Erfahrung und Analyse Experience and Analysis - Austrian Ludwig ...

EIN BEITRAG ZU EINER
SYSTEMATOLOGIE DES
WISSENSCHAFTSSYSTEMS
Harald A. Wiltsche, Graz, Österreich
Die wissenschaftstheoretische Diskussion des 20. und frühen
21. Jahrhunderts erweckt den Eindruck, ein Kampf
zweier Wissenschaftskulturen zu sein, ganz so, wie dies
C.P. Snow 1959 konzediert hatte. Die Auseinandersetzungen
im Bereich der Psychologie, der Ökonomie, der Soziologie
und der Geschichtswissenschaft gehören inzwischen
zu den Klassikern der Wissenschaftstheorie und
noch immer haben wir es mit einem Feld höchst unterschiedlicher
Konzeptionen zu tun, die allesamt für sich in
Anspruch nehmen, mehr oder minder große Teile dessen,
was wir das Wissenschaftssystem nennen wollen, erklären
und ordnen zu können.
Der Autor möchte einen Theorieansatz vorstellen, der sich
selbst nicht als eine weitere Facette im Dickicht wissenschaftstheoretischer
Positionen versteht, sondern die
Pluralität bestehender Theorien als Faktum akzeptiert und
vom systematologischen Standpunkt aus hinsichtlich struktureller
Implikationen analysiert.
Zu diesem Zweck wird das 1929 erschienene Werk Die
Anarchie der philosophischen Systeme des österreichischen
Philosophen Franz Kröner vorgestellt, das einen
zentralen Ausgangspunkt für die geplante Systematologie
des Wissenschaftssystems darstellt. Auf dieser Basis wird
nach einer möglichen Kompatibilität zur Phänomenologie
Edmund Husserls und zur Sinntheorie Niklas Luhmanns
gefragt.
SEARLE, BURGE AND
INTENTIONAL CONTENT
Maciej Witek, Zielona Góra, Poland
In his Intentionality John R. Searle develops an internalistic
account of the Intentional content of perceptual acts. Tyler
Burge in his essay “Vision and Intentional Content” argues
that the account is incoherent because there is a mismatch
between Searle’s direct realism and his alleged claim that
we are able to experience our inner experiences. Responding
to Burge, Searle points out that he has never
embraced the latter claim.
In my paper I analyse arguments developed by Searle and
Burge. The conclusions I draw are methodological rather
than substantive. First, there is a general pattern behind
Searle’s responses to Burge and to the scepticism about
perceptual knowledge. What justifies the pattern is the externalist
account of knowledge. Second, Searle’s account
of Intentional content seems to conflict with the doctrine of
privileged self-knowledge.
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Abstracts
THE NORMATIVITY OF INTENTIONALITY
Julie Yoo, Easton, Pennsylvania
Davidson has been instrumental in dampening the prospect
of reductively explaining the mind. The core of his
arguments turns upon his insistence that contentful mental
states, the bread and butter of folk psychology, have a
“normative element.” In spite of its pivotal role, as well as
its intrinsic interest, the concept is very poorly developed
and understood. This paper attempts to discern four different
strands of the normativity of intentionality and to spark
a long overdue systematic examination of a fascinating
and significant thesis.
A MINIMALIST ONTOLOGY OF ACTION
Leo Zaibert, Parkside, Wisconsin
Traditional theories of action tend to presuppose a rather
complicated ontology. Some contemporary attempts succeed
in simplifying the overcrowded ontology. One such
attempt, John Searle’s is defended here, as better than its
alternatives. On Searle’s account, ‘actions’ are simply
states of affairs which satisfy one specific type of intentional
states, intentions. While I applaud Searle’s ontological
parsimony, his theory of action is as incapable of
solving some important problems associated with the normative
assessment of actions as are other theories of
action.
WITTGENSTEIN ON THE FALLACY OF
THE ARGUMENT FROM PRETENCE
Edoardo Zamuner,
Edinburgh, Great Britain – Bologna, Italy
This paper is concerned with the answer Wittgenstein
gives to a specific version of the sceptical problem of other
minds. The sceptic claims that the expressions of feelings
and emotions can always be pretended. Wittgenstein
contrasts this idea with two arguments. The first argument
shows that other-ascriptions of psychological states are
justified by experience of the satisfaction of criteria. The
second argument shows that if one accepts the conclusion
of the first argument, then one is compelled to accept the
idea that pretence is justifiably ascribed on the same evidential
basis, which justifies any other-ascriptions. The two
arguments show that other-ascriptions of psychological
states and pretence-ascriptions share the same evidential
basis. This allows Wittgenstein to say that the sceptic’s
appeal to the possibility of pretence implies a contradiction.