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Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia
achieved. From a legal perspective, the hierarchy of laws - even if considered
clear by some experts - remains disputed, and the state authorities continue
to ignore the Autonomy Statute. Gagauzia keeps on ignoring certain
provisions of the Constitution and refrain from updating its own legislative
framework. On the one hand, a lack of capacity on both sides might be a
problem, such as a degree of ignorance, but resistance towards perceived
interference and control from the centre is also apparent in Comrat. While
consensus exists in the expert community and among political representatives
of different backgrounds that a dialogue is missing and that the current
situation should not continue, mechanisms to break the deadlock are not
used, are inappropriate or simply missing. One of the main problems of the
1994 Law is the fact that a facilitation organ was not included: it could play a
role in reforming the arrangements and encouraging political actors to engage
in dialogue and come to solutions, even through informal ways. As the case of
the university entry exams in summer 2011 showed, after the Bashkan and the
Prime Minister met to discuss this issue – preceded by confrontational politics,
orchestrated via the media – a temporary solution was found. While this is a
positive sign, the underlying structural problem was not tackled, and a similar
situation might arise in the future. It also appears that the long practice of
“salami tactics” 269 aimed at reducing the scope of the autonomy is still
followed as the General Prosecutor’s initiative has shown.
In Chisinau, the position remains that the Gagauz elite are unable to raise
the level of the autonomy and visibly improve the protection of their culture
and language. Officially, Gagauzia was fully integrated and as long as it did
not pose any problems it would be considered an ‘exemplary solution’. 270
However, the incentives for the autonomy to integrate in the state remain at
a minimum level, and it raises the question as to whether this is a specific or
a general phenomenon concerning other regions of the country. But even if
so, by agreeing to grant the autonomy, the Republic of Moldova took over
some obligations and the political compromise of 1994 demanded concrete
steps from central authorities, which so far have not been taken. Rather than
understanding the arrangement as a reform process and chance to prove that
Moldova can accommodate its minorities appropriately, the approach towards
the south gives the impression that the autonomy is to some extent only
existent on paper or treated according to a feudal model. Another relevant
aspect, as other scholars foresaw, is the recovery of the central state: it
seemingly made the authorities less willing to cede control through the
269 Protsyk and Rigamonti, “Real and ‘Virtual’ Elements …”, 8–10.
270 A typical official position was, for instance, displayed by Elena Beleacova, Director General of the
Office of Interethnic Relations of Moldova: when asked by UN experts as head of the delegation
about the possibility of Gagauz integrating into Moldovan society, she gave the following reply:
“The delegation said the autonomy granted to Gagauz was the most effective solution arrived at for
the problems faced by its people. The Gagauz were fully integrated in Moldovan political and social
life as their elected authorities were full members of the Moldovan executive and legislative
bodies.” The delegation stated that there was no segregation in relation to the Gagauz. OHCHR,
“Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Considers Report of the Republic of Moldova”, 2
March 2011, at http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10790&La.
www.eurac.edu/edap 40 edap@eurac.edu