Erfahrung und Analyse Experience and Analysis - Austrian Ludwig ...

AGAINST WITTGENSTEIN
Kevin Mulligan, Geneva, Switzerland
Wittgenstein attempts to show that philosophical ascent
and so philosophical theory are doomed to failure by
making a startingly original use of a number of distinctions
and grammatical reminders. Philosophical ascent is ascent
from ordinary talk and the language of science to talk of
truth, propositions, states of affairs, objects, existence,
values, norms, certainty, essence, possibilities and
properties. Philosophical theory sets out the super-order
between these formal super-concepts and superproperties
(PI §97). One type of philosophical theory is
provided by formal theories of such entities. Wittgenstein
attempts to undermine ascent by displaying the variety of
the starting points for such ascent. Like many of his
German contemporaries, he takes Geist to be a ghost
thrown up by Leben – geistige or seelische processes and
such geistige entities as propositions and concepts are
philosophical myths but also enemies of life. Once the
irreducible variety of human life is brought into focus we
will no longer be tempted by philosophical ascent and
hence by philosophical theory, we will come to see that
“truth” etc. are just words, like other words. But Wittgenstein’s
attempt fails. First, because he often makes use of
what are in fact philosophical theories in all but name.
Second, because reflection on ascent and on the types of
modification it involves shows that “truth” etc. are not in
fact words like other words.
ADEQUACY AND METHOD
Dieter Münch, Berlin, Germany
In order to clarify the relation between phenomenology and
analytic philosophy, the paper distinguishes between two
approaches in philosophy. The one claims the primacy of
method, the other the primacy of adequacy. This correlates
to the distinction between an epistemological methodism
and particularism, which has been introduced by Roderick
Chisholm. Phenomenology and the analytic philosophy of
the Vienna Circle exemplify these two orientations.
The following aspects have, however, to be taken into
account.
In the analytical tradition there is a movement, which
tries to overcome established methods. Example: John
Austin, Gilbert Ryle.
In phenomenology the primacy of adequacy has become
a rejection of methods. Example: Heidegger,
Gadamer.
There are well established methods which are perfectly
adequate for certain fields of objects and problems.
Example: The determination of the relation between
logic and mathematics.
The two orientations can be related to different phases
in the development of sciences. When appropriate
methods are not yet available the primacy of adequacy
will be chosen. This shall lead to the development of
methods and a change in the primacy. The question
arises, however, whether the primacy of adequacy approach
does not remain to be justified, if only because
we have to avoid blind spots.
Abstracts
PHENOMENOLOGY AND LANGUAGE.
SOME REMARKS ON WITTGENSTEIN’S
MIDDLE PERIOD
Volker A. Munz, Graz, Austria
Returning back to philosophy in the late twenties,
phenomenology played an important part in Wittgenstein’s
writings, although only for a few months. In his Some
Remarks on Logical Form probably held in summer 1929,
he introduced fundamental changes of his Tractarian
philosophy. Faced with the problem of colour incompatibility,
Wittgenstein thereby had to concede major errors of
some central ideas, he had elaborated in the Tractatus.
These mistakes were mainly connected with his conception
of elementary propositions as well as with the role
logical analysis played in his early work. In his new
approach, Wittgenstein now stipulated a logical analysis of
our actual phenomena, but only for a short time. After
about six months, he rejected his idea of a phenomenological
language based on the relation between so called
‘primary propositions’ and hypotheses and argued that
expressions concerning our given experience are really
grammatical rules concerning the use of particular words
included in those expressions. This paper tries to reconstruct
some of the main arguments, Wittgenstein
worked out in 1929 and shall contrast them with certain
ideas, he introduced in his Tractatus Logico-philosophicus.
REFERENCE AND MEANING OF ‘I’
Jose Nandhikkara, Warwick, Great Britain
Wittgenstein claimed that as a referring expression, ‘I’ is
redundant. Philosophers were confused to look for a
referent to ‘I’ in body, brain, mind, soul or in other
substantive entities. He wanted to resist the idea that the
self or subject is an entity bodily or ethereal. Wittgenstein
was wrong, however, to assert that ‘I’ does not refer at all.
Because how ‘I’ refers is different from how other words
refer, one cannot claim that ‘I’ does not refer at all. The
referent of ‘I’ is the human being who is speaking or writing
the word ‘I’. ‘I’ ‘is in a class by itself’ (Wittgenstein’s
Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35, pp. 35, 21). Its uniqueness
is shown by its grammatical position, first-person pronoun
singular. Though its use is different from proper names
and other personal pronouns, it is interwoven with them. It
is distinctive of living human beings that we can use firstperson
reference in our thought and language.
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