Erfahrung und Analyse Experience and Analysis - Austrian Ludwig ...

VALUE-PREDICATES AND
VALUE-PROPERTIES
John F. Drummond, Bronx, New York
Husserl’s moral theory stands on two pillars: an account of
evaluative intentionality and an analogy between formal
logic and formal axiology. This paper explores Husserl’s
account of the analogy between formal logic and formal
axiology in order to reveal features of evaluative intentionality.
The analogy appeals to the similarity between the
grammar of “cognitive” judgments and “evaluative” judgments.
However, this grammatical similarity masks important
logical differences that point in turn to important
phenomenological and ontological differences. The paper
attempts to discern these differences by investigating a
series of logical distinctions regarding adjectives, the
“predicates” belonging to the judgments. This investigation
will point to some conclusions about the ontological status
of “value-properties.” More important, these logical and
ontological differences necessarily point to differences in
the manner in which “cognitive” and “evaluative” experiences
disclose their objects. The affective dimension of
meaning involved in judgments of value introduces new
structures into the objectivity, the normativity, and the
“truth” of evaluative experiences and judgments. The
affective dimension of experience transforms not only our
experience but the ontological possibilities at work in the
experienced world.
METZGER, KANT AND
THE PERCEPTION OF CAUSALITY
Maurizio Ferraris, Turino, Italy
Allow me to tell you a true story, related to me by Paolo
Bozzi.
In 1943-1944, Wolfgang Metzger was serving in the army
in Cassino, Italy. One day he went to the toilet in the
barracks where his company was quartered, and when he
was done he flushed the toilet. At that very moment a
grenade hit the barracks, so that Metzger got the
impression that by flushing the toilet he had been the
cause of the disaster. Metzger saw such causality, just as
one sees a chair or a color.
One way to straighten out the whole matter would be to
claim that Metzger had been victim of some kind of optical
illusion. But if we try to look into it more carefully, we
realize that deep in Metzger’s toilet lies a radical attack
against the last stronghold of Kant’s transcendental
philosophy namely the fact that there is at least one thing
which is not in the world but which is supplied by thought,
namely causality.
EINGEBILDETE EMPFINDUNGEN:
WITTGENSTEINS ANALYSE EINES
PHILOSOPHISCHEN ‚TRIEBES’
Eugen Fischer, München, Deutschland
Der späte Wittgenstein behandelt philosophische „Probleme,
die durch ein Mißdeuten unserer Sprachformen
entstehen“ (PU 111), durch Fehlinterpretationen, zu denen
wir systematisch getrieben werden von verschiedenen
„Trieb[en], das Arbeiten unserer Sprache mißzuverstehen“
Abstracts
(PU 109). Anhand einer Analyse von Wittgensteins Untersuchung
des ‚Lesens’ (PU 156-78) soll dieser Aufsatz
erklären, was ein solcher Trieb ist, und wie er den Eindruck
von Problemen erzeugen kann, wo keine sind. Diese
Erklärung der Entstehung und Natur der von Wittgenstein
behandelten (Schein-)Probleme wird die ‚therapeutischen’
Aspekte seines Ansatzes erhellen, die derzeit im Mittelpunkt
der Diskussion stehen (Creary & Read, The New
Wittgenstein, 2000; Ammereller & Fischer, Wittgenstein at
Work. Method in the „Philosophical Investigations“, 2004).
ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION IN
HUSSERL AND WITTGENSTEIN
Dagfinn Føllesdal, Oslo, Norway
Husserl is often regarded as a fundamentalist in epistemology,
holding that we can obtain a priori, infallible
knowledge. Wittgenstein is known for his advocacy of the
opposite view, arguing in Über Gewissheit and other
places that there are no infallible foundations for knowledge.
Wittgenstein proposed instead another way of rebutting
scepticism.
In this paper it will be argued that Husserl was not a
foundationalist in the above sense, but had a view similar
to, but also interestingly different from that of Wittgenstein.
In Husserl’s position, the Lifeworld plays a role similar to
that of a form of life in Wittgenstein. But here, too, there
are interesting differences. It will be argued that several of
these differences go significantly in Husserl’s favor.
IDENTIFYING, DISCRIMINATING OR
PICKING OUT AN OBJECT:
SOME DISTINCTIONS NEGLECTED
IN THE STRAWSONIAN TRADITION
Martin Francisco Fricke, Coyoacán, México
In a strict and philosophically adequate sense of
“identification”, to identify means to say or realise that two
things are the same. Several quotes in Strawson’s
Individuals suggest that Strawson wishes to use the strict
notion of identification where he explains what is
necessary for the understanding of reference. However, it
is artificial and implausible to interpret Strawson’s notion of
speaker-hearer identification in the strict sense. Moreover,
there seems to be an incoherence in the fact that a strict
identification introduces a new reference which has to be
understood in order to understand the identification. Evans
does not use the strict notion of identification. This enables
him to claim that understanding reference requires
identification in the sense of discriminating knowledge.
Picking out is generally equated with distinguishing.
However, this might be wrong. A picking out constitutes a
distinguishing fact; but the picker does not have to be
aware of this fact in order to do the picking.
9