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same shall have been served upon the<br />
Authority by the intending plaintiff of his<br />
agent... It is clear that Section 26(1) and (2)<br />
of the NICON Act and Section 97(1) and (2) of<br />
the Ports Act are saying more or less the<br />
same thing. The Court of Appeal considered<br />
Section 97 of the Ports Act and decided not to<br />
follow NPA v. Construzioni Generali Supra.<br />
The reasoning is interesting. The Court of<br />
Appeal said: "...The issue in that case was a<br />
matter of contract which was not explicitly<br />
included and necessitating a pre-action notice.<br />
This case is however distinguishable from the<br />
one under consideration which the provision<br />
of Section 26(2) clearly requires that there<br />
must be pre-action notice to the Corporation<br />
in "any suit" giving no single specification or<br />
exception. Thus the remarkable distinguishing<br />
factor from the case under reference and cited<br />
by the appellant's learned counsel. The<br />
reasoning of the Court of Appeal is wrong. The<br />
issue in this case is also a matter of contract,<br />
a contract of employment. How may I ask is<br />
NPA v. Construzioni Generali supra<br />
distinguishable. The Court of Appeal said that<br />
any suit in subsection 2 of Section 26 of the<br />
NICON Act gives no single specification or<br />
exception, but failed to see and also failed to<br />
explain subsection 2 of Section 97 of the Ports<br />
Act which also has in this case "No suit". "No<br />
suit" and "Any suit" in the context used in the<br />
legislation mean the same thing. I fail to this