Job Market Paper - Personal Web Pages - University of Chicago
Job Market Paper - Personal Web Pages - University of Chicago
Job Market Paper - Personal Web Pages - University of Chicago
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Kim: Endogenous Choice <strong>of</strong> a Mediator<br />
<strong>of</strong> G δ with respect to the posterior beliefs (¯q 2,i (t 2 ), ¯q 1,i (t 1 )) if and only if:<br />
U j (G δ |t j , Σ(¯q·,i )) = ∑ t −i<br />
¯q −j,i (t −j ){ψ j,i (t j )u j (d 0 , t) + (1 − ψ j,i (t j )) · (ψ −j,i (t −j )u j (d 0 , t)<br />
+ (1 − ψ −j,i (t −j )) ∑ r∈R<br />
σ i (r|t) ∑ d∈D<br />
δ(d|r)u j (d, t))}<br />
≥ U j (G δ , ˆr j , ψ ′ j,i|t j , Σ(¯q·,i ))<br />
= ∑ t −i<br />
¯q −j,i (t −j ){ψ ′ j,i(t j )u j (d 0 , t) + (1 − ψ ′ j,i(t j )) · (ψ −j,i (t −j )u j (d 0 , t)<br />
+ (1 − ψ −j,i (t −j )) ∑ r∈R<br />
σ i (r|t) ∑ d∈D<br />
δ(d|r −j , ˆr j )u j (d, t))},<br />
∀j, ∀t j ∈ T j , ∀ˆr j ∈ R j , ∀ψ ′ j,i ∈ [0, 1].<br />
(T2)<br />
Condition (T2) asserts that player j with type t j should not expect any other report ˆr j or any<br />
other war strategy ψ ′ j,i to be better for him in Gδ than the strategies selected by his σ j,i and ψ j,i<br />
when i vetoes and G δ is played.<br />
Let ¯q = {¯q·,1 , ¯q·,2 } be a collection <strong>of</strong> vote beliefs vectors following any veto by a single player<br />
when the other player votes for ratification. Let Σ(¯q) = {Σ(¯q·,1 ), Σ(¯q·,2 )} denote a corresponding<br />
collection <strong>of</strong> equilibria in the resulting play <strong>of</strong> G δ with those vote beliefs.<br />
Unanimous ratification <strong>of</strong> γ followed by truthful revelation in γ is a sequential equilibrium in<br />
the two-stage ratification game if and only if γ is incentive compatible and γ is individually rational<br />
relative to G δ , that is, there exists ¯q and Σ(¯q) such that for each i and each t i :<br />
∑<br />
¯p(t −i ) ∑ γ(d|t)u i (d, t)<br />
t −i d∈D<br />
≥ ∑ ¯p(t −i ) ∑ γ(d|t −i , ˆt i )u i (d, t);<br />
t −i d∈D<br />
and ∑ ¯p(t −i ) ∑ γ(d|t)u i (d, t)<br />
t −i d∈D<br />
≥ ∑ ¯p(t −i ){ψ i,i(t ′ i )u i (d 0 , t)<br />
t −i<br />
+ (1 − ψ ′ i,i(t i )) · (ψ −i,i (t −i )u i (d 0 , t)<br />
(T3)<br />
+ (1 − ψ −i,i (t −i )) ∑ r∈R<br />
σ i (r|t) ∑ d∈D<br />
δ(d|r −i , ˆr i )u i (d, t))},<br />
∀ˆt i ∈ T i , ∀ψ ′ i,i ∈ [0, 1], ∀ˆr i ∈ R i .<br />
That is, (T3) asserts that player i cannot gain by vetoing the alternative γ (and then going to war<br />
with probability ψ ′ i,i and reporting ˆr i if G δ is played) when t i is his true type and the other player<br />
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