Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul: "De Anima" ii, 1-3

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A nalytics II, 10. This is contrary to Aristotle's assertion at 94 a I1 ,ff.(cf. 75 b 31-32) and to other evidence, but it is enough for our purposes in this paper that the definitions of De Anima II, I belong to the type called "conclusions." Here, and in what follows, the discussion draws on the results of "Essentialism and Semantic Theory in Aristotle: Posterior A nalytics 1I, 7-10," Philosophical Review, I 85 (1976); referred to below as ESTA. On the point in question here see ESTA, n. 14. 17 This conclusion is confirmed by the other language used to describe the definition in De Anima II, 2. The definition is said there to merely state a fact ('r bT&) about the soul and not to specify the essence (j alrCat) which explains such facts. This language is used in the Posterior Analytics to contrast nominal with real definitions (93 a 16, ff., 93 b 29, ff.). The definition is also said to give an account of soul which is clearer to us but less knowable in the order of explanation. This language is used to characterize nominal definitions as opposed to other types at Physics 184 a 18, ff. 18 Posterior Analytics, 93 a 16-29 with 93 b 29-32 and 94 a 7-9. 19 The items can change from stage to stage; 93 b 7-14 at 12-14. 20 93 b38-94a9. 21 Some of these definitions give "something of the thing itself' (T axaroi,roe 'fp&yRaros), i.e. an element of the essence of the thing, 93 a 22-24, 27-29 with 94 a 7-9; others give not an element of the essence but only a feature by means of which we grasp the existence of the thing and are pointed to (a knowledge of) the essence (vpbs [-T C8?vai] To Tv kaTL) due to the fact that the feature is exhibitable in a conclusion derivable from the essence (93 a 27-29, a 35-37; cf. De Anima 402 b 21-22). There is a third type of nominal definition, one which mentions merely accidental features of the entity defined (93 b 29-37, cf. 93 a 24-26). But this type can only function as a conclusion of a syllogism or a statement that something is (Tb bTL) in a secondary way (75 b 30-32). So this type is not in play in De A nima II, 1. 22 See 84 a, 11, ff. for the two permissible types of conclusions of demonstrations. The second type could, in principle, exhibit the inherence of a proprium in a thing but Aristotle thinks that such conclusions are very rare (73 a 6-7, 16-20). 23 Nominal definitions are accounts of what some word or phrase signifies (0aiiwve), 93 b 29-32. And signification has two components, reference and a fixing on a kind. (See the uses of ajo.clveLv at 92 b 26-34, 93 b 39-94 a 2 and ESTA, Sec. 7.) 24 93 a 16-29 with 93 b 29-32 and 94 a 7-9, and ESTA, Sec. 6. Cf. n. 26 below. 25 An example of the type of nominal definition which specifies a feature of the essence is 'Thunder(OpovTi) is a certain type of noise in the clouds (4&pos'rs vrqGCv)' (93 a 22-23). This definition does not say that any noise in the clouds would be thunder. It says that thunder is that certain type of noise in the clouds, familiar actual instances of which we recognize as thunder. It says, hence, that something is an instance of thunder if and only if it belongs to the same kind as those familiar actual instances. An example of the type of nominal definition which specifies a proper feature not a part of the essence is 'Eclipse is the failure of the full moon to cast shadows when nothing visible is in the way' (93 a 36 - b 7). This definition refers us to familiar actual cases of eclipse by means of a description which provides us with a sufficient condition for the occurrence of an eclipse. It tells us that something is an eclipse if and only if it has the same essence or cause (adxiTa or &6rt1) as those actual cases of inability of the full moon to cast shadows under a visibly clear sky which we recognize as cases of eclipse. See ESTA, Sec. 9. For another definition of this type see the definition of a citizen at Politics 1275 a 29-33 (with a 33 ff. at b 5-7). 26 The indefinite 'TLS' plays a crucial role in definitions of this type (see 93 a 21-24). It 276
means "that certain familiar." This is made clear by an important passage in the Physics (1, 1, 184 a 16 - b 14, at a 26, ff.) which reveals that initial (nominal) definitions in science are accounts by reference to actual cases of the entity defined which are familiar to us. These definitions focus by means of such a reference onto a certain familiar whole (QXov n). See ESTA, Sec. 7. 27 Here and in what follows I make explicit in parentheses various features of nominal definitions which Aristotle himself normally only brings out in theoretical discussions of definition. See nn. 25-26, Sec. 7 below, and ESTA, Secs. 6-9. 28 In the fourth definition '"oLoa&' (412 b 16) functions as 'fIs' does in the nominal definitions at PosteriorAnalytics 93 a 22-24 to indicate that it is a special sort of body that is in question here (cf. 'roip,& a6paxn, b I 1) and not just any body with an internal source of change. That sort is "the most familiar sort" with an internal source of change and it is the function of the 'roLoo00' to signify this. (Cf. Metaphysics, 1035 b 16 and 1043 a 36, where 'To&6a8E' and 'Tus' play, interchangeably, this role.) So understood the definition does provide a sufficient condition. 29 It is not here assumed that Aristotle ever succeeds in adequately differentiating the innate capacity for motion of living things, especially plants, from the innate impulse to motion (Physics 192 b 18) possessed by al inanimate natural objects. See F. Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World (Ithaca, 1960), 95-102. But the fourth definition of soul leaves open the possibility of a solution. 30 This rules out the reading of 414 a 27-28 in J. Owens, "Aristotle's Definition of Soul," in R. B. Palmer and R. Hamerton-KeUy (eds.) Philomathes (The Hague, 1971), at n. 29. 31 Assuming the primacy of the actuality of a function to the function, as at 415 a 18-20. This step in the argument is not explicit but it is easily supplied. 32 In fact Aristotle's claim at 413 b 24-27 is the stronger claim that "it is likely (Iotxe) that the intellect is a different type of soul, and it alone is separable." That 'IOLXE' has this force is clear from the parallel passage 408 b 18-29 (cf. 430 a 17-25). 33 It might be suggested that the definition of II, I is a nominal definition of the sort that exhibits necessary conditions for the presence of soul. If so, then according to the pattern at Posterior Analytics 94 a 3-9 the new definition of II, 2 would be a combination of the old definition of II, I and what we have been calling the new definition. In that case the correct new definition would be: Soul is the source (&p ii) of any group of the life functions, which source is always possessed (as first actuality) by a natural body which has life potentially. In this case each type of soul would have to be a function of some natural body. But Aristotle denies having claimed this in the very place where he is developing his new definition (413 b 13-16, 24-29). So his new definition can hardly have this form. 34 "Source of life" (&PX. Tow iv, 413 b 11-13 with a 22-25) may seem rather thin and commonplace for a real definition. But Politics 1275 a 38 - b I shows that genera of the type to which soul belongs are very thin in content (cf. De A nima 414 b 28-32) and the real definitions of entities of this type may be quite commonplace (see Politics 1279 a 25-27 with 1278 b 8-10, ff., and for the sort of definition of figure probably in view at DeAnima 414 b 20, ff., see Euclid, Elements I, Def. 14). The account of II, I may also seem rather technical for a nominal definition. But even a relatively advanced account may still be what is "familiar to us" and only nominal. (See the nominal definition of squaring at 413 a 16-19; cf. Politics 1275 a 29-34 and n. 25 above.) 35 Note that the new definition of II, 2 is not defective in this way - another reason for not taking it to be the inferior definition in view at 413 a 11, ff. Cf. n. 4 above. 277
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Page 3 and 4: common to every soul (nrL XOLVOV rr
Page 5 and 6: organs.6 This apparent inconsistenc
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Page 9 and 10: ecognize as ensouled).27 It will no
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Page 19: Aristotle never applies this langua

Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul: "De Anima" ii, 1-3

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