Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul: "De Anima" ii, 1-3

More documents

Recommendations

Info

They characterize soul generally as the generic form possessed by entities of the special type in question. The third definition of soul, as the first actuality of a natural body with organs, focuses on a wider range of entities. Entities characterized by any of the special types of sould defined by reference to collections of organic functions are in focus in this definition. The fourth definition speaks of soul more generally as the type of form possessed by a certain sort of natural body with an internal source of its activity. This definition focuses on certain natural bodies which engage in a certain range of activities but does not tie those activities down to organs. The new definition of II, 2 marks another stage in the process of generalization. It defines soul as the generic form of the type possessed by whatever engages in any life function. Here the functions are neither tied down to organs nor tied down to body. 9. Having attended to those features of the text which support the reading of the definition of II, 1 offered here, we should consider those features which might be thought to go against it. One of these has already been alluded to. At 412 b 4-6 and b 10 Aristotle speaks of one variant of the account of soul in II, 1 as an account which "mentions something common (TL XOLV6V) to every soul" and which "says what soul is in general (xa0o- Xov)". As we have seen, however, these remarks are not inconsistent with the interpretation offered here.39 The generic form of the familiar natural bodies with organs belongs even to the separate intellect and to the prime mover. Aristotle also says at 412 b 6-9 that it follows from his account of soul that we do not need to inquire whether "the soul and the body are one," since an actuality and that of which it is the actuality form a unity in the strictest sense. This does require that any type of soul which is the actuality of a particular body is not separable in toto from that body and that that body is not separable in toto from that soul. But it does not require that no faculty or faculties of such a soul are inseparable from the composite to which they are attached (413 a 3-7), nor that such a faculty could not when separate engage in some life function and be, hence, alive and ensouled (413 a 20-25).40 That "the soul and the body are one" no more requires that every ensouled thing is embodied than it requires that every material object is ensouled. The phrase "the soul" is no more general than its companion, "the body." And the phrase "the body" refers not to bodies in general but to the special bodies of certain particular things (412 b 6-8, 11-17). In the Metaphysics, in language which echoes that in the De Anima, Aristotle claims that in general "the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing" (1045 b 18-19). The unity in view there is just the sort which 270
obtains between soul and body (1045 a 23-33 with 1075 b 34-37). But Aristotle is not claiming there that every form is identical with some proximate matter. He denies that in the very place where he speaks of the form and the matter as one (1045 a 36, f.).41 It is "the proximate matter and its form" which are one (cf. 1041 b 7-9). So when Aristotle speaks in just the same way about soul and body he need only be talking about embodied souls and ensouled bodies. In the subsequent discussion the terms "soul" and "body" are used in a similarly restricted way to refer only to animal soul and body (412 b 27 - 413 a 3 with 412 b 22-25). Aristotle also remarks, at 414 a 19, ff. that: Those who take it that the soul is neither independent of body nor a type of body are right. It is not a body but a type of thing which belongs to a body and, therefore, it exists (in&pXEL) in a body - a body of a particular sort. This too might be taken to go against the interpretation proposed here. But Aristotle is again not taLking about all cases of soul. He is using the term "the soul" here in the familiar sense of "the human soul," as the context makes clear. The "soul" which Aristotle has just been discussing is "that whereby we live and perceive and have understanding primarily" (414 a12-13). This is only one in the series of types of soul which Aristotle is surveying in De A nima 11, 2- the human soul. Aristotle wants to show that this soul is, like the others surveyed there, "a type of thing which belongs to a body."42 Finally, there is Aristotle's suggestion that the intellect and the faculty of theoretical reasoning, being separable from the body, constitute "a distinct kind of soul" (4vxijs y?VOS '?'TEpov, 413 b 26). Some have read this remark to mean that the study of this faculty of soul belongs to a different science altogether than the one whose subject is delimited by the general definition of soul in II, 1.43 If that were so then we would not have to worry over how to make the definition of II, 1 fit the separate intellect. However, Aristotle treats this faculty of soul as one of the parts of the generic entity he is discussing in the very place where he refers to it as a distinct kind of soul. (See r6t XoLrr &0pupa iris 4vxips, 413 b 27-28). He treats it in the same way in DeAnima III, 4 (429 a 10, f.; cf. a 23) and speaks of it there as a type of soul (i voqrIxi [+vx ], a 28; cf. De GenerationeAnimalium 736 b 13-16). If this is so then the definition of II, 1 which mentions something common to every soul must cover it. And the only way allowed by Aristotle to read a definition which makes it intelligible how the account of II, 1 can mention something which belongs to the separate intellect is the way defended above. 10. It remains for us to deal with a rather technical problem concerning 271
Page 1 and 2: Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul
Page 3 and 4: common to every soul (nrL XOLVOV rr
Page 5 and 6: organs.6 This apparent inconsistenc
Page 7 and 8: totle inconsistency, change of mind
Page 9 and 10: ecognize as ensouled).27 It will no
Page 11 and 12: 6. We need now to look more closely
Page 13: ut it exhibits a sufficient and not
Page 17 and 18: doctrine of the Metaphysics require
Page 19 and 20: Aristotle never applies this langua
Page 21 and 22: means "that certain familiar." This

Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul: "De Anima" ii, 1-3

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?