Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul: "De Anima" ii, 1-3

Aristotle's definitions of the soul: De A nima
II, 1-3
ROBERT BOLTON
Just as in public assemblies they are accustomed
to newly introduce a law and if the
law newly introduced is better they abandon
the previous law, so ought one to proceed in
the case of definitions as well and to propose,
oneself, an alternate definition. For if
it is seen to be better and makes the thing
defined clearer it is obvious that the
definition in force will have been abandoned,
since there are not several definitions
of the same thing,
Topics 151 b 12-17
1. It is a philosophical commonplace that Aristotle's definition of the soul
as the form of the body contains an important anti-dualist solution to the
mind-body problem. It is also widely understood that Aristotle was not
entirely unbending in his attachment to an anti-dualist solution of the
problem. He claims in various places that the intellect is not the form of any
type of body and, hence, is capable of existence as a functioning entity
separate from the body. And he is committed to the existence of an
ensouled but immaterial living being, the prime mover, who not only
carries on the psychic activity of thinking but derives the greatest pleasure
from it. Various attempts have been made to either explain away the
doctrines which seem to conflict with the anti-dualist thrust of the
definition or to minimize their importance in Aristotle's most mature
thought. But none of these attempts has yet managed to secure and maintain
significant support.'
I want to offer here a new suggestion for dealing with the problem. My
proposal is that the structure of the familiar definition of the soul as the
form of the body has not been properly understood. When this is correctly
understood, I shall argue, the definition can be seen to be consistent with
the doctrine of the prime mover, with the theory of the separate intellect
and, most interestingly perhaps, with various types of mind-body dualism.
I begin with a consideration of a little noticed matter.
2. The well-known definition of the soul, as the form of a certain kind of
body, in De Anima II, 1, is offered as an account which mentions something
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