2842/09 - Maryland Courts

Apart from appellant=s testimony, which the trial court found not credible, there is no
evidence that appellant was coerced into reinitiating conversation with the police officers, or that
his statements were otherwise involuntary. Appellant Acontinued to speak nonstop@ after signing
his first advice of Miranda rights form. After appellant reinitiated communication with the police
officers, the police Acut [appellant] off@ and explained that appellant needed to waive his Miranda
rights if he wanted to speak to them. Approximately ten minutes after signing his first advice of
Miranda rights form, during which appellant Awas never quiet@ and A[t]here was never a break in
communication,@ A[appellant] was presented with and signed an Advice of Miranda Rights form
waiving his Miranda rights.@ Thereafter, Sgt. Becker Aopened it up to [appellant] and said at that
point [appellant] was free to tell [the police officers] whatever [appellant] wanted to tell [the police
officers].@ It was then that appellant provided a statement to the officers. Thus the record clearly
supports the conclusion reached by the trial court that appellant=s waiver of his Miranda rights,
after being advised of them a second time, was knowing and voluntary.
In sum, because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, shows that
appellant invoked his right to remain silent, then reinitiated conversation with the police, and
thereafter knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent, the trial court did not err in
denying appellant=s motion to suppress the statements that he made to the police.
II.
Merger
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to merge for sentencing purposes his
conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon into his conviction for felony murder. According
to appellant, the Aunderlying felony of a felony murder conviction is the same offense and not
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