Erfahrung und Analyse Experience and Analysis - Austrian Ludwig ...

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ZEITLICHKEIT UND BEWUSSTSEIN BEI FRANZ BRENTANO Eduardo Fugali, Graz, Österreich In diesem Beitrag wird Brentanos Auffassung der Verbindung zwischen Bewusstsein und Zeitlichkeit dargestellt, wie sie sich in der mittleren Phase (ca. 1878- 1900) des Denkwegs des Philosophen entwickelt hat. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dem Phänomen der Phantasie bzw. der ursprünglichen Assoziation geschenkt, indem sie die zeitliche Synthese leitet und dadurch das Bewusstsein als inneren Sinn kennzeichnet. ÜBER DIE PHÄNOMENALITÄT INTENTIONALER ZUSTÄNDE Martina Fürst, Graz, Österreich In dem vorliegenden Artikel wird die These vertreten werden, daß ein qualitativer oder phänomenaler Gehalt allen Arten mentaler Zustände zugesprochen werden muß. Meine Analyse wird mit einer kurzen Darstellung dessen beginnen, was ich unter dem Begriff des qualitativen Gehalts verstehe, welcher als die Essenz sogenannter phänomenaler Zustände ausgewiesen werden muß. Sobald eine Charakterisierung der Qualia erarbeitet worden ist, wird eine spezifische Form mentaler Zustände – nämlich die intentionalen Zustände – hinsichtlich eines möglichen phänomenalen Aspekts untersucht und für das Vorliegen desselben argumentiert werden. Die Signifikanz phänomenaler Eigenschaften für intentionale Einstellungen wird sowohl aufgrund einer speziellen Form des Inhalts – des bewußtseinsimmanenten Inhalts – als auch anhand der Phänomenalität der Einstellungsmodi zum Ausdruck kommen. SHARED VALUES AND SOCIAL UNITY Margaret Gilbert, Storrs, Connecticut There is considerable reference to “shared values” in the literature of contemporary political philo. At the same time there has been little esophy as well as in other disciplines and practical contextsxploration of what it is to share values. This paper considers two accounts of sharing values in relation to a thesis that has partisans on both sides – the thesis that sharing values unifies those involved in a substantial, society-constituting way. One of the accounts considered, the simple summative account, is likely to come to mind first. The other is what I call the plural subject account. I argue that those who deny the unifying quality of shared values are right, if they have in mind the simple summative account. Those who accept the unifying quality of shared values are right, if they have in mind the plural subject account. INTENTIONALITY DENATURALIZED Edwin Glassner, Durham, North Carolina In my paper I investigate the ways in which Intentionality can be understood as (1) influenced by a social context and (2) becoming the property of language or collectives. A constructed dialogue between Putnam (“Why Reason 10 Abstracts Can’t Be Naturalized” 1983) and de Man (Allegories of Reading 1979) introduces the problem of methodological solipsism and the related problem of an intentional subject as the origin of utterances. Analyzing the critical tradition which rejects Intentionality as part of the condition of language production, I describe the inverse of the critique of a naturalization of Putnam (Putnam 1983), showing that the problem of collective Intentionality hinges on how strong a notion of individual Intentionality is acceptable, since the strength of this delineation from some social predetermination is central to the problem. Finally, I will try to illuminate that almost any higher-order notion of Intentionality is more problematic than tolerable, since the new “subject” of this sort of Intentionality cannot be specified. A NATURALIZED APPROACH TO THE TURING TEST: IS DNA COMPUTING A WAY OUT OF THE CHINESE ROOM? Rodrigo González, Leuven, Belgium The Turing Test involves an instrumentalist approach to the assessment of intelligence by the emulation of intelligence rather than the verification of its creation. In this respect, Searle’s Chinese Room conclusion is that Artificial Intelligence is doomed to failure if it does not replicate the causal properties that engender mental life. I will argue that DNA computing can bridge the gap between simulating and creating mental life, for DNA can be regarded as the encoded program of life able to selfreproduce and from which adaptive and intelligent behavior arises. DIE ROLLE EINER MULTIPLIKATIVEN WAHRSCHEINLICHKEITSMETHODE (MPE-METHODE) BEI DER GESTALTWAHRNEHMUNG Rainer Gottlob, Wien, Österreich Es wurde die Rolle der Multiplikation der Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten (MPE-Methode) für die Gestaltwahrnehmung untersucht. Diese Methode ist unbewusst, aber nur größenordnungsmäßig durchführbar. Für die Gestaltwahrnehmungen von Personen und von einer Melodie gelangt man durch die (unbewusste) Multiplikation zu Sicherheiten für alle praktischen Zwecke, das sind Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten in Größenordnungen zwischen 10 -10 und 10 -80 .
EMOTION AS PERCEPTION OF BODILY CHANGES: ARE SOMATIC FEELING THEORIES’ EFFORTS IN REUNIFYING THE EMOTION CATEGORY FORLORN HOPE? Verena Gottschling, Mainz, Germany My focus is on theories that understand emotion as perception of bodily changes. The question I am concerned with is whether these James-Lange accounts to reunify the emotion category can be successful or not. Paul Griffiths presented a challenging argument that emotions do not form a natural class, because some basic emotions are modular and others have an essentially different structure. For this reason James-Lange accounts cannot be successful. I argue that this argument does not succeed. THE SELF-PRESENTATIONAL NATURE OF PHENOMENAL INTENTIONALITY George Graham, Winston-Salem, North Carolina Terry Horgan, Tucson, Arizona John Tienson, Memphis, Tennessee The thesis of phenomenal intentionality asserts (1) that all mental states, events, and processes that are immediately accessible to the cognitive subject – including occurrent thoughts and desires that are thus accessible – are phenomenally conscious, and (2) that virtually all phenomenally conscious mental phenomenal – including sensory-experiential phenomena – are intentional. We briefly rehearse some considerations that have previously been advanced in support of each component of the phenomenal intentionality thesis, by ourselves and by others. We then consider a potential form of Cartesian skepticism, directed toward one’s own immediate beliefs about which mental phenomena one is currently undergoing. Why, we ask, does this form of radical Cartesian skepticism get no grip upon people (Descartes himself included)? The answer we propose is that phenomenal consciousness has a self-presentational nature, and thus that a constitutive feature of one’s phenomenally intentional mental phenomena is that one is directly acquainted with them in experience. Immediate beliefs about matters of direct experiential acquaintance are not susceptible to radical Cartesian doubt. ASYMMETRICAL PRACTICAL REASONS Patricia S. Greenspan, College Park, Maryland I want to defend a conception of practical reasons that assigns a different force for action to positive and negative reasons, or what I call “qualifying” and “disqualifying” reasons. A positive or “qualifying” reason, understood as a consideration in favor of some option, does not in itself yield a rational requirement, even in the absence of competing reasons. So reasons as such do not compel, rationally speaking. It is only a serious negative or “disqualifying” reason, as a reason against some option, that it would be irrational to acknowledge as undefeated and yet make no attempt to act on. The positive/negative asymmetry can be explained by a picture of practical reasons as primarily serving to offer or answer criticism of action. In Abstracts the present paper I shall attempt to answer objections to this critical conception of practical reasons that charge it with misrepresenting the phenomenology of ordinary rational choice. MEANING WITHOUT INTENTION Hajo Greif, Graz, Austria According to the programme of teleosemantics, all intentional phenomena are to be subject to a naturalistic explanation in terms of an evolutionary history. A certain version of that programme is defended in the light of a non-deterministic reading of evolution. The thesis is that, firstly, the intentionality – as the meaning – of linguistic forms is not determined by the intentionality – as purposiveness – of the speakers’ minds; speakers’ intentions are one among other environmental conditions for the selection of the functions of linguistic forms. Secondly it is argued that the functions of mental representations and language in general, albeit historically and environmentally correlated, are subject to different regimes of selection, thus to be accounted for each in their own right. WITTGENSTEIN ON MUSICAL EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE Eran Guter, Haifa, Israel Wittgenstein’s thinking on music is intimately linked to core issues in his work on the philosophy of psychology. I argue that inasmuch musical experience exemplifies the kind of grammatical complexity that is indigenous to aspect perception and, in general, to concepts that are based on physiognomy, it is rendered by Wittgenstein as a form of knowledge, namely, knowledge of mankind. CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONCEPT OF NEGATION IN HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY Leila Haaparanta, Tampere, Finland In the analytic tradition, logic has been both a central field of research and a source of tools for philosophical practice. Phenomenologists have usually had a reserved attitude towards using logical tools in philosophy. The present paper pays attention to some of the roles that logic played in early phenomenology. It takes a closer look at the phenomenological roots of intuitionistic logic and studies Husserl’s way of seeking the origin of negation in consciousness. Some remarks are made on the relations between Husserl’s phenomenological analysis and Kant’s transcendental logic. It is concluded that there is no clear answer to the question of whether Husserl wished to revise logic in such a way that it would attend to his transcendental excavations. Still, it seems that analysing consciousness by means of a formal system that has cut off its ties to consciousness would not fulfil the requirements that a phenomenologist sets to philosophy. 11
Page 1 and 2: Erfahrung und Analyse Experience an
Page 3 and 4: IS EVERYTHING NAMEABLE? C. Anthony
Page 5 and 6: DAS VISUELLE ZIMMER PHÄNOMENOLOGIS
Page 7 and 8: BRENTANO UND ARISTOTELES ÜBER DIE
Page 9: VALUE-PREDICATES AND VALUE-PROPERTI
Page 13 and 14: EMOTIONALE AKTE UND MORALISCHE WERT
Page 15 and 16: A DRETSKEAN PREDICAMENT OF INTENTIO
Page 17 and 18: EXPERIENCING THE MEANING OF A WORD
Page 19 and 20: „NICHT ALLES, WAS HUND GENANNT WI
Page 21 and 22: AGAINST WITTGENSTEIN Kevin Mulligan
Page 23 and 24: NORMATIVITY AND SPEECH ACTS: ON ALS
Page 25 and 26: WITTGENSTEIN’S COLOUR BLINDNESS F
Page 27 and 28: EVIDENCE AS A CRITERION. A CRITICIS
Page 29 and 30: PLAIN PHENOMENOLOGY Charles Siewert
Page 31 and 32: A. D. SMITH’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL RE
Page 33 and 34: WITTGENSTEIN’S WAY OF WORKING AND
Page 35: ON THE RELATION BETWEEN METAPHYSICS

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