2842/09 - Maryland Courts

counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police.@); Johnson, 348 Md. at 350 (A>[When] an individual in custody
requests an attorney, interrogation must cease until an attorney is present, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.=@) (emphasis
omitted) (citations omitted); Raras, 140 Md. App. at 153-54.
We see no reason to distinguish between the right to counsel and the right to remain silent
on the issue presented in the instant case, namely, whether appellant=s right to remain silent was
violated when appellant invoked his right to remain silent, reinitiated conversation with police, and
the police resumed questioning appellant. Our sister jurisdictions have come to the same
conclusion on this issue. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 564 S.E.2d 192, 195 (Ga. 2002) (holding that
the trial court did not err in admitting the suspect=s statements to police, where the suspect Ahimself
initiated his statement, after previously expressing a different desire, thereby >clearly evincing his
intent not to remain silent=@); Cruz v. State, 715 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(upholding the trial court=s admission of the confessions appellant gave after he invoked his right
to silence because Athe right to remain silent can be waived where a defendant voluntarily chooses
to reinitiate contact with the police@); Jackson v. State, 387 S.W.3d 203, 211 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011)
(holding that because AJackson initiated the contact, [the detective] was not required to honor
Jackson=s earlier decision to remain silent@). Thus we hold that the police may question a suspect
who reinitiates communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police following an
invocation of his or her right to remain silent. What we said implicitly in Raras we now explicitly
hold here.
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