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same shall have been served upon the<br />

Authority by the intending plaintiff of his<br />

agent... It is clear that Section 26(1) and (2)<br />

of the NICON Act and Section 97(1) and (2) of<br />

the Ports Act are saying more or less the<br />

same thing. The Court of Appeal considered<br />

Section 97 of the Ports Act and decided not to<br />

follow NPA v. Construzioni Generali Supra.<br />

The reasoning is interesting. The Court of<br />

Appeal said: "...The issue in that case was a<br />

matter of contract which was not explicitly<br />

included and necessitating a pre-action notice.<br />

This case is however distinguishable from the<br />

one under consideration which the provision<br />

of Section 26(2) clearly requires that there<br />

must be pre-action notice to the Corporation<br />

in "any suit" giving no single specification or<br />

exception. Thus the remarkable distinguishing<br />

factor from the case under reference and cited<br />

by the appellant's learned counsel. The<br />

reasoning of the Court of Appeal is wrong. The<br />

issue in this case is also a matter of contract,<br />

a contract of employment. How may I ask is<br />

NPA v. Construzioni Generali supra<br />

distinguishable. The Court of Appeal said that<br />

any suit in subsection 2 of Section 26 of the<br />

NICON Act gives no single specification or<br />

exception, but failed to see and also failed to<br />

explain subsection 2 of Section 97 of the Ports<br />

Act which also has in this case "No suit". "No<br />

suit" and "Any suit" in the context used in the<br />

legislation mean the same thing. I fail to this

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