Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul: "De Anima" ii, 1-3

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Anima II, 1-2 to the initial definition of the soul.45 This highlights the importance of the discussion of nominal definition in the Posterior Analytics, since that is the one place where Aristotle explains in a full way what at least one sort of account of this type is like. It also indicates that special care may need often to be taken not to attribute to Aristotle views stronger than those to which he is actually committed - when, as in the case of the famous definition of the soul, what he says only describes the object under discussion "in outline."46 Rutgers College, Rutgers University 1 The standard contemporary attempts to deal with the problem are those of W. Jaeger, who argued that the dualistic doctrines are inconsistent with the anti-dualist definition and constitute an inheritance from Plato which Aristotle never abandoned (Aristotle, 2nd edn., Oxford, 1948, 217-219, 332-34); F. Nuyens, who supposed that the problematic doctrines while not inconsistent with the definition constituted with it for Aristotle a mystery whose threads he could not unravel (L'tvolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote, Louvain, 1948, Ch. VII, especially 317-318); and W. D. Ross, who argued that the dualistic doctrines belonged to an earlier phase of Aristotle's thought and were abandoned by the time of writing of De A nima II ("The Development of Aristotle's Thought," Proceedings of the British Academy, 43 (1957) 65-67). For the standard older views, see the discussion in R. D. Hicks, Aristotle, De Anima (Cambridge, 1907), pp. lxiv-lxix. 2 r4vrc and &xpl0s are standardly contrasted with each other. See H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus (Berlin, 1870), p. 779. Physics 184 a 23-26 shows that xao6Xou is sometimes used like rimy and contrasted with W' &xpOEiaS. See also Prior Analytics 46 a 10, ff., a 28-30. 3 Cf. De A nima 402 b 16, ff The account which gives the akrla is the one which gives the genuine ri bL. This is presumed in the illustration at 413 a 17-20 and is required by the language, as we shall see below. 4 Two other ways of reading the opening remarks of II, 2 deserve consideration. (1) Aristotle is announcing the method which he is about to follow - beginning with matters which are "clearer to us" than the definition of II, I (namely, the accounts of the particular faculties of soul) and working up inductively to a new account which is an improvement on that definition. (See R. D. Hicks, op. cit., p. 322. Hicks was following Simplicius, in De A nima, 96-97 Hayduck). But Aristotle does not produce a new account of soul at the end of his discussion of the special faculties. At the end of II, 2 we have the old definition reaffirmed (414 a 27-28; see below Sec. 6); and there is no new definition after that. And the accounts of the special faculties are not and cannot be derived from any new fully adequate general account of soul as they would be if they were accounts of soul which are "clearer to us." (Such accounts stand to the fully adequate account in the relation of fact to explanation and conclusion to reason, 413 a 11-16). The relation is rather the other way around (see Sec. II). (2) Aristotle is beginning again from an account of soul which is more obvious to us than the definition of II, I and working from that to establish inductively the old definition which is itself "more intelligible in the order of explanation." (So, apparently, Aquinas, in De Anima, Sections 245, ff. Pirotta; but see Section 244.) But the definition of II, I is itself an account "in outline" ('rimy), and 274
Aristotle never applies this language to a fully adequate account. As shown above, an account 'rimr has the features of an account that is "clearer to us" in contrast with one which is "more intelligible in the order of explanation" and one which states the facts about some subject without giving the essence in contrast with one that gives the essence. Moreover, the only new general account of soul offered after II, 1, at 413 b 11-13, is not derived by Aristotle, as it should be on this reading, from the account of II, 1 (nor can it be, since it covers the &pxij of the functioning separate intellect and the account of II, I - taken as a fully adequate account - does not). Again, it is the other way around (see Sections 5-8 below). Also, it would be quite uncharacteristic of Aristotle to start an inquiry with an account which is better known absolutely and then take up an account which is better known to us. This goes against his preaching and his practice (see, e.g., History ofA nimals 491 a 7-14). The reading proposed here accommodates the description of the definition of II, I at 413 a 9-10 and fits the pattern of the discussion of II, 2. It is closest to the reading of G. Rodier (Aristote, Traite de l'Ame Paris, 1900, v. 2, 188-191), though it differs from his in various important respects. 5 This remark is not normally taken as one of the definitions of the soul in De A nima II, 1. But the phrase "of that sort which has . . ." (TOLOV8 FxoVros . . ., b 16-17) specifies the sort of body which ensouled things, as opposed to axes, have. It fills out what the "certain sort of body" (roovw& aqLsa) of b 11 is. And soul is xa%Xov the essence of that sort of body (b 10-11). See, further, below on this. 6 See De Caelo 292 a 20 ff., b 28 f., 290 a 29 ff., 285 a 29. The rendering of owpa 6pyavLx6v (412 b 5-6) as "a body with organs" is standard and 412 a 28 - b 4 strongly supports it. Another possible rendering is "a body which serves as an instrument." (Cf. De Partibus Animalium 642 a 14, ff.) Such a body perhaps need not have organs, but only serve as an organ for, in the case in question, the performance of some vital function. So understood, an amoeba would, perhaps, have a aupa 6pyavLxo'v. But Aristotle does not believe that a living thing can perform active functions without organs which are heterogeneous parts (De Partibus A nimalium 646 b 11. ff.). So the amoeba still poses a problem. And the other problem remains. The stars do not use their bodies or any organ to move (De Caelo 290 a 29, ff.). 7 See 412 a 22-28 with 412 b 17-26 and 417 a 21, iff. 8 These same problems would arise on any attempt to treat the fourth definition as referring to a special type of capacity for self-motion whose possession is necessary and sufficient for the presence of life and soul. Cf. n. 30, below. 9 See also 408 b 18, ff., 411 b 15-19, 413 b 24-27, 430 a 17-23. This claim is found also in the biological works; see De Generatione A nimalium 736 b 27-29, 737 a 7-10. 10 Metaphysics 1072 b 26-27 reaffirms that the activity of the intellect (vovs) is a form of life (twi). And De A nima 29 a 28 speaks of the intellect as a type of soul (h VOq-TLX [iv 'Ix). At 413 a 8 it is soul (sAvxh) simply, in contrast (9,r a 8) to its parts (a 6-7), that is in question. 12 See G. Rodier, op. cit. for a concise report of the views of the older commentators. 13 See n. I above. 14 It is difficult to argue for an early date for De Anima III, 5 as Ross did (see n. 1), given the anticipations of its doctrines in Il 1, 2. Ross himself dropped the suggestion in his commentary (Aristotle, De Anima, Oxford, 1961, pp. 7-12). 15 The commentators are not clear on this. Hicks, for example (op. cit., p. 322), identifies the definition which functions as conclusion with the type which displays the essence. 16 Some have tried to avoid this by introducing a fourth type of definition into Posterior 275
Page 1 and 2: Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul
Page 3 and 4: common to every soul (nrL XOLVOV rr
Page 5 and 6: organs.6 This apparent inconsistenc
Page 7 and 8: totle inconsistency, change of mind
Page 9 and 10: ecognize as ensouled).27 It will no
Page 11 and 12: 6. We need now to look more closely
Page 13 and 14: ut it exhibits a sufficient and not
Page 15 and 16: obtains between soul and body (1045
Page 17: doctrine of the Metaphysics require
Page 21 and 22: means "that certain familiar." This

Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul: "De Anima" ii, 1-3

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