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De Viggiani, N., Daykin, N., Moriarty, Y. and Pilkington, P. and ...

De Viggiani, N., Daykin, N., Moriarty, Y. and Pilkington, P. and ...

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This has received cautious optimism from Third sector organisations (NAYJ 2011; NCVYS 2011;<br />

Griggs 2013), although, as Griggs (2013) has highlighted, small charities <strong>and</strong> agencies are concerned<br />

that they may be disadvantaged in competing for PbR contracts if they struggle to source upfront<br />

funding or to draw client referrals from host organisations. <strong>De</strong>velopment costs for new<br />

interventions can be prohibitive, especially for small providers required to re-orientate their<br />

activities towards measurable outcomes. Furthermore, the National Association for Youth Justice<br />

(NAYJ) has suggested that restricting PbR contracts to a single output of reducing re-offending may<br />

obscure underlying causes of offending behaviour, <strong>and</strong> therefore be perceived as a quick fix for<br />

deep-seated societal problems (NAYJ 2011). Specifically, the NAYJ (2011:3) has argued that that to<br />

link financial rewards to reducing re-offending<br />

“will divert attention from other important developmental, welfare-orientated, milestones.<br />

The wellbeing of disadvantaged children will be subordinated to an arbitrary focus on short<br />

term delinquency.”<br />

In this regard, PbR based contracts may not adequately address health, social or criminogenic<br />

needs that underlie offending. Moreover, heavily regulated criminal justice settings may be difficult<br />

for external, third party agencies to penetrate <strong>and</strong> introduce innovative programmes. Futon <strong>and</strong><br />

Savell (2012) state that PbR contracts are unlikely to be awarded against ‘soft outcomes’, such as<br />

improved resilience, wellbeing or communication, but will be more likely awarded to services who<br />

can demonstrate ‘hard outcomes’; these could include increased youth employment, reduced<br />

custody or reduced re-offending. Successful PbR bidders are also likely to have a good track record<br />

of outcomes orientated interventions, evident through detailed auditing, <strong>and</strong> robust partnerships<br />

with other sectors. For instance, a service to reduce reoffending might involve partnerships with<br />

education establishments, families <strong>and</strong> employers, as well as youth justice providers.<br />

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