Consumer protection diagnostic study - FSD Kenya
Consumer protection diagnostic study - FSD Kenya
Consumer protection diagnostic study - FSD Kenya
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26 • CONSUMER PROTECTION DIAGNOSTIC STUDY: KENYA<br />
Chapter 10<br />
FORMaL, UnSUPeRVISeD FInanCIaL SeRVICe<br />
PROVIDeRS<br />
10.1 SECTOR OVERVIEW<br />
The [non deposit-taking or “credit-only”] MFIs and those SACCOs unlikely to<br />
be regulated under the SACCO Societies Act are the two main groups of formal<br />
organisations that provide financial services but are not subject to prudential<br />
regulation and supervision. This category, while not prudentially regulated,<br />
are either at least registered already as credit providers with some statutory<br />
authority (e.g., non deposit-taking SACCOs - see chapter 6 - or hire-purchase<br />
companies, which were not included in the <strong>study</strong>) or potentially so (non<br />
deposit-taking MFIs). The number of such organisations providing some kind<br />
of unregulated financial services to low-income populations is unknown in<br />
<strong>Kenya</strong>. Almost all of them are small and their total consumer base does not<br />
appear to be significant. The ten <strong>Kenya</strong>n credit-only MFIs that report to The<br />
MIX Market (www.themix.org) had a combined clientele of around 210,000 at<br />
the end of 2009. SACCOs outside the regulation and supervision of SASRA are<br />
treated in the chapter on the SACCOs because they are subject to their own law<br />
and answer to the Ministry of Cooperatives.<br />
Unregulated consumer credit companies have also entered the market and<br />
appear to be growing rapidly.<br />
10.2 LEGAL, REGULATORY AND SUPERVISION FRAMEWORK<br />
The Microfinance Act assigns responsibility for regulation of the non deposittaking<br />
MFIs to the Ministry of Finance. The MoF has not developed or issued<br />
regulations for credit only MFIs as provided for under section 3(2) of the Act.<br />
10.3 GAP ANALYSIS<br />
The absence of regulation and a supervision agency for this sector reduces the<br />
opportunities for enforcing consumer <strong>protection</strong>s related to transparency, fair<br />
practice, and recourse. As noted above, the MoF does have the authority to<br />
issue regulations, but without supervision capacity to monitor compliance the<br />
effect of any such regulation will be difficult to judge.<br />
As mentioned previously, the consumer surveys reveal that MFI customers (no<br />
distinction between deposit and non deposit-taking MFIs) suffer frustrations<br />
with hidden fees and understanding the terms and conditions of their loan<br />
with a frequency that is only marginally lower than with banks and SACCOs.<br />
The previously referenced MFT APR calculation exercise revealed a widespread<br />
use of flat interest rates, fees, obligatory insurance policies, and obligatory<br />
cash deposit requirements that elevate the effective interest rate well above<br />
the rates that are quoted to clients. Moreover, the level of understanding<br />
about the cost impact of these practices on the consumer varied significantly<br />
among the providers. In general, the MFIs appear to be especially challenged<br />
in understanding the effect of their fees and charges on the total cost of credit<br />
to the borrower.<br />
10.4 RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
The MoF is encouraged to consider the potential benefits of using the<br />
regulatory and supervisory authority granted in the Microfinance Act to<br />
issue regulations for the MFIs that harmonize eventual disclosure and dispute<br />
resolution guidelines with those recommended for the supervised institutions.<br />
This action could be beneficial, even if the MoF does not dedicate resources to<br />
enforcing compliance with the regulations or delegates supervision to sector<br />
regulators or other public agencies. From a policy standpoint, the action would<br />
establish a level regulatory playing field across all formal providers. And in the<br />
MFI sector, there are market forces that may well provide significant incentive<br />
for compliance, even in the absence of supervision. The best of the creditonly<br />
MFIs (who also serve the majority of the sub-sector’s clients) are likely to<br />
comply with the regulations as they prepare to apply for a DTM license. To the<br />
extent they have investors, these funders are also likely to expect adherence to<br />
better practices in client <strong>protection</strong>.<br />
In addition, the Association of Microfinance Institutions of <strong>Kenya</strong> (AMFI)<br />
encourages its members to align their consumer <strong>protection</strong> procedures<br />
with industry-wide practice, through upholding the AMFI voluntary code<br />
of conduct. 49 The code sets standards for good banking and microfinance<br />
business practices while allowing competition and market forces to work,<br />
encouraging higher standards and better service provision. By signing the<br />
code, service providers commit to transparency and disclosure, fair practices,<br />
plain language contracts, financial educate, non-discriminatory behavior and<br />
the establishment of formal and informal dispute resolution channels and<br />
client feedback mechanism. This provides valuable <strong>protection</strong>s for the MFI<br />
clients who are mainly the poor, low-income households and small and micro<br />
scale enterprises.<br />
49 The AMFI Code of Conduct – Setting the standards for Microfinance best practices in <strong>Kenya</strong>, August<br />
2010.