directly in December 1941. 

The Trinity atomic bomb test, culmination of the 

Manhatten Project, July 16, 1945. http://www.cfo.doe. 

gov/me70/manhattan/images/Trinity.jpg 

The Manhattan Project 

The result of the Anglo-American scientific cooperation in 

the nuclear field was the Manhattan Project, established 

under the supervision of the United States Army. Fullscale 

reactors were constructed to produce weapons-grade 

plutonium, together with heavy water plants designed to 

fabricate neutron moderators for the chain reaction process. 

A team led by Robert Oppenheimer worked at Los Alamos 

in New Mexico on the design and construction of both 

uranium and plutonium bombs and this huge effort yielded 

successful results in mid-1945 when 

the first nuclear bomb was finished 

and tested. The military aspect of the 

program was soon effectuated; in 

August 1945 both the uranium and 

the plutonium bombs were dropped 

on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 

Manhattan Project officials, including Dr. Robert J. Oppenheimer (white hat) 

and General Leslie Groves, inspect the detonation site of the Trinity atomic 

bomb test.. http://static.howstuffworks.com/gif/manhattan-project-7.jpg 

respectively. It became clear that 

a line in the military technology 

was crossed and that from then on, 

there was no return. In 1949, the 

Soviet Union tested its first nuclear 

bomb, based largely on the Nagasaki 

one, and a slow but persistent 

process of nuclear proliferation was 

initiated. Subsequent countries – the 

United Kingdom, France, China, 

India, Pakistan, and North Korea 

– have since produced and tested 

nuclear weapons of their own while 

some others are believed to either 



also possess nuclear 

weapons, like Israel, or 

to be conducting their 

own national nuclear 

weapons programs – for 

example Iran. 99 

withdrawal cases like 

that of the North 

Korea and has proven 

insufficient. 

The Nuclear Non- 

Proliferation Treaty 

and its Breaches 

After the adoption 

of the Non- 

Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT) in 1970, further 

described in the ‘Past 

International Actions’ 

section, which included 

provisions on nuclear 

disarmament and nonspreading 

of nuclear 

military technology, 

there have been 

several breaches of 

its non-proliferation 

clauses. Two of them 

are already history: 

Libya’s development of 

a nuclear program was 

discovered through 

intelligence and 

solved through strong 

diplomacy, while that 

of Iraq was discovered 

and terminated as a 

result of the 1991 Gulf War. Furthermore, India, Pakistan 

and Israel are non-signatories and are all believed to have 

a nuclear weapons capability. 100 Since these states are not 

signatories of the NPT, the international community does 

not have any monitoring system to control the nuclear 

activities of these states. The treaty has also failed to stop 

the black market nuclear trade centering on a Pakistani 

scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, whose proliferation scheme 

of nuclear weapons technology to Iran and North Korea 

was exposed early in 2004. 101 Nuclear Energy 

Production 

The first nuclear 

reactor to produce 

electricity, albeit a 

trivial amount, was the 

small Experimental 

Breeder reactor (EBR-1) 

in Idaho, in the United 

States, which began 

operating in December 

1951.102 In 1953 

President Eisenhower 

proposed his ‘Atoms for 

Peace’ program, which 

reoriented significant 

research effort towards 

electricity generation 

and set the course for 

civil nuclear energy 

development in the 

United States.103 

The first commercial 

nuclear reactors started 

operating in the 1960s 

Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear 

in the United States, 

weapons defense systems. http://prempanicker.files.wordpress. the United Kingdom, 

com/2009/09/aq-khan-time1.jpg 

Canada, France, and in 

the Soviet Union. After 

a period of stagnation in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the 

new century brought a revival of prospects for nuclear 

power, due to several reasons: the realized scale of projected 

increased electricity demand worldwide, the awareness of 

the importance of energy independence and the growing 

concern about carbon emissions and global warming.104 

North Korea’s announcement 

Nuclear Terrorism 

The threat of nuclear terrorism has existed for several 

decades, but it seems to have significantly escalated in 

that it was withdrawing from the treaty, which implied the recent years. This is due to several factors, which can be 

departure of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) divided into two groups: on the and on the demand side. 

inspectors and an open road for the country to pursue a On the supply side, it is obvious that nuclear technology is 

nuclear weapons program has been the biggest crisis in the being constantly spread around the world, even in view of 

history of the Treaty. The Treaty has no means to deal with the numerous anti-proliferation efforts by the international 



community. Apart from the original five nuclear powers 

from the Non-Proliferation Treaty: United States, Russian 

Federation, United Kingdom, France and China, several 

other countries, including India, Pakistan, Israel, North 

Korea, have either confirmed the fact of having developed 

nuclear weapons, or are widely believed to have done so. 

The greater number of countries with nuclear arsenals is not 

the direct reason for the increased nuclear terrorism risk, but 

the levels of protection of these weapons and their related 

materials as well as the attitudes of some governments 

towards international terrorism pose significant threats to 

the international security. To mention only a few examples, 

Russia continues to deploy several of its most portable 

nuclear weapons on its front lines, where their security is 

severely reduced; these weapons are considered as the most 

attractive to terrorists, according to Senators Richard Lugar 

and Sam Nunn, authors of the Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Program. 109 Furthermore, new investigations have revealed 

unauthorized sales of sensitive nuclear technology by 

Pakistani nuclear scientists supportive of fundamentalist 

ideology, which raises doubts about the security of this 

country’s nuclear arsenal. 110 

Nuclear materials that could potentially be used in fabricating 

a nuclear bomb are even a greater cause of concern. Hundreds 

of tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Russia 

and some former Soviet Republics have astoundingly little 

or no protection, making them easy targets for extremely 

well organized and determined terrorists. Several reactors 

throughout the world still use highly enriched, weaponsusable 

uranium, very attractive to the nuclear terrorists; 

even some fissile material stocks stored in the United States, 

under seemingly much greater security measures, may be 

vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of numerous proven 

flaws in their protection. 111 

Naturally, the most significant threat to international nuclear 

security is constituted by the so-called predator states, 

which are believed to possess nuclear weapons or at least to 

conduct active nuclear weapon programs. These states may 

not want to be associated with nuclear attacks, but assisting 

and equipping nuclear terrorists might present an attractive 

way of pursuing their aggressive foreign policy plans. For 

example, if the Iranian President’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 

plans of ‘wiping Israel from the pages of history’ are to be 

considered serious and representative of the government’s 

policy, which are both, however, highly dubious, then 

equipping terrorists with nuclear arms might hypothetically 

seem to be a relatively sensible way for Iran to pursue this 

plan. Even if it would not completely eliminate the risk of 

retaliation from either Israel or one of its nuclear allies, the 

risk would be greatly reduced and Iran’s involvement would 

be much harder to prove. 

The Nature of the Threat 

The crucial reason for protecting nuclear materials is the 

threat of their usage in conducting terrorist attacks. 

Nowadays, terrorist organizations are extremely well 

organized and effectively financed, which opens completely 

new, appalling possibilities of operation. Nuclear terrorism 

is commonly being defined by diving it into four faces:112 

I. A theft and detonation of a ready-made nuclear 

weapon (INW – Intact Nuclear Weapon), 

II. A theft or purchase of fissile material and the 

subsequent fabrication and detonation of a 

crude nuclear weapon (IND – Improvised 

Nuclear Device), 

III. An acquisition of nuclear materials leading to 

the fabrication and detonation of a ‘dirty bomb’ 

(RDD – Radiological Dispersion Device or 

RED - Radiation Emission Device), 

IV. An attack on a nuclear facility, with the sole 

intention of causing a release of large amounts 

of radioactivity. 

The fourth method does not require any nuclear acquisition 

by terrorists and resembles conventional terrorism both 

in its methods and related measures of prevention. ‘Dirty 

bombs’ – conventional explosives coupled with radioactive 

materials – also resemble conventional arms rather than 

nuclear weapons in the requirements of their fabrication, 

delivery and detonation in the target area. Naturally, they 

include nuclear materials, but these are only radioactive 

materials that have no fission potential anymore and can 

only serve dispersing dangerous radiation and no nuclear 

energy in the target area. The level of protection of these 

materials is quite different from the usual security standard 

of fissile materials in respective countries; furthermore, the 

methods of acquisition and detonation of such bombs would 

be significantly different. 113 

There are four general key stages of a nuclear terrorist 

attack. 114 Each stage is simultaneously a condition that must 

be fulfilled for the act to be performed; should any link in the 

chain be spoiled, the whole plan would be unsuccessful: 

(1) A terrorist extreme group with sufficient resources 

– human, financial and other – must be formed, 



23

and it must decide to engage in an act of nuclear 

terrorism. 

(2) The group must obtain a nuclear weapon or fissile 

material or other radioactive material and adapt it 

for its specific purposes: bypass any safeguards in 

an INW; fabricate an IND or an RDD. 

(3) The terrorists must deliver the weapon to its desired 

target. 

(4) The weapon must be detonated. 

These seemingly obvious stages provide a framework for an 

analysis of the opportunities open to terrorists and constitute 

a basis for designing a comprehensive, layered defense. Today, 

probably no one believes that any measure of prevention can 

be one hundred per cent successful; therefore, the threat 

of nuclear terrorism can only be addressed by reducing 

the risk of success for terrorists on each successive step. At 

WorldMUN 2012, our committee will focus on designing 

solutions to prevent the second step of the above process 

(acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials) from being 

completed by a terrorist group. 

Nuclear Weapon Designs 

At this point, it seems worthwhile to look at two possible 

nuclear weapon designs – the gun-assembly and the 

implosion types – and to mention a few words about both 

of them before analyzing the feasibility of their fabrication 

by non-state actors. 

Nuclear weapons are based on the process commonly known 

as the chain reaction. When a neutron is projected into a 

uranium nucleus, one of the three possible results can be 

observed: it will be absorbed, scattered, or will induce fission. 

The latter situation initiates a chain reaction, by splitting the 

nucleus into smaller pieces and releasing new neutrons and 

energy – these neutrons induce subsequent fissions, and as a 

result, additional releases of energy. This energy release can 

constitute an explosion. Two additional crucial things need 

to be added to this description. First, neutrons that strike 

different isotopes of uranium have different probabilities of 

inducing fissions – those that hit U-235 are much more likely 

to do so than those that strike U-238, which can additionally 

be captured by U-238 and disappear completely. Therefore, 

using the former isotope of uranium is much more efficient 

in sustaining the chain reaction – for this reason, uranium 

with large fractions of U-235 is called highly-enriched and is 

generally considered weapons-grade. The other thing to note 

is that there is a specific configuration of uranium that prevents 

the reaction from ceasing prematurely – otherwise, neutrons 

can escape through the surface of uranium, thus failing to 

The nuclear fission process releases enormous amounts of energy. http://web.mit.edu/nrl/www/reactor/fission.jpg 



induce subsequent reactions. This specific size and shape of 

uranium is called critical, while any configuration that fails 

to sustain a chain reaction is called ‘subcritical.’ Therefore, 

both the enrichment and the criticality requirements must 

be satisfied for a nuclear device to have a successful yield. 

The general consensus among nuclear scientists and 

experts is that fabricating a gun-assembly weapon by nonstate 

actors is not trivial, but definitely not impossible. The 

National Academy of Sciences asserts in its report: ‘Crude 

HEU weapons could be fabricated without state assistance.’ 116 

There are, certainly, several obstacles to be overcome by 

such groups. Apart from the most significant difficulty of 

acquiring a sufficient amount of highly enriched uranium, 

which will be addressed below, there are some challenges 

connected to this particular weapon design. Obtaining 

an appropriate gun would not probably pose a significant 

obstacle – a commercially available conventional artillery 

piece could be used; however, the group would need to test 

the gun at least once using some kind of uranium, which 

involves a probability of detection. 117 A more significant 

challenge could be posed by the need to reshape the uranium 

– in case the material acquired by the group was not critical 

in its current form. Some experts assert that ‘the methods of 

casting and machining nuclear materials, can be described in 

a straightforward manner, but their conduct is most unlikely 

to proceed smoothly.’ 118 

Gun-Assembly Design 

The most common type of nuclear weapons is the socalled 

gun-assembly design. Simply put, it involves 

bringing two subcritical pieces of uranium together to form 

a supercritical piece, 

which subsequently 

produces neutrons 

and releases energy; 

since one piece (the 

bullet) is usually fired 

at another (the target), 

this design is called the 

gun-type. The yield of a 

gun-assembly nuclear 

weapon depends on the 

degree of supercriticality 

of the system when the 

chain reaction occurs: 

a premature neutron 

emission can expedite 

the chain reaction, thus 

reducing the energy 

released. Therefore, to 

maximize the yield, 

one must ensure that 

the bullet speed is 

high enough, while 

maintaining the neutron 

emission at a possibly low 

level. Highly-enriched, 

weapons-grade uranium 

is characterized by very 

low neutron emission. 115 

Gun-assembly type of nuclear bomb. http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 

nol/shared/spl/hi/sci_nat/05/nuclear_fuel/img/gun_trigger2_ 

bomb300.gif 

Others claim that 

‘uranium can be cast 

and heat treated in 

conventional vacuum 

melting furnaces 

and machined using 

conventional machine 

tools.’ 119 In any case, 

it seems reasonable to 

conclude that this can 

be done, but it does 

not necessarily mean 

that it is easy or likely 

to succeed. 120 It seems 

that now the question is 

not whether each of the 

successive steps on the 

path to nuclear weapons 

can be achieved, but how 

likely it is to be achieved 

by non-state actors. 

The final challenges 

are generated by the 

difficulties connected to 

developing an initiator 

and a tamper, which can 

both maximize the weapon’s yield or reduce the amount of 

uranium necessary to obtain criticality, but both of these 

designs are optional and could be completely ignored by 

terrorists. 121 

Implosion Design 

The other type of a nuclear weapon is referred to as 

the implosion design. It typically uses weapons-grade 

plutonium – WGPU, composed mainly of the isotope 

Pu-239 – instead of uranium. By its nature, plutonium 

has much higher neutron emission levels, which has 



important consequences for the probability of detection 

of an implosion bomb, that will be addressed later, and 

therefore it is not feasible to use the gun-assembly design to 

make it supercritical: even at extremely high bullet speeds, 

chain reactions would be initiated before the material gets 

significantly supercritical, therefore hampering a successful 

yield. For this reason, plutonium is normally used only in 

the implosion design – it involves surrounding a subcritical 

shell of WGPU with chemical explosives arrayed to produce 

a symmetrical inward-moving (implosion) shock wave, 

compressing the material enough to be supercritical.122 

There exists a heated debate among experts about whether 

non-state actors could fabricate an implosion weapon. 

Some scientists consider such a possibility. 123 Others – like 

Robert Galluci, the Dean of the School of Foreign Service 

at Georgetown University, disagree. 124 It is often pointed 

out that Iraq’s nuclear weapon scientists required several 

years to obtain an effective implosion-type nuclear weapon 

design. 125 One consensus shared by most experts is that 

developing an implosion weapon would be extremely, 

and maybe even prohibitively, difficult relying solely on 

theoretical calculations. Such an enterprise would most 

probably require several experimental tests, which might 

in turn prove deterring for any groups, in view of the costs 

and the risk of detection. It is worth noting, however, that 

very few definite conclusions about the new developments 

concerning implosion-type designs can be reached without 

classified information. 126 

Terrorists would probably avoid attempting to construct 

an implosion-type nuclear bomb, and would rather try to 

develop a gun-assembly device in view of the differences in 

difficulty of construction, reliability, and risks in favor of the 

latter. On the other hand, they would not necessarily have to 

produce a weapon with a maximum possible yield. If only a 

subcritical mass of uranium were available, some terrorists 

could well consider fabricating a crude implosion-type 

weapon and conducting an attack with such a device, even 

sacrificing much of the potential yield. It would still have a 

considerable value in terms of provoking nationwide fear by 

just being a nuclear weapon, therefore convincing terrorists 

that it could potentially lead to fulfilling their demands; this 

argument seems to be validated by the popular response to 

the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 or the Fukushima 

disaster in 2011, which both caused nation- and region-wide 

fear. 127 

The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism: Weapon 

Acquisition 

Non-state actors can obtain nuclear weapons in several 

different ways – all of them can be attributed to one 

of the two categories: either by acquisition of an intact 

nuclear weapon, or by fabrication of a crude nuclear device 

using fissile material. Both of these ways involve very 

similar ranges of scenarios, in which an organization would 

need to obtain the necessary resources and knowledge. 

These scenarios include a deliberate transfer by a national 

government, an unauthorized assistance from senior 

officials or custodians of nuclear weapons, a seizure without 

insider help, or a downfall of government or a political 

unrest in an unstable state.128 In any of these scenarios, 

terrorists could be able to gain access to nuclear weapons, 

either directly or indirectly. 

Complicity of a National Government 

Potentially the easiest but also the least probable way 

for nuclear materials to get into the hands of nonstate 

actors would be through complicity of a national 

government. The only governments that could be suspected 

of even considering such an option would be the ‘predator 

states’ that have access to nuclear technology. In this 

category, most experts include Iran, which openly supports 

the fundamentalist Islamic international terrorism and 

is believed to have acquired at least some knowledge 

and resources necessary to build a nuclear weapon, 

even though no supporting evidence has been found so 

far by the International Atomic Energy Agency; North 

Korea, which has a long history of selling strategic arms, 

especially missiles, to the highest bidder129 and is known 

to have tested nuclear weapons130; and Pakistan, where the 

leading figure in nuclear weapons program, A. Q. Khan, 

has admitted providing Iran, Libya, and North Korea with 

nuclear material for their nuclear armament programs.131 

Although it remains unclear whether or not the government 

of Pervez Musharraf was complicit in the transfers, it was 

at least indifferent to the question of the final destination 

of the country’s nuclear developments.132 By leaking out 

nuclear materials, more aggressive states could count on 

achieving their foreign policy aims without inflicting the 

risk of imminent retaliation should they decide to use their 

nuclear arsenals in an offensive war. On the other hand, 

‘problem states’ are normally dictatorships, so their leaders 

might in fact be reluctant to relinquish their control inside 

the country, and therefore they may not be eager to transfer 

nuclear weapons to any groups.133 



26

Here, however, a distinction 

should probably be made 

between transferring intact 

weapons or nuclear materials. 

While some governments can 

be suspected of transferring 

nuclear materials to non-state 

groups, it seems that none 

of them would be willing to 

transfer intact weapons. This is 

because of the risk of retaliation 

- tracing the flow of materials 

is virtually impossible, while 

a missing nuclear weapon 

in a country’s arsenal would 

immediately raise serious 

suspicions by the international 

community. 134 On the other 

hand, a threat of an imminent 

overthrow and regime change 

could potentially convince 

some of the most desperate 

government leaders to resort 

to such reckless measures. 

This argument is only strengthened by the possibility of 

an internal chaos in a country possessing nuclear arsenals, 

which could be at least equally perilous. The most significant 

danger seems to exist in Pakistan and North Korea. In the 

former, there have been several violent clashes between the 

various political groups and the nature of the government 

of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani seems to be far from 

stable; this is best proven by the relatively recent assassination 

attempt on him on 3 September 2008. 135 In North Korea, the 

economic collapse and impoverishment seems likely to lead 

to political instability and significant reduction in security of 

the country’s nuclear arsenal. Therefore, any solutions to the 

problem of safeguarding nuclear materials have to include 

provisions for political instability. 

Unauthorized Assistance 

Another possible way for nuclear materials to leak out is 

through unauthorized assistance: from a senior state 

official or from custodians of nuclear storages. If Mr. Khan 

and Mr. Musharraf are to be trusted, then the former has 

succeeded in transferring the country’s nuclear resources 

without the government’s knowledge. Similar possibilities 

cannot be ruled out in the case of North Korea, although 

the country’s clandestine system of division of power 

precludes definite judgments. Furthermore, if lower- 

Russian Topol inter-continental ballistic missiles pictured during a rehearsal 

for the nation’s annual May 9 Victory Day parade. http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/ 

pix/2008/08/28/article-0-0271899900000578-384_468x286_popup.jpg 

level officials and custodians of nuclear storages are to 

be considered, the list of endangered countries may well 

expand and contain even Russia or Ukraine, where experts 

point out that the low levels of protection and accounting of 

nuclear weapons and materials can create strong economic 

incentives for poorly-paid arsenal overseers to consider 

collaborating with the highest bidders. In countries such 

as Iran, incentives could also be of ideological or religious 

nature. Again, however, one should consider that ‘problem 

states’ are often dictatorship regimes; according to this line 

of argument, those just below the top level of authority 

would most probably not be granted access to the country’s 

nuclear arsenals.136 

Infiltration of a Nuclear Facility 

Finally, nuclear resources could be acquired by nonstate 

organizations without insider help. This would 

require significant preparations and infiltration of the 

target’s security measures, but it seems far from impossible. 

In case of weapons, it would obviously be much more 

difficult and riskier, but most probably it could hardly deter 

the extremely well organized and determined modern 

terrorists. According to experts, Russia can serve as an 

example in this matter – due to its huge number of bombs 

and relatively loose measures of security, compared to the 



other nuclear states, it seems to be an attractive target. In a 

US General Accounting Office report published in March 

2003, several gaps in security of Russian nuclear weapons 

were identified and, even if there have been significant 

improvements made since then,137 several risks still exist. 

This is further exacerbated by Russia’s invariable tendency 

to locate its most portable nuclear weapons on its front 

lines, where they are most exposed to capture attempts.138 

It is impossible to analyze the security measures for 

protecting nuclear arsenals in all nuclear states, but it seems 

enough to note that even in the United States, which seems 

to devote much attention to the safety of its own weapons, 

several reports have suggested vulnerabilities at several of 

its nuclear weapons facilities.139 Therefore, even if a theft 

of intact nuclear bombs cannot be definitely proclaimed as 

feasible, such an option cannot be decisively ruled out. 

The situation is even more appalling in the case of nuclear 

materials. More than 130 research reactors in more than 

40 countries still use HEU as their fuel, and most of these 

facilities have very modest measures of protection – no 

more than a night watchman and a chain-link fence. 140 

Similar reactors are present not only in the least developed 

countries; six of them are reportedly on US university 

campuses. 141 It is, therefore, not surprising that security 

measures in reactors in countries such as Russia present 

significant concerns; as noted by one US official visiting 

the Kurchatov Institute, 160 pounds of weapons-grade 

uranium was stored in lockers secured only by chain 

through the handles of the lockers, and only 20 per cent of 

these research facilities were secured by even the most basic 

electronic monitoring systems. 142 Such minimal security 

measures present an attractive opportunity for terrorists, 

and make acquisition by them of nuclear weapons a highly 

feasible option. 

Weapon Delivery: Military Technology 

Once a nuclear bomb has been acquired by a terrorist 

organization, the second and no less difficult phase 

of the enterprise begins: the process of delivering the 

bomb to the target and of detonating it. It seems that the 

military methods of delivery of nuclear warheads, such as 

gravity bombs, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, etc., are 

probably far from the reach of any terrorist organization. 

This view seems justified if one considers the newly-nuclear 

or potentially-nuclear states, such as Iran or North Korea, 

and their significant problems with acquiring any military 

means of transporting nuclear weapons. It would be 

unreasonable to think that any terrorist organization could 

overcome these difficulties without assistance of a major 

nuclear power; and in case of obtaining such assistance, 

the enterprise could no longer be considered terrorism. 

Apart from that, almost any major target for terrorists in 

the Western world would be successfully protected by antimissile 

shield systems, which would effectively prevent any 

attempt by terrorists of striking their targets. Similarly in 

case of gravity bombs, dropped from airplanes, no country 

would allow a suspicious plane to enter its airspace, and no 

gravity nuclear bomb could be possibly taken aboard an 

airplane from a trusted airport. Finally, it is highly unlikely 

that any terrorist organization in possession of a nuclear 

weapon would take the risk of referring to such hazardous 

methods of delivery when easier possibilities are open – its 

supply or nuclear weapons would be strictly limited and 

the organization would be completely compromised after a 

single failed attempt. 

Smuggling at Point Border Crossings 

Point border crossings, as contrasted to lines, are 

single spots on a country’s border which are open to 

international traffic, and include land border checkpoints, 

airports, seaports, etc. They are characterized by large 

volumes of traffic, of which most is legal, so the task of 

national customs and border protection agencies is to 

keep the legal crossings open to legal flow of goods, while 

remaining closed to any illegal items – in this case nuclear 

weapons or materials. The measures of detection currently 

used against nuclear smuggling are the following: traditional 

gamma rays and x-ray-type imaging, physical inspection, 

and neutron activation. The latter means sending a burst 

of neutrons into an item to cause fission upon striking e.g. 

uranium-235, which in turn would release other neutrons 

and energy; any neutrons coming back would be highly 

suspicious, while the gamma rays produced would allow 

identification of the isotope because they would possess 

unique sets of energies.143 These measures are far from 

perfect; one must remember that, as stated before, most 

nuclear weapons have very low neutron emission levels; at 

least this is true for HEU; WGPU has significantly higher 

emission rates. 

Two tests conducted by ABC News in September 2002 

and 2003 illustrate how significant a challenge it is for 

border protection officials to detect an attempted nuclear 

smuggling. 144 In both cases, the reporters successfully 

smuggled a 15-pound cylinder of depleted uranium into the 

United States to verify whether the border protection was 

efficient, using no elaborate means of detection prevention, 

apart from just simple shielding. 145 Although CBP (US 



28

Customs and Border Protection) and some critics argued 

that DU was not a good surrogate for HEU because of lower 

detection signal, experts have shown that they could have 

easily shielded the same mass of HEU to produce similar 

detection signal. 146 This shows that the United States border 

protection, and probably those of several other countries, 

may be insufficient to prevent nuclear terrorism, even if the 

deterrent effect might be sufficient. 

biggest ones are even 396 meters in length and can carry 

500,000 deadweight tons of oil 151 , which greatly reduces the 

chances of detection of the bomb within the tank. The size 

of a super tanker and the thickness of the steel preclude 

successful use of x-ray-imaging, while the volume of oil and 

its neutron absorption properties - deuterium or tritium 

would be formed of the hydrogen atoms in oil - would make 

neutron activation virtually useless. 152 On the other hand, 

detonating a nuclear weapon inside an oil tanker would 

pose a significant challenge, but would probably be far from 

impossible. 

Cargo Shipping 

Another scenario is smuggling a nuclear weapon in one 

of the several 

thousand million 

cargo containers that 

are shipped around 

the world each year, 

and whose size would 

easily allow shipping a 

nuclear weapon from 

a foreign port and 

transporting it within 

the country by rail or 

truck. 147 Even security 

measures such as the 

Container Security 

Initiative, which 

allows CBP agents 

to screen containers 

already at certain 

foreign ports so the 

foreign agents inspect 

the containers that 

seem suspicious, 148 

may be circumvented 

by terrorists if they 

acquire a trusted 

company to avoid 

suspicion, falsifying 

manifest data or 

infiltrating the CSI ports. 149 Furthermore, a nuclear weapon 

could be shipped from a non-CSI port and be detonated at 

a destination port before having been inspected. This would 

have very serious consequences for the world economy, 

which is highly dependent on the container traffic. Such 

an event would most likely cause many countries to 

immediately close their ports, thus bringing the global 

economy to its knees. 150 Current Situation 

Nuclear Weapons 

The accumulated 

threat posed by 

the estimated 27,000 

nuclear weapons in 

the United States, 

Russia, and the other 

Non-Proliferation 

Treaty nuclear 

weapons states, merits 

worldwide concern. 

Similar results could be achieved 

by using an oil tanker to transport a nuclear weapon. The 

153 

It is common to 

divide the process of 

proliferation of nuclear 

weapons into three 

waves of increasing 

level of threat. The 

first one, consisting of 

the United Kingdom, 

France, and China 

is often considered 

tolerable as the 

original group of 

Several thousand million cargo containers are shipped around the five nuclear weapon 

world each year. http://www.sustainabilityninja.com/wp-content/ 

states, including 

uploads/2009/02/cargo-ship-pollution.jpg 

also the United 

States and Russia, 

is characterized by stable political systems. According 

to this view, the second wave was already undesirable, 

because nuclear weapons were acquired by India, Pakistan 

and, probably, Israel – countries that claim that they are 

seriously endangered by terrorist acts and which might 

find it difficult to effectively protect their arsenals. These 

states could not be held responsible for violating the Non- 

Proliferation Treaty because they had never been parties 

to it. The third wave of proliferation, which included Iraq, 


Iran, Libya, and North Korea is commonly seen as a mortal 

danger and has met with a much more forceful reaction 

by the international community. 154 In addition to these, 

any country that currently possesses nuclear enrichment 

facilities is technically able to produce materials that 

could be used in the production of weapons if intercepted 

by terrorists – this issue concerns for example Japan and 

Brazil. It seems unjustified, however, to suggest that nuclear 

weapons in possession of some states pose no threat, while 

in the hands of others they place the world in mortal 

jeopardy: governments change and all of them can act 

either sensibly or irresponsibly, and levels of protection of 

nuclear arsenals vary. Ultimately, while existing nuclear 

arsenals and stockpiles of fissile material represent the most 

immediate concern, the spread of nuclear weapons and 

material has increased the probability of terrorists acquiring 

or constructing a nuclear device. 155 

The Current Shape of Nuclear Terrorism 

Nuclear terrorism, as contrasted to chemical and 

biological, is currently at a very early stage and 

probably mainly encompasses assessing the possibilities 

of using Radiological Dispersion Devices (RDD or dirty 

bombs) by terrorists. This is proved by several intelligence 

reports and recent cases of revealing of terrorist plans. In 

2001, two Pakistani scientists were arrested on accusations 

of transmitting technical knowledge on the design and the 

construction process of a dirty bomb to Al-Qaeda. 156 The 

plan involved using conventional explosives to detonate a 

used part of a fuel system of a nuclear reactor to disperse 

radioactive material around the target area. The United States 

military also found RDD blueprints in Afghanistan after 

having overthrown the Taliban regime in that country. 157 

Evidence of terrorists’ interest in other forms of possible 

nuclear weapons also exists. In November 2001, the CNN 

came into possession of a 25-page Al-Qaeda document 

entitled ‘The Super bomb,’ which was written in Arabic 

and concerned the design of an Improvised Nuclear Device 

(IND). 158 While both documents can be characterized by 

rather superficial display of technical knowledge of the 

issue, it shows the terrorists’ established interest in this type 

of activity. 159 

Nuclear terrorism in its present shape is also very closely 

related to attempts to capture radioactive materials, 

especially radiologic ones. The territories of some 

Caucasian and Central-Asian states constitute an area 

where several small-scale cases of smuggling of nuclear 

materials have been proved, and there exists an evidence 

base that Al-Qaeda has tried to purchase such radioactive 

materials from smugglers or to obtain it from other Islamic 

terrorist groups operating in the region. 160 Some facts also 

suggest that some Chechen terrorist groups have displayed 

interest in acquiring nuclear materials: the Russian army 

has discovered storages of radioactive materials in Chechen 

camps at several occasions. 161 The Chechens have already 

attempted to conduct an attack following the ‘dirty bomb’ 

scheme: they buried a large radioactive parcel near the 

entrance to one of Moscow’s biggest and most heavily used 

public parks – the Izmailovsky Park - in 1995. 162 In 2002, 

a Brooklyn-born convert to Islam was accused of plotting 

to detonate a ‘dirty bomb’ in the United States, but these 

charges were later dropped as an investigation revealed 

that he had been planning to destroy two skyscrapers with 

just conventional explosives. 163 Other plans discovered by 

investigators, however, reveal that planning a use of nuclear 

materials is not alien to modern terrorists. 

Controlling the Production of Enriched Uranium and 

Plutonium 

Most contemporary nuclear power reactors use as fuel 

uranium enriched to some 4%, which is produced in a 

technically difficult process that may also allow enrichment 

to levels suitable for use in nuclear weapons – 85% or 

more. 164 Therefore, technically any enrichment plant can be 

used for the production of bomb-grade material and it is 

only a matter of political will – or terrorist interception – to 

do so. It is for this reason that many governments express 

concerned about Iran’s development of uranium enrichment 

capacity. Intense diplomatic efforts have been under way 

to induce the Iranian government to terminate or defer its 

nuclear plans. A further risk is being posed by the current 

state in the global energy market, with fuel prices expected 

to continue rising – once the economic crisis is over – and 

the growing concern about greenhouse gas emissions. This 

is likely to increase the global reliance on nuclear energy, 

which implies a growing demand for uranium fuel leading 

to the construction of more enrichment and reprocessing 

plants. This increased flow of fissile material is likely to 

aggravate the risk of misuse and diversion. 165 

Past UN Actions 

The Non-Proliferation Treaty 

Adopted in 1970, the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is 

the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. 

The treaty was based on the common understanding by many 

countries that more fingers on nuclear triggers would results 

in a more dangerous world and, therefore, it was beneficial 

Harvard WorldMUN 2012 Disarmament and International Security 30

The Three Mile Island nuclear facility in Pennsylvania - 

a potential target? http://www.astrosurf.com/luxorion/ 

Physique/plant-three-mile-island.jpg 

for all states to reduce the nuclear threat by restricting access 

to military nuclear technologies. The original deal involved 

a resolution by non-nuclear weapon states not to pursue 

military nuclear program, and a commitment by the five 

nuclear states – USA, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and 

China – to conduct nuclear disarmament. 171 These states 

were chosen based on the credential that they acquired 

nuclear facilities before 1970s. All parties also agreed to 

share peaceful nuclear technologies between themselves 

to facilitate non-military uses of nuclear power. Further 

provisions ensured that parties to the agreement entered 

into safeguard commitments to the International Atomic 

Energy Agency and promised to exercise control over their 

nuclear-related exports: the Safeguards Agreement. 172 The 

NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995, following decisions 

on its principles and objectives for non-proliferation and 

disarmament, and a resolution to strengthen its review 

process. 173 At present, only four countries in the world are 

not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty: India, Israel, 

North Korea, and Pakistan. 174 

Despite its wide international appeal, the Non-Proliferation 

Treaty suffers from four general groups of problems that 

hinder its proper role. In fact, the NPT is the weakest 

of all international agreements concerning weapons 

of mass destruction in regards to its provisions about 

implementation. 175 The first group relates to the failure to 

make progress towards nuclear disarmament by the nuclear- 

weapons states. Nuclear tests were still conducted by the 

five powers for at least another 20 years after the NPT was 

adopted, 176 and presently all five states still maintain their 

nuclear arsenals and continue to develop new nuclear 

weapons. The second set of problems concerns the many 

breaches of the treaty by the originally non-nuclear states, 

such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Iran that were not 

faced with any strong consequences, which created the risk 

of inducing a domino effect. Thirdly, the example of North 

Korea illustrates the lack of response measures to a country’s 

withdrawal as a party to the treaty. The only provision 

to address such cases was included in Chapter 2, which 

states that any notice of withdrawal must be brought to the 

attention of all other parties and the United Nations Security 

Council (UNSC), which will determine whether the planned 

withdrawal constitutes a threat to the world peace and the 

appropriate international response that should be adopted. 177 

If the UNSC fails to respond in a strong enough manner, 

it may encourage others to follow suit and also withdraw 

from the NPT. Finally, the last problem is of entirely 

technical nature – the lack of any provision for a standing 

secretariat of the Treaty to assist the parties in implementing 

the treaty has proven ineffective. 178 At least one reform to 

the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be easy to conduct – 

its states parties should establish a standing secretariat to 

handle administrative matters, organize the treaty’s review 

conferences and their preparatory committee sessions, as 

well as other meetings to consider cases of possible noncompliance 

or withdrawal. 

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts 

of Nuclear Terrorism 

In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly 

addressed the issue of nuclear terrorism by adopting the 

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 

Nuclear Terrorism. The 191-member UN General Assembly 

unanimously approved the Convention, which provided 

that all party states would domestically criminalize all 

acts of nuclear terrorism and obligated them to cooperate 

internationally in the prevention, investigation, and 

prosecution of acts of nuclear terrorism. 179 Specifically, the 

treaty criminalized the possession or use of radioactive 

materials or a nuclear device ‘to cause death or serious bodily 

injury,’ to damage property, to pollute the environment, or 

to attack a nuclear facility. 180 These legal provisions ensured 

that governments would amend national laws to prevent 

terrorists and their supporters from financing, planning, 

or participating in nuclear terrorism, and that the share 

of information, extradition proceedings, and criminal 

prosecution of individuals linked to such acts would be 


facilitated. 181 The treaty obtained a broad support base 

when an agreement on language of the treaty was struck 

after members of the 57-nation Organization of the Islamic 

Conference were assured that the treaty would not be used 

to impose a generic definition of terrorism. 182 According 

to many experts, however, although the Convention is 

a welcome agreement and a step in the right direction, it 

offers no decisive solutions to the problem. 

Physical Protection 

The various measures of physical protection of nuclear 

weapons, materials and facilities refer to the controls 

designed to prevent sabotage, thefts, and other attacks. 

While all nuclear states have their own domestic laws and 

procedures to maintain physical security of such items, 

there have also been several international efforts and 

agreements to improve their standards of protection. The 

United Nations adopted the Convention of the Physical 

Protection of Nuclear Material in 1979, which provides for 

certain levels of physical protection during international 

transport of nuclear material and establishes a general 

framework for cooperation among states in the protection, 

recovery, and return of stolen nuclear material. 183 The 

International Atomic Energy Agency prepared a set of 

Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles 

in 2001, and has since issued several resolutions on 

Measures to Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism and has also 

The International Atomic Energy Agency sends its inspectors to nuclear 

facilities around the world. http://gstaadblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/iaea. 

jpg 

assisted states through its International Physical Protection 

Advisory Service. 184 The United Nations Security Council 

expressed its support for the increased efforts to strengthen 

the physical protection of nuclear weapons and materials 

in its Resolution 1540, which obligated all states to ‘develop 

and maintain appropriate effective physical protection 

measures.’ 185 It seems that the current system of international 

supervisions by the IAEA is relatively effective, and it is now 

an issue of ensuring compliance rather than of developing 

new multilateral rules. 

Proposed Solutions 

In view of the growing concern over the safety of nuclear 

materials, there is no single measure that can assure a 

100% certainty of success. A response should be based on 

the scheme called ‘layered defense,’ reflecting the idea that 

stealing nuclear materials would involve many steps from 

acquisition to transportation, and that attempting to thwart 

such attempts at each step has a higher likelihood of success 

than trying to block one step only. Whether this layered 

defense is an overarching strategy, or simply a name given to 

what would happen anyway as many agencies with different 

capabilities contribute in the ways each is able to, or a bit of 

both, is another matter. 190 In any case, there are four general 

categories of programs that are in place in order to prevent 

nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands. 

Efforts to Secure HEU Worldwide 

and Threat Reduction Programs 

Highly Enriched Uranium is still 

being widely used in reactors 

around the world, many of which 

are shockingly poorly guarded. This 

is an issue of particular concern, 

because obtaining these extremely 

dangerous materials is very valuable 

for terrorists, second only to 

acquiring an intact nuclear device. 

So far, however, the efforts to secure 

stocks of HEU worldwide have been 

largely ad hoc rather than part of a 

comprehensive plan. For example, 

projects Sapphire (1994) and Vinca 

(2002) reportedly removed HEU 

from poorly guarded research 

reactors in Kazakhstan and Serbia, 

respectively. 191 Several programs 

are in place with the objective of 

attempting to achieve a clean-up of 


stocks of HEU worldwide. For example, the Global Threat 

Reduction aimed to secure both used and unused Russianorigin 

HEU supplies, and to convert the cores of civilian 

research reactors using HEU to be able to use uranium with 

lower-enriched uranium which would not be applicable 

in a nuclear bomb. As mentioned before, however, these 

efforts are prevalently unilateral and mono-national, and 

thus such programs should be established through closer 

international cooperation, especially in the United Nations. 

An important specific aspect of the problem that 

should be addressed by the United Nations is the issue 

of handling of former Soviet nuclear weapons and 

materials. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United 

States has established several nuclear disarmament 

programs, such as the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction 

Act of 1992, also known as the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, 

authorizing the United States Department of Defense to 

assist the Russians in the destruction of Soviet nuclear 

weapons. In addition, the United States also funds 

numerous non-proliferation programs to secure nuclear 

materials from the Soviet era, including the Cooperative 

Threat Reduction program, the International Nuclear 

Materials Protection and Cooperation and Elimination 

of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production, 192 and the 

United Nations should join in strengthening these efforts. 

In addition to nuclear materials, it is crucial to secure 

sources of knowledge in the field of nuclear weapons 

production, which is especially important in the former 

Soviet Union states where several experts reside whose 

knowledge can be dangerous if acquired by terrorists. It 

is important, therefore, to ensure safety of these scientists 

and to provide them with grant funding for research on 

non-nuclear projects. One idea would be to establish 

international scientific institutes run by the United 

Nations through its numerous agencies in countries such 

as Russia or Ukraine. 

Another unavoidable issue in this area is the problem of 

security of Iran or North Korea’s nuclear facilities, and 

decisive diplomatic measures should be attempted to obtain 

agreements for international inspectors, e.g. from the IAEA, 

to inspect them. International guidance and assistance can 

be crucial in ensuring that terrorists do not gain access to 

these arsenals. 

Control of Borders 

International assistance is necessary to ensure that 

nuclear materials do not leak through the borders of the 

countries already involved in nuclear research. The already 

existing programs, such as the Second Line of Defense 

and the Export Control and Related Border Security 

Assistance should be strengthened with more international 

participation and a new comprehensive program could be 

created under the auspices of the United Nations to assist 

member states in their efforts to make their borders safe 

from nuclear trafficking. International cooperation is 

needed to ensure that current less-than-perfect methods of 

detection of nuclear materials, such as x-ray-type imaging, 

physical inspection, and neutron activation, are improved 

and that new methods are developed. For example, the 

United Nations, through one of its agencies, e.g. the IAEA, 

could establish programs deploying radiation monitors at 

strategic transit and border crossings, as well as airports 

and seaports throughout the world. 

Container Security Initiative 

Shipping containers account for 90 percent of all world 

cargo, and an annual total of 9 million are offloaded in US 

ports only. 193 A significant risk exists that nuclear materials 

could be smuggled via this mode of transport. Therefore, 

it is beneficial for all nations to reduce this threat by 

cooperating in establishing security measures in the world’s 

shipping industry, by developing a network of inspections 

that would effectively screen containers at all ports around 

the world before they are shipped. With this in mind, the 

Container Security Initiative was established in 2002 and is 

currently operational in 34 ports, with another 13 possible, 

where host countries’ border security officers work together 

with international inspectors in ensuring that all traffic is 

being properly inspected and that suspicious containers 

are detected and subjected to control. By participating in 

this mostly American program, the United Nations could 

ensure greater international coverage and could provide 

more resources at its disposal. 

Proliferation Security Initiative 

The Proliferation Security Initiative started in 2003; by 

2005, 60 states were already party to the agreement. 

The participants seek to interdict sea or air shipments of 

weapons of mass destruction or their related materials to 

or by states of ‘proliferation concern’ trying to acquire or 

transfer such items. 194 Thanks to the multinational nature 

of the program, shipments can be interdicted not only at 

participating countries’ ports, but also in their national 

waters and airspace, and even on the high seas. According 

to press reports, the first interception under the PSI took 

place in 2003 when a Libya-bound cargo of a German ship, 

with thousands of parts for special centrifuges for enriching 


uranium, was confiscated. 194 

Fuel-Cycle Proposals 

While growth in nuclear power 

will take time, and the 

existing global capacity for uranium 

enrichment and reprocessing is 

enough to meet the needs arising from 

a considerable expansion, 196 some 

designs are needed to ensure a safe 

and steady supply of nuclear fuel in 

the future to match the rising number 

of reactors. One proposal would be to 

impose a moratorium of a few years 

on the construction of new facilities 

for the enrichment or reprocessing of 

uranium to ensure that appropriate 

standards for international control 

of such facilities are developed. 197 A 

system could be designed under the 

supervision of the United Nations 

and the IAEA under which nuclear 

facilities of this kind would be built 

in a compromise-based location, so 

that all states could buy low-enriched 

nuclear fuel at market prices. In this 

internationally-managed project, 

all states – both producers and 

consumers – would participate in 

the marketing process by deciding 

on prices. A somewhat similar 

scheme – The Global Nuclear Energy 

Partnership (GNEP) – was advanced 

in 2006 by the United States and was 

discussed with the United Kingdom, 

France, Russia, China, India and 

Japan. 198 Under this scheme, a limited 

number of countries would produce 

nuclear fuel and then ‘lease’ it to other 

states, accepting it back later on for 

reprocessing. This would serve the 

two purposes of both reducing the 

amount of nuclear waste, which is 

North Korea’s nuclear programme remains an issue of international 

controversy. http://neoavatara.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/ 

northkoreaimage1.jpg 

dangerous for the environment and 

Key Actors and Positions 

could be intercepted by terrorists for use in the production 

of a dirty bomb, and constituting a disincentive for many 

states from building enrichment plants of their own. 

North Korea 

North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985, and in 1992 

its long-delayed safeguards agreement with the IAEA 

entered into force and IAEA inspections started. In the same 

year, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the 


Korean Peninsula was signed, in which North Korea and its 

southern neighbor agreed not to develop nuclear weapons 

and not to possess uranium enrichment facilities. 199 A few 

years later, however, IAEA’s safeguard inspections revealed 

that North Korea must have produced more plutonium than 

it had declared, which prompted North Korea to announce 

its intent to withdraw from the NPT. 200 In 1994, after USorganized 

negotiations, North Korea signed an Agreed 

Framework declaring a freeze to its nuclear program, an 

acceptance of IAEA’s inspectors and rejoining the NPT. 

By 2005, however, it became clear that North Korea had 

been secretly developing its nuclear capabilities, which was 

confirmed when the country’s government claimed being 

in possession of nuclear weapons. 201 In 2009 North Korea 

conducted another nuclear test and it became clear that 

North Korea has become a ‘fully fledged nuclear power,’ 

according to several experts, including the IAEA’s director 

Mohamed ElBaradei. 202 North Korea maintains that its 

nuclear weapons program is being conducted as part of 

the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent solely for 

self-defense, and refuses to abandon its program or to allow 

IAEA inspectors into its nuclear facilities. 

Iran 

Iran has a long-standing tradition of developing its nuclear 

capability by enriching uranium without reporting this 

activity to the IAEA. Iran’s government firmly asserts that its 

efforts are intended only to give the country an indigenous 

source of low-enriched uranium fuel for its planned nuclear 

power plants, and rejects any accusations that Iran intends to 

use these capabilities to produce highly-enriched uranium 

to develop nuclear weapons. 203 The Iranian government 

believes that concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation 

are pretextual, and international calls for suspension of 

enrichment are simply intended to ultimately deprive Iran 

of the right to have an independent nuclear technology, and 

thus maintains that its right to peaceful nuclear technology 

is inalienable. Iran is likely to object to any attempts to 

prevent it from possessing enrichment plants of its own, 

stating that it cannot simply trust the United States or 

Europe to provide Iran with nuclear energy fuel. 

United States 

The United States supports international cooperation 

among sovereign states, manifested by parallel or joint 

action towards common goals on a domestic or international 

level, accompanied by corresponding developments in 

treaty-based and UN-conceived international law. 204 The 

United States government spearheaded the Global Initiative 

to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and supported the adoption 

of several UN resolutions addressing the issue, including 

the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts 

of Nuclear Terrorism. America’s extensive involvement in 

addressing the issue of safeguarding of nuclear materials 

is undeniable and is best displayed by its relentless efforts 

in promoting international systems of prevention from 

nuclear threats, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. 

However, the United States government is highly suspicious 

of the role of international bureaucracies in achieving 

objectives of global importance, which is one of the main 

reasons it dislikes the International Criminal Court, and for 

this reason it might be reluctant toward any solutions that 

would emphasize the role of such instruments. 205 The United 

States is also deeply involved in guaranteeing nuclear nonproliferation, 

and is one of the strongest critics of the North 

Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. At the same time, the 

American government tends to refrain from taking a strong 

diplomatic stance against some other countries involved in 

nuclear proliferation – such as Pakistan – because of their 

role in the war on terrorism. 

Russia 

Since its political transformations after the fall of the Soviet 

Union, the Russian Federation has been extensively 

involved in securing the former-Soviet nuclear arsenals and 

material to prevent undesirable individuals from getting 

access to them, for example through its active support of 

the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program 

from 1992. It was the government of president Yeltsin that 

proposed a treaty to prevent rogue terrorists from getting 

their hands on nuclear material from insecure facilities 

spread across the former Soviet Union, which resulted in 

the adoption of the Convention for the Suppression of Acts 

of Nuclear Terrorism by the General Assembly seven years 

later. The Russian Delegation to the United Nations was also 

one of main authors of several international agreements on 

preventing nuclear terrorism, such as the Global Initiative 

to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In regards to Iran’s nuclear 

program, Russia has maintained that is no evidence that 

Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, 206 and has been 

reluctant to accept any drastic measures of response. Russia’s 

attitude to the North Korean nuclear weapons program 

is significantly different, and the Russian government has 

taken a stance of strong condemnation of North Korea’s 

nuclear tests. 207 


Arab League 

All member states of the Organization of the Islamic 

Conference are committed to responding to the 

Iranian nuclear program by preaching ‘full respect for 

equal and inalienable rights for all nations to explore 

modern technologies including nuclear energy for peaceful 

purposes.’ 209 

European Union 

Nuclear threats are a matter of special concern for 

the European Union because of the high level of 

nuclearization within the EU’s borders. Therefore, the 

European Union is fully committed to fighting against 

the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as to 

safeguarding its nuclear materials, which is practically 

demonstrated by the active implementation of the 

Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD adopted 

on 12 December 2003 by the European Council. 210 The 

Strategy contains a number of measures to prevent, deter, 

halt, and possibly eliminate proliferation programs that 

cause concern at the global level. In particular, it stresses 

that non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control 

can contribute significantly to the global fight against 

terrorism by reducing the risk of non state actors gaining 

access to weapons of mass destruction, radioactive 

materials, and means of delivery. 211 As expressed in 

the EU statement in support of the Global Initiative 

to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the European Union 

and its Member States are committed to fulfilling their 

obligations under international law and frameworks, 

notably the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 

Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical 

Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, 

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 

1540. 212 

Relevant Partners 

The International Atomic Energy Agency is probably the 

most prominent international institution dealing with 

issues such as nuclear safety, non-proliferation, and threat 

reduction. The Agency’s programs seek to promote peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy and to inhibit its application for 

military purposes. The IAEA’s experience in the field and 

its highly-developed system of safeguards and procedures 

guarantee that the Agency’s advice would be helpful in 

designing a comprehensive response to the issue of nuclear 

terrorism. 

International Crisis Group is an international nongovernmental 

organization whose mission is to prevent 

and resolve deadly conflicts around the world through 

field-based analyses and high-level advocacy. 213 The ICG 

can offer advice to the United Nations General Assembly 

on the possible measures for safeguarding nuclear 

materials, based on its field-based analyses. In the past, 

the International Crisis Group has presented valuable 

and detailed proposals for a way forward in looking for a 

solution to the proliferation problems, and it is expected 

to continue having a very significant direct impact on the 

prevention and resolution of this problem. 

Several other non-governmental organizations can 

provide valuable inputs into the works of the Disarmament 

and International Security Committee debating the 

issue of safety of nuclear materials. Organizations like 

the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, which was founded 

for and noted for its opposition to nuclear weapons, 

or the Global Policy Forum, which has offered some 

new strategic thinking on the issue of Iran’s nuclear 

program, can be valuable in regards to their aggressive 

and unbiased advocacy of the common interest in global 

safety. Other, more scientific NGOs can also be helpful 

in providing some technical information on the safe 

storage, transportation, and usage of nuclear materials. 

Questions a Resolution Must Answer 

How can member states strengthen cooperation and 

collaboration to reduce the global concern over 

nuclear materials? 

What international standards should be adopted/ 

reformed by the United Nations to assist member 

states in protecting their nuclear arsenals and 

stockpiles of nuclear materials? 

What can the United Nations and its agencies do to 

secure HEU worldwide? 

Should any international schemes be established 

under the aegis of the United Nations to provide 

member states with an opportunity to buy nuclear 

fuel and to discourage individual enrichment 

programs? 

What additional measures can be adopted to secure 

the world cargo shipping in regards to nuclear 

safety? 


How can the United Nations ensure that member 

states do not violate its non-proliferation rules? 

Suggestions for Further Research 

Given the nature of the issue of nuclear safety – the fact 

that it is more of a potential problem whose harbingers 

are hardly prominent enough to be reported by mass media 

– it is difficult to obtain updates on the issue by just reading 

news columns in newspapers and on websites. Some useful 

articles can be found in the online archives of the world’s 

leading news sources such as TV news channels, e.g. BBC, 

CNN, ABC, and newspapers, e.g. The Times, Le Figaro, The 

New York Times. Some of them are based on interventionist 

journalism of the kind exhibited by ABC reporters who 

staged an attempted smuggling of a nuclear device. 

A more useful source in researching the developments in 

the area of nuclear weapons and their related materials 

can come from various UN agencies, particularly the 

International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA’s website 

provides access to a plethora of highly informative reports 

and analyses by international experts, which can not 

only make you better informed on the current situation 

but can be also useful as sources of ideas for solutions 

to the problem. The United Nations resolution database 

is another interesting source that can provide you with 

excellent information on the course of action that the 

United Nations and its various bodies have adopted so 

far regarding the issue in question. 

There are also several independent publications on the 

growing threat of nuclear terrorism, both by researchers 

affiliated with various academic institutions and 

numerous non-governmental organizations that deal 

with this issue. For example, the book ‘Weapons of Terror,’ 

published by the Stockholm-based Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Commission, contains a comprehensive 

analysis of the possible measures of response to the risk 

of nuclear terrorism. Another great resource is the 2004 

report by Harvard University’s Project on Managing 

the Atom, which investigates the prospects of nuclear 

weapons falling into the hands of terrorists in the near 

future. 

p o s I t I o n pApers 

Writing a position paper is a crucial part of your 

preparation for the conference, even though it 

hardly seems as a fun part of the entire enterprise. Your 

position paper should concisely summarize your research 

on your country’s specific policy, reflecting the stance you, 

as a representative of your government, are going to take in 

committee. Make sure to carefully research and think about 

your country’s views on the issues in question, reflected both 

through its history, alliances and contemporary interests, 

and to present them coherently as you will in committee. 

Your position paper should address both topics in their 

entirety, but with reference to the specific issues that 

the committee will be focusing on. You are advised to 

include a brief discussion of your country’s views on a 

few basic aspects of both problems. In regards to the 

Arctic: the legitimacy of national sovereignty claims, 

the international status of Arctic waters, the rights 

of countries to station weapons in the region; in case 

of nuclear terrorism: the nuclear non-proliferation, 

uranium enrichment programs, threat reduction schemes 

and international cooperation in regards to border 

control. Within these branches, you should make sure 

to specify both the current position of your country and 

the past actions that your country has taken, in addition 

to your proposed solutions to each problem. Be creative 

and do not hesitate to present a more active stance than 

your country ever has historically, but always remember 

that being on-policy should be your first priority. 

Your position paper should not exceed one single-spaced 

page; brevity is encouraged. Please use Times New 

Roman, size 12 point font. 

c l o s I n g remArks 

Congratulations on making it to the end! You are now 

more than welcome to give yourself a pat on the back, 

but please remember that this piece of writing is just a very 

general introduction to the complex issues that we will 

debate, and it certainly cannot provide you with enough 

knowledge to excel in committee. The next step is to do some 

significant research of your own, including reconstructing 

your country-specific position and conceptualizing the set 

of ideas that you are going to pursue through discussion 

and resolution-writing. Please take a serious look at the 

‘Suggestions for Further Research’ sections in both topic 

areas while planning your approach to these complicated 

and multidimensional issues. 

I am incredibly excited to meet you all in Vancouver 

next year. Let me assure you that the conference will be 

a memorable experience for each and every one of you. 

Do not hesitate to contact me to ask any questions or just 

to introduce yourself. I hope you enjoy the topic areas 

and I am sure that together we will make DISEC live up 


to its ‘First Committee’ status by being the most exciting 

committee at WorldMUN 2012! 

e n d n o t e s 

1 General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament 

and International Security, Reaching Critical 

Will website. Accessed online on 10 August 

2009 at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/ 

political/1com/1comindex1.html 

2 Ibidem. 

3 Charter of the United Nations, United Nations 

website. Accessed online on 10 August 2009 at 

http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml 

4 Arctic. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Accessed online 

on 10 August 2009 at http://www.britannica.com/ 

EBchecked/topic/33100/Arctic 

5 History of Exploration, The Columbia Electronic 

Encyclopedia, Columbia University Press. Accessed 

online on 10 August 2009 at http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0921120.htm 

6 Bob Edwards, A Brief History of Arctic Exploration. 

Accessed online on 10 August 2009 at http:// 

geography.about.com/library/misc/ucarctic.htm 

7 Ibidem. 


Encyclopedia. 

9 Arctic. Encyclopaedia Britannica. 

10 Bob Edwards, A Brief History of Arctic Exploration. 


Encyclopedia. 


13 Ibidem. 

14 E. C. H. Keskitalo, Negotiating the Arctic. (New 

York: Routledge, 2004). 26 

15 Keskitalo 27 




19 Oran R. Young, Arctic Politics. (Hanover: University 

Press of New England 1992). 162 

20 The Manhattan’s Epic Voyage, Time, 29 September 

1969. Accessed online on 10 August 2009 

at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,844952,00.html 

21 The Polar Sea, CBC Digital Archives, 29 July 

1985. Accessed online on 10 August 2009 at http:// 

archives.cbc.ca/politics/federal_politics/topics/2349-13655/ 

22 Canada and the United States: Agreement 

on Arctic Cooperation, United Nations – Treaty 

Series, 27 January 1995. Accessed online 

10 August 2009 at http://untreaty.un.org/ 

unts/60001_120000/30/4/00058175.pdf 

23 Gerd Braune, Countries Seek a Piece of Pie, Spiegel 

Online International, 23 March 2009. Accessed 

online on 10 August 2009 at http://www.spiegel. 

de/international/world/0,1518,614900,00.html 


25 Ibidem. 

26 Thomas R. Berger, Alexei Rodionov and others, 

The Arctic: Choices for Peace and Security. (West 

Vancouver: Gordon Soules Book Publishers Ltd.). 


114 

27 Young 190 

28 Berger 114 

29 Berger 114 

30 Weapons of Mass Destruction, GlobalSecurity. 

org. Accessed online on 10 August 2009 at http:// 

www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/667B. 

htm 

31 Berger 118 


33 Young 190-192 

34 Young 192-193 

35 Young 193-194 

36 Young 194-195 

37 Marsha Walton, Countries in tug-of-war over 

Arctic resources, CNN, 2 January 2009. Accessed 

online on 10 August 2009 at http://www.cnn. 

com/2009/TECH/science/01/02/arctic.rights. 

dispute/index.html 

38 Jad Mouawad, Oil Survey Says Arctic Has Riches, 

The New York Times, 24 July 2008. Accessed online 

on 10 August 2009 at http://www.nytimes. 

com/2008/07/24/business/24arctic.html?_r=1 

39 USGS Arctic Oil and Gas Report, A USGS fact 

sheet from July 2008, Geology.com. Accessed online 

on 10 August 2009 at http://geology.com/usgs/ 

arctic-oil-and-gas-report.shtml 

40 Jad Mouawad, Oil Survey Says Arctic Has Riches. 

41 Ariel Cohen, Lajos F. Szaszdi, The New Cold War: 

Reviving the U.S, presence in the Arctic. The Heritage 

Foundation, 30 October 2008. Accessed online 

on 10 August 2009 at http://www.heritage.org/ 

research/energyandenvironment/bg2202.cfm 

42 Jad Mouawad, Oil Survey Says Arctic Has Riches. 


Reviving the U.S, presence in the Arctic. 

44 Mikhail Krutikhin, Arctic Ocean Prospects, 

Kommersant, 30 May 2008. Accessed online on 10 

August 2009 at http://www.kommersant.com/ 

p897663/Expert_shares_his_view_of_possible_oil_ 

mining_in_the_Arctic_zone 



46 Anthony Browne, Melting ice starts rush for 

Arctic resources, The Times, 28 January 2006. Accessed 

online on 10 August 2009 at http://www. 

timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article721377. 

ece 

47 Philip Bethge, Climate Change Sparks Scrap for 

Arctic Resources, Spiegel Online International, 31 

March 2006. Accessed online on 10 August 2009 

at http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,409001,00.html 

48 Ibidem. 

49 Anthony Browne, Melting ice starts rush for 

Arctic resources. 

50 Philip Bethge, Climate Change Sparks Scrap for 

Arctic Resources. 

51 Marsha Walton, Countries in tug-of-war over 


52 Gerd Braune, Countries Seek a Piece of Pie. 

53 Richard A. Lovett, Russia’s Arctic Claim Backed 

by Rocks, Officials Say, National Geographinc News, 

21 September 2007. Accessed online on 10 August 


2009 at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/ 

news/pf/47871933.html 

54 Ibidem. 

55 Marsha Walton, Countries in tug-of-war over- 


56 Ibidem. 

57 Russian Strategic Bombers Patrol Arctic, 

Atlantic Oceans, Russian News and Information 

Agency Novosti, 20 June 2008. Accessed 

online 10 August 2009 at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080620/111462629.html 

58 UN Backs Norway Claim to Arctic Seabed Extension. 

Accessed online 15 April 2009. Accessed online 

10 August 2009 at http://www.calgaryherald. 

com/Technology/backs+Norway+claim+Arctic+sea 

bed+extension/1499675/story.html 



60 Russian Strategic Bombers Patrolling Arctic, 

Interfax, June 9, 2008. 

61 Rowan Scarborough, Russian Flights Smack of 

Cold War, The Washington Times, 26 June 2008. 

Accessed online on 10 August 2009 at http://www. 

washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/26/russian-flights-smack-of-cold-war/ 



63 Navy Resumes Military Presence Near Spitsbergen, 

Russian News and Information Agency Novosti, 

14 July 2008. Accessed online on 10 August 2009 

at http://en.rian.ru/world/20080714/113914174. 

html 

64 Ibidem. 

65 Russia warns of war over Arctic resources, The 

Intelligence Daily, 14 May 2009. Accessed online 

on 10 August 2009 at http://www.inteldaily.com/ 

news/165/ARTICLE/10678/2009-05-14.html 



67 Arctic Military Bases Signal New Cold War, The 

Times, 11 August 2007. Accessed online on 10 

August 2009 at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ 

news/world/us_and_americas/article2238243.ece 

68 The United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law 

of the Sea website. Accessed online on 10 August 


www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ 

convention_historical_perspective.htm 


the Sea. United Nations General Assembly. Accessed 

online on 10 August 2009 at http://www.lawofthesea.net/Konvencija/part3.txt 

70 Donat Pharand, Leonard H. Legault, The Northwest 

Passage: Arctic straits. (Boston: Martinus 

Nijhoff Publishers, 1984). 209 

71 Pharand 209 


the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law 

of the Sea website. 

73 Convention on the Continental Shelf, United 

Nations 1964. Accessed online on 10 August 

2009 at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_continental_shelf.pdf 

74 Gerd Braune, Countries Seek a Piece of Pie 

75 Ilulisat Declaration. Accessed online on 10 

August 2009 at http://www.oceanlaw.org/ 

downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf 


76 Ibidem. 

77 Ibidem. 

78 Ibidem. 

79 Scott Borgerson, An Ice Cold War, The New 

York Times, 8 August 2007. Accessed online 

on 10 August 2009 at http://www.nytimes. 

com/2007/08/08/opinion/08borgerson.html 

80 John Bellinger, Treaty on ice Arctic, International 

Herald Tribune, 24 June 2008. Factiva 

81 Norway’s Policy in the High North – the Arctic 

Dimension, Utenriks Department website, 21 January 


www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dep/politisk_ledelse/elisabeth_walaas/taler/2008/arctic_frontiers. 

html?id=497558 

82 Michael Schwirtz, Russia – Arctic Deployment 

Planned, The New York Times, 27 March 2009. Accessed 


nytimes.com/2009/03/28/world/europe/28briefsbrfRUSSIA.html 

83 Gerd Braune, Countries Seek a Piece of Pie 

84 Thomas Omestad, Bush Signs Off on New U.S. Arctic 

Policy, U.S. News, 12 January 2009. Accessed online on 

10 August 2009 at http://www.usnews.com/articles/ 

news/world/2009/01/12/bush-signs-off-on-new-usarctic-policy.html 

85 Owen Bowcott, Bush urges US to stake claim to 

Arctic territory in last-gasp energy grab, The Guardian, 

15 January 2009. Accessed online on 10 August 2009 

at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/ 

jan/15/arctic-bush 

86 Thomas Omestad, Bush Signs Off on New US Arctic 

Policy. 

87 Harper on Arctic: ‘Use it or Lose it’, Canada. 

com, 10 July 2007. Accessed online on 10 August 

2009 at http://www.canada.com/topics/ 

news/story.html?id=7ca93d97-3b26-4dd1-8d92- 

8568f9b7cc2a&k=73323 

88 Ibidem. 

89 Sheldon Alberts, U.S. supports Arctic Treaty in turf 

battled over oil riches, Edmonton Journal, 7 April 2009. 


edmontonjournal.com/Technology/supports+Arctic+t 

reaty+turf+battle+over+riches/1472398/story.html 

90 Norway, Arctic Council website. Accessed online 

on 10 August 2009 at http://arctic-council.org/member_state/norway 

91 Flat, cold and increasingly crowded: What policies 

for the Arctic?, Norway’s Mission to the EU website, 

28 January 2009. Accessed online on 10 August 2009 

at http://www.eu-norway.org/news/newsarchives/ 

arctic+policy+briefing+jan+09.htm 

92 Bjorn Bjarnason, New Arctic Policies, 4 May 2009. 


bjorn.is/greinar/nr/4944 

93 Ibidem. 

94 Lomonosov Ridge off Greenland, Geologi och 

Geokemi, Stockholmes Universitet website. Accessed 

online on 10 August 2009 at http://www.geo.su.se/ 

forsk-maringeologi-projects/lomrog-2007-2_en 

95 Ian Traynor, Europe joins international contest for 

Arctic’s resources, The Guardian, 21 November 2008. 


guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/21/arctic-energy-eu 

96 Ibidem. 

97 Outline History of Nuclear Energy, World Nuclear 

Association website, September 2005. Accessed online 

on 10 August 2009 at http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 


info/inf54.htm 

98 Frisch-Peierls Memorandum, March 1940. Accessed 

online on 10 August 2009 at http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Begin/FrischPeierls.shtml 

99 Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, 

Strategic Arms Control and Policy, October 2007 

(Arms Control Association). Accessed online 10 

August 2009 at http://www.armscontrol.org/ 

factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat 

100 Non-Proliferation Treaty explained, BBC News, 

20 September 2004. Accessed online on 10 August 

2009 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2645379.stm 

101 Ibidem. 

102 Outline History of Nuclear Energy, World 

Nuclear Association website. 

103 Ibidem. 

104 Ibidem. 

110 Charles D. Ferguson, William C. Potter, The 

Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. (New York: Routledge, 

2005). 1 

111 Ferguson, Potter 2 



114 Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, Securing the 

Bomb: An Agenda for Action, Project on Managing 

the Atom. (Harvard University, May 2004). Accessed 

online November 28, 2008 at http://www. 

nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404. 

pdf. 20-31 

115 Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism (Harvard 

University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2007). 37 

116 Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science 

and Technology in Countering Terrorism, National 

Academy of Sciences. (Washington, National Academies 

Press, 2002). 45 [Amy L. Fitzgerald, Terrorism 

and National Security. (Nova Science Publishers, 

New York 2007). 3] 

117 Levi 39 

118 Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, 

William Maraman, Jacob Wechsler, Can Terrorists 

Build Nuclear Weapons? (Nuclear Control 

Institute). Accessed online 29 November, 2008 at 

http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm 

119 Andrew Bird, Simon Anthony, Casting Uranium: 

Experimental and Modeling Capabilities, 

Discovery, 5 July 2002 [Levi 40] 

120 Levi 40 

121 Levi 43-44 

122 Fitzgerald 3 

123 Mark, Taylor, Eyster, Maraman, Wechsler, op.cit. 

(online) 

124 Robert Galluci, Dean, School of Foreign Service, 

Georgetown University, wrote: ‘I do not believe that 

al-Qaida could build a nuclear weapon with a plutonium 

core, that is, a weapon with an implosion 

design’. Personal correspondence, 26 August 2002. 


126 Ferguson p. 73 

127 Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat 

Assessment for the 21st Century. (MacMillan Press 

LTD, London 1999). 133 

128 Ferguson, Potter 55-59 


129 James Dao, U.S. Official Says North Korea Could 

Sell Bomb Material, New York Times, 5 February 

2003. [Ferguson, Potter 57] 

130 North Korea tests nuclear weapon ‘as powerful 

as Hiroshima bomb’, The Guardian online. Accessed 

online 6 August 2009 at 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/25/ 

north-korea-hiroshima-nuclear-test 

131 David Rhode, David E. Sanger, Pakistani Is Said 

to Admit Atom Transfers, New York Times, 1 February 

2004. A1 


133 Levi 23 


135 Wilkinson Isambard, Pakistan PM Yousuf Raza 

Giliani escapes assassination days before key elections, 

The Daily Telegraph website. Accessed online 

December 5, 2008 at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 

news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/2675147/Pakistan-PM-Yousuf-Raza-Gilani-escapes-assassinationdays-before-key-elections.html 

136 Levi 23 

137 Ferguson, Potter 72-76 

138 Ibidem 71 

139 Ferguson 67 

140 Bunn, Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for 

Action, p. vii. 

141 Matthew Wald, Uranium Reactors on Campus 

Raise Security Concerns, New York Times, 15 August 

2004. 19 [Fitzgerald, Amy L. 4] 

142 Cameron, Gavin 3 


144 The Nuclear Loophole, ABC News website. 

Accessed online November 30, 2008 at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/popup?id=3398776 

145 The ABC News Smuggling Experiment – The 

Sequel, Natural Resources Defense Council website. 

Accessed online 30 November 2008 at http://www. 

nrdc.org/nuclear/furanium.asp 

146 Ibidem. 


148 Container Security Initiative, Department of 

Homeland Security website. Accessed online November 

30, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1165872287564.shtm 



151 Oil Tanker, Wikipedia. Accessed online November 

30, 2008 at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 

Oil_tanker 


153 Weapons of Terror, The Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Commission 2006. 60 

154 Weapons of Terror 60 

155 Nuclear Terrorism, Assessing the Threat, 

Developing a response. Accessed online 10 

August 2009 at http://www.csbaonline. 

org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20090422.Nuclear_Terrorism/R.20090422.Nuclear_Terrorism.pdf 

156 Al-Qaeda’s WMD activities, James Martin Center 

for Non-Proliferation Studies. Accessed online 

10 August 2009 at http://cns.miis.edu/other/ 

sjm_cht.htm 


157 Ibidem. 

158 Was Al-Qaeda Working on a Super Bomb, 

CNN transcripts. Accessed online 10 August 2009 

at transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0201/24/ 

se.00.html 

159 Jacek Adamski, Nowe Technologie w Sluzbie 

Terrorystow. (Warsaw: Trio 2007). 85 

160 Adamski 85 


162 Chechen Insurgents to Take Their Struggle to a 

Moscow Park, The New York Times, 24 November 


www.nytimes.com/1995/11/24/world/checheninsurgents-take-their-struggle-to-a-moscow-park. 

html 

163 Kirk Semple, Padilla sentenced to 17 Years in 

Prison, The New York Times, 22 January 2008. Accessed 


nytimes.com/2008/01/22/us/22cnd-padilla.html 

164 Weapons of Terror. (The Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Commission 2006). 73 

165 Ibidem 74 



168 Robert Jonhston, Nuclear Terrorist Incident. 


johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/wrjp1855.html 

169 Samuel Upton Newtan, Nuclear War I and 

Other Major Nuclear Disasters of the 20th Century. 

(Authorhouse 2007). 259 


171 Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nulcear 

Weapons, IAEA Information Cicular. Accessed 

online on 10 August 2009 at http://www.iaea. 

org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf 

172 Ibidem. 

173 Brief Background, United Nations. Accessed 

online on 10 August 2009 at http://www.un.org/ 

Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/ 



175 Ibidem 63 

176 Ibidem 106 

177 Ibidem 63 

178 Ibidem 63 

179 Ibidem 84 

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